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Wanting to write about the terrorist possibilities with nuclear materials, but a part of me wants to believe that our authorities and agencies responsible for these materials have them well secured. Time and time again, it becomes evident that there are lapses in both the security of facilities and nuclear materials as well as lapses in common sense in handling events that occur.

If a few simple things were done, security would certainly be better at anyplace housing, using, storing or creating electricity with nuclear materials.

  1. Is to make sure all security cameras are far removed from access by a person wanting to simply turn them away.
  2. Is to make sure that all security personnel and workers of every kind at any facilities with nuclear materials have been well vetted beyond a normal random check done for other types of businesses.
  3. Is to make sure that all ID badges used by facility personnel of any kind, any contractors, any plumbers that come out to fix something, any technicians, any company executives inclusively – have RFID tracking on the badges.
  4. Is to make sure that local constabulary, police supervisors, police and fire chiefs, and whoever else might make stupid or egotistical decisions locally about any event at a nuclear materials using facility – knows to immediately inform appropriate intel and counter-terrorism agencies about any and all irregular events concerning the plant. That would include murders of any personnel that works there, any loss of materials, any stuck valves that are made to look like they weren’t done intentionally though proof is visible that intentionality was likely, AND any bizarre occurrences out of the ordinary, such as having all the oil drained from a pump expected to be lubricating the turbines that causes significant damages, etc., etc., etc.,
  5. IS TO MAKE SURE that every country using nuclear materials for civilian uses and any other uses understands that the international community will not accept pretense about these materials because of their inherent dangers to us all.

When TEPCO executives made statements straight out of a playbook of damage control for public consumption, they first downplayed the incidents and their dangers even as those events were unfolding and they knew the magnitude of the disaster. This is not an acceptable path for executives, decision-makers, industries, industry spokespeople, industry pr firms, politicians or even local officials to take when events can unfold quickly and impact such a massive swath of humanity and civilization for years to come.

This is to say, that as our leaders meet for the Nuclear Security Summit, the greatest danger we face is to watch events unfold concerning nuclear materials and it be a week later before some local executive or supervisor at the facility or other business using those materials actually tells somebody who can do concrete measures to fix it. Or, in the case of terrorist use of those materials, to tell a group of agencies from Interpol to counter-terrorism and national security agencies that the materials are missing in a timely and effective manner.

The same is true for local police jurisdictions in areas near nuclear and other chemical industry facilities. It cannot be up to them to say a matter is no more than criminal when in fact, it could be very likely tied to terrorism or a terrorist network intending greater harm. That information needs to be in the hands of those who are collecting it, analyzing it, interpreting its connectivity to other known information about terrorists operations and then acted upon appropriately. That can’t happen when the information is circumvented by jurisdictional ego building tactics.

There, I’ve had my say about it. But, I do want to believe that our authorities and security / intel agencies have it all well in hand. And, they’ve thwarted countless terrorist plans, prepared events of terrorism and some really incredibly stupid stuff that would’ve been massively dangerous to us all. So, maybe. Maybe with the addition of just a few simple things – it can be made safer. I hope so.

  • cricketdiane, 04-01-16


At the same plant where these jihadists once worked, an individual who has yet to be identified walked into the reactor No. 4 in 2014, turned a valve and drained 65,000 liters of oil used to lubricate the turbines. The ensuing friction nearly overheated the machinery, forcing it to be shut down. The damage was so severe that the reactor was out of commission for five months.



Fire causes shutdown at Belgian nuclear reactor | Business …


Business Standard

Dec 1, 2014 – Read more about Fire causes shutdown at Belgian nuclear reactor on Business Standard. A fire caused the shutdown of a nuclear reactor in …

Fire shuts down Belgium′s Tihange nuclear reactor | News …


Dec 19, 2015 – Fire shuts down Belgium’s Tihange nuclear reactor … discovered in the walls of Belgian nuclear reactors are causing unease among experts.

Belgian nuclear plant’s reactor shuts down days after reboot …



Jan 3, 2016 – Another mishap rocked Belgium on November 1, when an explosion occurred overnight at a nuclear power plant in Doel, causing a fire.


Brussels attacks: Nuclear alert after security officer ‘found dead with his pass missing’

12:30PM GMT 26 Mar 2016