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Tag Archives: atomic weapons

Signs of a new kind of war

13 Sunday Dec 2009

Posted by CricketDiane in Cricket Diane C Sparky Phillips

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

atomic weapons, Chairman Putin, cricketdiane, International Concerns, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Russia

Official: Thais detain plane with weapons from North Korea

December 13, 2009 — Updated 0614 GMT (1414 HKT)

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/13/thai.plane.nkorea/index.html

Bangkok, Thailand (CNN) — Thai authorities seized a cargo aircraft carrying tons of weapons from North Korea during a refueling stop in Bangkok, a government official said.

The pilot told Thai authorities the aircraft was headed to Sri Lanka, but its final destination was unknown, according to Panitan Wattanayagorn, a spokesman for the Thai prime minister.

It contained about 35 tons of weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-launched rockets and tubes that may be missile components, the spokesman said.

[ . . . ]

The plane, which was detained Saturday, had five people onboard — four from Kazakhstan and one from Belarus.

[etc.]

Excerpt from:

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/13/thai.plane.nkorea/index.html

***

Iran nuclear scientist ‘abducted by US‘

Page last updated at 18:04 GMT, Tuesday, 8 December 2009
Iran nuclear scientist ‘abducted by US’

Manouchehr Mottaki accused the US of abducting the scientist in Saudi Arabia

Iran has accused the US of abducting one of its nuclear scientists who has been missing since June.

Shahram Amiri disappeared in Saudi Arabia while on a Muslim pilgrimage.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told journalists the Iranians expected the US to return Mr Amiri,

( . . . )

“Based on existing pieces of evidence that we have at our disposal the Americans had a role in Mr Amiri’s abduction,” Mr Mottaki said.

“The Americans did abduct him. Therefore we expect the American government to return him.”

Mr Amiri worked as a researcher at Tehran’s Malek Ashtar University, according to Iran’s state-run Press TV channel.

However, some reports said he had also been employed by Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, and had wanted to seek asylum abroad.

[ . . . ]

From:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8402321.stm

***

Russia-France arms deal
Page last updated at 00:54 GMT, Sunday, 13 December 2009

Russia-France arms deal raises concerns for neighbours

By Alla Lazareva
BBC Ukrainian Service, Paris

Moscow is said to be getting closer to buying from the French a Mistral-class assault warship – capable of transporting and deploying up to 16 helicopters, 13 battle tanks and 450 troops – costing between $600m (£368m) and $750m.

[ . . . ]

Should Paris decide to go ahead with the sale, France would become the first Nato member to have chosen to sell advanced military technology to Moscow.

‘Serious danger’

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin discussed the potential deal during a recent official visit to Paris.

“We are buyers, you are sellers,” he told his hosts.
Nikolas Sarkozy and Vladimir Putin
Mr Putin (right) stressed Russia would use the warship how it wished

“Whoever we buy it from, we will reserve the right to use it where and when we consider necessary.”

And Russian generals have said that, had they had such a warship during the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, they would have been able to reach its shores within 40 minutes – rather than the 26 hours the country’s navy took after setting off from their base in the Ukrainian Crimean port of Sevastopol.

(etc.)

Retired Russian naval officers acknowledge that the Russian navy is in a very poor state.

Rear Adm Blyznyukov, (Serhiy Blyznyukov) says it is unclear how the ship will be deployed

The shipyard, which produced the majority of Soviet aircraft carriers and missile cruisers, is not even Russian; it is in Mykolayiv, in southern Ukraine.

What remains of the Russian navy is estimated to be 20 times smaller than that of the US.

Yet Russian manufacturers themselves oppose the potential purchase from France – suggesting Moscow would do better to invest the money in reinvigorating Russia’s own military industrial complex, which they say has been starved of funds.

Ukrainian Rear Adm Serhiy Blyznyukov, an adviser to the Ukrainian defence minister, said it was not clear whether Russia would deploy a Mistral-class warship to the Black Sea.

The base at Sevastopol, he said, is lacking the required infrastructure – meaning Russia would have to station the warship at the base of its Northern or Pacific Fleets.

But he acknowledged that in the longer term Russia could upgrade and modernise its facilities in Sevastopol.

Another solution for Russia, he said, would be the creation of a new naval base at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where Ukraine hopes the current Black Sea fleet will be based after Russia’s lease in Crimea expires in 2017.

Excerpt from:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8408445.stm

***

(Also from the same site – )

RELATED INTERNET LINKS
BBC Ukrainian
Russian Navy analysis
Nato
Sorbonne university
****

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Iran nuclear weapons program – clandestine nuclear programs, loosey goosey nuclear / atomic materials security for over 40 years around the world –

26 Saturday Sep 2009

Posted by CricketDiane in Cricket Diane C Sparky Phillips

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

atomic weapons, Cricket House Studios, cricketdiane, IAEA, International Concerns, Iran nuclear weapons, New Persia Iran, nonproliferation treaties, nuclear non-proliferation agreements, nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons

When I did a Google search for this –

Iran nuclear missiles 1992

It gives a bunch of other very interesting information –

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/lavizan.htm

including this –

Sources and Resources

  • Iran has up to 4 nuclear bombs By STEVE RODAN Jerusalem Post 09 April 1999 — Iranian Revolutionary Guards official quotes an engineer identified as Turkan as saying that the nuclear warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
  • IRAN HAS FOUR NUCLEAR BOMBS ICEJ NEWS SERVICE April 9, 1998 — Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them. In 1992 the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
  • Missile Threat from Iran By Kenneth R. Timmerman Reader’s Digest January 1998
  • Aerospace Industries Organizations Homepage

(from that site)

***

[And – ]

Iran Missile Facilities

Bandar Abbas

Subordinate to: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy Command.

Other Names:
Bendar Abbas

Location:
Latitude 27° 11′ North; longitude 56° 16′ East; 1078km southeast of Tehran; province of Hormozgan

Primary Function:
Testing, assembly, manufacture, and upgrade of Chinese-built cruise missiles such as the HY-2 Seersucker and C-801 Sardine. Reportedly, it also has built a land-based missile launch site.

Description and Activities:
The city of Bandar Abbas is one of Iran’s major ports. It is located 1078km southeast of Tehran in the province of Hormozgan. Bandar Abbas hosts a missile site overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy Command. The Chinese built this facility in 1987. The facility assembles and extends the range of Silkworm missiles, modifies Seersucker missiles, and manufactures rockets. The Chinese may be assisting the IRGC in extending the range to 400km. Bandar Abbas also is believed to host a launch site with three to six launchers for the land-based Silkworm.

As a port, Bandar Abbas is a major point of delivery for missiles, weapons components, and conventional arms to Iran. In February 1992, North Korea transferred 80 Scud missiles to Iran and an additional 30 to Syria, via Bandar Abbas. US attempts to intercept this missile shipment were unsuccessful. In the spring of 1992, the North Korean ship Dae Hung Ho also delivered missile parts to Bandar Abbas before they were flown to Syria

In 1996, Iran purchased 10 more Houdong fast-attack craft (FAC) from China, some of which are deployed near Bandar Abbas. These craft are equipped to fire Saccade C-802 missiles. The precise number of C-802s purchased by Iran is not known, but sources believe Iran has armed approximately 20 FAC with Saccades. In January 1996, Iran reportedly test fired a Saccade missile, causing the United States to reassess Iran’s potential threat to shipping in the region.

Bandar Abbas also hosts Kilo class submarines delivered by the Russians, reportedly armed with missiles.

Key Sources: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iran’s Missile Development,” in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds. The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier’s Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 66; John Pike, “Bandar Abbas,” <http://www.fas.org&gt;; Anthony Cordesman, Threats and Non-Threats from Iran (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995); “Iranian Commentary Calls US Claims of Missile Test ‘Propaganda’,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 31 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960131000346, 31 January 1996; Reuters, “US sees threat to Gulf shipping from Iran missiles,” Financial Times (London), 31 January 1996, p.8; via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com&gt;; “Second Sub for Iran,” The Washington Post, 4 August 1993, p.A12; via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com&gt;; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Evolving Conventional Military Forces, Working Draft (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 February 1996); Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000); “Navy on Alert Since Arrival of Korean Freighter,” Sawt Al-Kuwayt Al-Duwali (London), 12 March 1992, pp.1, 11; in Proliferation Issues, 26 March 1992, pp.32-33; Melissa Healy, “Suspect Vessel Eludes US Net, Docks in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1992, p.A1, A9; “Rafsanjani’s Bomb,” Mednews, 8 June 1992, pp.1-5.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4099.html

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Abu Musa Island
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Aliabad
Arak
Bakhtaran
Bandar Abbas
The Instrumentation Factory Plant or Department 140/16
Farhin
Garmsar
Gostaresh
HASA
Isfahan
Karaj Missile Development Complex
Khoramabad
Kuhestak
Manzariyah
Mashhad
Parchin
Qeshm Island
Qom
Sanam College
Semnan
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Shahroud
Shiraz
Sirjan
Sirri Island
Tabas
Tehran

Maps
WMD411: U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
Issue Brief: IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
Issue Brief: IAEA Board Deplores Iran’s Failue to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
Issue Brief: Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
Issue Brief: The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
Issue Brief: WMD in the Middle East
Treaties and Organizations
NIE: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (2007)
CRS: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2007)
In Focus: IAEA and Iran
FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide
Survival: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme (2006)
The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2004)
Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: A Profile (1998)
Iran and CBW (1998)

***

Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development

by Koji OSHIMA

Senior Research Councilor, DRC

Introduction

Since 1987 when a former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu told London’s newspaper Sunday Times that Israel had been producing nuclear warheads, Israel has been recognized as a de facto nuclear state. About 10 years later, in May 1998, India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices, and declared that they became the sixth and seventh nuclear state. What country will be the next nuclear state? Iran would be one of the candidate states. Iranian nuclear weapons development is reviewed and briefly discussed here.

1. Strategic Environment

Iran borders on the west frontier of Iraq, with which Iran competed the hegemony in the West Asia. In the east is Pakistan, which has already tested nuclear devices. In the north is Caspian Sea, the north bank of which is a nuclear state, Russia. In the south is Persian Gulf, where strong U.S. naval fleets are always present. Across the Gulf is Saudi Arabia, where several huge U.S. military bases are located. Furthermore Israel, the common enemy of Arabian countries with nuclear arsenals, is only 1,000 km apart from Iran. The Khomeini Revolution caused U.S. to sever diplomatic relations with Iran, and its international isolation still remains.

Iran joins following international organizations for control of weapons of mass destruction; as a member state of Partial Test Ban Treaty (1964), NPT (1964), and Seabed Treaty (1971). It signed Outer Space Treaty (1967) (not ratified) and Safeguard Agreement with IAEA (1964). But Iran is excluded from Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, NSG, Zangger Committee and Organization of the Islamic Conference.

2. Natural Resources and Industries

(1) Natural Resources

Iran is a major producer of oil. At the end of 1999, 93 billion barrels of reserved oil and 25 trillion m3’s of natural gas were reportedly estimated. 5,000t of reserved uranium ore is also estimated in the dessert of the Iranian Heights. Reserved iron ore is estimated at 1.2 billion tons. Iran abounds relatively in copper, zinc and lead, but thorium, lanthanide elements, lithium and beryllium are not known of their reserved amount.

(2) Basic Industries

Oil is produced 3.79 million barrels per year and refined 1.52 million barrels per year. Oil field survey, oil well drilling and oil-refinery plant building were used to be conducted with economic and technical assistance from foreign countries, but Iran recently conducts them by itself. Natural gas is produced 90 billion m3 per year. Petro-chemical products are produced per year as follows: chlorine 240,000t; Ammonia 1,422,000t; urea 1,758,000t; nitric acid 386,000t; sulfuric acid 960,000t; ammonium nitrate 254,000t; sodium hydroxide 33,000t; and phosphoric acid 240,000t.

Iran has more production capabilities than developing countries in the area of electric and electronic industries.

(3) Nuclear R & D Laboratories

Major R & D laboratories for a nuclear development are the Teheran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).

TNRC is officially assumed as a research facility, but reportedly it also produces nuclear-weapon related materials. TNRC has a 5MWe research reactor, which was provided by U.S., and the reactor is officially reputed to be used for production of radioactive isotopes. The reactor changed its fuel rods to 20% enriched uranium rods made in Argentine. TNRC reportedly has a plutonium extraction plant, but there are some articles, that denied it. TNRC also has a uranium conversion facility, where crude uranium refined at the Sagham Mines Complex or at the Yadz University Nuclear Research Department, is converted into yellow cake. There are sufficient evidences to certify the presence of the facility, but the facility reportedly have not operated for a while. If yellow cake was produced here, it would be sent to the Fasa/Rudan Research Center in order to convert into uranium hexafluoride, and then would be sent to the Mo’allem Kalayeh facility in order to manufacture enriched uranium fuel rods for a reactor.

At the Ibn-e Heysam Laser Technology Center, the subsidiary organization of TNRC, uranium Laser enrichment and the inertia-confinement fusion are studied.

ENTC was established by the Ayatollah Khomeini Regime in 1984, just in the midst of Iran-Iraq war with a strong intension of nuclear development. ENTC is officially assumed as a research center, but it is regarded as the de facto center of the nuclear-weapon development. ENTC has a 27 kW miniature neutron source reactor, two sub-critical reactors, and four research reactors, employing about 3,000 workers. Furthermore, there has been a rumor afloat that ENTC has a 27MW plutonium production reactor, but the rumor may be some confusion as to a 27 kW miniature neutron source reactor. ENTC also has a China-made Calutron, but it is said to have no enrichment capability because of its non-corrosion resistance. But it is evident that it produces isotopes for medical treatment at least. There has also been a rumor of a conversion facility here, where uranium was converted into uranium hexafluoride, but some evidences suggested that the conversion facility was located at the Fasa/Rudan Research Center. ENTC also has a zirconium manufacturing facility, where zirconium cladding tubes for reactor fuels are manufactured.

Other nuclear R&D laboratories are the Laser Research Center, the Theoretical Physics & Mathematics Research Center, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Complex, the Gorgan Al Kabir Nuclear Center, the Tabriz Laboratory, and the Bonaz Atomic Energy Research Center.

At the Laser Research Center an atomic Laser enrichment is presumably studied. At the Theoretical Physics & Mathematics Research Center high energy physics, elementary particle physics, theoretical nuclear physics, and statistical mechanics are presumably studied.

(4) Nuclear Reactors

Since 1967 when Iran introduced a 5MWe research reactor from U.S., Iran has been making steady efforts to construct nuclear power plants for civil use. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was established 1975, and then a nuclear power plant construction was started at Bushehr with the aid of a West German company, Siemens, and a French company. But the Islamic Revolution stopped the construction in 1979, and the plant was severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq war. After the war Iran tried to tap Germany for reconstruction of the plant, but in June 1991 Germany refused it because of possible military use. In January 1995 Russia made a contract of constructing two Russian light water reactors at Bushehr, where the broken plant was constructed. One of them is supposed to start operations in December 2003. Iran reportedly introduced several small research reactors from China. All these were for peaceful use, but the steady introduction of nuclear reactors and introduction of construction/operation technology have caused a suspicion of nuclear-weapons ambition to Western countries, especially U.S.

Iran has five confirmed research reactors, one power reactor under construction, one power reactor planned, and three unconfirmed reactors. All of them were imported and constructed. Table 1 shows Iranian nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, and under contemplation.

Table 1 Iranian nuclear reactors in operation,

under construction, and under contemplation

Location

Type and Performance

Completed

IAEA’s Safeguard

TNRC*1

LWR, HEU(20%)

5MWe

1967

1980’s modified

Yes

ENTC*2

MNSR*3, HEU(900g), 27kW

1969

Yes

ENTC*2

HWZPR*4, natural uranium

Operating, Provide by China

No

ENTC*2

LWSCR*5, LEU

Operating, Provide by China

No

ENTC*2

GSCR*6

natural uranium

Operating, Provide by China

No

BNC*7,No.1

VVER-1000, LEU

1,000MWe

Scheduled

May 2003

Planning

BNC*7,No.2

VVER-1000, LEU

1,000MWe

Scheduled

2007

Planning

Tabas

Not identified

unconfirmed

―

Nekka

Russian Type, LEU

400MWe, underground

unconfirmed

―

Nekka

Russian Type, LEU

400MWe, underground

unconfirmed

―

*1 Teheran Nuclear Research Center

*2 Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center

*3 miniature neutron source reactor

*4 heavy water zero power reactor

*5 light water sub-critical reactor

*6 gas-cooled sub-critical reactor

*7 Bushehr Nuclear Complex

3. Motivations and Acquisition Processes of Iranian Nuclear Development

Iran may have four motivations of nuclear development: ①to have a deterrent to Iraqi conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction, ②to have a measure of lessening American influences to the West Asia, ③to have a countermeasure against Israeli conventional forces and nuclear forces, and ④to have a symbol of an Asian great power.

Iraq is the sworn foe, to which Iran fought several times for hegemony in the West Asia. Both countries launched chemical weapons each other during the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from September 1980 to July 1988. UNSCOM found out not only chemical programs, but also nuclear and biological programs through its inspection to Iraq after the Gulf War. These facts are supposed to lead Iran into development of surpassing weapons including nuclear weapons as a natural consequence.

The U.S. attacked Afghanistan in retaliation for the multiple terrorism on September 11th 2001, and by chance the U.S. could establish military bases in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The military presence in the area considerably strengthened U.S. influences on the West Asia. The region leads the world in oil production. A powerful U.S. influence over the region is a major issue for Iran, because petroleum is the primary industry of Iran. The U.S. has implemented economic sanctions against Iran since 1979. Iran must find some ways of dealing with the sanctions. A nuclear weapon is an extremely valuable measure of lessening U.S. influences over the West Asia.

Israel has the strongest conventional forces in the Middle East and it was recognized as a de facto nuclear state, even though the country itself made it ambiguous. The conventional forces and the nuclear weapons seem to back recent Sharon’s bullish behavior against Palestinians ignoring world’s public opinions. It is a common Arabian objective to have nuclear weapons as a countermeasure against Israeli nuclear weapons. Iran naturally hopes to develop nuclear weapons, even if the country is not a member state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

A nuclear weapon is a status symbol of a big power. Iran is isolated from international community in one way or another. Hence it is natural to attmpt nuclear weapons development as a breaking –through measure of the situation.

Iranian acquisition processes of a nuclear weapon are supposed as follows: ①illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union countries, ②indigenous development of nuclear weapons through secret purchase of nuclear materials, ③indigenous development of nuclear weapons supported by Russia and/or China, and ④indigenous development by Iran own.

In 1992 Russia was designated as the successor to the Soviet Union, which was authorized to have nuclear weapons by NTP. On the other hand Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, where nuclear weapons had been deployed, became non-nuclear states. Thus all nuclear weapons out of Russia should have been transferred to Russia and put under the Russian control. But confusion in Russia lasted long time and it made Russian managing ability questionable. Rumors were in the air that some nuclear weapons of former Soviet Union were missing and a part of them passed into Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.

The de facto nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel were said to have developed nuclear weapons using so called “reverse engineering”, which was indigenous engineering simulating purchased materials and equipment. The former Soviet countries are eliminating or cutting down nuclear weapons, thus nuclear materials, equipment, and technicians are in excess. These materials and technicians are said to have turned to the black market. There are many reports on newspapers that such black-market materials are confiscated by the customs in European countries. Therefore, such materials possibly flow into Iran.

Russia and China collaborate on nuclear development for peaceful use with Iran making a nuclear agreement respectively. 1992 Iranian nuclear technicians visited a nuclear-weapon related factory in Kazakhstan. In January 1995 the Russia-Iran nuclear reactor agreement was signed. In January 1999 the Moscow Aerospace Laboratory and two other Russian laboratories were accused of providing Iran nuclear technologies and were boycotted in business by the U.S. government. China used to be the main provider of nuclear technologies since 1985, and made an agreement to provide Iran with two reactors 1992. But China cancelled it 1995 yielding to the U.S. pressure. However, these kinds of collaboration will possibly occur in the future.

4. Indication and Analysis of Iranian Nuclear Program

The Iranian government has repeatedly denied her intention of developing nuclear weapons. But a U.S. agency confirmed that Iranian technicians visited the Ulba Metallurgical Plant at Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan in 1992, where a fast breeder reactor was operating and fuel rods were manufactured and spent fuels were reprocessed. The “Nuclear Fuel” (Dec. 5th, 1995) reported that the U.S. bought 650kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in 1995 to prevent Iran from obtaining the HEU. The ”Nucleonics Week” (Sep. 22nd, 1996) also reported that Russia promised Iran to sell 2,000t of natural uranium in accordance with 1995 Russia-Iran nuclear agreement. Therefore, Iran seems to have had no capability of extraction and refinement of uranium at the point of 1996.

Washington Times (Apr. 17th, 1996) reported that Iran had been constructing a conversion facility at Esfahan with a Chinese assistance since about 1990, where yellow cake was converted into UF6. Chinese assistances were stopped in March 1997 yielding to the strong U.S. pressure. But possibly Iran had already obtained necessary materials and basic technologies of yellow cake conversion. Iran had reportedly tried purchasing materials necessary for conversion several times.

The “Nuclear Fuel” (Apr. 10th, 1995) reported that some Iranian subsidiary company sometimes had tried to buy samarium-cobalt magnetic rings for a balancing machine and/or a bearing of a centrifugal separator of a laboratory scale from German and Swiss companies since 1990. The magazine (May 8th, 1995) also reported that Russia agreed to provide Iran with centrifugal separators in March or April 1995. But Reuter (Feb. 23rd, 1996) reported that President Yeltsin and President Clinton met May 10th, 1995, and agreed that Russia would cancel the agreement with Iran and remove the centrifugal separators. Thus, Jane’s estimated that Iran has crude centrifugal technologies, but Iran has little capability to manufacture essential parts of a centrifugal separator such as a UF6-resistant rotor, header, and scraper, because Iran imported these items. The major research in Iran may be located in some laboratory in the Ghazvin military base.

Little information is available as to Iranian Laser enrichment technologies. Russia agreed to provide the Laser Research Center of the Iranian Atomic Organization with the atomic Laser enrichment method; thus Iran may mainly study the atomic Laser enrichment method. But import of Laser equipment and uranium metal vapor generators are essentially required to complete the method. The atomic Laser enrichment technology may be studied at the Ibn-e Heysam Laser Technology Center and the Laser Research center.

There is unconfirmed information that Iran also studies electro-magnetic enrichment at the Karaj Agricultural & Medical Research Center, using a China-supplied Calutron and a Belgian Ion Beam Application Cyclotron.

Britain disclosed that its customs found a small amount of maraging steel usable for centrifugal separators shipping for Iran, and then stopped the cargo from departing. That made the suspicion of Iranian nuclear development rise to the surface. The CIA director John M. Deutch testified at the congress hearing that “Iran made active efforts to obtain indigenous capabilities of developing nuclear weapons, and the focus was on the production of plutonium and HEU. In order to shorten the development term, Iran also tried to import nuclear materials from former Soviet countries as well.” An American high official told on December 19th, 1997 that China had intension to stop selling a UF6 production plant. His words brought to light the Iranian intention of uranium enrichment.

An Israeli newspaper reported in April 1998 that Israel had received an Iranian document that indicated Iranian obtainment of several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet country. The paper also reported that Iran had received four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan, and the warheads had been maintained by Russian nuclear specialists. But just after the report, the DOD spokesman denied them, saying that there was no evidence.

A British newspaper reported on April 24th, 1998 that Iranians were arrested on the charge of purchasing nuclear-weapon related materials and technologies in Britain. What the nuclear-weapon related materials and technologies meant is not clear.

On January 12th, 1999 the Presidential Aide Burgher made a speech that three Russian laboratories were accused of collaborating with Iran on development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and they were imposed sanctions of banning trade and assistance. They were the “Electric, Science, Technology and Design Laboratory”, the “Mebdeleev Chemical Technology University”, and the “Moscow Aerospace Laboratory”.

In March 2000 Czech government announced that Czech would not permit a manufacturer the export of ventilators in production for an Iranian nuclear reactor. This means that Czech entertains apprehensions upon Iranian extraction of plutonium from spent fuels.

In June 2001 the Washington Post reported that a Russian metallurgical company had exported high-tensile aluminum alloy to Iran that could be usable for a rotor of a centrifugal separator of uranium enrichment.

Thus, Iran still needs foreign assistance to enrich uranium.

With respect to atomic affairs, Russia and Iran increasingly work in closer cooperation. In April 2000 Ministry of Russian Atomic Energy, Adamov, asserted at the executive council held in Snezhinsk (former Chelyabinsk) that Russia had intention to export Iran three more reactors. President Putin, who served as the chairman of the meeting, acknowledged the Minister’s words. Recently Iranian dependence upon Russia seems to be increasing. But on March 7th, 2000 the Czech Lower House passed the expert ban of military critical items, thus Czech manufacturer ZVVS could not provide Iran with equipment for the Bushehr nuclear plant. And so, Iranian nuclear development has not being progressing on schedule. Regarding these factors, Iran seems not to possess, not only capability of constructing a nuclear reactor as a whole, but also manufacturing a turbo alternator and other equipment for a nuclear plant.

Taking these facts above into account, the followings could be said.

① Iran explicitly has the intention of nuclear armament.

② Iranian nuclear programs are progressing step by step since the end of Iran-Iraq war in July 1988.

③ Iran has not attained self-sufficiency in its nuclear fuel cycle at the end of July 2002.

④ Iran has to import most of the materials and the technologies for a nuclear weapon from foreign countries such as Russia and China.

From other information sources, the followings are estimated.

① Iranian development & production programs of nuclear weapons are integrated into civilian nuclear development & production, which is conducted under the direction of the Nuclear Power Organization.

② Iranian nuclear programs seem to be mainly conducted by the Nuclear Power Organization under the strong influence of the Revolution Guard Corps (Pasdaran), and agencies of Pasdaran cooperate with subordinates of the Nuclear Power Organization.

③ Most of Iranian nuclear-weapon related companies are national enterprises under the Islamic Foundation.

5. Conclusion

As mentioned above, there are four ways for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons: ①illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons from former Soviet Union countries, ②indigenous development of nuclear weapons through secret purchase of nuclear materials, ③indigenous development of nuclear weapons supported by Russia and/or China, and ④indigenous development by Iran own.

Iran will be a nuclear state, when Iran illegally acquires a nuclear weapon, whether Iran can use it properly or not. But at the end of July 2002 Russia has been more stable than in 1990’s. Furthermore the U.S. gives economic and technical assistance to ensure the control of Russian nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar Act (Public Law 102-228). Therefore the possibility of illegal acquisition of nuclear weapon is quite low.

If Iran secretly obtains nuclear-related materials, it will take 1-3 years to complete manufacturing a nuclear weapon, depending upon kinds and quantity of the materials acquired. But after the Gulf War, the Nuclear Supply Group reviewed the London Guidelines and Warsaw Guidelines in detail, hence, the possibility for Iran to acquire nuclear materials becomes lower.

If Iran develops a nuclear weapon secretly with assistance from foreign countries such as Russia and China, it will take 5-10 years to have an atomic bomb. China seems to retreat its assistance to Iran, but Russia appears to assist Iran aggressively in the area of peaceful nuclear development. Hereafter the relationship between India and Iran in the area of an atomic power should be focused on carefully.

When Iran develops a nuclear weapon by its indigenous technologies, it will take 10 years or more. But since this will be the worst case for Iranian to be a nuclear state, Iran will try to avoid it as much as possible.

Here I conclude that Iran will join a nuclear club within 5-10 years, if the present situation continues. Recognizing Iranian natural resources and industries, it is very hard to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, even if the development of a nuclear weapon could be retarded by export control and/or a public opinion of the world. The only way of prevention is to make an environment, where Iran realizes that its nuclear armament is not the best policy.

○ Biographies of authors

○ Contents

http://www.drc-jpn.org/AR-6E/ohshima-e02.htm

DEFENSE RESEARCH CENTER (DRC)

Japan

***

However by early March 2004, Iran faced criticism for failing to disclose parts of its nuclear programme in a resolution drafted at a meeting of the UN nuclear watchdog. According to the IAEA’s report Tehran failed to reveal sensitive research in a declaration submitted last October. The report singled out Iran’s failure to declare that it was researching advanced centrifuge designs, known as P2, capable of producing highly enriched uranium. In early March, Iran first banned IAEA inspectors after the agency issued a resolution accusing Tehran of secret nuclear activities but later claimed the cancellation of the inspectors visit was due to “technical problems” and agreed to their to return. All this at a time when the United States is keen to accuse Iran of developing a secret weapons programme and wants the IAEA to declare the country in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There is little doubt amongst the scientific community that Iran’s uranium enriching programme and centrifuges buried underground belie the regime’s claims that its nuclear programme is “entirely for peaceful purposes”. When IAEA inspectors first found enriched Uranium in Iran’s nuclear deposits, the government claimed that this was an accident caused by contamination, and even blamed imported equipment for this contamination. However the quantity and quality of enriched uranium found in Iran contradicted these claims. Of course enriched uranium can be used for commercial reactors (as can plutonium). But NPT countries are not supposed to enrich uranium without mandatory IAEA inspections because of its potential for “dual use”.

To make a bomb that will be carried in a missile you need 25kg of highly enriched uranium or 8kg of plutonium. Natural uranium contains less than 0.1% of fissile material. This fraction needs to be increased to 20%-90% to make a weapon. This “enrichment” is what the centrifuges do.

The other route to a nuclear weapon is to create fissile uranium or plutonium in a reactor and use chemical processing to extract it – this is what is done at Sellafield, UK. A number of counties, including France, reuse enriched uranium and plutonium from reprocessed fuel in reactors. The idea is that they are then independent of sources of natural uranium as the “breeder” reactors create more fissile uranium and plutonium than they consume. Iran enriches Uranium above 20 %. This is precisely what can be used for nuclear weapons.

http://www.iran-bulletin.org/IBMEF_1_word%206%20files/atom_rev.htm

(A statement from a person with interesting insight and many good facts.)

***

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg

Map shows Iran as (grey) signifying “suspected clandestine programs” on Nuclear Weapons Status 2005 Map – includes a chart of numbers

Map of Nuclear Weapon States 2005 - includes Iran as suspected of clandestine nuclear weapons programs - Carnegie Endowment

Map of Nuclear Weapon States 2005 - includes Iran as suspected of clandestine nuclear weapons programs - Carnegie Endowment

[from -]

Deadly Maps

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/deadlymaps.cfm

Deadly Maps view detail comment email this

<!–   (view record) –> This site provides images of “the complete collection of maps from Carnegie’s, ‘Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats’. … The first five maps reflect the worldwide proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their missile delivery systems. The country maps show the major nuclear installations, both civilian and military, in each country.” Includes maps of Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, Pakistan, Libya, Israel, and other countries. From the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/deadlymaps.cfm

[from – ]

http://lii.org/pub/subtopic/3584

(and also found on the deadly maps site)

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/iran.jpg

Iran Deadly Arsenals 2005 Map from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Iran Deadly Arsenals 2005 Map from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

5,000 tons of uranium reserves – Uranium mining – Iran

***

Issue: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

Document Eight: Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Livermore, “Summary Report of the NTH Country Experiment,” W. J. Frank, ed., March 1967. Original classification: secret. [extract of heavily excised document]

This report describes an experiment that took place at a time when policymakers wanted to know how difficult it would be for a non-nuclear power to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory paid two newly-minted physicists, with no access to or knowledge of classified information, to “produce a credible nuclear weapons design.” After three “man-years”, the two physicists had a design for an implosion nuclear weapon. The report’s conclusions remain classified, but apparently the experiment was a success: it showed that any capable physicist could design a nuclear weapon.

[Page 1] [Page 2] [Page 3] [Page 4] [Page 5] [Page 6] [Page 7] [Page 8] [Page 9] [Page 10] [Page 11] [Page 12] [Page 13] [Page 14] [Page 15]

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html

***


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Non-Proliferation requires more than knowledge, talk, willingness to sit down at the table – It requires mutual respect, and a really, really, really big stick –

06 Monday Jul 2009

Posted by CricketDiane in America - USA, Creating Solutions for America, Creating Solutions That Work, Cricket D, cricket diane, Cricket Diane C Sparky Phillips, Cricket House Studios, cricketdiane, Democracy, Designs, diane c phillips, Information Systems, Intelligence, International Concerns, Inventing Solutions For America, Reality-based Analysis, Statistical Analysis, Systems Analysis, Thoughts, Twenty-first Century, Uncategorized, United States of America, US Government, Workable Solutions

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

atomic weapons, China, European Parliament, India, Iran, Middle East, non-proliferation, North Korea, nuclear non-proliferation agreements, nuclear weapons, Pakistan, President Obama trip to Moscow, Russia, treaties, UN, US Government, weapons stockpiles, weapons technology

https://cricketdiane.wordpress.com/2009/07/05/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-information-counterterrorism-resources-databases-and-information-portals-to-military-simulation-definitions-and-weapons-resources-databases/

https://cricketdiane.wordpress.com/2009/07/05/decision-makers-around-the-world-global-economic-crisis-nuclear-non-proliferation-agreements-ecology-global-warming-climate-change-macroeconomics/

***

My Analysis of the information about non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the treaties, agreements, sanctions and current situation with Iran, North Korea and in some respects, Russia, as well –

It is an observation really. And, that observation is that where Western governments have Administrators, Executives, Parliaments and Legislatures that are changing as a result of elected citizen participants, the countries listed above including Iran, North Korea, Russia, China and others of concern are not changing administrations. Theirs stay the same.

That probably doesn’t seem like it would make a big difference, but what I see is that as new administrations, a new European Parliament, for instance, comes into place – it appears to be a whole new ballgame to the new members of that Parliament. Certainly there is history and getting up to speed about previous agreements and background, but it is still a new ballgame to them.

But it isn’t a new ballgame to the participants of countries whose administrations are not changing. The agreement made ages ago which took them by surprise, or humiliated them, or annoyed their last nerve, is still ever present and a direct memory to the process which confronts them today.

It is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage. This is a simple observation that I noted when researching some things about the non-proliferation agreements and compared them to some of the current activities described in the news and other sources. It might be handy to be aware of it.

– cricketdiane, 07-05-09

***

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North Korea nuclear tests – underground nuclear / atomic testing, US reality with veterans / military personnel exposed to radioactive / nuclear tests – and an interesting note from 2002 during the Bush administration concerning the re-opening of the nuclear testing questions at the time

26 Tuesday May 2009

Posted by CricketDiane in Air Quality, America - USA, International Concerns

≈ Leave a comment

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atomic weapons, International Concerns, North Korea missile launch, North Korea underground nuclear test, nuclear testing

North Korea conducts nuclear test
Mon May 25, 2009 12:25am EDT

“(North Korea) successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way,” the North’s official KCNA news agency said.

It added that the underground test “was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control.”

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSEO14165620090525

***
TIMELINE:North Korea: climbdowns and tests
Mon May 25, 2009 12:25am EDT

North Korea is already under U.N. Security Council sanctions for its first nuclear test in 2006, which officials and analysts say was only partially successful.

Here is a timeline of the North’s nuclear activities and international attempts to contain them.

[ . . . ]

* April 25: North Korea’s foreign ministry says reprocessing of spent fuel rods from the pilot atomic power plant has begun.

* April 29: North Korea threatens to conduct nuclear test and also test an intercontinental ballistic missile unless the U.N. Security Council apologizes for imposing sanctions against it.

* May 25: North Korea says it has successfully conducted a nuclear test, raising the explosive power and level of control of its nuclear device to a new level.

Source: Reuters

(Compiled by Gillian Murdoch, Editing by Dean Yates)

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54O0K020090525

***

October 3, 2002
Bush’s Curious Timing: NPR Reanimates Nuclear Testing Specter

This article first appeared in DefenseNews Jan. 21-27, 2002.

While stopping short of overturning his father’s moratorium on nuclear testing, U.S. President George W. Bush has catapulted the testing issue back into the political foreground with the Pentagon’s new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Following the NPR’s release, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was at pains to point out that Bush “has not ruled out testing in the future.”

Although Fleischer and other administration officials are quick to say there are no plans to actually resume underground nuclear testing, the NPR calls for an acceleration in “testing readiness” so the Department of Energy would be able to resume such tests within a one-year window.

The question is, why? Why spotlight such a controversial issue at this time, when the Bush administration is seeking to win friends and influence people abroad, most importantly those in Russia, with its vow to downsize the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

The administration’s repudiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed by 154 nations, already has caused consternation among many U.S. friends and allies who say the treaty helps prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

To be sure, the question of U.S. nuclear testing is something of a vampire in domestic politics, rising from the seeming dead on a regular basis. Every year the Energy Department and the Pentagon must certify the nuclear stockpile as “safe and reliable,” and that there is no need to resume the nuclear testing voluntarily abandoned by the United States in 1992. Every year since 1992, the two departments have so certified, and voiced confidence that the Energy Department’s “Stockpile Stewardship” program is capable of continuing to ensure this is so.

And nearly every year, a tenacious group of nuclear-laboratory officials, lawmakers and right-wing pundits seek to undermine confidence in the largely computer-based Stockpile Stewardship program’s ability to conduct that certification.

[ . . . ]

While troublesome, the delays in the non-nuclear test regime do not, as some have sought to claim, automatically mean there are problems with U.S. warheads, or that renewed underground nuclear testing is now needed. In fact, even before the 1992 moratorium, underground nuclear testing was not the primary method of certifying stockpile safety and reliability.

According to Sidney Drell, a theoretical physicist and long-time adviser to the Department of Energy, the weapon labs and Congress on Stockpile Stewardship, only about 10 percent of the 150 to 200 U.S. underground nuclear explosive tests of modern weapons from 1972 to 1992 were those on deployed warheads. Instead, the bulk of the tests were used in designing and proving new nuclear weapons.

[ etc. ]

A study released in January 2001 by the National Institute for Public Policy, “The Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control,” a group that reads like a Who’s Who of today’s administration and Bush’s informal nuclear policy advisers, argued for development of “simple, low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground biological weapons facilities.”

Proponents of a so-called mini-nuke successfully spurred Congress to demand that the Defense and Energy departments issue a report on “Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets” in order to raise the issue.

[ . . . ]
The author, Theresa Hitchens, is vice president of the Center for Defense Information.

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=189&IssueID=35&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=32&issueID=35

***

Nuclear Proliferation
Facts And Figures

Next (10)
Chinese Nuclear Arsenal
January 21, 2009
Author(s): Brian Ellison
New CRS Report: “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues”
September 5, 2008
The “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues” report by Amy F. Woolf of the Congressional Research Service takes an in-depth look at the triad that makes up U.S. nuclear forces: Bombers, ICBM and submarine-launched missiles. The report examines the history of each delivery system, the weapons used and the future outlook for each, particularly in regard to U.S. nuclear treaty obligations. The report also looks at differences between the military services controlling the weapons systems, and congressional mandates to change them in spite of service disagreements.
Russian Nuclear Arsenal
July 30, 2008
Author(s): Eric Hundman
Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal
July 10, 2008
Author(s): Elliott Becker ,  Eric Hundman
The World’s Nuclear Arsenals: Updated January 21, 2009
July 10, 2008
United Kingdom Nuclear Forces
July 9, 2008
Author(s): Elliott Becker ,  Eric Hundman
Indian Nuclear Arsenal
July 8, 2008
Author(s): Elliott Becker ,  Eric Hundman
North Korean Nuclear Arsenal (DPRK)
May 9, 2008
Author(s): Brian Ellison
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments and Issues
February 25, 2008
The “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues” report by Amy F. Woolf of the Congressional Research Service takes an in-depth look at the triad that makes up U.S. nuclear forces: Bombers, ICBM and submarine-launched missiles. The report examines the history of each delivery system, the weapons used and the future outlook for each, particularly in regard to U.S. nuclear treaty obligations. The report also looks at differences between the military services controlling the weapons systems, and congressional mandates to change them in spite of service disagreements.
GAO Report – “Nuclear Nonproliferation:  DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed”
January 15, 2008
“Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed,” GAO Report GAO-08-189, December 2007.

[From – ]

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=32&issueid=46

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy
August 6, 2007
The Updated Congressional Research Services Report.
Overview of Fiscal Year 2008 Department of Energy Budget Request
February 8, 2007
Under the direction of the Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, the Department of Energy has requested $24.3 billion in discretionary funding for fiscal year 2008, a 3.0 percent increase from the amount requested in fiscal year 2007. The National Nuclear Security Administration is seeking a 0.8 percent increase to $9.38 billion in FY 08. CDI Research Assistant Brian Ellison provides an overview of both agencies FY 08 budget requests.
Author(s): Brian Ellison
The Plutonium’s Not Going Anywhere: So what’s next for nuclear complex transformation?
December 6, 2006
Half of a decade of studies at the national laboratories has shown that the plutonium parts in nuclear warheads will be good for at least 100 years – nearly twice the previous estimate. WSI Science Fellow Haninah Levine asks where that leaves the Bush administration’s ambitious plans for the nuclear weapons complex.
Author(s): Haninah Levine
Emerging Nuclear Weapons Policies: An opportunity to increase dialogue
October 25, 2006
On Oct. 12 and 13, 2006, CDI hosted a collaborative conference to bring experts together to discuss emerging nuclear weapons policies in the United States, Russia and China. The presentations by conference attendees are now available.
Author(s): Victoria Samson

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?StartRow=11&ListRows=10&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=32&issueID=46

***

The Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20036-2109

202.332.0600 (phone)
202.462.4559 (fax)

For more information on CDI, please email –
info@cdi.org

***

***
Remarks on signing the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.(Week Ending Friday, December 22, 2006)
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents | December 25, 2006 |

(My Note – looks like this would be worth reading.)

***

Testimony of Dr. Rosalie Bertell

The testimony presented to the U.S. Senate, in 1998, by Sister Doctor Rosalie Bertell, on bealf of legislation concerning ionizing radiation, is as pertientnt today as it was then, especially as the 110th Congress wrestles with issues affecting Veterans in general and Atomic/Nuclear Veterans in particular.
Testimony of
Dr. Rosalie Bertell
before the
Unites States Senate Committee
on Veterans’ Affairs
10:00 am Room SR-418,
Russell Senate Office Building
Tuesday, 21 April 1998

My testimony addresses, in particular,

* Senate Bill S.1385 (Wellstone), to amend Title 38, United States Code, to expand the number of diseases presumed to be service connected with respect to radiation exposed veterans, and
* Senate Bill S.1822 (Specter et al) which would authorize the Veteran’s Administration to provide medical care to veterans who were treated with nasopharyngeal radium irradiation to prevent ear injury caused by severe pressure changes encountered in submarine and flight duty.

By profession, I am a biometrician, which is a specialty in mathematics applied to biomedical problems, and am qualified to design and evaluate epidemiological research. I have worked in the area of the health effects of ionizing radiation, especially at low doses and slow dose rates, for the past 30 years and have produced and published books, and professional papers,,,, on the subject.

It seems to me to be very sad that US veterans exposed to the cleanup of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than fifty years ago, those exposed to radium implants, and those exposed to the nuclear weapon testing in the 1950’s and 1960’s are still waiting for recognition. The first book on radiation related cancer was published in 1912 – almost 90 years ago. It would seem that the disputes which have surrounded this issue involve much more than straight forward scientific investigation and reporting. I hope to show that the poor design of the research, specially that done on the atomic bomb survivors, together with an arrogance which claimed that this was the definitive study against which all other radiation research was to be judged, has left the Congress without answers to the most fundamental and urgent questions facing the veterans.

Since many of the veterans exposed to nuclear fallout and debris or unwise medical experiments are now dead, I think that government policy with regard to survivors should be as broad as possible. In particular, I support the proposed extension of the list of presumptive diseases which can be radiation induced. The list is eminently reasonable and should have been recognized long ago. I strongly support both of these Bills, and would like to see the guidelines for medical care even broader.

[ . . . ]

There are two major questions which I would like to address in this testimony:

First, dose reconstruction does nothing to prove or disprove that a veteran’s cancer or disease is related to their nuclear radiation exposure. It should be sufficient for a veteran to prove that he or she participated in a “radiation risk activity”.

Second, there are non-cancer physical injuries suffered by the veterans and their offspring which have not yet been recognized as indicating eligibility for veteran medical care

[ . . . ]

Furthermore, there is no scientific evidence that a limiting dose of radiation exists below which there is little or no risk of developing a cancer or other health problem. In fact, there is peer reviewed published research which shows that excess cancers have occurred at dose levels which are within the maximum permissible dose levels set for workers and members of the public. Setting such a cut off for a veteran’s eligibility for medical care is at best a subjective judgment, and at worst a deliberate ploy to pretend that standards are protective and to save money by denying the veteran health care. Radiation Protection Standards have never claimed to be health based, i.e., levels below which there is no harm. They are clearly the result of cost-benefit trade-offs, where the cost is cancer death and the benefits are social and economic. They are inappropriate for use as a criterion for government health care responsibility toward veterans!

“The Commission believes that this level (50 mSv or 5 rem radiation exposure over 30 years to the general public, an average of 1.67 mSv or 167 mrem per year, and 50 mSv or 5 rem per year for workers) provides reasonable latitude for the expansion of atomic energy programs in the forseeable future. It should be emphasized that the limit may not in fact represent a proper balance between possible harm and probable benefit because of the uncertainty in assessing the risks and benefits that would justify exposure.” International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) No. 26, 1965.

[ . . . ]

The probability of damage occurring when someone is exposed to ionizing radiation is 100 percent. You can see, by the enclosed picture of the living cell, its complexity. The electron micrograph of a plutonium particle exploding in lung tissue gives you some idea of the destruction wrought by one “nuclear event” in living tissue. The energy needed to break the molecular bonds in the DNA is roughly 6 to 10 eV (electron volts), whereas the energy release in just one atomic transformation of a plutonium atom is about 5 MeV (million electron volts). The energy from one transformation of one radium atom is about the same, and the energy of cesium 137 and strontium 90 is about 0.5 MeV (five hundred thousand eV). There can be no question of the ability of the smallest particle of one of the radionuclides to disrupt the chemical bonds of the DNA. The probability that this damage will cause genomic instability in the cells affected is still high, just slightly less than 100 percent (since some cells die). This renders the surviving cells more susceptible to cancer initiation at a later time.

In one nuclear transformation striking living tissue, we expect some cells to be killed, some to be damaged and then repaired or misrepaired, and some to be permanently damaged yet able to reproduce. The misrepaired cells, which then misfunction, and the damaged cells able to reproduce their mutated DNA, can later result in ill health or cancer.

[ . . . ]

I would strongly encourage the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in consideration of the US research failure to study biological endpoints of concern to the veterans, to extend radiation related medical care for all cancers and for the above list of other potentially radiogenic illnesses to all veterans without regard to dose reconstruction estimates. It is reasonable to presume that the genomic instability induced by radiation exposure left the individual survivor fragile in the face of normal environmental and life style insults, resulting in the observed premature chronic diseases and reduced quality of life. This is the least the government can do for the few survivors after years of denial of their injuries.

Redirect research money in order to provide relevant health information for veterans exposed to military technology. This would be more appropriate than trying to use the research into military effectiveness of specific weaponry, in this case, the atomic bomb technology, for evaluating the veterans health problems. The research goals and designs are different, and the information gathered by the military to evaluate weapon effectiveness is not appropriate for decision making with respect to the medical care of veterans.

This Committee, or a relevant Congressional oversight Committee of RERF, should strongly recommend that RERF make available to the Japanese researchers who are studying chronic diseases in the atomic bomb the survivors the DS86 dose estimates for those survivors. This would enable them to test whether or not disease prevalence increases with dose.

Require that administrative decisions of the radiation protection community, namely that only cancer deaths are “of concern” and that this cancer must be caused (not just promoted) by radiation, through direct damage to the DNA, be broadened to include the newest research on low dose radiation mechanisms and indirect or promotional causes of cancer. These are not scientific questions, they are discretionary judgments.

I would hope also that the Committee would revisit the question of genetic damage to the offspring of radiation exposed veterans. This is especially appropriate since the US Government has recently recognized such damage for the offspring of Viet Nam Veterans exposed to Agent Orange.

~ end of testimony ~

Response to Posthearing Questions

Concerning April 21, 1998 Hearing

For Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
Ranking Minority Member
Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs
From Rosalie Bertell Ph. D., GNSH
International Institute of Concern for Public Health

The best detailed critique which I have read on dose reconstruction was written by William J. Brady. He was a Security Officer at the Nevada Test Site from 1952 on, and became a Radiation Safety Office in 1956. Over the following 36 years he acted as radiation monitor, supervisor, reactor branch leader, laboratory branch leader, dosimetry superintendent, senior health physicist, environmental sciences technical advisor and Principal Health Physicist with the prime support contractor for the Nevada Test Site. His report, prepared for a conference in June 25-30, 1995, at the University of Lethbridge, provides detailed first hand accounts of various nuclear tests, the official dose reconstructions for participants in those tests and the errors he finds in those dose reconstructions. Between 1978 and 1991, Mr. Brady represented his company at the Nuclear Test Personnel Review meetings held by the Defense Nuclear Agency Headquarters. If you do not have his paper available I will be glad to send you a copy .

Using the DNA dose reconstructions, it would be impossible to distinguish between the real exposures of veterans reported as having one or two rem exposure and those having five or six rem exposure. The error bars for both estimates would most likely overlap, indicating that the difference was not significant. The probability of a veterans cancer being radiation related would not differ significantly between a veteran having a dose reconstruction estimate of five rem exposure and one having a one rem exposure. Therefore compensating one and not the other makes little sense, even if the measurements are accurate.

The mechanism of cancer induction assumes that radiation related carcinogenesis involves the breaking or mutating of the DNA in a cell, damaging it but leaving it able to reproduce its damaged self in an uncontrolled way so that an overgrowth or tumor forms. The energy needed to break the bond in DNA is roughly between 6 and 10 electron volts. Radionuclides periodically induce miniature explosions, which release energy. These events are called “nuclear transformations”. One energy transformation of one plutonium atom releases about 5 million electron volts, and one energy transformation of one atom of cesium 137 or strontium 90 releases about 500 thousand electron volts. This is more than sufficient to cause a cancer. Therefore, we know scientifically that one atom of these radioactive elements, properly placed in proximity to cells, can initiate a cancer. The organ dose from the nuclear transformation of one atom is not even measurable on the scale of rems or mrems!

The probability of cancer developing is related to the human response to the nuclear transformation event: the cell may die, it may be repaired or misrepaired, or it may survive the immune screening in the internal environment and go on to form a clinically detectable cancer or some other chronic illness. There is research which indicates that some cellular damage is too small to activate the cellular repair system, making exposures below this level more likely to cause cancer than those above the trigger point for repair. Human variability likely outweighs the direct dose effect at low doses. (The nuclear industry is using this observation to call exposures just above the trigger point “beneficial”).

The Radiation Protection Regulations merely try to “limit” the radiation related cancers, not to eliminate them. A certain number of cancers are assumed to be “acceptable” to society for the economic and social benefits of the activity. This does not mean that such tolerated damage to an individual should not be compensated!

2.     If dose reconstruction should prove to be unreliable as a means to determine compensation, can you recommend an alternative mechanism for determining the validity of a veterans claim of radiation exposure?

The simplest test of a veteran’s claim would be to accept the proof of participation in a service related radiation risk activity prior to the development of the cancer as determining the validity of the claim. In such a case, some veterans will be helped who did not have a service related illness.

[ . . . ]

http://www.radvets.org/page151.htm

(It is really worth reading all of this – it gave me many questions, as did the information posted above it. For one, I did not know that the Department of Energy was partly responsible for monitoring nuclear stockpiles or that they were jointly responsible for nuclear materials matters, at one point that makes sense and at another, it does not. And, did our military subject our soldiers to this – ” veterans who were treated with nasopharyngeal radium irradiation to prevent ear injury caused by severe pressure changes encountered in submarine and flight duty.” And, then do whatever possible to not cover their medical care? And, to not cover the medical care for conditions caused by being subjected to fallout  from atomic / nuclear tests in the 1950’s and 1960’s? – my note)

***

Rising unemployment raises threat of social crisis: World Bank
Sun May 24, 2009 7:27am EDT

MADRID (Reuters) – World economic recovery will be slow and rising unemployment could bring the threat of social crisis and protectionism, World Bank President Robert Zoellick said in an interview with Spanish Sunday newspaper El Pais.

“What began as a great financial crisis and became a great economic crisis is now becoming a great crisis of unemployment, and if we don’t take measures there is a risk of a great human and social crisis, with major political implications,” he said.

[ . . . ]

http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE54N0JV20090524

***

updated 5 minutes ago

N. Korea fires short-range missiles off its east coast

North Korea has fired two short-range missiles from its east coast, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency cited an unnamed official as saying, one day after conducting a nuclear test and firing a short-range missile that roiled governments around the world. full story
  • Author: U.S., China must act Video
  • Roh’s death tops ‘most read’ lists in S. Korea
  • In depth: Nuclear tension | Timeline
  • <!–

    • CNN Wire: include virtual=”/.element/ssi/auto/2.0/sect/MAIN/cnn.wire.html”

    –>

http://www.cnn.com/

SEOUL, South Korea (CNN) — North Korea fired two short-range missiles from its east coast Tuesday — a day after conducting a nuclear test — South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported, citing a South Korean official.

[ . . . ]

The firings came a day after the reclusive communist state conducted a nuclear test and fired another short-range missile.

“We should be clear that these are short-range missiles. They are in the realm of anti-ship or anti-aircraft missiles, not missiles designed to target cities or other country population centers,” said analyst Daniel Pinkston of the International Crisis Group, which describes itself as an independent non-profit group committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict.

The U.N. Security Council condemned Monday’s nuclear test as a “clear violation” of international law.

Even the North’s closest ally criticized its actions. China said North Korea “disregarded the opposition of the international community.”

[ . . . ]

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/26/nkorea.test/index.html

***

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Top Posts

  • Strange Conspiracy in a Land of Freedom, Honor and Integrity 4 - Washington and what human rights and civil rights are? Have our leaders ever had integrity, decency and honor?
  • Gulf Oil Disaster with enormous oil plumes as much as 300 feet thick in places - from Deepwater Horizon crude oil drilling accident -
  • 13,000 psi oil well pressure - Deepwater Horizon disaster and the 1990 Oil Act gave oil companies authority and rights to the entire Gulf of Mexico and Gulf Coast superceding elected officials and federal agencies
  • I gave up and made a store entirely of Men's Ugly Ties I'm designing -
  • Mining Oil - Mining - Gushing Oil in the Gulf of Mexico - Facts and Fantasy - The Fact is it exploded into fire - The fantasy is that doesn't mean anything and its safe -
  • Exploratory Drilling means to stick a straw in the ground and when oil starts gushing out - cover the straw till later - unless its 5000 feet down on the ocean floor in the Gulf of Mexico - oil gusher
  • How I learn - (cont.)
  • Ocean Waves Painting Titled - Gentle Waves On The Sand - Cricket Diane C Phillips - Cricket House Studios - 2008
  • Education budget cuts, tuition and higher education cost hikes and paying for it with taxes on oil companies drilling and profiting in California

New Cricket House Studios – cricketdiane stuff

  • Corruption of President’s Actions Affects US and the International Community -Ukraine Transcript IS Proof
  • DNI Maguire Broke The Law For His Own Fealty To The President – Arrest Him Like Any Of The Rest Of Us Would Be
  • “Moscow Mitch” Soybeans and Aluminum
  • US Congress Party Control 1965 – 2019
  • Nifty New Products and an Amazing Rainbow Tie I Forgot That I Created – Cool
  • And another thing
  • Hurricane Florence in Real Time Live Streaming Cams Plus Helpful Info
  • Hurricane Update Sites – Hurricane Florence
  • Customizing Rainbow Pop Art Wall Decal Design Makes Amazing New Choices
  • Interesting Independent Designer Products You Can Buy Online
  • Elsewhere
  • Ocean Beach Posters for Beach Decor by CricketDiane and Cricket House Studios
  • Little Donnie Dare Trump limericks for the Resistance – SecondCivilWarLetters 4th of July 2018
  • Why the rights of citizens are in jeopardy in the United States right now
  • Introducing the Little Shop Out Back Preview for Studios of CricketDiane Art and New Ocean Paintings

Cricket Diane

  • 5 Nerdy Goodies that are Geeky Gifts I’ve Designed on Zazzle
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  • CricketDiane in the Studio Working
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  • Got No Money Guides by Cricketdiane
  • International concerns – Mideast
  • Ocean Paintings
  • Private Equity Purchase of Toys R Us Required Toys R Us to Pay the Full Price of Being Bought – Is that Right?

Archives

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