, , , , , ,

The Project Daedalus reference article from the English Wikipedia on 24-Jul-2004
(provided by Fixed Reference: snapshots of Wikipedia from wikipedia.org)
Project Daedalus

Project Daedalus was a study conducted between 1973 and 1978 by the British Interplanetary Society to design a plausible interstellar unmanned spacecraft. A dozen scientists and engineers led by Alan Bond worked on the project.

The design criteria were that the spacecraft had to use current or near-future technology and had to be able to reach its destination within a human lifetime (a flight time of 50 years was alotted). The target chosen was Barnard’s Star, 5.9 light years away, which at the time was believed to posses at least one planet (the evidence on which this belief was based has since been discredited). The design was required to be flexible enough that it could be sent to any of a number of other target stars, however.

Daedalus would be constructed in Earth orbit and have an initial mass of 54,000 tons, including 50,000 tons of fuel and 500 tons of scientific payload. Daedalus was to be a two-stage spacecraft. The first stage would operate for two years, taking the spacecraft to 7.1% of light speed, and then after it was jettisoned the second stage would fire for 1.8 years, bringing the spacecraft up to about 12% of light speed before being shut down for a 46-year cruise period.

This velocity was well beyond the capabilities of chemical rockets, so nuclear pulse propulsion was selected instead. Specifically, Daedalus would be propelled by a fusion rocket using pellets of deuterium/helium-3 mix that would be ignited in the reaction chamber by inertial confinement using electron beams. 250 pellets would be detonated per second, and the resulting plasma would be directed by a magnetic nozzle.

The second stage would have two 5-meter optical telescopes and two 20-meter radio telescopes. About 25 years after launch these telescopes would begin examining the area around Barnard’s Star to learn more about any accompanying planets. This information would be sent back to Earth, using the 40-meter diameter second stage engine bell was a communications dish, and targets of interest would be selected. Since the spacecraft would not decelerate upon reaching Barnard’s Star, Daedalus would carry 18 autonomous sub-probes that would be launched between 7.2 and 1.8 years before the main craft entered the target system. These sub-probes would be propelled by nuclear-powered ion drives and carry cameras, spectrometers, and other sensory equipment. They would fly past their targets, still travelling at 12% of the speed of light, and transmit their findings back to the Daedalus second stage mothership.

The ship’s payload bay containing its sub-probes, telescopes, and other equipment would be protected from the interstellar medium during transit by a 50-ton 7mm-thick beryllium disk. Larger obstacles that might be encountered while passing through the target system would be dispersed by an artificially-generated cloud of particles some 200 km ahead of the vehicle. The spacecraft would carry a number of robot wardens capable of autonomously repairing damage or malfunctions.

External links

* http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/D/Daedalus.html



Operation Northwoods
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Northwoods memorandum (March 13, 1962).[1]

Operation Northwoods, or Northwoods, was a false-flag plan, proposed within the United States government in 1962. The plan called for CIA or other operatives to commit apparent acts of terrorism in U.S. cities to create public support for a war against Castro-led Cuba. One plan was to develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington .

This operation is especially notable in that it included plans for hijackings and bombings followed by the use of phony evidence that would blame the terrorist acts on a foreign government, namely Cuba.

The plan stated:

The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Operation Northwoods was drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and signed by then-Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer, and sent to the Secretary of Defense.

Several other proposals were listed, including the real or simulated actions against various U.S military and civilian targets. Operation Northwoods was part of the U.S. government’s Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose) anti-Castro initiative. It was never officially accepted or executed.

* 1 Origins and public release
* 2 Content
* 3 James Bamford summary
* 4 Related Operation Mongoose proposals
* 5 Reaction
* 6 See also
* 7 Further reading
* 8 References
* 9 External links

Origins and public release

The main proposal was presented in a document entitled Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS), a collection of draft memoranda written by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative to the Caribbean Survey Group.[1] (The parenthetical TS in the title of the document is an initialism for Top Secret. ) The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13 as a preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of any such operation be assigned to them.

The previously secret document was originally made public on November 18, 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,[2] a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination.[3][4][5][6][7] A total 1521 pages of once-secret military records covering 1962 to 1964 were concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.

Appendix to Enclosure A and Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series[8][9]—specifically, as a documentation supplement to Episode 10: Cuba, which aired on November 29, 1998.[10][11] Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.

The Northwoods document was published online in a more complete form (i.e., including cover memoranda) by the National Security Archive on April 30, 2001.[12]


In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document lists methods (with, in some cases, outlined plans) the authors believed would garner public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. These are staged attacks purporting to be of Cuban origin.

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):
1. Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
2. Land friendly Cubans in uniform over-the-fence to stage attack on base.
3. Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).[13]
5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.
8. Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
9. Capture militia group which storms the base.
10. Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—napthalene.
11. Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be in lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A Remember the Maine incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to evacuate remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.[14]
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A Cuban-based, Castro-supported filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. Cuban B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with Cuban messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and Cuban shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.[15]
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a MAY DAY message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio[16] stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to sell the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.[17]

James Bamford summary

Journalist James Bamford summarized Operation Northwoods in his April 24, 2001 book Body of Secrets:

Operation Northwoods, which had the written approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba to be sunk on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington, D.C., Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings they did not commit; planes would be hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of it would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse, as well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their war.[18]

Related Operation Mongoose proposals

In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.

Twelve of these proposals come from a February 2, 1962 memorandum entitled Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba, written by Brig. Gen. William H. Craig and submitted to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.[5][6][7][19]

The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to, in its words, create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John Glenn crashed, saying: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al. Cuba [sic]. It continues, This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.

Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, A contrived ‘Cuban’ attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS.

The plan expresses confidence that by this action, the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba. [18][20]

Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war against Castro.[18] As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:

Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation. [18]

The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro’s subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [the U.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo. [18]

President John F. Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal. A JCS/Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale memo) dated March 16, 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads: General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for US intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on US aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn’t use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba. [21] The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.

Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly afterward, although he became Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963.

The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence community (the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Project, etc.) prompted Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy fired then CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towards Vietnam.

Kennedy also took steps to bring discipline to the CIA’s Cold War and paramilitary operations by drafting a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) which called for the shift of Cold War operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Department of Defense as well as a major change in the role of the CIA to exclusively deal in intelligence gathering. Kennedy was notably unpopular with the military, a rift that came to a head during Kennedy’s disagreements with the military over the Cuban Missile Crisis, shortly before the presentation of Northwoods. Personally, Kennedy expressed concern and anger to many of his associates about the CIA’s growing influence on civilians and government inside America.

On August 3, 2001, the National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a statement referring to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it condemned such U.S. government plans.[22]
See also
Cuba portal

* Bay of Pigs Invasion
* Body of Secrets
* CIA Family Jewels
* Cuba – United States relations
* Operation WASHTUB
* Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group
* Operation Gladio
* False flag

Further reading

* Jon Elliston, editor, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne, Australia and New York: Ocean Press, 1999), ISBN 1-876175-09-5.
* James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, April 24, 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: Fists of this book.


1. ^ a b U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS), U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent, non-governmental research institute the National Security Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.
2. ^ The Records of the Assassination Records Review Board, National Archives and Records Administration.
3. ^ Media Advisory: National Archives Releases Additional Materials Reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board, Assassination Records Review Board (a division of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration), November 17, 1997. A U.S. government press-release announcing the declassification of some 1500 pages of U.S. government documents from 1962-64 relating to U.S. policy towards Cuba, among which declassified documents included the Operation Northwoods document.
4. ^ Jim Wolf, Pentagon Planned 1960s Cuban ‘Terror Campaign’, Reuters, November 18, 1997.
5. ^ a b Mike Feinsilber, At a tense time, plots abounded to humiliate Castro, Associated Press (AP), November 18, 1997; also available here.
6. ^ a b Tim Weiner, Documents Show Pentagon’s Anti-Castro Plots During Kennedy Years, New York Times, November 19, 1997; appeared on the same date and by the same author in the New York Times itself as Declassified Papers Show Anti-Castro Ideas Proposed to Kennedy, late edition—final, section A, pg. 25, column 1.
7. ^ a b Jon Elliston, Operation Mongoose: The PSYOP Papers, ParaScope, Inc., 1998.
8. ^ National Security Archive: COLD WAR: Documents, National Security Archive, September 27, 1998-January 24, 1999.
9. ^ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Appendix to Enclosure A: Memorandum for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project and Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, U.S. Department of Defense, circa March 1962. First published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998, as part of CNN’s Cold War documentary series. Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A is the section of the Operation Northwoods document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
10. ^ Episode 10: Cuba; Cuba: 1959-1968, CNN (Cable News Network LP, LLLP).
11. ^ Cold War Teacher Materials: Episodes, and Educator Guide to CNN’s COLD WAR Episode 10: Cuba, Turner Learning (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
12. ^ Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962, National Security Archive, April 30, 2001.
13. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p7, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
14. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p8, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
15. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p9, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
16. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p10, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
17. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p11, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
18. ^ a b c d e James Bamford, Chapter 4: Fists of Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, April 24, 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: Fists of this book.
19. ^ Memo from Brig. Gen. William Craig to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass, or Disrupt Cuba, U.S. Department of Defense, February 2, 1962. The following are photoscans of this document in JPEG format: Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4. (Note: the foregoing links to Brig. Gen. Craig’s memo are at this time offline. The following are backup links: text in HTML; JPEG photoscans: Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4.)
20. ^ Mike Feinsilber, Records Show Plan To Provoke Castro, Associated Press (AP), January 29, 1998.
21. ^ Lansdale Memo of 16 Mar 1962. This memo records a high-level meeting in the White House 3 days after McNamara was presented with Operation Northwoods. [1]
22. ^ Statement by the National Assembly of People’s Power of the Republic of Cuba, National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, August 3, 2001; also available here.

External links

See the above References section for documents cited in the body of this article.

* The Full Operation Northwoods document in both JPEG and fully searchable HTML format.
* High resolution scans from the National Archives, main pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
* Scott Shane and Tom Bowman with contribution from Laura Sullivan, New book on NSA sheds light on secrets: U.S. terror plan was Cuba invasion pretext, Baltimore Sun, April 24, 2001.
* Ron Kampeas, Memo: U.S. Mulled Fake Cuba Pretext, Associated Press (AP), April 25, 2001.
* Bruce Schneier, ‘Body of Secrets’ by James Bamford: The author of a pioneering work on the NSA delivers a new book of revelations about the mysterious agency’s coverups, eavesdropping and secret missions, Salon.com, April 25, 2001.
* David Ruppe, U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba; Book: U.S. Military Drafted Plans to Terrorize U.S. Cities to Provoke War With Cuba, ABC News, May 1, 2001.
* TV interview with James Bamford regarding Operation Northwoods
* The Truth Is Out There—1962 memo from National Security Agency, Harper’s Magazine, July 2001.
* Chris Floyd, Head Cases, Moscow Times, December 21, 2001, pg. VIII; also appeared in St. Petersburg Times, Issue 733 (100), December 25, 2001.
* Operation Northwoods, SourceWatch.

* Thierry Meyssan, Operation Northwoods: The Terrorist Attacks Planned by the American Joint Chief of Staff against its Population, Voltaire Network, November 5, 2001.
v • d • e
Flag of Cuba Cuba – United States relations Flag of the United States

Bay of Pigs Invasion A Brothers to the Rescue A Cuban American A Cuban-American lobby A Cuban Five A Cuban Missile Crisis A Cuban opposition since 1959 A Elian Gonzalez affair A Guantanamo Bay Naval Base A Helms-Burton Act A List of Cuba-US aircraft hijackings A Luis Posada Carriles A Mariel boatlift A Operation Peter Pan A Platt Amendment A Spanish–American War A United States Ambassador to Cuba A United States embargo against Cuba A United States Interests Section in Havana
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods
Categories: Canceled military operations involving the United States | United States intelligence operations | False flag operations | Cuba – United States relations | Opposition to Fidel Castro | Official documents of the United States | Terrorism in Cuba | 1962 works | Secret government programs


Operation Northwoods memorandum (March 13, 1962).[1]


USS Thresher (SSN-593)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

USS Thresher (SSN-593) underway, 30 April 1961.

Career United States Navy ensign
Ordered: 15 January 1958
Builder: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Laid down: 28 May 1958
Launched: 9 July 1960
Commissioned: 3 August 1961
Struck: 16 April 1963
Motto: Vis Tacita (Silent Strength)
Fate: Sank with all hands during deep diving tests, 10 April 1963, 129 died.
Status: Located 350 km east of Cape Cod at a depth of 8400 ft.
General characteristics
Displacement: 3,540 short tons (3,210 t) light, 3,770 short tons (3,420 t) submerged
Length: 279 ft (85 m)
Beam: 32 ft (9.8 m)
Draft: 26 ft (7.9 m)
Propulsion: 1 Westinghouse S5W PWR, Westinghouse Geared Turbines 15,000 shp (11 MW)
Speed: 20+ kts
Complement: 16 officers, 96 men
Armament: 4 x 21 inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes amidships
For other ships of the same name, see USS Thresher.

The second USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the lead ship of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines in the United States Navy. Her loss at sea during deep-diving tests in 1963 is often considered a watershed event in the implementation of the rigorous submarine safety program SUBSAFE.

The contract to build Thresher was awarded to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on 15 January 1958, and her keel was laid on 28 May 1958. She was launched on 9 July 1960, was sponsored by Mrs. Frederick B. Warder (wife of the famous Pacific War skipper), and was commissioned on 3 August 1961, with Commander Dean L. Axene in command.

* 1 Early career
* 2 Sinking
* 3 Details of the disaster
* 4 Memorials
* 5 See also
* 6 Footnotes
* 7 References
* 8 External links

Early career

Thresher conducted lengthy sea trials in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea areas in 1961 and 1962. These tests provided a thorough evaluation of her many new and complex technological features and weapons. Following these trials, she took part in Nuclear Submarine Exercise (NUSUBEX) 3-61 off the northeastern coast of the United States from 18 September to 24 September 1961.

On 18 October Thresher headed south along the East Coast. While in port at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 2 November 1961, her reactor was shut down and the diesel generator was used to carry the hotel electrical loads. Several hours later the generator broke down, and the electrical load was then carried by the battery. The generator could not be quickly repaired, so the captain ordered the reactor restarted. However, the battery charge was depleted before the reactor went critical. With no electrical power for ventilation, temperatures in the machinery spaces reached 60 °C (140 °F), and the boat was partially evacuated. Cavalla (SS-244) arrived the next morning and provided power from her diesels, enabling Thresher to restart her reactor.[1]

Thresher conducted further trials and fired test torpedoes before returning to Portsmouth on 29 November. The boat remained in port through the end of the year, and spent the first two months of 1962 evaluating her sonar and Submarine Rocket (SUBROC) systems. In March, the submarine participated in NUSUBEX 2-62 (an exercise designed to improve the tactical capabilities of nuclear submarines) and in antisubmarine warfare training with Task Group ALPHA.

Off Charleston, SC, Thresher undertook operations observed by the Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Council before she returned briefly to New England waters, after which she proceeded to Florida for more SUBROC tests. However, while moored at Port Canaveral, Florida, the submarine was accidentally struck by a tug which damaged one of her ballast tanks. After repairs at Groton, Connecticut, by the Electric Boat Company, Thresher went south for more tests and trials off Key West, Florida, then returned northward and remained in dockyard for refurbishment through the early spring of 1963.

On 9 April 1963, after the completion of this work, Thresher, now commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Wesley Harvey, began post-overhaul trials. Accompanied by the submarine rescue ship USS Skylark (ASR-20), she sailed to an area some 350 kilometers (220 statute miles or 190 nautical miles) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and on the morning of 10 April started deep-diving tests. As Thresher neared her test depth, Skylark received garbled communications over underwater telephone indicating … minor difficulties, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow. [2][3][4] When Skylark received no further communication, surface observers gradually realized Thresher had sunk. Publicly it took some days to announce that all 129 officers, crewmen, and military and civilian technicians aboard were presumed dead.

After an extensive underwater search using the bathyscaphe Trieste, oceanographic ship Mizar and other ships, Thresher’s remains were located on the sea floor, some 8,400 feet (2,600 m) below the surface, in six major sections.[5] The majority of the debris had spread over an area of about 134,000 square metres (160,000 sq yd). The major sections were the sail, sonar dome, bow section, engineering spaces section, operations spaces section, and the stern planes.

Deep sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of her design and operational history permitted a Court of Inquiry to conclude Thresher had probably suffered the failure of a joint in a salt water piping system, which relied heavily on silver brazing instead of welding; earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints, most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require a repair. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, which in turn caused a shutdown ( scram ) of the reactor, with a subsequent loss of propulsion. The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the ship’s high-pressure air flasks, which froze and plugged the flasks’ flowpaths while passing through the valves. This was later simulated in dock-side tests on Thresher’s sister ship, USS Tinosa (SSN-606). During a test to simulate blowing ballast at or near test depth, ice formed on strainers installed in valves; the flow of air lasted only a few seconds. Air driers were later retrofitted to the high pressure air compressors, beginning with Tinosa, to permit the emergency blow system to operate properly.

Unlike diesel submarines, nuclear subs rely on speed and deck angle rather than deballasting to surface; they are driven at an angle towards the surface. Ballast tanks were almost never blown at depth, and to do so could cause the ship to rocket to the surface out of control. Normal procedure was to drive the ship to periscope depth, raise the periscope to verify the area was clear, then blow the tanks and surface the ship.

At the time, reactor-plant operating procedures precluded a rapid reactor restart following a scram, or even the ability to use steam remaining in the secondary system to drive the ship to the surface. After a scram, standard procedure was to isolate the main steam system, cutting off the flow of steam to the turbines providing propulsion and electricity. This was done to prevent an over-rapid cool-down of the reactor. Thresher’s Reactor Control Officer, Lieutenant Raymond McCoole, was not at his station in the maneuvering room, or indeed on the ship, during the fatal dive. McCoole was at home caring for his wife who had been injured in a household accident — he had been all but ordered ashore by a sympathetic Commander Harvey. McCoole’s trainee, Jim Henry, fresh from nuclear power school, probably followed standard operating procedures and gave the order to isolate the steam system after the scram, even though Thresher was at or slightly below her maximum depth and was taking on water. Once closed, the large steam system isolation valves could not be reopened quickly. Reflecting on the situation in later life, McCoole was sure he would have delayed shutting the valves, thus allowing the ship to answer bells and drive herself to the surface, despite the flooding in the engineering spaces. Admiral Rickover later changed the procedure, allowing steam to be withdrawn from the secondary system in limited quantities for several minutes following a scram.

There was much (covert) criticism of Rickover’s training after Thresher went down,[citation needed] the argument being his nukes were so well conditioned to protect the nuclear plant they would have shut the main steam stop valves by rote — depriving the ship of needed propulsion — even at great depths and with the ship clearly in jeopardy.[citation needed] Nothing enraged Rickover more than this argument. Common sense, he argued, would prove this to be untrue.[citation needed]

It’s more likely that the engine room crew was simply overwhelmed by the flooding casualty, or took too long to contain it.[citation needed] In a dockside simulation of flooding in the engine room, held before Thresher sailed, it took the watch in charge 20 minutes to isolate a simulated leak in the auxiliary seawater system. At test depth, taking on water, and with the reactor shut down, Thresher would not have had anything like 20 minutes to recover. Even after isolating a short-circuit in the reactor controls it would have taken nearly 10 minutes to restart the plant.

The Thresher probably imploded at a depth somewhere between 1,300 and 2,000 feet (400 and 600m).

Over the next several years, the Navy implemented the SUBSAFE program to correct design and construction problems on all submarines (nuclear and diesel-electric) in service, under construction, and in planning. During the formal inquiry, it was discovered record-keeping at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was far from adequate.[citation needed] For example, no one could determine the whereabouts of hull weld X-rays made of Thresher’s sister ship Tinosa, nearing completion at Portsmouth, or, indeed, whether they had been made at all. It was also determined that the engine room layout was awkward, in fact dangerous, as there were no centrally-located isolation valves for the main and auxiliary seawater systems. Most subs were subsequently equipped or retrofitted with flood control levers, which allowed the Engineer Officer of the Watch in the maneuvering room to remotely close isolation valves in the seawater systems from a central panel, a task necessarily performed by hand on Thresher. Hand-power valves might not even have been accessible during a flooding casualty: at such depths, the blast of water from even a small leak (a water spike ) can dent metal cabinets, rip insulation from cables, and even cut a man in half. (Water pressure at 1,000 feet (300 m)] is about 450 psi (3,100 kPa)].)
SUBSAFE would prove itself to be a crucial part of the Navy’s safe operation of nuclear submarines, but was disregarded just a few years later in a rush to get another nuclear sub, Scorpion, ready for service as part of yet another program meant to increase nuclear submarine availability. The subsequent loss of Scorpion reaffirmed the need for SUBSAFE, and apart from Scorpion, the U.S. Navy has suffered no further losses of nuclear submarines.

The Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U.S. Naval nuclear-powered ships. These reports provide specifics on the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life which were taken to ascertain whether Thresher’s nuclear reactor has had a significant effect on the deep ocean environment. The reports also explain the methodology for conducting deep sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirms that there has been no significant effect on the environment. Nuclear fuel in the submarine remains intact.

According to newly declassified information, the Navy sent Commander (Dr.) Robert Bob Ballard, the oceanographer credited for the successful search for the wreck of RMS Titanic, on a secret mission to map and collect visual data on both the Thresher and the Scorpion wrecks.[citation needed] The Navy used Ballard’s search for the Titanic as a screen to hide the mission. Ballard approached the Navy in 1982 for funding to find the Titanic with his new deep-diving robot submersible. The Navy saw the opportunity and granted him the money on the condition he first inspect the two submarine wrecks. Ballard’s robotic survey discovered that the Thresher had sunk so deep it imploded, turning into thousands of pieces. His 1985 search for the Scorpion, which was thought to be a victim of a Soviet attack, revealed such a large debris field that it looked as though it had been put through a shredding machine. The survey data revealed the most likely cause of the loss of the Scorpion was one of its own torpedoes exploding inside the torpedo room. Once the two wrecks had been visited, and the radioactive threat from both was established as small, Ballard was able to search for Titanic. Due to dwindling funds, he had just twelve days to do so, but he used the same debris-field search techniques he had used for the two subs, which worked, and the Titanic was found.[6]

U.S. submarine classes are generally known by the hull number of the lead ship of the class – for instance, Los Angeles-class boats are called 688s because the hull number of USS Los Angeles was SSN-688. The Thresher-class boats should thus be called 593s, but since Thresher’s sinking they have been referred to as 594s (Permit class).

Details of the disaster
Time-accelerated sequence of events during the disaster

The following is from the 1975 book The Thresher Disaster by John Bentley.[7] Times are in 24-hour notation.

* 07:47: Thresher begins its descent to the test depth of 1,300 feet (400 m).
* 07:52: Thresher levels off at 400 feet (120 m), contacts the surface, and the crew inspects the ship for leaks. None are found.
* 08:09: Commander Harvey reports reaching half the test depth.
* 08:25: Thresher reaches 1,000 feet (300 m).
* 09:02: Thresher is cruising at just a few knots (subs normally moved slowly and cautiously at great depths, lest a sudden jam of the diving planes send the ship below test depth in a matter of seconds.) The boat is descending in slow circles, and announces to Skylark she is turning to Corpen [course] 090. At this point, transmission quality from the Thresher begins to noticeably degrade, possibly as a result of thermoclines.
* 09:09: It is believed a brazed pipe-joint ruptures in the engine room. The crew would have attempted to stop the leak; at the same time, the engine room would be filling with a cloud of mist. Under the circumstances, Commander Harvey’s likely decision would have been to order full speed, full rise on the sail planes, and blowing main ballast in order to surface. Due to Joule-Thomson effect, the pressurized air rapidly expanding in the pipes cools down, condensing moisture and depositing it on strainers installed in the system to protect the moving parts of the valves; in only a few seconds the moisture freezes, clogging the strainers and blocking the air flow, halting the effort to blow ballast. Water leaking from the broken pipe most likely causes short circuits leading to an automatic shutdown of the ship’s reactor, causing a loss of propulsion. The logical action at this point would have been for Harvey to order propulsion shifted to a battery-powered backup system. As soon as the flooding was contained, the engine room crew would have begun to restart the reactor, an operation that would be expected to take at least 7 minutes.
* 09:12: Skylark pages Thresher on the underwater telephone: Gertrude check, K [over]. With no immediate response (although Skylark is still unaware of the conditions aboard Thresher), the signal K is repeated twice.
* 09:13: Harvey reports status via underwater telephone. The transmission is garbled, though some words are recognizable: [We are] experiencing minor difficulty, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow. The submarine, growing heavier from water flooding the engine room, continues its descent, probably tail-first. Another attempt to empty the ballast tanks is performed, again failing due to the formation of ice. Officers on the Skylark could hear the hiss of compressed air over the loudspeaker at this point.
* 09:14: Skylark acknowledges with a brisk, Roger, out, awaiting further updates from the SSN. A follow-up message, No contacts in area, is sent to reassure Thresher she can surface quickly, without fear of collision, if required.
* 09:15: Skylark queries Thresher about her intentions: My course 270 degrees. Interrogative range and bearing from you. There is no response, and Skylark’s captain, Lieutenant Commander Hecker, sends his own gertrude message to the submarine, Are you in control?
* 09:16: Skylark picks up a garbled transmission from Thresher, transcribed in the ship’s log as 900 N. [The meaning of this message is unclear, and was not discussed at the enquiry; it may have indicated the submarine’s depth and course, or it may have referred to a Navy event number (1000 indicating loss of submarine), with the N signifying a negative response to the query from Skylark, Are you in control? ]
* 09:17: A second transmission is received, with the partially recognizable phrase exceeding test depth…. The leak from the broken pipe grows with increased pressure.
* 09:18: Skylark detects a high-energy low-frequency noise with characteristics of an implosion.
* 09:20: Skylark continues to page Thresher, repeatedly calling for a radio check, a smoke bomb, or some other indication of the boat’s condition.
* 11:04: Skylark attempts to transmit a message to COMSUBLANT (Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet): Unable to communicate with Thresher since 0917R. Have been calling by UQC voice and CW, QHB, CW every minute. Explosive signals every 10 minutes with no success. Last transmission received was garbled. Indicated Thresher was approaching test depth…. Conducting expanding search. Radio problems meant that COMSUBLANT did not receive and respond to this message until 12:45. Hecker initiated Event SUBMISS [loss of a submarine] procedures at 11:21, and continued to repeatedly hail the Thresher until after 17:00.

On 11 April, at a news conference at 10:30, the Navy officially declared the ship as lost.

Memorial stone in Arlington National Cemetery, USS Thresher, July, 1967

* Just outside the main gate of the Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California, a Thresher-Scorpion Memorial honors the crews of the two submarines.[8]
* In Carpentersville, IL the Dundee Township Park District named a swimming facility in honor of Thresher.[citation needed]
* In Portsmouth, New Hampshire, there is a stone memorial with a plaque honoring all who were lost on the Thresher. It is located outside the USS Albacore museum.[9]
* A Joint Resolution was introduced in 2001 calling for the erection of a memorial in Arlington National Cemetery, but this proposal has yet to be adopted.[10]
* On 12 April 1963, President John Kennedy issued an Executive Order (No. 11104) paying tribute to the crew of Thresher by flying flags at half-staff.[11]
* The musician Phil Ochs composed a song detailing the vessel’s demise. This song appears on his debut album, All the News That’s Fit to Sing. Pete Seeger also composed a song inspired by the vessel.[citation needed]
* The Thresher’s hull number, 593, can be seen on the sailfin of the fictional USS Wayne in the movie The Spy Who Loved Me.[citation needed]
* In Eureka, Missouri, there is a marble stone at the post office on Thresher Drive honoring the officers and crew of the USS Thresher, Lost 10 April 1963 [12]

See also

* Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle
* USS Scorpion (SSN-589), the only other American nuclear-powered submarine to be lost at sea, sunk under mysterious circumstances in 1968
* John Craven USN Key individual in the search for Thresher


1. ^ [1]
2. ^ COMSUBPAC Web site, Submarines Lost or Damaged before and after World War II . http://www.csp.navy.mil/othboats/593.htm. Retrieved 2006-02-02.
3. ^ U.S. Gov Info / Resources, US Navy’s Submarine Rescue Team . http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa081700a.htm. Retrieved 2006-02-02.
4. ^ NOVA Web site, transcript of Submarines, Secrets, and Spies . http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2602subsecrets.html. Retrieved 2006-02-02.
5. ^ Brand, V (1977). Submersibles – Manned and Unmanned. . South Pacific Underwater Medicine Society journal 7 (3). ISSN 0813-1988. OCLC 16986801. http://archive.rubicon-foundation.org/6154. Retrieved 2008-07-10.
6. ^ The Times: Titanic search was cover for secret Cold War subs mission; May 24, 2008
7. ^ Bentley, John. The Thresher Disaster, New York: Doubleday, 1975, pp. 157-165
8. ^ http://www.submarinehistory.com/ThresherScorpionMemorial.html
9. ^ [2]
10. ^ http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/uss-thresher.htm
11. ^ http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/jfkeo//eo//11104.htm
12. ^ http://www.eureka.mo.us/MINUTES/2007PARK_BOARD/Park_Board_Minutes_4-10-07.pdf (pdf file)


* Loss of USS Thresher: http://www.submarinehistory.com/Thresher.html
* Thresher-Scorpion Memorial: http://www.submarinehistory.com/ThresherScorpionMemorial.html
* World War II National Submarine Memorial – West: http://www.submarinehistory.com/WWIISubmarineMemorial.html
* World War II National Submarine Memorial – East: http://www.submarinehistory.com/WWIISubmarineMemorial-East.html
* Sontag, Sherry; Drew, Christopher; Drew, Annette Lawrence (1998). Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage. Harper. ISBN 0-06-103004-X.
* Polmar, Norman Death of the Thresher The Lyons Press, ISBN 1-58574-348-8
* Bentley, John The Thresher Disaster Doubleday, ISBN 0-385-03057-6
* Rockwell, Theodore The Rickover Effect iUniverse, Inc, ISBN 0-595-74527-X
* http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read/USS-THRESHER-SSN593/2005-01/1104944120 — McCoole’s statement re: shutting main steam valves during reactor scram
* DeMercurio, Michael The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Submarines Alpha Books, ISBN 978-0028644714

External links

* On Eternal Patrol: USS Thresher
* http://www.ussthresher.com/
* http://www.thresherbase.org/
* Memorial Video on YouTube

v • d • e
Thresher/Permit-class submarine

Thresher A Permit A Plunger A Barb A Pollack A Haddo A Jack A Tinosa A Dace A Guardfish A Flasher A Greenling A Gato A Haddock
List of submarines of the United States Navy A List of submarine classes of the United States Navy

Coordinates: 41°46?N 65°03?W? / ?41.767°N 65.05°W? / 41.767; -65.05

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)
Categories: United States submarine accidents | Permit class submarines | Lost submarines of the United States | Lost nuclear submarines | Nuclear-powered ships | United States Navy nuclear ships | Maritime incidents in 1963 | Shipwrecks in the Atlantic Ocean | Ships built in Maine | 1960 ships



Lyman Lemnitzer
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer
August 29, 1899(1899-08-29) – November 12, 1988 (aged 89)
Lyman L. Lemnitzer.jpg
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, US Army (Ret.)
Place of birth Honesdale, Pennsylvania
Allegiance United States of America
Service/branch United States Army
Years of service {USAMA 1916-1920} 1920-1969
Rank US-O10 insignia.svg General
Commands held Chief of Staff of the United States Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Allied Commander, NATO
Battles/wars World War II
Korean War
Awards Army Distinguished Service Medal (3)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
British Order of the British Empire
French Legion of Merit (Officer)
German Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Gold
Other work Rockefeller Commission

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 – November 12, 1988) was an American Army General, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962. He then served Supreme Allied Commander, NATO from 1963 to 1969.

* 1 Biography
* 2 Awards and decorations
o 2.1 Foreign decorations
* 3 See also
* 4 References
* 5 External links


Lemnitzer was born on August 29, 1899 in Honesdale, Pennsylvania. He graduated from West Point in 1920 and was assigned at his request to a Coast Artillery unit. Lemnitzer served in the Philippines but soon began receiving the staff assignments that marked his military career.

Lemnitzer was promoted to Brigadier General in June 1942 and assigned to General Eisenhower’s staff shortly thereafter. He helped form the plans for the invasions of North Africa and Sicily and was promoted to Major General in November 1944. Lemnitzer was one of the senior officers sent to negotiate the Italian surrender during the secret Operation Sunrise and the German surrender in 1945.

Following the end of World War II, Lemnitzer was assigned to the Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was later named Deputy Commandant of the National War College. In 1950, at the age of 51, he took parachute training and was subsequently placed in command of the 11th Airborne Division. He was assigned to Korea in command of the 7th Infantry Division in November 1951 and was promoted to Lieutenant General in August 1952.

Lemnitzer was promoted to the rank of General and named Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and of the 8th Army in March 1955. He was named Chief of Staff of the Army in July 1957 and appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1960. As Chairman, Lemnitzer weathered the Bay of Pigs crisis and the early years of American involvement in Vietnam. He was also required to testify before the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee about his knowledge of the activities of Major General Edwin Walker, who had been dismissed from the Army over alleged attempts to promote his political beliefs in the military.

Lemnitzer approved the plans known as Operation Northwoods in 1962, a proposed plan to discredit the Castro regime and create support for military action against Cuba by staging false flag and develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington . Lemnitzer presented the plans to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. It is unclear how McNamara reacted, but three days later President Kennedy told the general that there was no chance that America would take military action against Cuba. Within a few months, after the denial of Operation Northwoods, Lemnitzer was denied another term as JCS chairman.[1]
In November 1962, Lemnitzer was appointed as Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, and as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO (the US European Command is the crown jewel of regional commands) in January 1963.[2] This period encompassed the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 and the withdrawal of NATO forces from France in 1966.
Major-General Arsa Jovanovic’, Major-General Fitzroy MacLean, Field Marshal Harold Alexander & Major-General Lyman Lemnitzer in Belgrade, February 1945.

Lemnitzer retired from the military in July 1969. In 1975, President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (aka the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate whether the Central Intelligence Agency had committed acts that violated American laws and allegations that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame) were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Lemnitzer died on November 12, 1988 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. His wife, Katherine Tryon Lemnitzer (1901-1994), is buried with him.

Lemnitzer was played by John Seitz in the 1991 Oliver Stone film, ‘JFK.
[edit] Awards and decorations

Lemnitzer was awarded numerous military awards and decorations[3] including but not limited to:
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal ribbon.svg
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with three oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service ribbon.svg Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service ribbon.svg Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star ribbon.svg Silver Star
Legion of Merit ribbon.svg Legion of Merit (Officer) and (Legionnaire) degrees
PresFree.gif Presidential Medal of Freedom (Awarded by President Reagan, June 23, 1987)
American Defense Service ribbon.svg American Defense Service Medal
Bronze service star
Bronze service star
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign ribbon.svg
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal (with two campaign stars)
American Campaign Medal ribbon.svg American Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal ribbon.svg World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation ribbon.svg Army of Occupation Medal
National Defense Service Medal ribbon.svg National Defense Service Medal
Bronze service star
Bronze service star
Korean Service Medal (with two service stars)

* Parachutist Badge

Foreign decorations

* Honorary Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Great Britain)
* Honorary Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Great Britain)
* Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic (Italy)
* Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown (Italy)
* Military Order of Merit (Italy)
* Grand Cross of the Légion d’honneur (France)
* Médaille militaire (France)
* Croix de guerre with Palm (France)
* Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Gold (Germany)
* Grand Officer of the Order of Boyaca (Columbia)
* Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (Japan)
* Medalha de Guerra (Brazil)
* Grand Official of the Order of Military Merit (Brazil)
* Order of Military Merit Teaguk (Korea)
* Order of Military Merit Teaguk with Gold Star (Korea)
* Gold Cross of Merit with Swords (Poland)
* Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (Thailand)
* Medal for Military Merit, First Class (Czechoslovakia)
* Royal Order of the White Eagle, Class II (Yugoslavia)
* Grand Star of Military Merit (Chile)
* Order of Melnik (Ethiopia)
* United Nations Korea Medal
* Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation

See also
World War II portal
United States Army portal


1. ^ ABC News: U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba
2. ^ Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General, United States Army . arlingtoncemetery.net. http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lemnitz.htm.
3. ^ Richard Nixon: Remarks on Presenting the Distinguished Service Medals of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. – July 11th, 1969

External links

* Finding aid for Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
* Official US Joint Chiefs of Staff Biography

Military offices
Preceded by
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Chief of Staff of the United States Army
1959—1960 Succeeded by
Gen. George Decker
Preceded by
Gen. Nathan F. Twining Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1960—1962 Succeeded by
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
Preceded by
Gen. Lauris Norstad Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
1963—1969 Succeeded by
Gen. Andrew Goodpaster

v • d • e
Leaders of the United States Army
Senior Officer /
Commanding General
Washington A Knox A Doughty A Harmar A St. Clair A Wayne A Wilkinson A Washington A Hamilton A Wilkinson A Dearborn A Brown
Macomb A Scott A McClellan A Halleck A Grant A Sherman A Sheridan A Schofield A Miles
Flag of the Chief of Staff of the Army
Flag of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
Chiefs of Staff
Young A Chaffee A Bates A Bell A Wood A Wotherspoon A Scott A Bliss A March A Pershing A Hines A Summerall A MacArthur A Craig A Marshall A Eisenhower A Bradley A Collins A Ridgway A Taylor A Lemnitzer A Decker A Wheeler A Johnson A Westmoreland A Palmer A Abrams A Weyand A Rogers A Meyer A Wickham A Vuono A Sullivan A Reimer A Shinseki A Schoomaker A Casey
Vice Chiefs of Staff
Collins A Haislip A Hull A Bolte A Palmer A Lemnitzer A Decker A Eddleman A Hamlett A Abrams A Haines A Palmer A Haig A Weyand A Kerwin A Kroesen A Vessey A Wickham A Thurman A Brown A RisCassi A Sullivan A Reimer A Peay A Tilelli A Griffith A Crouch A Shinseki A Keane A Casey A Cody A Chiarelli
v • d • e
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Bradley • Radford • Twining • Lemnitzer • Taylor • Wheeler • Moorer • Brown • Jones • Vessey • Crowe • Powell • Jeremiah (acting) • Shalikashvili • Shelton • Myers • Pace • Mullen
Flag of the Chairman
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyman_Lemnitzer
Categories: 1899 births | 1988 deaths | American military personnel of World War II | Burials at Arlington National Cemetery | Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | Recipients of the Distinguished Service Medal (United States) | Recipients of the Silver Star | Recipients of the Legion of Merit | American military personnel of the Korean War | People from Pennsylvania | United States Army Chiefs of Staff | United States Military Academy alumni | NATO Supreme Allied Commanders | Honesdale, Pennsylvania | United States Army Vice Chiefs of Staff | Recipients of the Croix de Guerre (France) | Grand Croix of the Légion d’honneur



Lessons from the Palomares nuclear accident | Bulletin of the …
May 13, 2009 … The 1966 nuclear accident over Palomares, Spain, was one of the worst mishaps … The United States, the thinking goes, would launch nuclear …

U.S. Nuclear Accidents
Article: US Nuclear Accidents. … over the coast of Spain, killing eight of the eleven crew members and igniting the KC-135’s 40000 gallons of jet fuel. …
US Dropped Four H-Bombs On Spain In 1966
PALOMARES, Spain — Almost 40 years have passed since the U.S. Air Force … fifth nuclear bomb from the Palomares accident was never recovered and remains …
Calendar of Nuclear Accidents
17-1984: Fire on board the US-nuclear submarine Guitarro 18-1968: Accident during launch of US satellite, radioactive materials fall into ocean near …
Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation: a reference book – Google Books Result
by Sarah J. Diehl, James Clay Moltz – 2002 – History – 375 pages
The United States submits a draft nuclear nonprolifera- tion treaty in August to the … midair accident and drops four nuclear weapons on Palomares, Spain. …
books.google.com/books?isbn=1576073610… –
Broken Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents | atomicarchive.com
Since 1950, there have been 32 nuclear weapon accidents, known as Broken Arrows. … with a KC-135 during refueling operations and crashed near Palomares, Spain. … The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Gato reportedly collided with a …
1966 Palomares B-52 crash – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Retrieved 2008-02-16. ^ a b c Megara, John. Dropping Nuclear Bombs on Spain, The Palomares Accident of 1966 and the U.S. Airborne Alert (PDF). …

N-BASE – Submarine accident list
The threat of a serious nuclear weapons accident has not disappeared with the … a KC-135 tanker aircraft while over the village of Palomares in southern Spain. … 9 April 1981: The U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS …
http://www.n-base.org.uk/public/report…/air_sea_accidents.html – Cached – Similar –


John R. Bolton
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

John Bolton

25th United States Ambassador to the United Nations
In office
August 1, 2005 – December 9, 2006
President George W. Bush
Preceded by John Danforth

Anne W. Patterson (acting)
Succeeded by Alejandro Wolff (acting, Dec.2006-April 2007)

Zalmay Khalilzad (May 2007 to Jan 2009)
Born November 20, 1948 ( 1948-11-20) (age 60)
Baltimore, Maryland
Political party Republican
Spouse(s) Gretchen Bolton
Children Jennifer Sarah Bolton
Profession Lawyer, diplomat
Military service
Service/branch United States Army National Guard
Unit Maryland

John Robert Bolton (born November 20, 1948), is an American conservative political figure who has been employed in several Republican presidential administrations. He worked as the interim Permanent US Representative to the UN from August 2005 until December 2006 on a recess appointment[1], and resigned in December 2006 when his recess appointment would have ended[2] [3] and he was unable to gain confirmation from the Senate.[4][5]

Bolton is currently a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and of counsel to the law firm Kirkland & Ellis, in their Washington D.C. office.[6] He is also involved with a broad assortment of other conservative think tanks and policy institutes, including the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), Institute of East-West Dynamics, National Rifle Association, US Commission on International Religious Freedom, and the Council for National Policy (CNP). Bolton is often described as a neoconservative,[7][8][9] though he personally rejects the term.[10]

* 1 Background and education
* 2 Personal life
* 3 Legal career
* 4 Public policy career
* 5 Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
o 5.1 Weapons of mass destruction
o 5.2 Diplomacy
o 5.3 Criticism
* 6 Permanent Representative to the UN
o 6.1 Views on the United Nations
o 6.2 2005 nomination, Senate confirmation hearings
+ 6.2.1 Day 1
+ 6.2.2 Day 2
+ 6.2.3 Erosion of Republican support
o 6.3 The Democrats’ filibuster
o 6.4 Accusations of false statement
o 6.5 Recess appointment
o 6.6 Term at the UN
o 6.7 2006 nomination
o 6.8 Support for Bolton
* 7 American Enterprise Institute
* 8 References
* 9 Bibliography
o 9.1 Books
* 10 External links

Background and education

Bolton was born in Baltimore, Maryland. The son of a fireman[11], he grew up in the working-class neighborhood of Yale Heights and won a scholarship to the McDonogh School in Owings Mills, Maryland, graduating in 1966. He also ran the school’s Students For Goldwater campaign in 1964. He then attended Yale University, where he shared classes with his friend Clarence Thomas, and was a contemporary of Bill and Hillary Clinton at Yale Law School.[12]. He was a member of the Yale Political Union, and he ultimately earned a B.A. summa cum laude in 1970 and a J.D. in 1974. Though Bolton supported the Vietnam War, he enlisted in the Maryland Army National Guard, but did not serve in Vietnam. He wrote in his Yale 25th reunion book I confess I had no desire to die in a Southeast Asian rice paddy. I considered the war in Vietnam already lost. [13] In an interview, Bolton discussed his comment in the reunion book, explaining that he decided to avoid service in Vietnam because by the time I was about to graduate in 1970, it was clear to me that opponents of the Vietnam War had made it certain we could not prevail, and that I had no great interest in going there to have Teddy Kennedy give it back to the people I might die to take it away from. [14][15]

Personal life

He is married to Gretchen Smith Bolton. She has degrees from Wellesley College and New York University. The couple’s home is currently in Bethesda, Maryland.[16]. They have one daughter, Jennifer Sarah, who graduated from the Holton-Arms School and, in May 2008, graduated from Yale in the same residential college as her father did, Calhoun College. She is the former Chairman of the Tory Party of the Yale Political Union, an organization her father was also involved in. John Bolton is a member of the Lutheran Church.[17]

Legal career

From 1974 to 1981, Bolton was an associate at the Washington office of Covington & Burling; he returned to the firm again from 1983 to 1985. Bolton was also a partner in the law firm of Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus, from 1993–1999.[18][19]

Public policy career

Between 1997 and 2000, Bolton worked pro bono as an assistant to James Baker in Baker’s capacity as Kofi Annan’s personal envoy to the Western Sahara.[20] Before joining the George W. Bush administration, Bolton was Senior Vice President for Public Policy Research at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank.

During the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, he worked in several positions within the State Department, the Justice Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

His Justice Department position required him to advance Reagan administration positions, including opposition[citation needed] to financial reparations to Japanese-Americans held in World War II-era internment camps; the insistence of Reagan’s executive privilege during William Rehnquist’s chief justice confirmation hearings, when Congress asked for memos written by Rehnquist as a Nixon Justice Department official; the framing of a bill to control illegal immigration as an essential drug war measure; and, issues related to the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair.

Bolton’s government service included such positions as:

* Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs at the Department of State (1989–1993), where he led in the successful effort to rescind the UN resolution from the 1970s that had equated Zionism with racism, and also played a major role in obtaining UN resolutions endorsing the use of force to fight Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait;
* Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (1985–1989);
* Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID (1982–1983); and
* General Counsel, USAID (1981–1982).[18][19]

Bolton is also the former executive director of the Committee on Resolutions in the Republican National Committee.[18]

During the George W. Bush administration, Bolton has been the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (2001-2005) and U.S. Ambassador to the UN (2005-2006).

Bolton has been a prominent participant in some neoconservative groups such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG). But Bolton disputes the label neo-conservative attached to him[7],pointing out that he was a conservative since high school, when he worked on the 1964 Goldwater campaign[21].

Bolton was formerly involved with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Federalist Society, National Policy Forum, National Advisory Board, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, New Atlantic Initiative, Project on Transitional Democracies).

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
John Bolton
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
In office
2001 – 2005
Preceded by new position
Succeeded by Robert Joseph

Bolton worked as the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, sworn in to this position on May 11, 2001. In this role, a key area of his responsibility was the prevention of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Bolton also led the Bush administration’s opposition on constitutional grounds[22] to the International Criminal Court, negotiating with many countries to sign agreements, called Article 98 agreements, with the U.S. to exempt Americans from prosecution by the Court, which is not recognized by the U.S.; more than 100 countries have signed such agreements so far. Bolton said the decision to pull out of the ICC was the happiest moment of his political career so far.[23]

Weapons of mass destruction

Bolton was instrumental in derailing a 2001 biological weapons conference in Geneva convened to endorse a UN proposal to enforce the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, led by Bolton, argued that the plan would have put U.S. national security at risk by allowing spot inspections of suspected U.S. weapons sites, despite the fact that the U.S. claims not to have carried out any research for offensive purposes since 1969. [24]

Also in 2002, Bolton is said to have flown to Europe to demand the resignation of Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and to have orchestrated his removal at a special session of the organization.[citation needed] The United Nations’ highest administrative tribunal later condemned the action as an unacceptable violation of principles protecting international civil servants. Bustani had been unanimously re-elected for a four-year term — with strong U.S. support — in May 2000, and in 2001 was praised for his leadership by Colin Powell.[25]

He also pushed for reduced funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to halt the proliferation of nuclear materials.[26] At the same time, he was involved in the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, working with a number of countries to intercept the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and in materials for use in building nuclear weapons.[citation needed]


According to an article in the The New Republic, Bolton was highly successful in pushing his agenda, but his bluntness has won him many enemies. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has called Bolton ‘rude’ and ‘undiplomatic’ .[27] In response to critics, Bolton states that his record demonstrates clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Bush administration officials have stated that his past statements would allow him to negotiate from a powerful position. It’s like the Palestinians having to negotiate with [Israeli Prime Minister] Ariel Sharon. If you have a deal, you know you have a deal, an anonymous official told CNN.[28] He also won widespread praise for his work establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative,[29] a voluntary agreement supported by 60 countries .[30]

He was part of the State Department’s delegation to six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program in 2003. He was removed from the delegation after describing Kim Jong-il as a tyrannical dictator and saying that, for North Koreans under Kim’s rule, life is a hellish nightmare. [31] In response, a North Korean spokesman said such human scum and bloodsucker is not entitled to take part in the talks. [32] Congressional Democrats argued that Bolton’s words at the time were undiplomatic and endangered the talks. Critics argued that Bolton’s record of allegedly politicizing intelligence would harm U.S. credibility with the United Nations[33] President Bush said he wanted John Bolton because he can get the job done at the United Nations. [34]. Bolton recalls that his ‘happiest moment at State was personally ‘unsigning’ the Rome Statute,’ which had set up the International Criminal Court.[35]


Critics allege Bolton tried to spin intelligence to support his views and political objectives on a number of occasions. Greg Thielmann, of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was assigned as the daily intelligence liaison to Bolton. Thielmann stated to Seymour Hersh that, Bolton seemed troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear … I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, ‘The Undersecretary doesn’t need you to attend this meeting anymore.’ According to former coworkers, Bolton withheld information that ran counter to his goals from Secretary of State Colin Powell on multiple occasions, and from Powell’s successor Condoleezza Rice on at least one occasion.[36]

In 2002, Bolton accused Cuba of transfers of biological weapons technology to rogue states and called on it to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. [37] According to a Scripps Howard News Service article, Bolton wanted to say that Cuba had a biological weapons capacity and that it was exporting it to other nations. The intelligence analysts seemed to want to limit the assessment to a declaration that Cuba ‘could’ develop such weapons. [38] According to AlterNet, a progressive/liberal activist news service, Bolton attempted to have the chief bioweapons analyst in the State Department’s bureau of intelligence and research and the CIA’s national intelligence officer for Latin America reassigned. Under oath at his Senate hearings for confirmation as Ambassador, he denied trying to have the men fired, but seven intelligence officials contradicted him.[26] Ultimately, intelligence officials refused to allow Bolton to make the harsh criticism of Cuba he sought to deliver, [38] and were able to keep their positions. Bolton claims that the issue was procedural rather than related to the content of his speech and that the officers, who did not work under him, behaved unprofessionally.

Bolton is alleged by Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman to have played a role in encouraging the inclusion of statement that British Intelligence had determined Iraq attempted to procure yellowcake uranium from Niger in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address.[39] These statements were claimed by critics of the President to be partly based on documents later found to be forged.[40] Waxman’s allegations have no visible means of support as they are based on classified documents.[39]

Bolton is alleged by the Knight Ridder news agency to have been scheduled to tell the House of Representatives International Relations subcommittee that Syria’s development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they posed a threat to stability in the region. Knight Ridder reported that Bolton’s appearance was cancelled after CIA and other intelligence agencies said that assessment was exaggerated.

Bolton claimed that Iran and Syria were threatening the world with weapons of mass destruction, an allegation that was denied by the CIA. Bolton has also made threats against Iran. In a 2006 speech to AIPAC, Bolton threatened Iran with painful consequences if that country did not yield to Washington demands that it shut down all its nuclear programs. Bolton’s actions at the United Nations Security Council were controversial. During and after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, he consistently blocked efforts to adopt a ceasefire. He rejected criticism of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon and claimed that there is no moral equivalence between Lebanese civilians killed accidentally by Israel retaliation attacks and Israelis killed by malicious terrorist acts .

Bolton stated in June 2004 congressional testimony Iran was lying about enriched uranium contamination: Another unmistakable indicator of Iran’s intentions is the pattern of repeatedly lying to … the IAEA, … when evidence of uranium enriched to 36 percent was found, it attributed this to contamination from imported centrifuge parts. However, later isotope analysis supported Iran’s explanation of foreign contamination for most of the observed enriched uranium.[41] At their August 2005 meeting the IAEA’s Board of Governors concluded: Based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of that analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran’s statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. [42]. Bolton has authored a new book titled Surrender Is Not an Option. In his book Bolton criticizes the Bush administration for changing its foreign policy objectives during the start of the administration’s second term.[43]

On May 28, 2008, the British activist George Monbiot attempted to make a citizen’s arrest of Bolton, for his role as an architect of the Iraq War at the Hay Festival of Literature & Arts in Hay-on-Wye, Wales. The attempt was unsuccessful, and Monbiot was ejected by security personnel.[44]

Permanent Representative to the UN
President George W. Bush announces the nomination of Bolton as the U.S. Ambassador to UN as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice looks on.

On March 7, 2005 Bolton was nominated to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations by President George W. Bush. As a result of a Democratic filibuster, he was never confirmed by the Senate and thus never obtained the official title of Ambassador. Bolton’s nomination received strong support from Republicans but faced heavy opposition from Democrats due initially to concerns about his strongly expressed views on the United Nations.

Holding a 10-8 majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (tasked with vetting ambassadorial nominees), the Republican leadership hoped to send Bolton’s nomination to the full Senate with a positive recommendation. Concern among some Republicans on the committee, however, prompted the leadership to avoid losing such a motion and instead to send the nomination forward with no recommendation. In the full Senate, Republican support for the nomination remained uncertain, with the most vocal Republican critic, Ohio Senator George V. Voinovich, circulating a letter urging his Republican colleagues to oppose the nomination.[45] Democrats insisted that a vote on the nomination was premature, given the resistance of the White House to share classified documents related to Bolton’s alleged actions. The Republican leadership moved on two occasions to end debate, but because a supermajority of 60 votes is needed to end debate, the leadership was unable to muster the required votes with only a 55-44 majority in the body. An earlier agreement between moderates in both parties to prevent filibustering of nominees was interpreted by the Democrats to relate only to judicial nominees,[46] not ambassadorships, although the leader of the effort, Sen. John McCain, said the spirit of the agreement was to include all nominees.

On November 9, 2006, Bush, only days after losing both houses to a Democratic majority, sent the nomination[47] for John Robert Bolton to continue as representative for the United States at the UN.[48] He said: I believe that the leaders of both political parties must try to work through our differences. And I believe we will be able to work through differences. I reassured the House and Senate leaders that I intend to work with the new Congress in a bipartisan way to address issues confronting this country.

Views on the United Nations

Bolton has been a strong critic of the United Nations for much of his career. In a 1994 Global Structures Convocation hosted by the World Federalist Association (now Citizens for Global Solutions), he stated,
“ There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international community, which can only be led by the only remaining superpower, which is the United States. [49] He also stated that The Secretariat Building in New York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference. [50] ”

Both Bolton’s opponents[51] and his supporters[52] have used the same video of his remarks at the 1994 event in support of their points of view.

When pressed on the statement during the confirmation process, he responded, There’s not a bureaucracy in the world that couldn’t be made leaner. [53] In a paper on U.S. participation in the UN, Bolton stated the United Nations can be a useful instrument in the conduct of American foreign policy. [54]

A member of the Project for the New American Century, Bolton was also one of the signers of the January 26, 1998 PNAC letter sent to President Bill Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein from power using U.S. diplomatic, political and military power. The letter also stated American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

The November 15, 2005 Washington Times article Can the U.S. find a substitute for the U.N.? noted that Bolton advocates a revolution of reform at the UN. Specifically, he called for:

* The five permanent members of the UN Security Council to work more closely to craft powerful resolutions and make sure they are enforced, and to address the underlying causes of conflicts, rather than turning them over to the Secretariat and special envoys;
* A focus on administrative skills in choosing the next secretary-general; and
* A more credible and responsible Human Rights Commission.

Bolton noted that the U.S. had the option of relying on regional or other international organizations to advance its goals if the U.N. proves inadequate.[55]

2005 nomination, Senate confirmation hearings
Day 1

On April 11, 2005, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviewed Bolton’s qualifications. Bolton said that he and his colleagues view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy and will work to solve its problems and enhance its strengths.[citation needed]

Republican committee chairman Richard Lugar of Indiana criticized Bolton for ignoring the policy consequences of his statements, saying diplomatic speech should never be undertaken simply to score international debating points to appeal to segments of the U.S. public opinion or to validate a personal point of view. [56] The committee’s top Democrat, Joe Biden of Delaware, compared sending Bolton to the UN to sending a bull into a china shop, and expressed grave concern about Bolton’s diplomatic temperament and his record: In my judgment, your judgment about how to deal with the emerging threats have not been particularly useful, Biden said.

Republican Senator George Allen of Virginia said that Bolton had the experience, knowledge, background, and the right principles to come into the United Nations at this time, calling him the absolute perfect person for the job.

Russ Feingold, a Democrat on the committee from Wisconsin, asked Bolton about what he would have done had the Rwandan genocide occurred while he was ambassador to the United Nations, and criticized his answer – which focused on logistics – as amazingly passive.

According to Newsday, Lincoln Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island, may be pivotal for Bolton’s nomination. [57] His initial remarks were cautiously favorable: You said all the right things in your opening statement. Chafee stated that he would probably support Bolton unless something surprising shows up.

According to an Associated Press story on the hearing, [T]hree protesters briefly interrupted the proceedings, standing up in succession with pink T-shirts and banners, one reading: ‘Diplomat for hire. No bully please.’ These protesters were part of a group advocating representation in the Senate for residents of the District of Columbia that is known for such demonstrations at a variety of hearings.

Day 2

On April 12, 2005, the Senate panel focused on allegations discussed above that Bolton pressured intelligence analysts. I’ve never seen anybody quite like Secretary Bolton. … I don’t have a second, third or fourth in terms of the way that he abuses his power and authority with little people, former State Department intelligence chief Carl W. Ford Jr., said, calling Bolton a serial abuser. Ford contradicted Bolton’s earlier testimony, saying: I had been asked for the first time to fire an intelligence analyst for what he had said and done. Ford also characterized Bolton as a kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy , implying that he was always ready to please whoever had authority over him, while having very little regard for people working under him[58].

Lugar, who criticized Bolton at his April 11 hearing, said that the paramount issue was supporting Bush’s nominee. He conceded that [b]luntness may be required, even though it is not very good diplomacy.

Chafee, the key member for Bolton’s approval, said that the bar is very high for rejecting the president’s nominees, suggesting that Bolton would make it to the Senate.

Erosion of Republican support
Search Wikinews Wikinews has related news: U.S. Senator Voinovich allows Bolton nomination to pass to full Senate vote

On April 19, Democrats, with support from Voinovich, forced Lugar to delay the committee vote on Bolton’s nomination until May. The debate concerning his nomination raged in the Senate prior to the Memorial Day recess. Two other Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee, Chafee and Chuck Hagel, also expressed serious concerns about the Bolton nomination.

Asked on April 20 if he was now less inclined to support the nomination, Chafee said, That would be accurate. He further elaborated that Bolton’s prospects were hard to predict but said he expected that the administration is really going to put some pressure on Senator Voinovich. Then it comes to the rest of us that have had some reservations.

On April 20, it emerged that Melody Townsel, a former US AID contractor, had reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Bolton had used inflammatory language and thrown objects in the course of her work activities in Moscow. Townsel’s encounter with Bolton occurred when she served as a whistleblower against a poorly performing minority contractor for US AID, IBTCI. Townsel told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that Bolton had made derogatory remarks about her sexual orientation and weight, among other workplace improprieties. In an official interview with Senate Foreign Relation Committee staff, Townsel detailed her accusations against Bolton, which were confirmed by Canadian designer Uno Ramat, who had served as an IBTCI employee and one of Townsel’s AID colleagues. Time Magazine, among other publications, verified Townsel’s accusations and Ramat’s supporting testimony, and Townsel’s story was transcribed and entered into the official Senate committee record. Townsel, who was an employee of Young & Rubicam at the time of her encounter with Bolton, continued working for the company on a variety of other US AID projects.

On April 22 the New York Times and other media alleged that Bolton’s former boss, Colin Powell, was personally opposed to the nomination and had been in personal contact with Chafee and Hagel. The same day, Reuters reported that a spokesman for Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) said that the Senator felt the committee did the right thing delaying the vote on Bolton in light of the recent information presented to the committee. [59]

On April 28, The Guardian reported that Powell was conducting a campaign against Bolton because of the acrimonious battles they had had while working together, which among other things had resulted in Powell cutting Bolton out of talks with Iran and Libya after complaints about Bolton’s involvement from the British. It added that The foreign relations committee has discovered that Bolton made a highly unusual request and gained access to 10 intercepts by the National Security Agency… Staff members on the committee believe that Bolton was probably spying on Powell, his senior advisers and other officials reporting to him on diplomatic initiatives that Bolton opposed. [60] However, Rich Lowry pointed out that During the same four-year period, other State Department officials made roughly 400 similar requests. [61]

Also on May 11, Newsweek reported allegations that the American position at the 7th Review Conference in May 2005[62] of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty had been undercut by Bolton’s absence without leave during the nomination fight, quoting anonymous sources close to the negotiations .[63]

The Democrats’ filibuster

On May 26, 2005, Senate Democrats postponed the vote on Bolton’s UN nomination. The Republican leadership failed to gain enough Republican or Democratic support to pass a cloture motion on the floor debate over Bolton, and minority leader Harry Reid conceded the move signaled the first filibuster of the year. The Democrats claimed that key documents regarding Bolton and his career at the Department of State were being withheld by the Bush administration. Scott McClellan, White House press secretary, responded by saying, Just 72 hours after all the good will and bipartisanship (over a deal on judicial nominees), it’s disappointing to see the Democratic leadership resort back to such a partisan approach. [64]

The failure of the Senate to end debate on Bolton’s nomination provided one surprise for some: Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) voted against cloture for procedural reasons, so that he could bring up a cloture vote in the future.[65] (Although Voinovich once spoke against confirming Bolton, he voted for cloture.) Senator John Thune (R-SD) voted to end debate but announced that he would vote against Bolton in the up-or-down vote as a protest against the government’s plans to close a military base (Ellsworth) in his home state.

On June 20, 2005 the Senate voted again on cloture. The vote failed 54-38, six votes short of ending debate. That marked an increase of two no votes, including the defection of Voinovich, who switched his previous yes vote and urged President Bush to pick another nominee (Democrats Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu and Ben Nelson voted to end debate both times). On June 21, Frist expressed his view that attempting another vote would be pointless, but later that day, following a lunch at the White House, changed his position, saying that he would continue to push for an up-or-down vote.[66] Voinovich later recanted his opposition and stated that if Bolton were renominated he would have supported the nomination.[67]

Accusations of false statement

On July 28, 2005 it was revealed that a statement made by Bolton on forms submitted to the Senate was false. Bolton indicated that in the prior five years he had not been questioned in any investigation, but in fact he had been interviewed by the State Department’s Inspector General as part of an investigation into the sources of pre-war claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After insisting for weeks that Bolton had testified truthfully on the form, the State Department reversed itself, stating that Bolton had simply forgotten about the investigation.[68]

Recess appointment
Search Wikinews Wikinews has related news:

* Bush likely to appoint Bolton during congressional recess
* Bush appoints John Bolton United States’ ambassador to the United Nations

On August 1, 2005, Bush officially made a recess appointment of Bolton, installing him as Permanent US Representative to the UN. A recess appointment lasts until the next session of Congress ends or until the individual is renominated and confirmed by the Senate. During the announcement, Bush said, This post is too important to leave vacant any longer, especially during a war and a vital debate about U.N. reform. [69] Democrats criticized the appointment, and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said Bolton would lack credibility in the U.N. because he lacked Senate confirmation.[70] U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed Mr. Bolton, but told reporters that the new ambassador should consult with others as the administration continued to press for changes at the United Nations.[71]

Term at the UN

The Economist called Bolton the most controversial Ambassador ever sent by America to the United Nations. Some colleagues in the UN appreciated the goals Bolton was trying to achieve, but not his abrasive style.[72][73] The New York Times, in its editorial The Shame of the United Nations, praised Bolton’s stance on reforming the disgraceful United Nations Human Rights Commission ,[74] saying John Bolton, is right; Secretary-General Kofi Annan is wrong. The Times also said that the commission at that time was composed of some of the world’s most abusive regimes who used their membership as cover to continue their abusiveness.

Bolton also opposed the proposed replacement for the Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council, as not going far enough for reform, saying: “We want a butterfly. We don’t intend to put lipstick on a caterpillar and call it a success.”[75]

2006 nomination

Bush announced his intention to renominate Bolton for confirmation as U.N. ambassador at the beginning of 2006, and a new confirmation hearing was held on July 27, 2006, in the hope of completing the process before the expiration of Bolton’s recess appointment at the end of the 109th Congress.[76] Voinovich, who had previously stood in opposition to Bolton, had amended his views and determined that Bolton was doing a good job as UN Ambassador; in February 2006, he said I spend a lot of time with John on the phone. I think he is really working very constructively to move forward. [77]

Over the summer and during the fall election campaign, no action was taken on the nomination because Chafee, who was in a difficult re-election campaign, blocked a Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote.[citation needed] Without his concurrence, the SFRC would have been deadlocked 9-9, and the nomination could not have gone to the Senate floor for a full vote. Bush formally resubmitted the nomination on November 9, 2006, immediately following a midterm election that would give control of the 110th Congress to the Democratic party.[78] Chafee, who had just lost his re-election bid, issued a statement saying he would vote against recommending Bolton for a Senate vote, citing what he considered to be a mandate from the recent election results: On Tuesday, the American people sent a clear message of dissatisfaction with the foreign policy approach of the Bush administration. To confirm Mr. Bolton to the position of U.N. ambassador would fly in the face of the clear consensus of the country that a new direction is called for. [79]

On December 4, 2006, Bolton announced that he would terminate his work as U.S. Representative to the UN at the end of the recess appointment and would not continue to seek confirmation.[80] His letter of resignation from the Bush administration was accepted on December 4, 2006, effective when his recess appointment ended December 9 at the formal adjournment of the 109th Congress.

The announcement was characterized as Bolton’s resignation by the Associated Press,[81] United Press International,[82] ABC News,[83] and other news sources, as well as a White House press release[3] and President Bush himself.[84] The White House, however, later objected to the use of this language. Deputy Press Secretary Dana Perino told CBS News it is not a resignation. [85] The actual language of the President’s written acceptance was: It is with deep regret that I accept John Bolton’s decision to end his service in the Administration as Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations when his commission expires. However, at press conference, the president said, I received the resignation of Ambassador John Bolton. I accept it. I’m not happy about it. I think he deserved to be confirmed. [84] Some news organizations subsequently altered their language to phrases such as to step down, to leave, or to exit. [citation needed]

Support for Bolton

During his confirmation hearings in 2005, letters with signatures of more than 100 co-workers and professional colleagues were sent to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in praise of Bolton and contradicting other criticisms and allegations concerning his diplomatic style and his treatment of colleagues and staff. In late 2006, when his nomination was again before the Committee, another letter signed by more than 56 professional colleagues supporting the renomination was sent to Senator Lugar.[86] A Wall Street Journal op ed by Claudia Rossett on December 5, 2006, said in part, Bolton has been valiant in his efforts to clean up UN corruption and malfeasance, and follow UN procedure in dealing with such threats as a nuclear North Korea, a Hezbollah bid to take over Lebanon, and the nuclearization of Hezbollah’s terror-masters in Iran. But it has been like watching one man trying to move a tsunami of mud.

American Enterprise Institute

In Bolton’s time at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, he spoke against the policy of rewarding North Korea for ending its nuclear weapons program.[87] He said the policy would encourage others to violate nuclear non-proliferation rules so that they could then be rewarded for following the rules they’d already agreed to.[87]

On three episodes of Fox News in May and June 2008, Bolton suggested that Israel may attack Iran after US elections in November.

In January 2009, Bolton proposed a three state solution to the Arab Israeli conflict in which Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank in some configuration reverts to Jordanian sovereignty. [88]

On July 27, 2009, John Bolton was appointed to the board of directors for EMS Technologies, Inc. (ELMG), a Georgia based tech company that subcontracts for many DOD contractors.


1. ^ Jennifer Senior (January 1, 2006). Bolton in a China Shop . New York. http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/international/features/15457/.
2. ^ White House announces John Bolton’s resignation . International Herald Tribune. 2006-12-04. http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/04/news/bolton.php. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
3. ^ a b President Bush Accepts John Bolton’s Resignation as U.S. Representative to the United Nations . White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2006-12-04. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061204.html. Retrieved 2006-12-04.
4. ^ John Bolton resigns as ambassador to U.N. . Associated Press (MSNBC). 2006-12-04. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16036708/. Retrieved 2009-03-19.
5. ^ Cooper, Helene (2006-12-04). John Bolton resigns as ambassador to U.N. . World (The New York Times). http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/05boltoncnd.html?hp&ex=1165294800&en=0e5a81b1f6309575&ei=5094&partner=homepage. Retrieved 2009-03-19.
6. ^ Kirkland & Ellis LLP > Bolton, John R. Kirkland & Ellis, Retrieved February 6, 2009
7. ^ a b John Bolton: The Angriest Neocon
8. ^ Empire Builders: Neoconservatives and their blueprint for US power , Christian Science Monitor, June 2005
9. ^ David Ramm, Bolton, John R. , Current Biography Yearbook, 2006
10. ^ Jacob Heilbrun, They Knew They Were Right, Random House (2008), p. 266
11. ^ Embassy of the U.S. London: Current Issues: Current Issues: President George W. Bush: President Appoints Bolton U.S. Ambassador to United Nations
12. ^ John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad, Theshold, 2007
13. ^ Ross Goldberg and Sam Kahn, Bolton’s conservative ideology has roots in Yale experience , Yale Daily News, April 28, 2005.
14. ^ Diane Rehm Show, NPR, Nov. 12, 2007, http://wamu.org/programs/dr/07/11/12.php
15. ^ In his memoir, ‘Surrender Is Not an Option’, Bolton now writes that he didn’t want to ‘waste time on a futile struggle’. Cited Brian Urquhart, ‘One Angry Man’, New York Review of Books’, March 6,2008 pp.12-15,p.12
16. ^ official biography from aei.org
17. ^ A lecture about the book Surrender is not an option , November 13, 2007. See transcript here.
18. ^ a b c results.gov : Resources For The President’s Team
19. ^ a b http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/2976.htm
20. ^ US Department of State (2005-03-07). Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the UN . Press release. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43062.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
21. ^ John Bolton, Munk Debates
22. ^ Reasonable Doubt: The Case against the Proposed International Criminal Court
23. ^ Let the child live . The Economist. 2007-01-25. http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8599155. Retrieved 2007-08-16.
24. ^ Slavin, Barbara; Bill Nichols (2003-11-30). Bolton a ‘guided missile’ . USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-11-30-bolton-usat_x.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
25. ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/05/AR2005060500182.html
26. ^ a b AlterNet: The Abysmal Ambassador
27. ^ Kaplan, Lawrence F. (2004-03-29). THE SECRETS OF JOHN BOLTON’S SUCCESS. . The New Republic. http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040329&s=kaplan032904. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
28. ^ Bush nominates Bolton as U.N. ambassador . CNN. 2005-03-08. http://cnn.com/2005/US/03/07/bolton/. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
29. ^ http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm
30. ^ Profile: John Bolton . BBC News. 2005-08-01. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4327185.stm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
31. ^ Kralev, Nicholas (2003-08-04). Bush backs Bolton’s tough talk . The Washington Times. http://washingtontimes.com/world/20030804-111212-6491r.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
32. ^ Lee, Soo-Jeong (2003-08-04). North Korea bans Bolton from talks . The Washington Times. http://washingtontimes.com/world/20030804-121425-6611r.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
33. ^ Kaplan, Fred (2005-04-11). It’s Time To Write a Dear John . Slate Magazine. http://slate.msn.com/id/2116567/. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
34. ^ U.S. Will Pursue Common Approach to North Korea, Bush Says – US Department of State
35. ^ John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad, Theshold 2007, as cited by Brian Urquhart, ‘One Angry Man’, New York Review of Books, March 6,2008 pp.12-15,p.13
36. ^ Linzer, Dafna (2005-04-18). Bolton Often Blocked Information, Officials Say . The Washington Post. pp. A04. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61304-2005Apr17.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
37. ^ U.S.: Cuba Developing Biological Weapons . Fox News. 2002-05-06. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,52049,00.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
38. ^ a b http://www.knoxstudio.com/shns/story.cfm?pk=BOLTON-04-11-05&cat=WW
39. ^ a b http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20050301112122-90349.pdf
40. ^ Events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq: Africa-uranium allegation (Forged Niger Documents)
41. ^ Linzer, Dafna (2005-08-23). No Proof Found of Iran Arms Program . The Washington Post. pp. A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/22/AR2005082201447.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
42. ^ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf
43. ^ America’s latest African misadventure. – By Michela Wrong – Slate Magazine
44. ^ [1] Telegraph.co.uk May 28, 2008 Accessed May 28, 2008
45. ^ Jehl, Douglas (2005-05-26). Republican urges colleagues to reject UN . he International Herald Tribune. http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/bolton.php. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
46. ^ ConfirmThem
47. ^ Nominations Sent to the Senate
48. ^ Press Conference by the President
49. ^ Watson, Roland (2005-03-08). Bush deploys hawk as new UN envoy . The Times. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-1515816,00.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
50. ^ Applebaum, Anne (2005-03-09). Defending Bolton . The Washington Post. pp. A21. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18706-2005Mar8.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
51. ^ home accommodation uk activity holidays at stopbolton.org
52. ^ Move America Forward
53. ^ http://www.cumberlink.com/articles/2005/04/11/ap/headlines/d89ddcug0.txt
54. ^ USIA, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, May 1997 John R. Bolton, AMERICA’S SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS
55. ^ Pisik, Betsy (2005-11-15). Can the U.S. find a substitute for the U.N.? . The Washington Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20051115-123449-9640r.htm. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
56. ^ Borger, Julian (2005-04-12). Democrats try to block Bush’s man for UN job . The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1457569,00.html?gusrc=rss. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
57. ^ http://www.newsday.com/news/politics/wire/sns-ap-bush-un-ambassador-quotes,0,3383126.story?coll=sns-ap-politics-headlines
58. ^ USATODAY.com – Critic says Bolton a ‘kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy’
59. ^ http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=8270328
60. ^ Blumenthal, Sidney (2005-04-28). The good soldier’s revenge . The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1471879,00.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
61. ^ http://www.townhall.com/columnists/richlowry/rl20050422.shtml
62. ^ Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
63. ^ Hirsh, Michael; Eve Conant (2005-05-11). A Nuclear Blunder? . Newsweek. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7817986/site/newsweek/. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
64. ^ Jehl, Douglas (2005-05-27). DEMOCRATS FORCE SENATE TO DELAY A VOTE ON BOLTON . The New York Times. pp. A1, Column 6. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/27/politics/27bolton.html?hp&ex=1117252800&en=13e283b4538d3c0f&ei=5094&partner=homepage. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
65. ^ Say Anything
66. ^ http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/06/21/frist_says_no_new_vote_planned_for_bolton/
67. ^ Babington, Charles (2006-07-22). Bolton’s Nomination Revives After Senator Changes Mind . The Washington Post. pp. A02. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/21/AR2006072101351.html. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
68. ^ Weisman, Steven (2005-07-30). Bolton not truthful, 36 senators charge in opposing appointment . New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/30/politics/30bolton.html. Retrieved 2005-07-30.
69. ^ Bumiller, Elisabeth; Sheryl Stolberg (2005-08-01). Bush appoints Bolton as U.N. envoy, bypassing Senate . New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/01cnd.bolton.html. Retrieved 2005-08-01.
70. ^ Williams, Timothy (2005-08-01). Bush appoints Bolton as U.N. envoy, bypassing Senate . New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/01cnd-bolton.html. Retrieved 2005-08-01.
71. ^ Bumiller, Elisabeth; Sheryl Stolberg (2005-08-02). President sends Bolton to U.N.; bypasses Senate . New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/politics/02bolton.html. Retrieved 2008-02-08.
72. ^ His UNdoing . The Economist. 2006-12-07. pp. 33-34. http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8382325. Retrieved 2007-08-16.
73. ^ A matter of honour . The Economist. 2007-07-26. http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9546302. Retrieved 2007-08-16.
74. ^ The Shame of the United Nations . New York Times. 2006-02-26. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/opinion/26sun2.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fOpinion%2fEditorials%20and%20Op%2dEd%2fEditorials&oref=slogin. Retrieved 2006-08-15.
75. ^ Bad counsel . The Economist. 2007-04-04. http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8966293. Retrieved 2007-08-16.
76. ^ U.S. Congress (July 27 2006). Nominations . Congressional Record Daily Digest. http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/digest2006/d27JY061.pdf.
77. ^ [2]
78. ^ Key Republican joins Dems opposing Bolton nomination – CNN.com
79. ^ Bolton May Not Return As U.N. Envoy , Dafna Linzer, Washington Post, Friday, November 10, 2006
80. ^ http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/12/04/bolton.resignation.ap/index.html
81. ^ Terence Hunt (2006-12-04). Bush Accepts Bolton’s UN Resignation . CBS News. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/04/ap/politics/mainD8LQ53500.shtml. Retrieved 2006-12-04.
82. ^ Russians hope for better ties to U.S. . United Press International. 2006-12-04. http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20061204-121611-6155r. Retrieved 2006-12-04. : They were reacting to the resignation of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton earlier Monday, Bolton resigned after it became clear that the incoming Democratic-controlled Senate in the 110th Congress would not vote to confirm his appointment as ambassador.
83. ^ Ben Feller (2006-12-04). Bush Accepts Bolton’s U.N. Resignation . ABC News. http://www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2699916. Retrieved 2006-12-04.
84. ^ a b President Bush Meets with United Nations Ambassador John Bolton . Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. 2006-12-04. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061204-8.html. Retrieved 2006-12-04. : I received the resignation of Ambassador John Bolton. I accepted.
85. ^ White House Contests Claim That Bolton ‘Resigned’ . CBS News. 2006-12-04. http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/12/04/publiceye/entry2224533.shtml. Retrieved 2006-12-04.
86. ^ [3]
87. ^ a b Fighting fires . The Economist. 2007-02-16. http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8696412. Retrieved 2007-08-16.
88. ^ Jordan and Egypt should take over Palestine – Bolton, By Agence France Presse (AFP) , Tuesday, January 06, 2009 [4]


* Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations, Threshold Editions, ISBN 1416552847

External links
Search Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons has media related to: John R. Bolton
Search Wikiquote Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: John R. Bolton

* Profile: John R. Bolton, RightWeb
* John R. Bolton, Notable Names Database
* The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of the United Nations John Bolton’s chapter from the Cato Institute book, Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and Global Intervention
* John Bolton interviewed by Jon Stewart on The Daily Show from March 20, 2007
* John Bolton interview by Neal Conan on Talk of the Nation, May 1, 2007
* Audio interview with National Review Online

Government offices
Preceded by
John D. Holum Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
2001 – 2005 Succeeded by
Robert Joseph
Diplomatic posts
Preceded by
Anne W. Patterson (acting) United States Ambassador to the United Nations
2005 – 2006 Succeeded by
Alejandro Daniel Wolff (acting)

v • d • e
United States Ambassadors to the United Nations
Edward Stettinius, Jr. A Warren Austin A Henry C. Lodge, Jr. A James J. Wadsworth A Adlai Stevenson A Arthur Goldberg A George Ball A James R. Wiggins A Charles W. Yost A George H. W. Bush A John A. Scali A Daniel P. Moynihan A William Scranton A Andrew Young A Donald McHenry A Jeane Kirkpatrick A Vernon A. Walters A Thomas R. Pickering A Edward J. Perkins A Madeleine Albright A Bill Richardson A Richard Holbrooke A John Negroponte A John Danforth A John R. Bolton A Zalmay Khalilzad A Susan Rice
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Bolton
Categories: 1948 births | Assistant Attorneys General of the United States | Living people | American Lutherans | People from Baltimore, Maryland | United States Department of State officials | Permanent Representatives of the United States to the United Nations | People from Bethesda, Maryland | Yale University alumni | Yale Law School alumni | Recess Appointments during the George W. Bush administration | Reagan Administration personnel | American Enterprise Institute | Presidents of the United Nations Security Council


Broken Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents

Since 1950, there have been 32 nuclear weapon accidents, known as Broken Arrows. A Broken Arrow is defined as an unexpected event involving nuclear weapons that result in the accidental launching, firing, detonating, theft or loss of the weapon. To date, six nuclear weapons have been lost and never recovered.

Date: November 10, 1950
Location: Quebec, Canada
A B-50 jettisoned a Mark 4 bomb over the St. Lawrence River near Riviere-du-Loup, about 300 miles northeast of Montreal. The weapon’s HE [high explosive] detonated on impact. Although lacking its essential plutonium core, the explosion did scatter nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of uranium. The plane later landed safely at a U.S. Air Force base in Maine.

Date: March 10, 1956
Location: Exact Location Unknown
Carrying two nuclear capsules on a nonstop flight from MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida to an overseas base, a B-47 was reported missing. It failed to make contact with a tanker over the Mediterranean for a second refueling. No trace was ever found of the plane.

Date: July 27, 1956
Location: Great Britain
A B-47 bomber crashed into a nuclear weapons storage facility at the Lakenheath Air Base in Suffolk, England, during a training exercise. The nuclear weapons storage facility, known as an igloo, contained three Mark 6 bombs. Preliminary exams by bomb disposal officers said it was a miracle that one Mark 6 with exposed detonators sheared didn’t explode. The B-47’s crew was killed.

Date: February 5, 1958
Location: Off Georgia, United States
In a simulated combat mission, a B-47 collided with an F-86 near Savannah, Georgia. After attempting to land at Hunter Air Force Base with the nuclear weapon onboard, the weapon was jettisoned over water. The plane later landed safely. A nuclear detonation was not possible since the nuclear capsule was not on board the aircraft. Subsequent searches failed to locate the weapon.

Date: February 28, 1958
Location: Great Britain
A B-47 based at the U.S. air base at Greenham Common, England, reportedly loaded with a nuclear weapon, caught fire and completely burned. In 1960, signs of high-level radioactive contamination were detected around the base by a group of scientists working at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE). The U.S. government has never confirmed whether the accident involved a nuclear warhead.

Date: January 24, 1961
Location: North Carolina, United States
While on airborne alert, a B-52 suffered structural failure of its right wing, resulting in the release of two nuclear weapons. One weapon landed safely with little damage. The second fell free and broke apart near the town of Goldsboro, North Carolina. Some of the uranium from that weapon could not be recovered. No radiological contamination was detectable in the area.

Date: July 4, 1961
Location: North Sea
A cooling system failed, contaminating crew members, missiles and some parts of a K-19 Hotel -class Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine off Norway. One of the sub’s two reactors soared to 800 degrees Celsius and threatened to melt down the reactor’s fuel rods. Several fatalities were reported.

Date: December 5, 1965
Location: Pacific Ocean
An A-4E Skyhawk attack aircraft loaded with one B43 nuclear weapon rolled off the deck of the USS Ticonderoga. Pilot, plane and weapon were never found.

Date: Mid-1960s (Date undetermined)
Location: Kara Sea
Soviet nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin was forced to dump its reactors in the Kara Sea. Some accounts said the Lenin experienced a reactor meltdown.

Date: January 17, 1966
Location: Palomares, Spain
A B-52 carrying four nuclear weapons collided with a KC-135 during refueling operations and crashed near Palomares, Spain. One weapon was safely recovered on the ground and another from the sea, after extensive search and recovery efforts. The other two weapons hit land, resulting in detonation of their high explosives and the subsequent release of radioactive materials. Over 1,400 tons of soil was sent to an approved storage site.

Date: April 11, 1968
Location: Pacific Ocean
A Soviet diesel-powered Golf -class ballistic missile submarine sank about 750 miles northwest of the island of Oahu, Hawaii. Reports say the submarine was carrying three nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, as well as several nuclear torpedoes. Part of the submarine was reportedly raised using the CIA’s specially constructed Glomar Explorer deep-water salvage ship.

Date: November 1969
Location: White Sea
The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Gato reportedly collided with a Soviet submarine on November 14 or 15, 1969, near the entrance of the White Sea.

Date: April 12, 1970
Location: Atlantic Ocean
A Soviet November -class nuclear-powered attack submarine experienced an apparent nuclear propulsion problem in the Atlantic Ocean about 300 miles northwest of Spain. Although an attempt to attach a tow line from a Soviet bloc merchant ship; the submarine apparently sank, killing 52.

Date: November 22, 1975
Location: Off Sicily, Italy
The aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy and the cruiser USS Belknap collided in rough seas at night during exercises. Although it was declared as a possible nuclear weapons accident, no subsequent nuclear contamination was discovered during the fire and rescue operations.

Date: October 3, 1986
Location: Atlantic Ocean
A Soviet Yankee I -class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine suffered an explosion and fire in one of its missile tubes 480 miles east of Bermuda. The submarine sank while under tow on October 6 in 18,000 feet of water. Two nuclear reactors and approximately 34 nuclear weapons were on board.

Date: April 7, 1989
Location: Atlantic Ocean
About 300 miles north of the Norwegian coast, the Komsomolets, a Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine, caught fire and sank. The vessel’s nuclear reactor, two nuclear-armed torpedoes, and 42 of the 69 crew members were lost.

Date: August 10, 1985
Location: Near Vladivostok, Russia
While at the Chazhma Bay repair facility, about 35 miles from Vladivostok, an Echo -class Soviet nuclear-powered submarine suffered a reactor explosion. The explosion released a cloud of radioactivity toward Vladivostok but did not reach the city. Ten officers were killed in the explosion.

Date: September 27, 1991
Location: White Sea
A missile launch malfunction occurred during a test launch on a Typhoon -class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

Date: March 20, 1993
Location: Barents Sea
The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Grayling collided with a Russian Delta III nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Both vessels reportedly suffered only minor damage.

Date: February 11, 1992
Location: Barents Sea
A collision between a CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Sierra -class nuclear-powered attack submarine with the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine Baton Rouge. Both vessels reportedly suffered only minor damage. There is a dispute over the location of the incident in or outside Russian territorial waters.

Date: August 12, 2000
Location: Barents Sea
The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Oscar II class submarine, Kursk, sinks after a massive onboard explosion. Attempts to resuce the 118 men fail. It is thought that a torpedo failure caused the accident. Radiation levels are normal and the submarine had no nuclear weapons on board.

U.S. Defense Department
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
National Security Archive
Joshua Handler, Princeton University
United Press International
The Associated Press
Blind Man’s Bluff : The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage



Edwin Walker
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Edwin Anderson Walker
November 10, 1909(1909-11-10) – October 31, 1993 (aged 83)
Colonel Edwin A. Walker
Place of birth Center Point, Texas
Allegiance United States of America
Service/branch United States Army
Rank Major General
Commands held 24th Infantry Division
Battles/wars World War II
Korean War

Major General Edwin Anderson Walker (November 10, 1909 – October 31, 1993) of the U.S. Army was known for his conservative political views and for being an attempted assassination target of Lee Harvey Oswald.

* 1 Early life and military career
* 2 Assassination attempt
* 3 Associated Press v. Walker
* 4 Later life
* 5 Culture
* 6 Notes
* 7 External links

Early life and military career

Edwin Ted Walker was born in Center Point, Texas and graduated from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1927. He then attended the United States Military Academy, where he graduated in 1931.[1] During World War II, Walker commanded a subunit of the Canadian-American First Special Service Force in the invasion of Anzio, Italy in January 1944. In August 1944, Walker succeeded Robert T. Frederick as the unit’s commanding officer. The FSSF landed on the Hyeres Islands off of the French Riviera, taking out a strong German garrison.

Walker again saw combat in the Korean War, commanding the Third Infantry Division’s Seventh Infantry and was senior advisor to the First Korean Corps. He next became the commander of the Arkansas Military district in Little Rock, Arkansas. During his years in Arkansas, he implemented an order from President Eisenhower in 1957 to quell civil disturbances during the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock.

In 1959, General Walker was sent to Germany to command the 24th Infantry Division. In 1961, however, he became involved in controversy. Walker initiated an anti-communist indoctrination program for troops called Pro Blue (due to Free World troops being coloured blue on maps)[2] and was accused of distributing right-wing literature from the John Birch Society to the soldiers of his division. He was also quoted by a newspaper, the Overseas Weekly, as saying that Harry S. Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Dean Acheson were definitely pink. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara relieved Walker of his command, while an inquiry was conducted, and in October Walker was reassigned to Hawaii to become assistant chief of staff for training and operations in the Pacific. Instead, Walker resigned from the Army on November 2, 1961. Said Walker: It will be my purpose now, as a civilian, to attempt to do what I have found it no longer possible to do in uniform. [3]
In February 1962, Walker entered the race for Governor of Texas, but finished last among six candidates in a Democratic primary election in May that was won by John Connally.[4]

Walker organized protests in September 1962 against the use of federal troops to enforce the enrollment of African-American James Meredith at the racially segregated University of Mississippi. His public statement on September 29:

This is Edwin A. Walker. I am in Mississippi beside Gov. Ross Barnett. I call for a national protest against the conspiracy from within. Rally to the cause of freedom in righteous indignation, violent vocal protest, and bitter silence under the flag of Mississippi at the use of Federal troops. This today is a disgrace to the nation in ‘dire peril,’ a disgrace beyond the capacity of anyone except its enemies. This is the conspiracy of the crucifixion by anti-Christ conspirators of the Supreme Court in their denial of prayer and their betrayal of a nation.[5]

After a violent, 15-hour riot broke out on the campus, on September 30, in which two people were killed and six federal marshals were shot, Walker was arrested on four federal charges, including insurrection against the United States. Walker posted bond and returned home to Dallas, where he was greeted by a crowd of 200 supporters.[6] After a federal grand jury adjourned in January 1963 without indicting him, the charges were dropped. Because the dismissal of the charges was without prejudice, the charges could have been reinstated within five years.[7]

Assassination attempt

It was around this time that Walker got Lee Harvey Oswald’s attention. Oswald, a self-proclaimed Marxist,[8] considered Walker a fascist and the leader of a fascist organization. [9]

A front page story on Walker in the October 7, 1962, issue of the Worker, a Communist Party newspaper to which Oswald subscribed, warned the Kennedy administration and the American people of the need for action against [Walker] and his allies. On October 8, Oswald quit his job and moved to Dallas, with no explanation. Five days after the front page news on January 22, 1963 that Walker’s federal charges had been dropped,[10] Oswald ordered a revolver by mail, using the alias A.J. Hidell. [11]

In February 1963, Walker was making news by joining forces with evangelist Billy James Hargis in an anti-communist tour called Operation Midnight Ride .[12] In a speech Walker made on March 5, reported in the Dallas Times Herald, he called on the United States military to liquidate the scourge that has descended upon the island of Cuba. [13] Seven days later, Oswald ordered by mail a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, using the alias A. Hidell. [14]

Oswald began to put Walker under surveillance, taking pictures of Walker’s Dallas home on the weekend of March 9–10.[15] He planned the assassination for April 10, ten days after he was fired from the photography firm where he worked. He told his wife later that he chose a Wednesday evening because the neighborhood would be relatively crowded because of services in a church adjacent to Walker’s home; he would not stand out and could mingle with the crowds if necessary to make his escape. He left a note in Russian for his wife Marina with instructions should he be caught.[16] Walker was sitting at a desk in his dining room when Oswald fired at him from less than a hundred feet (30 m) away. Walker survived only because the bullet struck the wooden frame of the window, which deflected its path. However, he was injured in the forearm by fragments.

At the time, authorities had no idea who attempted to kill Walker. A police detective, D.E. McElroy, commented that Whoever shot at the general was playing for keeps. The sniper wasn’t trying to scare him. He was shooting to kill.

Marina Oswald stated later that she had seen Oswald burn most of his plans in the bathtub, though she hid the note he left her in a cookbook, with the intention of bringing it to the police should Oswald again attempt to kill Walker or anyone else. Marina later quoted her husband as saying, Well, what would you say if somebody got rid of Hitler at the right time? So if you don’t know about General Walker, how can you speak up on his behalf? [17] Oswald’s involvement in the attempt on Walker’s life was suspected within hours of his arrest on November 22, 1963, following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.[18] But police had no evidence of Oswald’s involvement in the Walker attempt until early December 1963, when the note and some of the photos were found by authorities. The bullet was too badly damaged to run conclusive ballistics tests, but neutron activation tests later determined that it was extremely likely the bullet was a Mannlicher-Carcano bullet manufactured by the Western Cartridge Company, the same ammunition used in the Kennedy assassination.[19]

Oswald later wrote to Arnold Johnson of the Communist Party, U.S.A., that on the evening of October 23, 1963 he had attended an ultra right meeting headed by Gen. Edwin A. Walker.[20]

Associated Press v. Walker

Angered by negative publicity he was receiving for his conservative political views, Walker began to file libel lawsuits against various media outlets. One of these suits was in response to coverage of his participation in the University of Mississippi riot, specifically that he had led a charge of students against federal marshals and that he had assumed command of the crowd. [21] A Texas trial court in 1964 found the statements false and defamatory.[22] The decision was appealed, as Associated Press v. Walker, all the way to the United States Supreme Court,[23] but the Court ruled against Walker and found that although the statements may have been false, the Associated Press was not guilty of reckless disregard in their reporting about Walker. The Court, which had previously said that public officials could not recover damages unless they could prove actual malice, extended this to public figures as well.

Later life

By resigning instead of retiring, Walker was unable to draw a pension from the Army. He made statements at the time to the Dallas Morning News that he had refused to take his pension. The Army restored his pension rights in 1982. He had made several previous requests for his pension dating back to 1973.[24]

Walker, then 66, was arrested on June 23, 1976 for public lewdness in a restroom at a Dallas park and accused of fondling an undercover policeman.[25][26][27] He was arrested again in Dallas for public lewdness on March 16, 1977.[28][29] He pled no contest to one of the two misdemeanor charges, was given a suspended, 30-day jail sentence, and fined $1,000.[30]

He died of lung cancer at his home in Dallas in 1993.[31]


* Walker was cited as inspiration for the Air Force General James Mattoon Scott character in the film Seven Days in May, although Walker himself is mentioned by name in the film.


1. ^ Handbook of Texas: Center Point, Texas. Retrieved March 16, 2007.
2. ^ p. 105 Schoenwald, Jonathan M. A Time for Choosing: The Rise of American Conservatism Oxford University Press 2001
3. ^ I Must Be Free . . ., Time, November 10, 1961.
4. ^ Elections of Texas Governors, 1845–2006.
5. ^ Walker Demands a ‘Vocal Protest,’ New York Times, September 30, 1962, p. 69.
6. ^ Crowd Welcomes Ex-Gen. Walker’s Return to Dallas, Dallas Morning News, October 8, 1962, sec. 1, p. 1.
7. ^ The Strange Case of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker.
8. ^ Radio debate between Oswald and anti-Castro activists Ed Butler and Carlos Bringuier at station WDSU in New Orleans, August 21, 1963.
9. ^ Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 1, p. 16, Testimony of Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald.
10. ^ Judge Dismisses Walker Charges, Dallas Morning News, January 22, 1963, sec. 1, p. 1.
11. ^ Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 16, p. 511, CE 135, Mail-order coupon in name of A.J. Hidell.
12. ^ Hargis Says Walker Will Join in Tour, Dallas Morning News, February 14, 1963, sec. 1, p. 16. Walker Preparing for Crusade, Dallas Morning News, February 17, 1963, sec. 1, p. 16. Pickets Protest Talks Given by Hargis, Walker, Dallas Morning News, March 28, 1963, sec. 4, p. 18.
13. ^ Dallas Times Herald, March 6, 1963.
14. ^ Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 17, p. 635, CE 773, Photograph of a mail order for a rifle in the name A. Hidell, and the envelope in which the order was sent.
15. ^ Construction work seen in one of the photos was determined by the supervisor to have been in that state of completion on March 9–10. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 22, p. 585, CE 1351, FBI Report, Dallas, Tex., dated May 22, 1964, reflecting investigation concerning photographs of the residence of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker.
16. ^ A photocopy of Oswald’s note, in Russian. Retrieved March 16, 2007.
17. ^ Testimony of Marina Oswald Porter, HSCA Hearings, vol. II, p. 232.
18. ^ Officials Recall Sniper Shooting at Walker Home , Dallas Morning News, November 23, 1963, sec. 1, p. 15.
19. ^ Testimony of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, HSCA Hearings, vol. I, p. 502.
20. ^ Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 20, p. 271, Undated letter from Lee Harvey Oswald to Arnold S. Johnson, with envelope postmarked November 1, 1963. Rally Talk Scheduled by Walker, Dallas Morning News, October 231963, sec. 1, p. 7. Walker Says U.S. Main Battleground, Dallas Morning News, October 241963, sec. 4, p. 1.
21. ^ Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1965).
22. ^ The General v. The Cub , Time, June 26, 1964.
23. ^ Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
24. ^ Warren Weaver, Jr., Pension Restored for Gen. Walker , New York Times, July 24, 1983, p. 17.
25. ^ General Walker Faces Sex Charge: Right-Wing Figure Accused in Dallas of Lewdness , United Press International, New York Times, July 9, 1976, p. 84.
26. ^ Catch as Catch Can, Time, July 26, 1976.
27. ^ Trial for Walker Routinely Passed , Dallas Morning News, September 15, 1976, p. D4.
28. ^ Police Arrest Retired General for Lewdness, Dallas Morning News, March 17, 1977, p. B18.
29. ^ General Walker Free on Bond , New York Times, March 18, 1977, p. 8.
30. ^ Judge Convicts, Fines Walker , Dallas Morning News, May 23, 1977, p. A5.
31. ^ Eric Pace, Gen. Edwin Walker, 83, Is Dead; Promoted Rightist Causes in 60’s , New York Times, November 2, 1993, p. B-10.

External links

* Edwin Walker biography page
* The Strange Case of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker
* The Handbook of Texas Online: Walker, Edwin A.

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Walker
Categories: American military personnel of the Korean War | American military personnel of World War II | Cancer deaths in Texas | Deaths from lung cancer | John Birch Society | John F. Kennedy assassination | People from Kerr County, Texas | Recipients of the Combat Infantryman Badge | United States Army generals | United States Military Academy alumni | American anti-communists | 1909 births | 1993 deaths



United States President’s Commission on CIA activities within the United States

The U.S. President’s Commission on CIA activities within the United States was set up under President Gerald Ford in 1975 to investigate the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies within the United States. The commission was led by the Vice President, Nelson Rockefeller, and is sometimes referred to as the Rockefeller Commission.

The commission was created in response to a December 1974 report in The New York Times that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. The commission issued a single report in 1975, touching upon certain CIA abuses including mail opening and surveillance of domestic dissident groups. It publicized Project MKULTRA, a CIA mind control study. It also studied issues relating to the John F. Kennedy assassination, specifically the head snap as seen in the Zapruder film (first shown on television in 1975), and the possible presence of E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis in Dallas, Texas.[1]

A larger investigation, the Church Committee, was set up on 27 January 1975 by the U.S. Senate. The Nedzi Committee was created in the U.S. Congress on 19 February 1975. It was replaced by the Pike Committee five months later.


* 1 References
* 2 See also
* 3 Additional reading
* 4 External links


1. ^ Michigan State University Libraries – Electronic Resources

See also

* Church Committee
* Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)
* Nedzi Committee
* Pike Committee
* Plausible denial
* Project MKULTRA
* Hughes-Ryan Act

Additional reading

See Chapter 3, The Politics of Spying: The Rockefeller Commission and the CIA, in Kenneth Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
[edit] External links

* Rockefeller Commission Report – the full text of the report, as scans

* The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA
v • d • e
Major US Intelligence Reforms

National Security Act of 1947 (1947) • The First Hoover Commission – Eberstadt Report (1947) • The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report (1949) • The Second Hoover Commission (1953) • The Doolittle Report (1954) • The Bruce-Lovett Report (1956) • The Taylor Report (1961) • The Kirkpatrick Report (1961) • The Schlesinger Report (1971) • The Murphey Investigation (794) • The Rockefeller Commission (1975) • The Church Committee (1976) • The Pike Committee (1976) • Clifford/Cline Proposals (1976) • EO 11905 (Ford) (1976) • Charter Legislation (1978) • EO 12036 (Carter) (1978) • EO 12333 (Reagan) (1981) • Iran-Contra Investigation (1987) • Boren-McCurdy (1992) • Aspen-Brown Commission (1995) • IC21 (1996) • US Commission on National Security/21st Century (2001) • 9/11 Commission Report (2004) • WMD Commission (2005) • EO 13470 (G. W. Bush) (2008) •
Stub icon This United States government-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.
v • d • e
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_President%27s_Commission_on_CIA_activities_within_the_United_States
Categories: Central Intelligence Agency | Surveillance | John F. Kennedy assassination | Mind control | United States national commissions | United States government stubs



From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
MKULTRA redirects here. For other uses, see MKULTRA (disambiguation).
Declassified MKULTRA documents

Project MK-ULTRA, or MKULTRA, was the code name for a covert CIA mind-control and chemical interrogation research program, run by the Office of Scientific Intelligence. The program began in the early 1950s, continuing at least through the late 1960s, and it used United States citizens as its test subjects.[1][2][3] The published evidence indicates that Project MK-ULTRA involved the surreptitious use of many types of drugs, as well as other methods, to manipulate individual mental states and to alter brain function.

Project MK-ULTRA was first brought to wide public attention in 1975 by the U.S. Congress, through investigations by the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission. Investigative efforts were hampered by the fact that CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed in 1973; the Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission investigations relied on the sworn testimony of direct participants and on the relatively small number of documents that survived Helms’ destruction order.[4]

Although the CIA insists that MK-ULTRA-type experiments have been abandoned, 14-year CIA veteran Victor Marchetti has stated in various interviews that the CIA routinely conducts disinformation campaigns and that CIA mind control research continued. In a 1977 interview, Marchetti specifically called the CIA claim that MK-ULTRA was abandoned a cover story. [5][6]

On the Senate floor in 1977, Senator Ted Kennedy said:

The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over thirty universities and institutions were involved in an extensive testing and experimentation program which included covert drug tests on unwitting citizens at all social levels, high and low, native Americans and foreign. Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in social situations. At least one death, that of Dr. Olson, resulted from these activities. The Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers.[7]

To this day most specific information regarding Project MKULTRA remains highly classified.[citation needed]

* 1 Title and origins
* 2 Goals
* 3 Budget
* 4 Experiments
o 4.1 Drugs
+ 4.1.1 LSD
+ 4.1.2 Other drugs
o 4.2 Hypnosis
o 4.3 Canadian experiments
* 5 Revelation
* 6 U.S. General Accounting Office Report
* 7 Deaths
* 8 Legal issues involving informed consent
* 9 Extent of participation
* 10 Notable subjects
* 11 Conspiracy theories
* 12 Popular culture
* 13 See also
* 14 Footnotes
* 15 Further reading
* 16 External links

[edit] Title and origins
Dr. Sidney Gottlieb approved of an MKULTRA subproject on LSD in this June 9, 1953 letter.

The project’s intentionally oblique CIA cryptonym is made up of the digraph MK, meaning that the project was sponsored by the agency’s Technical Services Division, followed by the word ULTRA (which had previously been used to designate the most secret classification of World War II intelligence). Other related cryptonyms include MK-NAOMI and MK-DELTA.

A precursor of the MK-ULTRA program began in 1945 when the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency was established and given direct responsibility for Operation Paperclip. Operation Paperclip was a program to recruit former Nazi scientists. Some of these scientists studied torture and brainwashing, and several had just been identified and prosecuted as war criminals during the Nuremberg Trials.[8][9]

Several secret U.S. government projects grew out of Operation Paperclip. These projects included Project CHATTER (established 1947), and Project BLUEBIRD (established 1950), which was later renamed to Project ARTICHOKE in 1951. Their purpose was to study mind-control, interrogation, behavior modification and related topics.

Headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the MK-ULTRA project was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles on April 13, 1953,[10] largely in response to Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.[11] The CIA wanted to use similar methods on their own captives. The CIA was also interested in being able to manipulate foreign leaders with such techniques,[12] and would later invent several schemes to drug Fidel Castro.

Experiments were often conducted without the subjects’ knowledge or consent.[13] In some cases, academic researchers being funded through grants from CIA front organizations were unaware that their work was being used for these purposes.[14]

In 1964, the project was renamed MK-SEARCH. The project attempted to produce a perfect truth drug for use in interrogating suspected Soviet spies during the Cold War, and generally to explore any other possibilities of mind control.

Another MK-ULTRA effort, Subproject 54, was the Navy’s top secret Perfect Concussion program, which used sub-aural frequency blasts to erase memory.[15]

Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for investigators to gain a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.[16]
[edit] Goals

The Agency poured millions of dollars into studies probing dozens of methods of influencing and controlling the mind. One 1955 MK-ULTRA document gives an indication of the size and range of the effort; this document refers to the study of an assortment of mind-altering substances described as follows:[17]

1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient would be discredited in public.
2. Substances which increase the efficiency of mentation and perception.
3. Materials which will prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized diseases in a reversible way so that they may be used for malingering, etc.
6. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise enhance its usefulness.
7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called brain-washing .
8. Materials and physical methods which will produce amnesia for events preceding and during their use.
9. Physical methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of surreptitious use.
10. Substances which produce physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs, acute anemia, etc.
11. Substances which will produce pure euphoria with no subsequent let-down.
12. Substances which alter personality structure in such a way that the tendency of the recipient to become dependent upon another person is enhanced.
13. A material which will cause mental confusion of such a type that the individual under its influence will find it difficult to maintain a fabrication under questioning.
14. Substances which will lower the ambition and general working efficiency of men when administered in undetectable amounts.
15. Substances which promote weakness or distortion of the eyesight or hearing faculties, preferably without permanent effects.
16. A knockout pill which can surreptitiously be administered in drinks, food, cigarettes, as an aerosol, etc., which will be safe to use, provide a maximum of amnesia, and be suitable for use by agent types on an ad hoc basis.
17. A material which can be surreptitiously administered by the above routes and which in very small amounts will make it impossible for a man to perform any physical activity whatsoever.

Historians have asserted that creating a Manchurian Candidate subject through mind control techniques was a goal of MK-ULTRA and related CIA projects.[18]


A secretive arrangement granted the MK-ULTRA program a percentage of the CIA budget. The MK-ULTRA director was granted six percent of the CIA operating budget in 1953, without oversight or accounting.[19] An estimated US$10m or more was spent[20].


CIA documents suggest that chemical, biological and radiological means were investigated for the purpose of mind control as part of MK-ULTRA.[21]
Early efforts focused on LSD, which later came to dominate many of MK-ULTRA’s programs.

Experiments included administering LSD to CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, mentally ill patients, and members of the general public in order to study their reactions. LSD and other drugs were usually administered without the subject’s knowledge or informed consent, a violation of the Nuremberg Code that the U.S. agreed to follow after World War II.

Efforts to recruit subjects were often illegal, even discounting the fact that drugs were being administered (though actual use of LSD, for example, was legal in the United States until October 6, 1966). In Operation Midnight Climax, the CIA set up several brothels to obtain a selection of men who would be too embarrassed to talk about the events. The men were dosed with LSD, the brothels were equipped with one-way mirrors, and the sessions were filmed for later viewing and study.[22]

Some subjects’ participation was consensual, and in many of these cases, the subjects appeared to be singled out for even more extreme experiments. In one case, volunteers were given LSD for 77 consecutive days.[23]

LSD was eventually dismissed by MK-ULTRA’s researchers as too unpredictable in its results.[1] Although useful information was sometimes obtained through questioning subjects on LSD, not uncommonly the most marked effect would be the subject’s absolute and utter certainty that they were able to withstand any form of interrogation attempt, even physical torture.

Other drugs

Another technique investigated was connecting a barbiturate IV into one arm and an amphetamine IV into the other.[24] The barbiturates were released into the subject first, and as soon as the subject began to fall asleep, the amphetamines were released. The subject would begin babbling incoherently at this point, and it was sometimes possible to ask questions and get useful answers.

Other experiments involved heroin, morphine, temazepam (used under code name MK-SEARCH), mescaline, psilocybin, scopolamine, marijuana, alcohol, sodium pentothal,[25] and ergine (in Subproject 22).


Declassified MK-ULTRA documents indicate hypnosis was studied in the early 1950s. Experimental goals included: the creation of hypnotically induced anxieties, hypnotically increasing ability to learn and recall complex written matter, studying hypnosis and polygraph examinations, hypnotically increasing ability to observe and recall complex arrangements of physical objects, and studying relationship of personality to susceptibility to hypnosis. [26]

Canadian experiments

The experiments were exported to Canada when the CIA recruited Scottish physician Donald Ewen Cameron, creator of the psychic driving concept, which the CIA found particularly interesting. Cameron had been hoping to correct schizophrenia by erasing existing memories and reprogramming the psyche. He commuted from Albany, New York to Montreal every week to work at the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University and was paid $69,000 from 1957 to 1964 to carry out MKULTRA experiments there. In addition to LSD, Cameron also experimented with various paralytic drugs as well as electroconvulsive therapy at thirty to forty times the normal power. His driving experiments consisted of putting subjects into drug-induced coma for weeks at a time (up to three months in one case) while playing tape loops of noise or simple repetitive statements. His experiments were typically carried out on patients who had entered the institute for minor problems such as anxiety disorders and postpartum depression, many of whom suffered permanently from his actions.[27] His treatments resulted in victims’ incontinence, amnesia, forgetting how to talk, forgetting their parents, and thinking their interrogators were their parents.[28] His work was inspired and paralleled by the British psychiatrist Dr William Sargant at St Thomas’ Hospital, London, and Belmont Hospital, Surrey, who was also involved in the Intelligence Services and who experimented extensively on his patients without their consent, causing similar long-term damage.[29] Dr. Cameron and Dr. Sargant are the only two identified Canadian experimenters, but the MKULTRA file makes reference to many other unnamed physicians who were recruited by the CIA.[citation needed]

It was during this era that Cameron became known worldwide as the first chairman of the World Psychiatric Association as well as president of the American and Canadian psychiatric associations. Cameron had also been a member of the Nuremberg medical tribunal in 1946-47.[30]


In 1973, CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed. Pursuant to this order, most CIA documents regarding the project were destroyed, making a full investigation of MK-ULTRA impossible.

In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. That report prompted investigations by the U.S. Congress, in the form of the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission that looked into domestic activities of the CIA, the FBI, and intelligence-related agencies of the military.

In the summer of 1975, congressional Church Committee reports and the presidential Rockefeller Commission report revealed to the public for the first time that the CIA and the Department of Defense had conducted experiments on both unwitting and cognizant human subjects as part of an extensive program to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. They also revealed that at least one subject had died after administration of LSD. Much of what the Church Committee and the Rockefeller Commission learned about MKULTRA was contained in a report, prepared by the Inspector General’s office in 1963, that had survived the destruction of records ordered in 1973.[31] However, it contained little detail.

The congressional committee investigating the CIA research, chaired by Senator Frank Church, concluded that [p]rior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects . The committee noted that the experiments sponsored by these researchers … call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for experiments.

Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.

On the heels of the revelations about CIA experiments, similar stories surfaced regarding U.S. Army experiments. In 1975 the Secretary of the Army instructed the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation. Among the findings of the Inspector General was the existence of a 1953 memorandum penned by then Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Documents show that the CIA participated in at least two of Department of Defense committees during 1952. These committee findings led to the issuance of the Wilson Memo, which mandated—in accord with Nuremberg Code protocols—that only volunteers be used for experimental operations conducted in the U.S. armed forces. In response to the Inspector General’s investigation, the Wilson Memo was declassified in August 1975.

With regard to drug testing within the Army, the Inspector General found that the evidence clearly reflected that every possible medical consideration was observed by the professional investigators at the Medical Research Laboratories. However the Inspector General also found that the mandated requirements of Wilson’s 1953 memorandum had been only partially adhered to; he concluded that the volunteers were not fully informed, as required, prior to their participation; and the methods of procuring their services, in many cases, appeared not to have been in accord with the intent of Department of the Army policies governing use of volunteers in research.

Other branches of the U.S. armed forces, the Air Force for example, were found not to have adhered to Wilson Memo stipulations regarding voluntary drug testing.

In 1977, during a hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to look further into MKULTRA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, revealed that the CIA had found a set of records, consisting of about 20,000 pages,[32] that had survived the 1973 destruction orders, due to having been stored at a records center not usually used for such documents.[31] These files dealt with the financing of MKULTRA projects, and as such contained few details of those projects, but much more was learned from them than from the Inspector General’s 1963 report.

In Canada, the issue took much longer to surface, becoming widely known in 1984 on a CBC news show, The Fifth Estate. It was learned that not only had the CIA funded Dr. Cameron’s efforts, but perhaps even more shockingly, the Canadian government was fully aware of this, and had later provided another $500,000 in funding to continue the experiments. This revelation largely derailed efforts by the victims to sue the CIA as their U.S. counterparts had, and the Canadian government eventually settled out of court for $100,000 to each of the 127 victims. None of Dr. Cameron’s personal records of his involvement with MKULTRA survive, since his family destroyed them after his death from a heart attack while mountain climbing in 1967.[33]

U.S. General Accounting Office Report

The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on September 28, 1994, which stated that between 1940 and 1974, DOD and other national security agencies studied thousands of human subjects in tests and experiments involving hazardous substances.

The quote from the study:

… Working with the CIA, the Department of Defense gave hallucinogenic drugs to thousands of volunteer soldiers in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In addition to LSD, the Army also tested quinuclidinyl benzilate, a hallucinogen code-named BZ. (Note 37) Many of these tests were conducted under the so-called MKULTRA program, established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing techniques. Between 1953 and 1964, the program consisted of 149 projects involving drug testing and other studies on unwitting human subjects…[34]


Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player in New York City, died as a result of a secret Army experiment involving MDA.[35]

Frank Olson, a United States Army biochemist and biological weapons researcher, was given LSD without his knowledge or consent in 1953 as part of a CIA experiment, and died under suspicious circumstances (initially labeled suicide) a week later following a severe psychotic episode. A CIA doctor assigned to monitor Olson’s recovery claimed to be asleep in another bed in a New York City hotel room when Olson jumped through the window to fall ten stories to his death.[36]

Olson’s son disputes this version of events, and maintains that his father was murdered due to the belief that he was going to divulge his knowledge of the top-secret interrogation program code-named Project ARTICHOKE.[37] Frank Olson’s body was exhumed in 1994, and cranial injuries indicated Olson had been knocked unconscious before exiting the window.[38]

The CIA’s own internal investigation, by contrast, claimed Gottlieb had conducted the experiment with Olson’s prior knowledge, although neither Olson nor the other men taking part in the experiment were informed as to the exact nature of the drug until some 20 minutes after its ingestion. The report further suggested that Gottlieb was nonetheless due a reprimand, as he had failed to take into account Olsen’s already-diagnosed suicidal tendencies, which might well have been exacerbated by the LSD.[36]

Legal issues involving informed consent

The revelations about the CIA and the Army prompted a number of subjects or their survivors to file lawsuits against the federal government for conducting illegal experiments. Although the government aggressively, and sometimes successfully, sought to avoid legal liability, several plaintiffs did receive compensation through court order, out-of-court settlement, or acts of Congress. Frank Olson’s family received $750,000 by a special act of Congress, and both President Ford and CIA director William Colby met with Olson’s family to publicly apologize.

Previously, the CIA and the Army had actively and successfully sought to withhold incriminating information, even as they secretly provided compensation to the families. One subject of Army drug experimentation, James Stanley, an Army sergeant, brought an important, albeit unsuccessful, suit. The government argued that Stanley was barred from suing under a legal doctrine—known as the Feres doctrine, after a 1950 Supreme Court case, Feres v. United States—that prohibits members of the Armed Forces from suing the government for any harms that were inflicted incident to service.

In 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed this defense in a 5–4 decision that dismissed Stanley’s case.[39] The majority argued that a test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. In dissent, Justice William Brennan argued that the need to preserve military discipline should not protect the government from liability and punishment for serious violations of constitutional rights:

The medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is morally and legally unacceptable. The United States Military Tribunal established the Nuremberg Code as a standard against which to judge German scientists who experimented with human subjects… . [I]n defiance of this principle, military intelligence officials … began surreptitiously testing chemical and biological materials, including LSD.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing a separate dissent, stated:

No judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case. Indeed, as Justice Brennan observes, the United States played an instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with human subjects during the Second World War, and the standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential … to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts.’ If this principle is violated, the very least that society can do is to see that the victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators.

This is the only Supreme Court case to address the application of the Nuremberg Code to experimentation sponsored by the U.S. government. And while the suit was unsuccessful, dissenting opinions put the Army—and by association the entire government—on notice that use of individuals without their consent is unacceptable. The limited application of the Nuremberg Code in U.S. courts does not detract from the power of the principles it espouses, especially in light of stories of failure to follow these principles that appeared in the media and professional literature during the 1960s and 1970s and the policies eventually adopted in the mid-1970s.

In another law suit, Wayne Ritchie, a former United States Marshall, alleged the CIA laced his food or drink with LSD at a 1957 Christmas party. While the government admitted it was, at that time, drugging people without their consent, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel found Ritchie could not prove he was one of the victims of MKULTRA and dismissed the case in 2007.[40]

Extent of participation

Forty-four American colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like including Sandoz (currently Novartis) and Eli Lilly & Co., 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 prisons are known to have participated in MKULTRA.[41][42]

Notable subjects

A considerable amount of credible circumstantial evidence suggests that Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, participated in CIA-sponsored MK-ULTRA experiments conducted at Harvard University from the fall of 1959 through the spring of 1962. During World War II, Henry Murray, the lead researcher in the Harvard experiments, served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a forerunner of the CIA. Murray applied for a grant funded by the United States Navy, and his Harvard stress experiments strongly resembled those run by the OSS.[43] Beginning at the age of sixteen, Kaczynski participated along with twenty-one other undergraduate students in the Harvard experiments, which have been described as disturbing and ethically indefensible. [43][44]

Merry Prankster Ken Kesey, author of One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, volunteered for MK-ULTRA experiments while he was a student at Stanford University. Kesey’s ingestion of LSD during these experiments led directly to his widespread promotion of the drug and the subsequent development of hippie culture.[45]

Candy Jones, American fashion model and radio host, claimed to have been a victim of mind control in the ’60s.[46]

Infamous Irish mob boss James Whitey Bulger volunteered for testing while in prison.[47]

Conspiracy theories

MK-ULTRA plays a part in many conspiracy theories given its nature and the destruction of most records.

Lawrence Teeter, attorney for convicted assassin Sirhan Sirhan, believed Sirhan was under the influence of hypnosis when he fired his weapon at Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Teeter linked the CIA’s MKULTRA program to mind control techniques that he claimed were used to control Sirhan.[48]
Jonestown, the Guyana location of the Jim Jones cult and Peoples Temple mass suicide, was thought to be a test site for MKULTRA medical and mind control experiments after the official end of the program. Congressman Leo Ryan, a known critic of the CIA, was assassinated after he personally visited Jonestown to investigate various reported irregularities.[49]

Popular culture

* MKULTRA is referenced in the plots of The Ambler Warning by Robert Ludlum, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test by Tom Wolfe, Firestarter by Stephen King, Infinite Jest by David Foster Wallace, Just a Couple of Days by Tony Vigorito, The Manchurian Candidate by Richard Condon, The Telling of Lies by Timothy Findley; and The Watchmen by John Altman; the films The Bourne Ultimatum, Conspiracy Theory, The Good Shepherd, Jacob’s Ladder, and The Killing Room; the television series Angel, The West Wing. The Lone Gunmen, Numb3rs, Bones, Quincy M.E. and The X-Files; the games Conspiracy X and The Suffering: Prison is Hell; the character Deathstroke the Terminator in the Teen Titans by DC Comics.
* The bands mk Ultra, MK-ULTRA, and a side project of Frank Tovey took their names from these projects. MKULTRA is also referenced by such musical artists as Black Rebel Motorcycle Club, Canibus, Exit Clov, Fatboy Slim, Green Magnet School, Immortal Technique, Manic Street Preachers, Muse, The Orb, Sirius Isness, Lustmord side project Terror Against Terror, Tokyo Police Club, and Unwound.
* MKULTRA also provides a name for a move by professional wrestler Sterling James Keenan.

See also

* Brainwashing
* CIA operations
* Human radiation experiments
* Louis Jolyon West
* Macy conferences
* Project MKDELTA
* Project MKNAOMI
* Operation Paperclip
* Sidney Gottlieb
* United States v. Stanley
* William Sargant


1. ^ Richelson, JT (ed.) (2001-09-10). Science, Technology and the CIA: A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book . George Washington University. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/. Retrieved 2009-06-12.
2. ^ Chapter 3, part 4: Supreme Court Dissents Invoke the Nuremberg Code: CIA and DOD Human Subjects Research Scandals . Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments Final Report. http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap3_4.html. Retrieved 2005-08-24.
3. ^ The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence . Church Committee report, no. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.. Washington, D.C..: United States Congress. 1976. pp. 392. http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book1/html/ChurchB1_0200b.htm.
4. ^ An Interview with Richard Helms . Central Intelligence Agency. 2007-05-08. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v44i4a07p_0021.htm. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
5. ^ Interview with Victor Marchetti . http://www.skepticfiles.org/socialis/marcheti.htm. Retrieved 2009-08-22.
6. ^ Cannon, M (1992). Mind Control and the American Government . Lobster Magazine 23.
7. ^ Opening Remarks by Senator Ted Kennedy . U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, and Subcommittee On Health And Scientific Research of the Committee On Human Resources. 1977-08-03. http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/e1950/mkultra/Hearing01.htm.
8. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4443934.stm
9. ^ http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/NaziMedEx.html
10. ^ Church Committee; p. 390 MKULTRA was approved by the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on April 13, 1953
11. ^ Chapter 3, part 4: Supreme Court Dissents Invoke the Nuremberg Code: CIA and DOD Human Subjects Research Scandals . Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments Final Report. http://www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap3_4.html. Retrieved August 24 2005. MKULTRA, began in 1950 and was motivated largely in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean uses of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.
12. ^ Church Committee; p. 391 A special procedure, designated MKDELTA, was established to govern the use of MKULTRA materials abroad. Such materials were used on a number of occasions.
13. ^ Church Committee; The congressional committee investigating the CIA research, chaired by Senator Frank Church, concluded that ‘[p]rior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.’
14. ^ Price, David (June 2007). Buying a Piece of Anthropology: Human Ecology and unwitting anthropological research for the CIA (PDF). Anthropology Today 23 (3): 3–13. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00510.x. https://secure.wikileaks.org/w/images/AT-june07-Price-PT1.pdf. Retrieved 2008-04-13.
15. ^ http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/e1950/mkultra/Hearing05.htm, retrieved 25 April 2008
16. ^ Chapter 3, part 4: Supreme Court Dissents Invoke the Nuremberg Code: CIA and DOD Human Subjects Research Scandals . Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments Final Report. http://www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap3_4.html. Retrieved August 24 2005. (identical sentence) Because most of the MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 … MK-ULTRA and the related CIA programs.
17. ^ Senate MKULTRA Hearing: Appendix C–Documents Referring to Subprojects, (page 167, in PDF document page numbering). (pdf). Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Human Resources. August 3, 1977. http://www.arts.rpi.edu/~pellr/lansberry/mkultra.pdf. Retrieved 2007-08-22.
18. ^ Ranelagh, John (March 1988). The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. Sceptre. pp. 208–210. ISBN 0-340-41230-5.
19. ^ Declassified
20. ^ Mind Control and the Secret State
21. ^ Declassified
22. ^ Marks, John (1979). The Search for the Manchurian Candidate. New York: Times Books. pp. 106–7. ISBN 0-8129-0773-6.
23. ^ NPR Fresh Air. June 28, 2007 and Tim Weiner, The Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.
24. ^ Marks 1979: pp 40-42.
25. ^ Marks 1979: chapters 3 and 7.
26. ^ Declassified
27. ^ Marks 1979: pp 140-150.
28. ^ Turbide, Diane (1997-04-21). Dr. Cameron’s Casualties . http://www.ect.org/dr-camerons-casualties/. Retrieved 2007-09-09.
29. ^ Collins, Anne ([1988] 1998). In the Sleep Room: The Story of CIA Brainwashing Experiments in Canada. Toronto: Key Porter Books. pp. 39, 42–3, 133. ISBN 1550139320.
30. ^ Marks 1979: p 141.
31. ^ a b Prepared Statement of Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence
32. ^ Government Mind Control Records of MKULTRA & Bluebird/Artichoke
33. ^ HistoryOnAir Podcast 98 – MKULTRA
34. ^ Quote from Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans Health? Lessons Spanning Half A Century , part F. HALLUCINOGENS 103rd Congress, 2nd Session-S. Prt. 103-97; Staff Report prepared for the committee on veterans’ affairs December 8, 1994 John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia, Chairman. Online copy provided by gulfweb.org, which describes itself as Serving the Gulf War Veteran Community Worldwide Since 1994 . (The same document is available from many other (unofficial) sites, which may or may not be independent.)
35. ^ Marks 1979: p 72n.
36. ^ a b Marks 1979: chapter 5.
37. ^ Olson, E (2002-08-22). Family Statement on the Murder of Frank Olson . http://www.frankolsonproject.org/Statements/FamilyStatement2002.html. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
38. ^ Ronson, Jon (2004). The Men Who Stare at Goats. Picador. ISBN 0-330-37548-2.
39. ^ United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
40. ^ Ritchie v. United States of America: United States District Court, Northern District of California No. C 00-3940 MHP. Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law Re: Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings (pdf). http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/5c/Ritchie.pdf. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
41. ^ Book Review: Search for the Manchurian Candidate by John Marks
42. ^ CIA Off Campus: Building the Movement Against Agency Recruitment and Research
43. ^ a b Chase, A (2000-06-01). Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber . The Atlantic Monthly. pp. 41-65. http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/06/chase.htm. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
44. ^ Cockburn, A; St Clair J (1999-10-18). CIA Shrinks and LSD . CounterPunch. http://www.counterpunch.org/ciashrinks.html. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
45. ^ Baker, Jeff (November 11, 2001). All times a great artist, Ken Kesey is dead at age 66 . The Oregonian: pp. A1.
46. ^ Bennett, C (2001-07-01). Candy Jones: How a leading American fashion model came to be experimented upon by the CIA mind control team . Fortean Times. http://www.forteantimes.com/features/profiles/497/candy_jones.html. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
47. ^ Bruno, A. James Whitey Bulger . truetv.com. http://www.trutv.com//library/crime/gangsters_outlaws/mob_bosses/james_whitey_bulger/2.html. Retrieved 2008-10-16.
48. ^ Teeter, Lawrence. Interview with Sirhan’s attorney Lawrence Teeter . KPFA 94.1/Guns & Butter show. http://www.kpfa.org/archives/index.php?arch=8965&page=2&type=.
49. ^ Meier, M (1989). Was Jonestown a CIA Medical Experiment?: A Review of the Evidence. New York: Edwin Mellen. ISBN 0-8894-6013-2.

Further reading

* U.S. Congress: The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence (Church Committee report), report no. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 394 . http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book1/contents.htm.
* U.S. Senate: Joint Hearing before The Select Committee on Intelligence and The Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. August 3 1977 . http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/e1950/mkultra/index.htm.

External links

* Short documentary about MKULTRA and the Frank Olson incident
* The Most Dangerous Game Downloadable 8 minute documentary by independent filmmakers GNN
* GIF scans of declassified MKULTRA Project Documents
* Interview of Alfred McCoy on CIA mind control research
* U.S. Supreme Court CIA v. SIMS, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) 471 U.S. 159
* U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. STANLEY, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) 483 U.S. 669

v • d • e
United States chemical weapons program
Agents and chemicals
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) A Chlorine A Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) A Phosgene A QL A Sarin (GB) A Sulfur mustard (HD) A VX
Bigeye bomb A M1 chemical mine A M104 155mm Cartridge A M110 155mm Cartridge A M121/A1 155mm Cartridge A M125 bomblet A M134 bomblet A M138 bomblet A M139 bomblet A M2 mortar A M23 chemical mine A M34 cluster bomb A M360 105mm Cartridge A M426 8-inch shell A M43 BZ cluster bomb A M44 generator cluster A M55 rocket A M60 105mm Cartridge A M687 155mm Cartridge A XM-736 8-inch projectile A MC-1 bomb A M47 bomb A Weteye bomb
Operations and testing
Dugway sheep incident A Edgewood Arsenal experiments A MKULTRA A Operation CHASE A Operation Geranium A Operation LAC A Operation Red Hat A Operation Steel Box A Operation Ranch Hand A Operation Top Hat A Project 112 A Project SHAD
Anniston Army Depot A Anniston Chemical Activity A Blue Grass Army Depot A Deseret Chemical Depot A Edgewood Chemical Activity A Hawthorne Army Depot A Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System A Newport Chemical Depot A Pine Bluff Chemical Activity A Pueblo Chemical Depot A Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility A Umatilla Chemical Depot
Units and formations
1st Gas Regiment A U.S. Army Chemical Corps A Chemical mortar battalion
Chemical Agent Identification Set A M93 Fox A MOPP A People sniffer
Related topics
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory A Chlorine bombings in Iraq A Herbicidal warfare A List of topics A Poison gas in World War I A Tyler poison gas plot
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_MKULTRA
Categories: Devices to alter consciousness | History of the United States government | Central Intelligence Agency operations | Psychedelic research | LSD | Medical research | Military history of the United States | Military psychiatry | Mind control | 1953 establishments | Secret government programs | Human experimentation in the United States | Investigations and hearings of the United States Congress | Code names



The Pond (intelligence organization)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Pond was a small, secret organization formed by the government of the United States of America which operated between 1942 and 1955.[1] It engaged in espionage. Its existence has only recently been acknowledged.

In the spring of 1942, Brigadier General Hayes Kroner, the head of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service, was given the go-ahead to set up an espionage organization separate from William Wild Bill Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services.[1] He selected U.S. Army Captain John or Jean Grombach to head it.[1] Grombach, the son of the French consul in New Orleans, had obtained American citizenship and graduated from West Point before World War II.[1]

In 1955, The Pond was disbanded by the American government because of post-war centralization of intelligence gathering and questions about the organization’s effectiveness.

On April 27, 2008, the Associated Press reported that the Central Intelligence Agency planned to release a stash of Pond-related papers accidentally discovered in a Virginia barn in 2001 and hand them over to the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.[2]


1. ^ a b c d Mark Stout. The Pond: Running Agents for State, War, and the CIA . Central Intelligence Agency official site. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article07.html.
2. ^ Clues surfacing in Wallenberg disappearance / WWII hero may have had ties to White House; other data to be released . Associated Press. April 27, 2008. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24339683/wid/7279844//. Retrieved May 17, 2009.
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pond_(intelligence_organization)
Categories: United States intelligence agencies | Secret government programs | United States government stubs



President’s Surveillance Program
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cover of the 10 July 2009 Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program

The President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) is a collection of secret intelligence activities authorized by then President of the United States George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks in 2001 as part of the War on Terrorism. The Terrorist Surveillance Program, which authorized warrantless wiretapping of international communications where one party to the communication was believed to be affiliated with al-Qa’ida, is the only part of the President’s program that has been publicly disclosed. The other intelligence activities covered under the same Presidential authorizations remain classified information, although the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the existence of such activities in 2007.[1] The other activities have reportedly included data mining of e-mail messages[2] and telephone call detail records in the NSA call database.[3]

The President’s Surveillance Program activities were periodically reauthorized by the President, and were later transitioned to authority granted in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008. The act required the Inspectors General of all intelligence agencies involved in the program to complete a comprehensive review of the activities through January 17, 2007, and produce an unclassified report within one year after enactment. The report published on July 10, 2009 concluded that the President’s program involved unprecedented collection activities, that went far beyond the scope of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.[1] The report raised questions over the legal underpinnings of the authorizations, a lack of oversight, excessive secrecy, and the effectiveness of the program.[4][5] The report concluded that the program was built on a factually flawed legal analysis.[6]

Public disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance Program in 2005 ignited the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy. The other classified aspects of the program had also raised serious concerns within the Department of Justice over the program’s legal status and its potential effect on future criminal prosecutions. This caused conflicts with the White House that resulted in a dramatic confrontation in 2004 at the hospital bedside of the ailing Attorney General, and nearly lead to mass resignations of top Justice officials in protest when they were overruled.[7] The report on the program was also released during a period of intense negotiations over proposed language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that would amend the National Security Act of 1947, increasing the requirements for briefing Congress on some classified intelligence programs like this one—President Barack Obama has threatened to veto the bill over that issue.[8]

* 1 Background
* 2 PSP IG Group report
o 2.1 Origin of the program
o 2.2 Legal underpinnings
+ 2.2.1 Initial justification
+ 2.2.2 Conflicts between DOJ and the White house
# Ashcroft hospital bedside meeting
+ 2.2.3 White House Counsel reauthorization
+ 2.2.4 Transfer to FISA
+ 2.2.5 Briefings
+ 2.2.6 Discovery issues
+ 2.2.7 Effectiveness
o 2.3 Reaction
* 3 Timeline
* 4 Further reading
* 5 References
* 6 External links

[edit] Background

In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a classified program to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. As part of the NSA’s classified program, several different intelligence activities were authorized in Presidential authorizations, and the details of these activities changed over time. The program was reauthorized by the President approximately every 45 days, with certain modifications. Collectively, the activities carried out under these authorizations are referred to as the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).[1]

One of the activities authorized as part of the PSP was the interception of the content of communications into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa’ida, affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa’ida. After a series of articles published in The New York Times revealed classified details on this aspect of the PSP, they were publicly acknowledged and described by the President, the Attorney General, and other Administration officials beginning in December 2005, including a Presidential radio address on December 17, 2005. The President and other Administration officials labeled the publicly disclosed interception of the content of certain international communications by the NSA as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). The Attorney General subsequently publicly acknowledged the fact that other intelligence activities were also authorized under the same Presidential authorization, but the details of those activities remain classified.[1]

Several different agencies had roles in the PSP. At the request of the White House, the NSA was involved in providing the technical expertise necessary to create the program. The NSA also was responsible for conducting the actual collection of information under the PSP and disseminating intelligence reports to other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for analysis and possible investigation. With the exception of the NSA, the Department of Defense (DoD) had limited involvement in the PSP.[1]

Components of the Department of Justice (DOJ) other than the FBI also were involved in the program. Most significantly, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided advice to the White House and the Attorney General on the overall legality of the PSP. In addition, DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now called the Office of Intelligence in DOJ’s National Security Division) worked with the FBI and the NSA to address the impact PSP-derived information had on proceedings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). DOJ’s National Security Division also handled potential discovery issues that may have involved PSP-related information in international terrorism prosecutions.[1]

The CIA, in addition to receiving intelligence reports as PSP consumers, requested information from the program and used this information in its intelligence analyses. The CIA also initially prepared threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the periodic Presidential authorizations. Beginning in 2005, the newly created ODNI assumed responsibility for preparing these threat assessment memoranda. In addition, NCTC analysts received program information for possible use in analytical products prepared for the President, senior policymakers, and other Intelligence Community (IC) analysts and officers.[1]

PSP IG Group report
The Inspectors General (IGs) of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) – collectively the PSP IG Group – conducted the review required under the FISA Amendments Act. The 32 page unclassified report, dated July 10, 2009, summarized the portions of the collective results of the IG reviews that could be released in unclassified form. A separate classified report summarized the classified results of the individual IG reviews.[1] The classified report is reportedly several hundred pages long. The unclassified report revealed new details of internal deliberations over the programs, but few new details on the scope of the surveillance.[5]

The PSP IG Group collectively interviewed approximately 200 government and private sector personnel as part of this review. Among the interviewees were former and current senior government officials, including Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte, NSA and CIA Director and Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) Michael Hayden, White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The IGs did not have the power to compell testimony,[9] and Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Attorney General John Ashcroft, DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, and former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet declined the opportunity to be interviewed for the review.[1]

Origin of the program

In the days immediately after September 11, 2001, the NSA used its existing authorities to gather intelligence information in response to the terrorist attacks. When Director of Central Intelligence Tenet, on behalf of the White House, asked NSA Director Hayden whether the NSA could do more against terrorism, Hayden replied that nothing more could be done within existing authorities. When asked what he might do with more authority, Hayden said he put together information on what was operationally useful and technologically feasible. This information formed the basis of the PSP. Shortly thereafter, the President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of new, highly classified intelligence activities.[1]

The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by the Presidential Authorizations were highly classified. Former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that it was the President’s decision to keep the program a close hold. Gonzales stated that the President made the decision on all requests to read in any non-operational persons, including DOJ officials. Attorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential Authorization for the PSP as to form and legality on the same day that he was read into the program in October 2001.[1]

The CIA initially prepared the threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the Presidential Authorization and periodic reauthorizations of the PSP. The memoranda documented intelligence assessments of the terrorist threats to the United States and to U.S. interests abroad from al-Qa’ida and affiliated terrorist organizations. Initially, the analysts who prepared the threat assessments were not read into the PSP and did not know how the threat assessments would be used.[1]
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for drafting the first series of legal memoranda supporting the program. Yoo was the only OLC official read into the PSP from the program’s inception in October 2001. Jay Bybee was OLC Assistant Attorney General at the time, and Yoo’s supervisor. However, Bybee stated he was never read into the PSP and could shed no further light on how Yoo came to draft the OLC opinions on the program. The first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the PSP was dated November 2, 2001, and was drafted by Yoo.[1]

NSA Director Hayden consulted with NSA senior technical experts and experienced attorneys from the NSA’s Office of General Counsel, but only Hayden knew about and participated in the development of the Presidential Authorization by serving as a technical advisor. After the Authorization was signed, NSA attorneys supported the lawfulness of the resulting program. After Hayden received the first Authorization, he assembled 80 to 90 people in a conference room and explained what the President had authorized. Hayden said: We’re going to do exactly what he said and not one photon or electron more. According to Hayden, the program was designed to provide the NSA with the operational agility to cover terrorism-related targets.[1]

Legal underpinnings
Initial justification

John Yoo was the sole OLC attorney who advised Attorney General Ashcroft and White House officials on the PSP from the program’s inception in October 2001 through Yoo’s resignation from DOJ in May 2003. Upon Yoo’s departure, another DOJ official, Patrick Philbin, was selected by the White House to be read into the PSP to assume Yoo’s role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning the program. In addition, Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC on October 6,2003. Even though Bybee had never been read into the PSI, Philbin persuaded Counsel to the Vice President David Addington to read in Goldsmith, Bybee’s replacement. After being read into the PSP, Goldsmith and Philbin became concerned about the factual and legal basis for Yoo’s legal memoranda supporting the program.[1]

Goldsmith and Philbin began developing an analysis to more fully address the FISA statute with respect to the PSP. Beginning in August 2003, Philbin and later Goldsmith brought their concerns about the OLC legal opinions to Attorney General Ashcroft. In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Counsel to the Vice President Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the legal underpinnings of the program. In late January 2004, at Goldsmith’s request, the White House agreed to allow Deputy Attorney General James Comey to be read into the PSP following Comey’s confirmation as the Deputy Attorney General in December 2003. After being briefed, Comey agreed that the concerns about Yoo’s legal analysis were well-founded. Comey told the DOJ OIG that of particular concern to him and Goldsmith was the notion that Yoo’s legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification.[1]

The DOJ OIG later concluded that it was extraordinary and inappropriate that a single DOJ attorney, John Yoo, was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the PSP, and that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo’s work, as customarily is the practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that at a minimum was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memoranda became apparent once additional DOJ attorneys were read into the program in 2003 and when those attorneys sought a greater understanding of the PSP’s operation. The DOJ OIG concluded that the White House’s strict controls over DOJ access to the PSP undermined DOJ’s ability to perform its critical legal function during the PSP’s early phase of operation.[1]

Conflicts between DOJ and the White house

Comey told the DOJ OIG that he met with Attorney General Ashcroft on March 4, 2004, to discuss the PSP and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey and the other DOJ officials’ assessment of the potential legal problems with the PSP. Later that day, Ashcroft was struck with severe gallstone pancreatitis and was admitted to the George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Because of Ashcroft’s disability, Comey took over as Acting Attorney General.[1]

Later on March 5, Gonzales called Goldsmith to request a letter from OLC stating that Yoo’s prior OLC opinions covered the program, meaning the PSP. Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey re-examined Yoo’s memoranda and concluded that Yoo’s memoranda did not accurately describe some of the Other Intelligence Activities that were being conducted under the Presidential Authorizations implementing the PSP, and that the memoranda therefore did not provide a basis for finding that these activities were legal. On Saturday, March 6, Goldsmith and Philbin, with Comey’s concurrence, met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to convey their conclusions that certain activities in the PSP should cease.[1]

After a series of follow-up meetings between DOJ and White House officials, the President instructed Vice President Cheney on the morning of Wednesday, March 10, to call a meeting with congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with DOJ. A meeting with the Top administration officials, and the congressional leaders known as the Gang of Eight, but without DOJ personnel, was convened in the White House Situation Room later that day. According to Gonzales’s notes of the meeting, the consensus of the congressional leaders was that the program should continue. However, after Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2007, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Senator Jay Rockefeller, and Senator Tom Daschle issued statements sharply disputing Gonzales’s characterization of their statements at the March 10, 2004 meeting, stating that there was no consensus at the meeting that the program should proceed.[1]

Ashcroft hospital bedside meeting

Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that following the meeting with the congressional leaders on March 10, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the George Washington University Hospital to speak to Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering from surgery. At approximately 7:00 p.m. that day, Comey learned that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft. He relayed this information to FBI Director Mueller, and told him that Ashcroft was in no condition to receive guests, much less make a decision about whether to recertify the PSP. Philbin said he was leaving work that evening when he received a call from Comey, who told Philbin that he needed to get to the hospital right away and to call Goldsmith and tell him what was happening.[1]

Comey recalled that he ran up the stairs with his security detail to Ashcroft’s floor, and he entered Ashcroft’s room, which he described as darkened, and found Ashcroft lying in bed and his wife standing by his side. Comey said he began speaking to Ashcroft, and that it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he seemed pretty bad off. Goldsmith and Philbin arrived at the hospital within a few minutes of each other, and met with Comey in an adjacent room. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin later entered Ashcroft’s room and, according to Goldsmith’s notes, Comey and the others advised Ashcroft not to sign anything. [1]

When Gonzales and Card arrived, they entered Ashcroft’s hospital room and stood across from Mrs. Ashcroft at the head of the bed, with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin behind them. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that he carried with him in a manila envelope the March 11, 2004, Presidential authorization for Ashcroft to sign. According to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was feeling and Ashcroft replied, Not well. Gonzales then said words to the effect, You know, there’s a reauthorization that has to be renewed …. [1]

Comey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that at this point Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card in very strong terms about his legal concerns with the PSP, which Comey testified Ashcroft drew from his meeting with Comey about the program a week earlier. Comey testified that Ashcroft next stated: ‘But that doesn’t matter, because I’m not the Attorney General. There is the Attorney General,’ and he pointed to me – I was just to his left. The two men [Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the room. [1]

Gonzales, subsequently summoned Comey to the White House, and he brought United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson with him as a witness. Andy Card was also present for this meeting which took place later that evening. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that little more was achieved at this meeting other than a general acknowledgment that a situation continued to exist because of the disagreement between DOJ and the White House regarding legal authorization for the program.[1]

White House Counsel reauthorization

On the morning of March 11, 2004, with the Presidential Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new Authorization for the PSP. In a departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify the Authorization as to form and legality, the March 11 Authorization was certified by White House Counsel Gonzales. At noon on March 11, Director Mueller met with Card at the White House. According to Mueller’s notes, Card told Mueller that if no legislative fix could be found by May 6, 2004, when the March 11 Authorization was set to expire, the program would be discontinued. Mueller wrote that he told Card that the failure to have DOJ representation at the congressional briefing and the attempt to have Ashcroft certify the Authorization without going through Corney gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program. [1]

Several senior DOJ and FBI officials considered resigning after the Presidential Authorization was signed without DOJ’s concurrence. Corney told the DOJ OIG that he drafted a letter of resignation because he believed it was impossible for him to remain with DOJ if the President would do something DOJ said was not legally supportable. Corney also testified that Ashcroft’s Chief of Staff David Ayres believed Ashcroft also was likely to resign and thus Ayres urged Corney to wait until Ashcroft was well enough to resign with him. Goldsmith told the DOJ OIG he drafted a resignation letter at around the same time as Corney. According to his contemporaneous notes, Goldsmith cited the shoddiness of the prior OLC legal review, the over-secrecy of the PSP, and the shameful incident at the hospital as among his grievances.[1]

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, FBI Director Mueller drafted by hand a letter to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program. Mueller told the DOJ OIG that he planned on having the letter typed and then tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary. Later that morning, the President met with Mueller. According to Mueller’s notes, Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI’s continued participation in the program, and that he was considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate without the concurrence of the Attorney General. Mueller wrote that he explained to the President that he had an independent obligation to the FBI and to DOJ to assure the legality of actions we undertook, and that a presidential order alone could not do that. According to Mueller’s notes, the President then directed Mueller to. meet with Corney and other PSP principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue participating in the program as appropriate under the law. [1]

On March 17, 2004 the President decided to modify certain PSP intelligence-gathering activities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence Activities that DOJ believed were legally unsupported. The President’s directive was expressed in two modifications to the March 11, 2004 Presidential Authorization. On May 6,2004 Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was operating at that time. The OLC memorandum stated that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 gave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad all necessary and appropriate force, including signals intelligence capabilities, to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States.[1]

Transfer to FISA

Certain activities that were originally authorized as part of the PSP have subsequently been authorized under orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The activities transitioned in this manner included the interception of certain international communications that the President publicly described as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Further details regarding this transition are classified. As a result of this transition, the President decided not to reauthorize these activities and the final Presidential Authorization expired on February 1, 2007. The Protect America Act of 2007, passed in August of that year, amended FISA to address the government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the United States of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This legislation expired in early 2008, and in July 2008 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted.[1]

The DOJ OIG review concluded that several considerations favored initiating the process of transitioning the PSP to FISA authority earlier than had been done, especially as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. These considerations included the PSP’s effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons, the instability of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for several years, and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI agents’ access to and use of program-derived information due to the highly classified status of the PSP.[1]


Each Presidential Authorization also included a requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program. The President also noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the program as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with national defense needs. According to the NSA, between October 25,2001, and January 17,2007, Hayden and current NSA Director Keith B. Alexander, sometimes supported by other NSA personnel, conducted approximately 49 briefings to members of Congress and their staff, 17 of which took place before the December 2005 media reports regarding what was called the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Hayden told the IGs that during the many PSP briefings to members of Congress no one ever suggested that NSA should stop the program.[1]

From January 2002 to January 2006, only Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Presiding Judge Royce C. Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, were read into the PSP. The circumstances under which the Presiding Judge was notified of the existence of the PSP and read into the program, and the measures subsequently taken to address the effect of the PSP on the government’s relationship with the FISC are only revealed in the classified report.[1]

Discovery issues

DOJ was aware as early as 2002 that information collected under the PSP could have implications for DOJ’s litigation responsibilities under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 and Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Analysis of this discovery issue was first assigned to OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in 2003. However, no DOJ attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibilities were read into the PSP until mid-2004, and as a result DOJ continued to lack the advice of attorneys who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in connection with the PSP. The steps taken since then to address discovery issues with respect to the PSP are discussed only in the classified report. The DOJ may need to re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was collected under the PSP, to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases.[1]


The IGs also examined the impact of PSP information on counterterrorism efforts. Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled a gap in intelligence collection thought to exist under the FISA statute shortly after the al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks against the United States. Others within the IC, including FBI agents, CIA analysts and officers, and other officials had difficulty evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering tools in these efforts. The IG reports describe several examples of how PSP-derived information factored into specific investigations and operations.[1]

During the May 2006 Senate hearing on his nomination to be CIA Director, Hayden said that, had the PSP been in place before the September 2001 attacks, hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi almost certainly would have been identified and located. In May 2009, Hayden told NSA OIG that the value of the Program was in knowing that NSA signals intelligence activities under the PSP covered an important quadrant of terrorist communications. NSA’s Deputy Director echoed Hayden’s comment when he said that the value of the PSP was in the confidence it provided that someone was looking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains.[1]

The DOJ OIG found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the DOJ OIG visited said the FBI’s process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adequately prioritize the information for investigation. In sum, the DOJ OIG found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the PSP program as it relates to the FBI’s counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents reviewed, the DOJ OIG concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI’s overall counterterrorism efforts.[1]

The CIA OIG determined that several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the product of the PSP. Many CIA officials stated that too few CIA personnel at the working level were read into the PSP. The CIA OIG determined that the CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. In a May 2006 briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a senior CIA official said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an intelligence success, but that it frequently played a supporting role.[1]


Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), issued a statement on the day the report was released saying, no president should be able to operate outside the law. She was responding specifically to a statement in the report attributed to former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey that,[6] Yoo’s legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification. [1] Pelosi further stated that, the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees will closely examine the findings and recommendations of the classified and unclassified reports, and will conduct appropriate oversight of electronic surveillance activities. [6]

John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), House Judiciary Committee Chairman, made the following comments in an official statement on the day the report was released: This report, mandated by Congress last year, documents what many of us in Congress concluded long ago: President Bush’s warrantless surveillance program was illegal from the beginning, and of questionable value. It clearly violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which regulates domestic surveillance for intelligence purposes, and was based on legal analysis that was ‘factually flawed’…. The refusal of key Bush administration officials such as David Addington and John Yoo to cooperate with the IGs’ review underscores the need for an independent commission with subpoena power to further review these issues, as I have called for. [10][11]

Conyers’ counterpart on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), issued a statement on the report saying its conclusions should highlight rule-of-law issues ignored by the previous administration. Leahy said, This report underscores why we should move forward with a nonpartisan commission of inquiry. Without a thorough, independent review of decisions that run counter to our laws and treaties, we cannot ensure that these same mistakes are not repeated. Such a commission must have bipartisan support to be able to truly get to the bottom of these issues with objectivity and credibility. [12]

Shortly after the report was released, former NSA Director Michael Hayden, who designed and implemented the program in 2001, told the Associated Press that he personally briefed key members of congress on the program. He maintained that the members were kept well-informed, and was distressed by suggestions that they were not. Hayden said key members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of both parties were briefed about four times a year, but admitted that the number of lawmakers informed was intentionally limited as the program was highly classified.[13]

* 2001-09-11: September 11 Attacks kill approximately 3000 people in the U.S.
* 2001-10-25: First Congressional briefing on the surveillance program[1]
* 2001-11-02: Date of first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the PSP (drafted by John Yoo)[1]
* 2002-12-11: Yoo drafted another opinion concerning the PSP using the same basic analysis contained in his November 2, 2001 memo[1]
* 2003-03: Yoo’s supervisor Jay Bybee resigns as the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC,[1] to become a U.S. Court of Appeals judge
* 2003-05: Yoo resigns from DOJ[1]
* 2003-10-06: Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC[1]
* 2003-12: Goldsmith and Patrick Philbin met with David Addington, and Alberto Gonzales to express their concerns[1]
* 2004-01: Goldsmith’s request for the new Deputy AG James Comey to be read into the PSP is granted[1] by Addington[14]
* 2004-02-19: Mike Hayden and Vito Potenza from NSA meet with Comey to read him in to the program in the Justice Department’s SCIF[14]
* 2004-02-19: Hayden tells Comey, I’m so glad you’re getting read in, because now I won’t be alone at the [witness] table when John Kerry is elected president [14]
* 2004-03-01: Comey discussed DOJ’s concerns about the legality of the program with FBI Director Robert Mueller[1]
* 2004-03-04: Comey met with Attorney General John Ashcroft to discuss his concerns on the legality of the PSP [1]
* 2004-03-04: Attorney General Ashcroft is hospitalized that evening[1]
* 2004-03-05: Comey takes over as Acting Attorney General[1]
* 2004-03-05: Gonzales calls Goldsmith to request letter reaffirming Yoo’s prior OLC opinions[1]
* 2004-03-06: Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to tell them that certain activities in the PSP should cease.[1]
* 2004-03-07: Goldsmith and Philbin met again with Addington and Gonzales at the White House.[1]
* 2004-03-09: Gonzales called Goldsmith to the White House in an effort to persuade him that his criticisms of Yoo’s memoranda were incorrect[1]
* 2004-03-09: Another meeting at the White House was held with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin present[1]
* 2004-03-10: Comey learns his old friend, then Deputy National Security Advisor Frances Townsend, is not read in, so he cannot consult her.[14]
* 2004-03-10: Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey met to discuss the meeting at the White House the day before and how DOJ should proceed[1]
* 2004-03-10: Vice President Dick Cheney decides to get personally involved in the reauthorization[14]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales, Cheney, Card, Hayden, and others, convened an emergency meeting with the Gang of Eight in the White House Situation Room[1]
* 2004-03-10: Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin rush to the hospital to tell Ashcroft not to sign anything[1]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales and Card entered Ashcroft’s hospital room with the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization for Ashcroft to sign[1]
* 2004-03-10: Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card in very strong terms about his legal concerns with the PSP and referred them to Comey[1]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales and Card left the hospital and then summoned Comey to the White House before he had left[1]
* 2004-03-10: Goldsmith called his deputy at OLC M. Edward Whelan III and told him to go to the office to draft a resignation letter for him, without explanation[15]
* 2004-03-10: After calling Comey, Card learns that top Justice staff are planning to resign[15]
* 2004-03-10: Comey brings Ted Olson to the White House at about 11:00 p.m. to witness the meeting with Gonzales and Card[1]
* 2004-03-10: Card confronts Comey over the resignation rumor, and learns that Comey is planning to resign [15]
* 2004-03-11: Addington re-types the code-word-classified Presidential authorization, replacing the signature line for Ashcroft with Gonzales[15]
* 2004-03-11: President George W. Bush signed a new Authorization for the PSP certified by White House Counsel Gonzales instead of the Attorney General[1]
* 2004-03-11: After learning the PSP was reauthorized, Comey types a resignation letter, but holds it at the request of Ashcroft’s Chief of Staff David Ayers
* 2004-03-12: Mueller drafts a resignation letter[1]
* 2004-03-12: National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice suggests that President Bush talk directly to Comey to “hear him out”[15]
* 2004-03-12: At the end of his daily briefing, Bush calls Comey aside, and asked him wait another 45 days, but Comey declines[15]
* 2004-03-12: After learning from Comey that Mueller planned to resign, Bush met with him privately and tells Mueller to tell Comey to do what “needs to be done.”[15]
* 2004-03-16: Comey drafted a memorandum to White House Counsel Gonzales setting out his advice to the President. Gonzales sent a dismissive reply[1]
* 2004-03-17: Bush modifies some PSP intelligence-gathering activities and discontinues others that DOJ believed not were legally supported[1]
* 2004-03-31: Ashcroft is cleared by his doctors to resume his duties as Attorney General[1]
* 2004-05-06: Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was operating at that time[1]
* 2004-05-06: The March 11 Authorization was set to expire[1]
* 2004-11-02: George W. Bush is re-elected President of the United States
* 2005-12-16: The New York Times publishes the first article describing NSA warrantless wiretaps[16]
* 2005-12-17: President Bush describes the TSP in a radio address[1]
* 2005-12-19: Gonzales & Hayden discuss legal issues around the TSP in a joint press conference[17]
* 2006-07-18: Gonzales testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee[1]
* 2007-02-01: The President decided not to reauthorize these activities and the final Presidential Authorization expired[1]
* 2007-07-24: Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the March 10, 2004, Gang of Eight briefing[1]
* 2007-08-05: The Protect America Act was enacted, amending FISA to address the government’s ability to conduct domestic electronic surveillance[1]
* 2008-02-17: The Protect America Act expired[1]
* 2008-07-10: The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted, providing broader authority than the acknowledged TSP scope[1]
* 2009-07-10: Inspectors General report required under FISA Amendments Act released[1]

Further reading

* Gellman, Barton D. (2009). Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics). ISBN 0-14-311616-9. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/.


1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz Inspectors General of the DoD, DOJ, CIA, NSA, and ODN (2009-07-10) Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program. Report. Retrieved on 2009-07-11. “Finally, the collection activities pursued under the PSP, and under FISA following the PSP’s transition to that authority, involved unprecedented collection activities. We believe the retention and use by IC organizations of information collected under the PSP and FISA should be carefully monitored.”
2. ^ U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials Report . The New York Times. 2009-07-12. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/us/11nsa.html?_r=1. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The report states that at the same time Mr. Bush authorized the warrantless wiretapping operation, he also signed off on other surveillance programs that the government has never publicly acknowledged. While the report does not identify them, current and former officials say that those programs included data mining of e-mail messages of Americans.
3. ^ Cauley, Leslie (2006-05-11). NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls . USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, people with direct knowledge of the arrangement told USA TODAY.
4. ^ Hess, Pamela (2009-07-11). Report: Too few officials knew of surveillance . Google News. The Associated Press. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hEr2O_sANlmWwPWdPygTxCbq1_bQD99C4KI00. Retrieved 2009-07-11. Not enough relevant officials were aware of the size and depth of an unprecedented surveillance program started under President George W. Bush, let alone signed off on it, a team of federal inspectors general found. The Bush White House pulled in a great quantity of information far beyond the warrantless wiretapping previously acknowledged, the IGs reported. They questioned the legal basis for the effort but shielded almost all details on grounds they’re still too secret to reveal.
5. ^ a b Taylor, Marisa (2009-07-11). Report: Effectiveness of Bush wiretap program disputed . Miami Herald. McClatchy News Service. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/1136936.html. Retrieved 2009-07-11. A declassified intelligence report faults the Bush administration’s secrecy about its warrantless wiretap program. Despite the Bush administration’s insistence that its warrantless eavesdropping program was necessary to protect the country from another terrorist attack, FBI agents, CIA analysts and other officials had difficulty evaluating its effectiveness, according to an unclassified government report made public Friday.
6. ^ a b c Bush-era wiretap program had limited results, report finds . CNN.com date=2009-07-12. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/12/bush.wiretap/. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who took part in that face-off, told investigators that the program’s original authorization ‘involved ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification.’ That line drew the ire of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who issued a statement Friday declaring that ‘no president should be able to operate outside the law.’
7. ^ Johnson, Carrie; Nakashima, Ellen (2009-07-12). Report: Wiretaps risked a crisis . Philadelphia Inquirer. The Washington Post. http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20090711_Report__Wiretaps_risked_a_crisis.html. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The Bush White House so strictly controlled access to its warrantless-eavesdropping program that only three Justice Department lawyers were aware of the plan, which nearly ignited mass resignations and a constitutional crisis when a wider circle of administration officials began to question its legality, according to a watchdog report released yesterday.
8. ^ Shane, Scott (2009-07-12). Cheney Is Linked to Concealment of C.I.A. Project . The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/politics/12intel.html?hp. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Democrats in Congress, who contend that the Bush administration improperly limited Congressional briefings on intelligence, are seeking to change the National Security Act to permit the full intelligence committees to be briefed on more matters. President Obama, however, has threatened to veto the intelligence authorization bill if the changes go too far, and the proposal is now being negotiated by the White House and the intelligence committees.
9. ^ Johnson, Carrie; Nakashima, Ellen (2009-07-11). Inspectors General Report Faults Secrecy of Surveillance Program . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR2009071002536.html?wprss=rss_print/asection. Retrieved 2009-07-11. ‘Extraordinary and inappropriate’ secrecy about a warrantless eavesdropping program undermined its effectiveness as a terrorism-fighting tool, government watchdogs have concluded in the first examination of one of the most contentious episodes of the Bush administration.
10. ^ Conyers: IG Report Shows Bush Broke the Law, Personally Authorizing the Warrantless Surveillance Program . House Committee on the Judiciary. http://judiciary.house.gov/news/090710.html.
11. ^ Stern, Christopher (2009-07-10). Bush Wiretapping Program Lacked Proper Legal Review (Update1) . Bloomberg.com. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ai0sdApeGhds. Retrieved 2009-07-12. ‘President Bush’s warrantless surveillance program was illegal from the beginning and of questionable value,’ said House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat, in an e-mailed statement.
12. ^ AFP: US govt review questions effectiveness of wiretaps . Google News. 2009-07-11. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gbmJ61GItjVdbI6rLlbNlq-8wneA. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Democrat Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in a statement that the conclusions of this review should help shed more light on these rule-of-law issues that the previous administration avoided for a long time.
13. ^ Hess, Pamela (2009-07-12). AP Interview: Hayden denies Congress not informed . Google News. Associated Press. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwJhPuY4ndVAdfJgwbiS3uh7uIGgD99CJOBO0. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Former CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden angrily struck back Saturday at assertions the Bush administration’s post-9/11 surveillance program was more far-reaching than imagined and was largely concealed from congressional overseers. In an interview with The Associated Press, Hayden maintained that top members of Congress were kept well-informed all along the way, notwithstanding protests from some that they were kept in the dark.
14. ^ a b c d e Gellman, Barton (2008-09-14). Conflict Over Spying Led White House to Brink . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/13/AR2008091302284.html?sid=ST2008091302818. Retrieved 2009-07-13. This is the first of two stories adapted from Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, to be published Tuesday by Penguin Press.
15. ^ a b c d e f g Gellman, Barton (2008-09-15). Cheney Shielded Bush From Crisis – washingtonpost.com . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/14/AR2008091401974.html. Retrieved 2009-07-13. This is the second of two stories adapted from Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, to be published Tuesday by Penguin Press.
16. ^ Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts . NYT’s Risen & Lichtblau’s December 16, 2005 Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts . http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1216-01.htm. Retrieved February 18 2006. via commondreams.org
17. ^ The White House (December 19, 2005). Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence . Press release. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html.

External links

* Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program on Wikisource.

PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from the United States Government document Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program, 10 July 2009 .
v • d • e
War on Terrorism
Timeline A Casualties A Theaters A Criticism A ISAF

ISAF A Operation Enduring Freedom participants A Multinational force in Iraq A Afghanistan A Northern Alliance A Iraq (Iraqi Army) A NATO A Pakistan A United Kingdom A United States A Philippines A Ethiopia

al-Qaeda A Osama bin Laden A Abu Sayyaf A Iraqi insurgency A Hamas A Islamic Courts Union A Jemaah Islamiyah A Taliban A Jaish-e-Mohammed A Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami A Hizbul Mujahideen A Hezbollah A Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan A Lashkar-e-Taiba
Enduring Freedom

War in Afghanistan A OEF – Philippines A Georgia Train and Equip Program A Georgia Sustainment and Stability A OEF – Horn of Africa A OEF – Trans Sahara A Missile strikes in Pakistan

Insurgency in the Maghreb A Iraq insurgency and operations A Insurgency in Saudi Arabia A War in North-West Pakistan A South Thailand insurgency A Lebanon War A War in Somalia A Lebanon-Fatah al-Islam conflict

September 11 attacks A Bahawalpur church attack A Indian Parliament attack A Shoe bomb plot A Ghriba synagogue bombing A Karachi bus bomb A Jaunpur train crash A Karachi US Consulate bombing A Akshardham Temple attack A 1st Bali bombing A Zamboanga bombings A Kurnool train crash

Riyadh compound bombings A Casablanca bombings A 2003 Mumbai bombings A Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing A Istanbul bombings A SuperFerry 14 bombing A Madrid train bombings A Khobar massacre A Beslan school hostage crisis A Jakarta Australian embassy bombing

1st London bombings A 2nd London bombings A Sharm el-Sheikh attacks A 2nd Bali bombing A 1st Delhi bombings A Amman bombings A 2006 Varanasi bombings A 2006 Mumbai train bombings A Transatlantic aircraft plot A Toronto terrorism plot

1st Algiers bombings A Fort Dix attack plot A Ankara bombing A London car bomb plot A Glasgow Airport attack A 2007 Yemen tourist attack A Hyderabad bombings A Qahtaniya bombings A Karachi bombing A Baghlan bombing A Philippine Congress bombing A 2nd Algiers bombings A Assassination of Benazir Bhutto A Jaipur bombings A Danish embassy A Indian embassy A United States consulate A Bangalore bombings-Ahmedabad A 2nd Delhi bombings A American embassy A Islamabad bombing A 3rd Delhi bombing A 2008 Assam bombings A 2008 Mumbai attacks

Attack on Sri Lankan cricket team A 2009 Yemen tourist attack A 2009 Lahore bombing A Pearl Continental hotel bombing A Jakarta bombings
See also
Abu Ghraib prison A Axis of evil A Bush Doctrine A CIA run Black sites A Combatant Status Review Tribunal A Enhanced interrogation techniques A Extrajudicial prisoners of the US A Extraordinary rendition A Guantanamo Bay detention camp A Military Commissions Act A NSA electronic surveillance program A President’s Surveillance Program A Protect America Act of 2007 A Unitary executive theory A Unlawful combatant A USA PATRIOT Act
Terrorism A War
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s_Surveillance_Program
Categories: Anti-terrorism policy of the United States | Counter-terrorism | George W. Bush administration controversies | National Security Agency | Secret government programs | Surveillance | War on Terrorism | Intelligence operations


The Nuclear fallout reference article from the English Wikipedia on 24-Jul-2004
(provided by Fixed Reference: snapshots of Wikipedia from wikipedia.org)
Nuclear fallout
For people who check facts

Fallout is radioactive dust created when a nuclear weapon explodes. A nuclear explosion vaporizes any material within the fireball, including the ground if it is nearby. In water, the minerals (including sodium in ocean water) are made radioactive by neutrons from the bomb core. Fallout from seawater is unusually dangerous because it is difficult to remove by washing.

When this material condenses in the cloud, it forms dust and light sandy material that resembles ground pumice. In the case of seawater, it forms a heavy fog from the base of the mushroom cloud (the base surge ). This highly irradiated material then falls to earth. The fallout behaves much like thousands of tiny x-ray machines, emitting gamma rays in all directions. A fallout shelter is designed to shield its occupants from this radiation. However, some radioactive contamination will probably remain when the inhabitants eventually emerge.

The closer to ground an atomic bomb is detonated, the more dust and debris is thrown into the air, resulting in greater amounts of fallout. From a tactical standpoint, this has the disadvantage of hindering any occupation efforts until the fallout clears, but more directly, the impact with the ground severely limits the destructive force of the bomb. For these reasons, ground bursts are not usually considered tactically advantageous, with the exception of hardened underground targets such as missile silos or command centers such as Cheyenne Mountain. Salting enemy territory with a fallout-heavy atomic burst could be used to deny enemy access to a contaminated area but such use is generally not considered an ethical military action.

The fallout residue can be used to analyze the source and nature of the weapon used. Materials used in the weapon will have distinct signature, which with proper analysis could reveal where or by whom the weapon was made.

Table of contents [showhide]
1 Effects of fallout
1.1 See also
2 Nuclear fallout
2.2 See also
3 References

Effects of fallout

Initial radiation from fallout can exceed 300 gray per hour (Gy/h) immediately downwind of a ground burst. A cumulative dose of 4.5 Gy is fatal to half of a population of humans. There have been no documented cases of survival beyond 6 Gy. Most people become ill after an exposure to 1 Gy or more. The fetuses of pregnant women are vulnerable and may miscarry, especially in the first trimester. Human biology resists mutation from large radiation exposure: grossly mutated fetuses usually miscarry. Civilian dose rates in peace-time range from 0.1 to 0.03 mGy/year.

Fallout radiation falls off (‘decays’) exponentially (quickly) with time. Most areas become safe for travel and decontamination after three to five weeks.

The ground track of fallout from an explosion is a long, thin fuzzy ellipse downwind of the explosion. It may be hundreds of km long, and up to 50 km (30mi) wide from a single explosion. Rain can cause fallout to settle more quickly. This means that a rainstorm can significantly increase the hazards to those just downwind of a nuclear war.

The most dangerous emissions from fallout are gamma rays, which travel in straight lines, like ordinary light. The fallout particles emit the invisible, deadly gamma rays in the same way that a light bulb emits light. Gamma rays are invisible, and cannot be seen, smelt, or felt, even at very dangerous intensities. Special equipment is required to detect and measure gamma rays.

Gamma rays do not contaminate people or objects. Fallout particles contaminate people or objects, and since they resemble sand, they can be brushed off, or washed off. The radioactive fog from seawater is a notable exception, being very difficult to wash off. The particles should be removed from the shelter, or shielded. Emergency drinking water can be adequately cleaned by filtering contaminated water through more than 25cm (10 in) of dirt. Food in sealed packages is not poisoned by fallout. Stored grain and exposed fruit can be cleaned and peeled. Vehicles are usually washed down with fire-hoses, into drains with removable filters, or deep trenches. Ground is usually decontaminated by bulldozing the fallout into deep, narrow trenches, and then back-filling the trenches.

See also

* Radioactive contamination
* Poison
* Dirty bomb
* Neutron bomb
* Radiological weapon

Nuclear fallout

The residual radiation hazard from a nuclear explosion is in the form of radioactive fallout and neutron-induced activity. Residual ionizing radiation arises from:

* Fission Products. These are intermediate weight isotopes which are formed when a heavy uranium or plutonium nucleus is split in a fission reaction. There are over 300 different fission products that may result from a fission reaction. Many of these are radioactive with widely differing half-lives. Some are very short, i.e., fractions of a second, while a few are long enough that the materials can be a hazard for months or years. Their principal mode of decay is by the emission of beta and gamma radiation. Approximately 60 grams of fission products are formed per kiloton of yield. The estimated activity of this quantity of fission products 1 minute after detonation is equal to that of 1.1 x 1021 Bq (30 million kg of radium) in equilibrium with its decay products.
* Unfissioned Nuclear Material. Nuclear weapons are relatively inefficient in their use of fissionable material, and much of the uranium and plutonium is dispersed by the explosion without undergoing fission. Such unfissioned nuclear material decays by the emission of alpha particles and is of relatively minor importance.
* Neutron-Induced Activity. If atomic nuclei capture neutrons when exposed to a flux of neutron radiation, they will, as a rule, become radioactive (neutron-induced activity) and then decay by emission of beta and gamma radiation over an extended period of time. Neutrons emitted as part of the initial nuclear radiation will cause activation of the weapon residues. In addition, atoms of environmental material, such as soil, air, and water, may be activated, depending on their composition and distance from the burst. For example, a small area around ground zero may become hazardous as a result of exposure of the minerals in the soil to initial neutron radiation. This is due principally to neutron capture by sodium (Na), manganese, aluminum, and silicon in the soil. This is a negligible hazard because of the limited area involved.

Worldwide Fallout: After an air burst the fission products, unfissioned nuclear material, and weapon residues which have been vaporized by the heat of the fireball will condense into a fine suspension of very small particles 0.01 to 20 micrometers in diameter. These particles may be quickly drawn up into the stratosphere, particularly if the explosive yield exceeds 10 kt. They will then be dispersed by atmospheric winds and will gradually settle to the earth’s surface after weeks, months, and even years as worldwide fallout.

The radiobiological hazard of worldwide fallout is essentially a long-term one due to the potential accumulation of long-lived radioisotopes, such as strontium-90 and caesium-137, in the body as a result of ingestion of foods incorporating these radioactive materials. This hazard is much less serious than those which are associated with local fallout and, therefore, is not discussed at length in this publication. Local fallout is of much greater immediate operational concern.

This type of fallout is featured in the book On the Beach by British author Nevil Shute.

Local fallout: In a land or water surface burst, large amounts of earth or water will be vaporized by the heat of the fireball and drawn up into the radioactive cloud. This material will become radioactive when it condenses, with fission products and other radiocontaminants that have become neutron-activated.

There will be large amounts of particles of less than 0.1 micrometer to several millimeters in diameter generated in a surface burst in addition to the very fine particles which contribute to worldwide fallout.

The larger particles will not rise into the stratosphere and consequently will settle to earth within about 24 hours as local fallout.
Severe local fallout contamination can extend far beyond the blast and thermal effects, particularly in the case of high yield surface detonations.

Whenever individuals remain in a radiologically contaminated area, such contamination will lead to an immediate external radiation exposure as well as a possible later internal hazard due to inhalation and ingestion of radiocontaminants.

In severe cases of fallout contamination, lethal doses of external radiation may be incurred if protective or evasive measures are not undertaken.

In cases of water surface (and shallow underwater) bursts, the particles tend to be rather lighter and smaller and so produce less local fallout but will extend over a greater area. The particles contain mostly sea salts with some water; these can have a cloud seeding affect causing local rainout and areas of high local fallout.

For subsurface bursts, there is an additional phenomenon present called base surge. The base surge is a cloud that rolls outward from the bottom of the column produced by a subsurface explosion. For underwater bursts the visible surge is, in effect, a cloud of liquid (water) droplets with the property of flowing almost as if it were a homogeneous fluid. After the water evaporates, an invisible base surge of small radioactive particles may persist.

For subsurface land bursts, the surge is made up of small solid particles, but it still behaves like a fluid. A soil earth medium favors base surge formation in an underground burst.

Meteorological Effects: Meteorological conditions will greatly influence fallout, particularly local fallout. Atmospheric winds are able to distribute fallout over large areas. For example, as a result of a surface burst of a 15 Mt thermonuclear device at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, a roughly cigar-shaped area of the Pacific extending over 500 km downwind and varying in width to a maximum of 100 km was severely contaminated.

Snow and rain, especially if they come from considerable heights, will accelerate local fallout. Under special meteorological conditions, such as a local rain shower that originates above the radioactive cloud, limited areas of heavy contamination may be formed.

Blast and thermal injuries in many cases will far outnumber radiation injuries. However, radiation effects are considerably more complex and varied than are blast or thermal effects and are subject to considerable misunderstanding. A wide range of biological changes may follow the irradiation of animals, ranging from rapid death following high doses of penetrating whole-body radiation to essentially normal lives for a variable period of time until the development of delayed radiation effects, in a portion of the exposed population, following low dose exposures.

Median Lethal Dose (LD50): When comparing the effects of various types or circumstances, that dose which is lethal to 50% of a given population is a very useful parameter. The term is usually defined for a specific time, being limited, generally, to studies of acute lethality. The common time periods used are 30 days or less for most small laboratory animals and to 60 days for large animals and humans. It should be understood that the LD50 assumes that the individuals did not receive other injuries or medical treatment.

For yields of 5-10 kt (or less), initial nuclear radiation is the dominant casualty producer on the battlefield. Military personnel receiving an acute incapacitation dose (30 Gray) will become performance degraded almost immediately and combat ineffective within several hours. However, they will not die until 5-6 days after exposure if they do not receive any other injuries which make them more susceptible to the radiation dose. Soldiers receiving less than a total of 150 cGray will remain combat effective. Between those two extremes, military personnel receiving doses greater than 150 cGray will become degraded; some will eventually die. A dose of 530-830 cGray is considered lethal but not immediately incapacitating. Personnel exposed to this amount of radiation will become performance degraded within 2-3 hours, depending on how physically demanding the tasks they must perform are, and will remain in this degraded state at least 2 days. However, at that point they will experience a recovery period and be effective at performing nondemanding tasks for about 6 days, after which they will relapse into a degraded state of performance and remain so for about 4 weeks. At this time they will begin exhibiting radiation symptoms of sufficient severity to render them totally ineffective. Death follows at approximately 6 weeks after exposure.

Late or delayed effects of radiation occur following a wide range of doses and dose rates. Delayed effects may appear months to years after irradiation and include a wide variety of effects involving almost all tissues or organs. Some of the possible delayed consequences of radiation injury are life shortening, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, decreased fertility, and genetic mutations.

For videos and more on the effects of a thermonuclear device check [1]

See also

radiation poisoning, radioactive contamination, fallout shelter, nuclear terrorism, radioactive waste, nuclear weapon design.


* Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition), U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. (Available Online)
* NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations (Part I – Nuclear), Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1996. (Available Online)
* Smyth, H. DeW., Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Princeton University Press, 1945. (Available Online)
* The Effects of Nuclear War, Office of Technology Assessment (May 1979)



Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, plutonium, and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—known as weapons usable material-are considered to pose the greatest proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of IAEA’s member states, currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either HEU or plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons-usable material occurred during 1993-95. The remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001.

Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material since 1992

Date Source of material Country where
material seized Material/quantity How material was found
May 1992 Russia
(Luch Scientific Production Assoc.) Russia 1.5 kilograms
(90 percent HEU) Police investigation
May 1993 Russia Lithuania 0.1 kilogram
(50 percent HEU) Police investigation
July 1993 Russia Russia 1.8 kilograms
(36 percent HEU) Police investigation
November 1993 Russia Russia 4.5 kilograms
(20 percent HEU) Police investigation
March 1994 Russia Russia 3.05 kilograms
(90 percent HEU) Police investigation
May 1994 Unspecified Germany 0.006 kilograms plutonium-239 Police investigation
June 1994 Russia Germany 0.0008 kilograms
(87.8 percent HEU) Police investigation
July 1994 Russia Germany 0.00024 kilograms plutonium Police investigation
August 1994 Russia Germany 0.4 kilograms of plutonium Police investigation
December 1994 Russia Czech Republic 2.7 kilograms
(87.7 percent HEU) Police investigation
June 1995 Russia Czech Republic 0.0004 grams
(87.7 percent HEU) Police investigation
June 1995 Russia Czech Republic 0.017 kilograms
(87.7 percent HEU) Police investigation
June 1995 Russia Russia 1.7 kilograms
(21 percent HEU) Police investigation
May 1999 Russia Bulgaria 0.004 kilograms of HEU Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs.
October 1999 Unspecified Kyrgyzstan 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium Police investigation
April 2000 Unspecified but Russia suspected Georgia 0.9 kilograms of HEU (30 percent) Possible combination of radiation detection equipment at border and police investigation
September 2000 Possibly Russia
and/or Ukraine Georgia 0.0004 kilograms of plutonium Police investigation
December 2000 Germany Germany Less than 1 milligram of plutonium Radioactive contamination disclosed in a test.
January 2001 Unspecified Greece Approximately 0.003 kilograms of plutonium Police investigation
July 2001 Unspecified France About 0.005 kilograms of HEU
(approximately 80 percent enriched) Police investigation

Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the weight of a paperclip.

Source: GAO Report, May 2002: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning



Appendix A: Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix A: Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

March 27, 1996

———- 1996 ———-

17 March

Tanzanian police arrested one individual last week and seized a container of radioactive cesium.
9 March

Romanian police announced on 8 March that they are holding two individuals for attempting to sell stolen radioactive material, according to press reports. A po lice spokesman announced that two had in their possession 82 kg of radioactive material including low enriched uranium. Officials also found reportedly secret documents stolen from the Research and Design Center for Radioactive Metals.
4 March

UPDATE (12 February): According to press reports, Lithuanian officials have determined that the 100 kg of radioactive material seized last month from an armed gang is uranium-238. This material was stolen from a company responsible for maintenance at the nearby Ignalina nuclear power plant.
23 February

According to press reports, the Belarus Committee for State Security (KGB) seized five kilograms of cesium-133. The radioactive metal reportedly was sealed in glass containers. Belarus authorities are investigating the incident, according to press.
12 February

Lithuanian authorities announced that they had arrested seven people and seized nearly 100 kg of radioactive material, according to press reports. The mate rial, believed to be uranium, will undergo further tests to ascertain its makeup and origin. It was emitting 14,000 microroentgens per hour. Some reports stated that the material was a component of a nuclear fuel assemply which has been missing from the n early Ignalina nuclear power plant for several years. The Ignalina plant manager claims that the seized material is not nuclear fuel or equipment used at his facility.
1 February

Swiss federal prosecutors announced on 1 February the arrest of a Swiss citizen of Turkish descent for attempting to sell a sample of slightly-enriche d uranium in Switzerland, according to press. Swiss authorities stated that the individual claimed the sample was part of a larger cache still in Turkey. Turkish police using information from their Swiss counterparts, then arrested eight people and seized 1.128 kg of similar material. Press reports indicate that the uranium was similar to that used in nuclear power plant fuel rods. Swiss authorities reportedly are conducting tests to determine the uranium’s country of origin.
25 January

According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
21 January

UPDATE (7 November 95): The German parliamentary commission investigating the 1994 plutonium smuggling incident, reportedly has uncovered German gove rnment documents indicating that the three smugglers offered to supply 11 kilograms of Russian-origin, weapons-grade plutonium, which they claimed was enough to build three nuclear weapons, according to press reports.
18 January

According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium-137 smuggled from Zaire to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
17 January

A Palestinian in Dubai, UAE has offered to sell three kilograms of reportedly Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman, according to US diplomatic reporting.

———- 1995 ———-

28 December

According to press reports, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested nine members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized a quantit y of radioactive material. The material was identified in press reports as enriched uranium-235. The material had been transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakstan. The ultimate destination may have been South Korea, accord ing to press reports.

2 December

UPDATE (9 Nov 95): According to Italian press reports, Italian prosecutors have arrested an individual, Roger D’Onofrio, with reported links to the U S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian-American mafia as part of their investigation of smuggling radioactive materials, money-laundering and arms trafficking. D’Onofrio, 72, reportedly has dual Italian and U.S. citizenship and retired from t he CIA only two years ago. The ring he is alleged to have been part of is said to have been active from the early 1990s up to this year. Italian investigators reportedly suspect that D’Onofrio is the mastermind behind an international ring which laundered dirty money and smuggled gold, weapons, and radioactive material. His name also appears in another investigation into an arms smuggling operation between Italy and the Middle East, according to press reports. D’Onofrio was taken into preventive custody o n charges of money laundering and acting as a broker in illegal currency dealing. According to press, the prosecutors had so far ascertained money laundering for over 2.5 billion dollars on behalf of secret service and organised crime sources in complicit y with diplomats, the ruling families in Kuwait, Morocco and Zambia, bankers, prelates and others.

1 December

UPDATE (23 November ): According to US diplomats in Moscow, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) delivered an official statement to US official s regarding the radioactive material discovered in Izmailov park on 23 November. The container, which held cesium-137, posed no public health threat. Radiation levels of the cesium were between 10 to more than 50 millicurrie. The radioactive material may have been used as an instrument calibration source used in flaw detection equipment.

30 November

A former Greenpeace president revealed that the organization had been offered a nuclear warhead by a disgruntled former Soviet officer keen to highlight la x security, according to press accounts. The former Greenpeace official stated in a recently published book that a Soviet officer with access to nuclear weapons offered Greenpeace an 800 kg nuclear Scud warhead for public display in Berlin. The offer was made shortly before 7 September 1991.

29 November

Russian security officials have recovered four containers with radioactive cesium, stolen from an industrial plant in the Urals and arrested the thieves, a ccording to press reports. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers found the 90-kilogram (198-pound) containers in a shaft of an old mine, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. One of the alleged thieves, the Bakal mining plant’s electrical engineer, had in itially kept them at his vegetable garden but moved them to a safer place after the theft had been discovered, claimed security officials. Two officials of a local penitentiary were his accomplices, they further alleged. Each container held a capsule with cesium 137, a radioactiveisotope used in geological research, as well as in medicine. The containers were similar to the one allegedly planted by Chechen rebels in a Moscow park.

23 November

Acting on a tip from Chechen separatist leader Basayev, Russian television reporters discovered a 32 kg container–reportedly holding cesium-137–in a Mosc ow park. The container was reportedly removed and turned over to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). FSB officials stated that an official investigation was underway and that no further comments would be made until the inquiry was completed, accor ding to press reports. Television reports quote a highly-placed FSB officer as stating unofficially that the object was a piece of a hospital x-ray machine. Basayev claimed earlier this month that several containers of radioactive material attached to exp losive devices had been planted in Russia. In a television interview aired on 15 October, Russian Interior minister Kulikov stated that Chechen separatist leader Basayev might have radioactive waste or radioisotopes taken from the Budyonnovsk hospi tal seized by Chechen rebels last spring.

23 November

UPDATE (7 Nov 95): A German court sentenced Adolph Jaekle, a German businessman, to 51/2 years in prison for smuggling weapons grade plutonium into the country, according to press reports. Investigators made the first in a series of contraband plutonium seizures in Germany when they raided Jaekle’s home, in the southern town of Tengen in May, 1994, and found a lead cylinder containing 6.15 grams ofpl utonium 239. Jaekle had pleaded not guilty to the plutonium charge, arguing that he did not know what the substance was.

11 November

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials arrested two Lithuanian citizens in Smolensk for smuggling 10 kgs of uranium-238 into Russia, according to Russian television rep orts. Three Russians also were arrested for attempting to sell the uranium. Both the Lithuanians and the Russians claimed that poverty had induced them to attempt to traffic in smuggled nuclear materials. According to press accounts, Russian authorities s tressed that the material was not weapons grade and had no commercial or industrial uses.

9 November

Italian prosecutors reportedly have asked Spanish authorities for permission to question the Archbishop of Barcelona about his role in an international criminal syndicate involved in smuggli ng radioactive materials, according to Italian press accounts. Accusations against the Archbishop arose after Italian officials tapped a telephone conversation in which the Archbishop was named as playing a leading role in the criminal enterprise. Both th e Archbishop and the Vatican have vehemently denied the accusations. The Spanish Justice ministry has characterized the Italian request as not very well thought out. The Italian investigation grew out on an earlier probe into money laundering operations which reportedly uncovered information that a criminal enterprise involving a self-professed Italian intelligence official, was attempting to sell 7.5 kg osmium for $63,000 per gram, according to Italian press accounts.

7 November

During a search of a car at the Polish-Czech border, Polish Border Guards discovered 11 cigarette pack-size containers filled with strontium-90, according to press accounts. This incident is the first case in 1995 involving smuggling radioactive material through Poland.

7 November

UPDATE (10 Aug 94): Adolf Jaekle, accused of smuggling Russian-origin plutonium following a May 1994 raid on his home, denied any involvement in nuclear smu ggling, according to press reports. Jaekle insisted that the container of plutonium was planted at his home and that the container was not the same one he took from a Swiss associate for metal reprocessing.

7 November

Iranian press reports indicate the Iranian law enforcement authorities have arrested five Iranians and seized nine packets of uranium in tehran and two other cities. No details were released regarding amount of material or whether it was enriched or not.

25 October

The cleaning staff at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 2 airport found a small lead container packed with radioactive substances in the men’s restrooms, according to p ress reports. Experts reportedly are attempting to determine the exact composition of the three sources of ionizing radiation found in the container. The speculation, in the Russian press, was that a nuclear smuggler lost his nerve and abandoned the mater ial during an aborted smuggling attempt.

19 October

UPDATE (10 Aug 94): According to a 19 October article in Der Stern, nuclear weapons smugglers involved in smuggling Russian-origin plutonium into Ger many in August 1994 have stored eight to ten kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium in Berlin. The article also implicates highly placed Russians in the smuggling activity.

14 October

Russian mafia figures reportedly were behind the 1993 theft of radioactive beryllium from a Russian nuclear laboratory and the failed attempt to sell the ma terial in the West, according to press reports. The theft, which was widely reported in 1993, was seized by police in Lithuania and remains today in the bank vault where it was first discovered. According to press, the smugglers were preparing to sell the beryllium to an Austrian middleman who in turn had a mystery buyer who reportedly was willing to pay as much as $24 million for the material. The buyer, although never identified, was said to be Korean. Beryllium, which is used in missile guidance system s, is a highly efficent neutron reflector, according to public statements by nuclear scientists.

10 October

Russian authorities claim that there have been no identified incidents in which weapons-grade radioactive material has been smuggled out of Russia, accordin g to press reports. In a press conference, Russian General Terekhov of the Interior Ministry, stated that of the 16 cases involving theft of radioactive materials, none could have been used to make nuclear weapons. He also ruled out any involvement by Rus sian organized criminal organizations in the thefts. The general claimed that the thefts were spontaneous actions by individuals working at nuclear facilities. The Russian officials concluded the press conference by stating that there is no black market i n nuclear materials.

1 September

According to press reports, Bulgarian police had broken an international nuclear smuggling ring composed of Russians and Ukrainians. Police spokesmen, decl ining to disclose details only said that the materials seized were of strategic value and included rare metals. The arrests were the culmination of a year-long undercover operation. Senior policie officials comented that they were still investigating the final destination of the materials, some of which were radioactive.

15 June

Press reports indicate that so far in 1995 Romanian authorities have seized 24 kgs of uranium powder and tablets and 1994 they arrested 24 people for involveme nt in nuclear smuggling and seized 10.35 kgs of uranium powder and tablets. From 1989 to 1993, the Romanians reportedly broke up five gangs, arrested 50 people, and seized 230 kgs of nuclear material.

13 April

Slovak police culminated a long investigation with the discovery of 18.39kg of nuclear material, 17.5 kg of which apparently is U-238, in a car stopped near P oprad in eastern Slovakia. Altogether, three Hungarians, four Slovaks, and two Ukrainians were arrested. This gang was connected to three other nuclear material smuggling incidents.

5 April

Four brass containers weighing 2 kilos each containing radioactive americium-241 and cesium-137 were stolen from a storeroom of isotopes in Wroclaw, Poland.

4 April

Press reports that 6 kg of U-235, U-238, radium, and palladium were found in a Kiev apartment. Occupants were ex-army, a lieutenant colonel and a warrant offic er, and material reportedly came from Russia.

2 April

Documents recovered by Japanese police in the investigation of Aum Shinrikyo involvement in the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack reportedly indicated that the ter rorists were collecting information on uranium enrichment and laser beam technologies. A spokesman for Russia’s prestigious nuclear physics laboratory, Kurchatov Institute, acknowledged that at least one Aum Shinrikyo follower was working at the institute .

14 March

Polish police in Bielska-Biala province arrested a man for possession of uranium .

8 March

Italian police arrested one Nicola Todesco for murder in a plutonium smuggling case gone awry when the murder victim did not have the money to pay for a quanti ty of plutonium smuggled out of Bulgaria. Todesco claimed he threw 5g of plutonium into the Adige river, but no trace of it was found after an extensive search. (Comment: Although an official Italian spokesman believed the plutonium was enriched for military use, it had not been analyzed and may be another scam involving ‘plutonium screws’ from smoke detectors.

25 January

According to Talinn news broadcasts, Lithuanian border police, using U.S.-supplied stationary radiation detectors, seized two tons of radioactive wolfram hi dden in a secret compartment in a truck trailer. (The wolfram is tungsten, which has a short half-life, and probably was infected by a radioactive contaminant.) The incident occurred at the Lithuanian-Belorus border, and the truck’ s owner and two other men were arrested. A similar incident occurred a week earlier at another border post but no details are available.

———- 1994 ———-

14 December

Czech police seized 2.72 kg of material–later identified as 87.7 percent enriched U-235–in Prague; this is the largest recorded seizure of such material. Police arrested a Czech nuclear physicist and two c itizens of the Former Soviet Union. The uranium apparently came from the FSU and was to be smuggled to Western Europe.

10 December

Press reporting indicates Hungarian border guards seized 1.7 kg of uranium and arrested four Slovak citizens. The material (depleted uranium and reactor fu el grade) reportedly was concealed in a fruit jar and was to be smuggled into Austria.

6 December

In a long article in Pravda, it was reported that three staffers of the Institute of Nuclear Physics were convicted of stealing 4.5 kg of uranium.

10 November

Press reporting indicates Hungarian police discovered 26 kg of radioactive material in the trunk of a car. Three suspects were subsequently arrested.


Press reporting indicates German police seized 1 milligram of cesium-137 in early November and arrested two suspects.


Press reporting indicates Turkish police arrested an Azeri national trying to sell 750 g of uranium.


Press reporting indicates Russian authorities seized 27 kg of U-238, an unknown quantity of U-235 and detained 12 members of a criminal gang.


Press reporting indicates that in mid-October, four Indian villagers were arrested attempting to sell 2.5 kg of yellowcake, i.e. uranium extracted from ore.


Press reporting indicates Bulgarian officials seized four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive material. The capsules were found on a bus enrou te to Turkey and police detained the two bus drivers.


Press reporting indicates Romanian authorities arrested seven people and seized 7 kg of uranium and an unidentified quantity of strontium or cesium.


Press reporting indicates Romanian police arrested four people trying to sell over 4 kg of U-235 and U-238.


Press reporting dated 26 October indicates Russian authorities arrested three men trying to pass 67 kg of U-238 to unidentified individuals in the city of Psko v.

28 September

Press reporting indicates that a container with radioactive substances was found on a street in Tallinn.

28 September

Romanian authorities arrested several indivduals who were attempting to sell 4.55 kg of uranium tetrachloride (61.9 percent uranium) for $25 thousand per kg, according to press reports

28 September

Press reporting indicates Slovak officials arrested four Slovaks trying to smuggle almost 1 kg of U-235 (judged not to be weapons-grade) into Hungary.

26 September

Press reporting indicates the discovery of a glass flask containing unspecified weak radioactive material at the Wetzlar railroad station in G ermany.


A Pole tried to sell 1 kg of U-235/238 in Germany. A German court subsequently sentenced him to two and a half years in prison for trading in radioactive ura nium.

11 September

Press reports indicate German police arrested a Zairian national attempting to smuggle 850 g of uraninite into Germany.

07 September

Press reports indicate Russian police arrested three people in Glazov trying to sell 100 kg of U-238.

05 September

Press reports indicate Bulgarian authorities arrested six Bulgarians in connection and seized 19 containers of radioactive material.

30 August

Press reports indicate thieves broke into a chemical plant in Tambov and stole 4.5 g of cesium 137.

29 August

Press reports indicate Hungarian police arrested two men and seized 4.4 kg of material believed to be fuel rods from a reactor in Russia.

20 August

Press reports Russian authorities arrested two men attempting to steal 9.5 kg of uranium 238 from the Arzamas-16 nuclear weapons research facility.

18 August

Press reports indicate Estonian police arrested a man and seized 3 kg of U-238 he had buried under his garage.

According to press reporting, about 100 uranium-contaminated drums were stolen from South Africa’s Atomic Energy Corporation plant in Pelindaba, Transvaal.

12 August

Press reports indicate that St. Petersburg police arrested three men trying to sell 60 kg of unidentified nuclear material.

12 August

Press reports indicate German police in Bremen arrested a German who claimed to have 2 g of plutonium; the sample contained only minute amounts of legally ob tainable plutonium.

10 August

Press report indicates that over 500 g of nuclear material were seized at Munich airport. The trial began on 10 May 1995 of two men for possession of 363g (12.8 ounces) of weapons-grade plutonium-239.


Unconfirmed press report says 3 kg of enriched uranium were seized in August in southwestern Romania.


Press reporting dated 19 July indicates Turkish National Police arrested seven Turks and seized 12 kg of weapons-grade uranium.


According to 6 July press reporting, Russian authorities in Shezninks discover 5.5 kg of U-238 previously stolen from the Chelyabinsk-65 nuclear facility.


According to a 2 November press report, police in Timisoara, Romania, arrested five Romanians trying to sell 2.6 kg of Russian uranium.

13 June

Press reporting indicates a seizure of 0.8 g of uranium 235 (enriched to 88%) occurred in Landshut, Germany.


According to 6 June press reporting, Russian security official announces the arrest of three Russians in St. Petersburg who allegedly tried to sell 3.5 kg of HEU.


According to an 8 July press report, Russian authorities arrested three officers from the Northern Fleet accused of having stolen 4.5 kg of U-238 from their base in Nov 93.

According to a 2 November press report, police in Pitesti, Romania, arrested three Romanians trying to sell 3 kg of uranium tablets.


According to 30 July press reporting, 56 g of material, including 6 g of plutonium 239, were seized and Adolf Jaekle, a German citizen, was arrested in G ermany in May.

———- 1993 ———-


In a case stemming from an incident in November 1993 in which a Russian naval officer stole 4 kg of 20 percent enriched U 235 nuclear fuel rods from a p oorly guarded area at Severomorsk, a Russian court found the officer guilty but gave him a suspended sentence because he admitted the act. Two accomplices were sentenced to three years at a labor camp.

Posted: Apr 03, 2007 08:54 PM
Last Updated: Apr 03, 2007 08:54 PM
Last Reviewed: Apr 03, 2007 08:54 PM



Trafficking in Nuclear and Radioactive Material in 2005
IAEA Releases Latest Illicit Trafficking Database Statistics
Staff Report
21 August 2006

* Story Resources
* Full Report: 2005 Nuclear Trafficking Statistics [pdf]

* Security of Radioactive Sources

* IAEA and Nuclear Security

* IAEA Office of Nuclear Security

There were 103 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials in 2005, newly released statistics from the Agencýs Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) show.

The ITDB covers a broad range of cases from illegal possession, attempted sale and smuggling, to unauthorized disposal of materials and discoveries of lost radiological sources.

Eighteen of the confirmed incidents in 2005 involved nuclear materials; 76 involved radioactive material, mainly radioactive sources; two involved both nuclear and other radioactive materials, and seven involved radioactively contaminated materials.

Another 57 incidents from previous years were reported. They involved illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and had occurred earlier, mainly in 2004.

Two reported cases in 2005 involved small quantities of high-enriched uranium (HEU) which is a fissile material. In New Jersey, USA, a package containing 3.3 grams of HEU was reported inadvertently disposed of. The second incident occurred in Fukui, Japan, when a neutron flux detector containing 0.0017 grams was lost at a nuclear power plant.

From the terrorism threat standpoint, these cases are of little concern but they show security vulnerabilities at facilities handling HEU, the latest report from the ITDB said. Indeed the majority of cases reported in 2005 showed no evidence of criminal activity.

The ITDB facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on incidents of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. There are 91 countries that report to the IAEÁs database. See Story Resources for the full report, which covers the past 13 years.

The Past 13 Years: 1993 – 2005

Nuclear Materials
During the thirteen year period, there were 16 confirmed incidents that involved trafficking in HEU and plutonium – which are fissile materials needed to make a nuclear weapon. A few of these incidents involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, but most involved very small quantities.

View Chart: Incidents Involving HEU and Pu (1993-2005) » [pdf]

The majority of confirmed cases with nuclear materials involved low-grade nuclear materials, i.e. low enriched uranium (LEU) mostly in the form of reactor fuel pellets, and natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium. Where information on motives is available, it indicates that profit seeking is the principal motive behind such events, the ITDB report said.

View Chart: Incidents Involving Nuclear Materials (1993-2005) » [pdf]

Other Radioactive Materials
During 1993-2005, just over 60 incidents involved high-risk dangerous radioactive sources, which present considerable radiological danger if used in a malicious act. In the hands of terrorists or other criminals, some radioactive sources could be used for malicious purposes, e.g. in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or ́dirty bomb́, the ITDB said. The overwhelming majority of incidents concerning dangerous sources were reported over the last six years. The majority of all incidents involved the radioisotope Caesium 137.

View Chart: Incidents Involving Radioactive Sources, by Type of Radioisotope (1993-2005) » [pdf]

Click to access chart3-2005.pdf

View Chart: Incidents Involving Radioactive Sources, by Type of Application (1993-2005) » [pdf]

Click to access chart4-2005.pdf

See Story Resources for more information.



Observed data from confirmed smuggling incidents and associated seizures and arrests are not necessarily representative of the wider universe of black market nuclear deals, including sophisticated schemes that escape scrutiny. As with other illegal commodities—
drugs for instance—what is captured probably represents just a fraction of what is available in the international marketplace. For example, the small (usually multi-gram) quantities of HEU and plutonium intercepted by authorities suggests that traders planned to show prospective customers samples of what could be larger inventories of privately-held material. Even kilogram-sized lots appearing in the black market may represent the tip of the proverbial iceberg. For instance, according to a Czech police investigation of a 1994 seizure in Prague of 2.7 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU, smugglers claimed they could deliver to buyers an additional 40 kilograms of HEU in the short term and 5 kilos each month over the next 12 months.2 Where this vagabond material, if it really existed, is now anyone’s guess.

Furthermore, the basic preconditions of a true market—would-be sellers and interested buyers—appear to be present. In Russia, the post-cold
war loss of government orders for nuclear goods, weakened security controls, and the economic desperation faced by the Russian workforce, set the stage for a dangerous proliferation dynamic. As then-senator Sam Nunn told a Senate hearing in 1995, the former Soviet Union was a ‘‘vast potential supermarket for nuclear weapons, weapons grade uranium and plutonium and equally deadly chemical and biological weapons.’’ 3

The literally hundreds of attempted thefts of nuclear and radiological materials at post-Soviet nuclear enterprises, especially in the 1990s, is ample evidence of proliferation pressures on the supply side. In one revealing 1998 incident, suggestive of a highly unstable security
climate, Russian security officials reportedly foiled a plot by ‘‘staff members’’ of a Chelyabinsk nuclear facility to steal 18.5 kilograms of HEU which, depending on the level of enrichment, could be almost enough for an atomic bomb.4

Click to access lee.nuclearsmuggling.pdf


Among sub-national groups, Al Qaeda and (in the 1990s) the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult have most consistently demonstrated an interest in acquiring a nuclear capability, including a complete nuclear weapon via black market channels. Osama bin Laden, in an oft quoted statement, called the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the defense of Muslims a ‘‘religious duty,’’ leaving little doubt of his WMD intentions.6

Finally, the ostensible lack of clear market relationships in observed
nuclear smuggling activity may be unrepresentative of the true state of affairs. That is, purveyors of strategic nuclear wares may be converging with customers in ways not readily apparent to western intelligence or security officials.

The prime example of such a ‘‘shadow market’’ in the nuclear realm was the notorious marketing network for nuclear weapons technology set up by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. The network, which sold centrifuges, centrifuge components, uranium hexafluoride gas, and nuclear weapons designs to various adversary nations, operated for about 15 years (from the late 1980s to early 2004) before being shut down by a joint U.S.-U.K. intelligence effort.7

For example, in June 2003 an Armenian smuggler was captured at the border with Georgia carrying 170 grams of HEU. The material was enriched to 89 percent U-235, close to the standard used for nuclear weapons (above 90 percent). In early 2006, a Russian (North Ossetian) trafficker was apprehended in a sting operation in Georgia with 100 g of HEU also enriched to 89 percent. Whether the two shipments were part of the same cache is not known. The smuggler told Georgian authorities that he had access to an additional two to three kilograms of the same material, but this claim was not verified.
A New York Times account of the incident observed that ‘‘the case has alarmed officials, because they had thought that new security precautions had tamped down the nuclear black market that developed in the 1990s . . .’’ However, in both of the above cases, there is a strong likelihood that the material leaked out years earlier, before the safeguards were fully in place, and then stashed while the perpetrators looked for a buyer.12

Click to access lee.nuclearsmuggling.pdf


The cases of Iran and Al Qaeda—adversaries of greatest current
concern—suggest a plausible link between smuggling and proliferation, even
if no definitive evidence exists that either has obtained a weapon or the means
to make one through smuggling channels.
The link is especially obvious in the case of Al Qaeda, since for nonstate
actors smuggling is practically the sole pathway to a nuclear capability.
The group is believed to have sought HEU (apparently unsuccessfully) in
various venues—Africa, Western Europe, and the former Soviet Union—since
the early 1990s. The group appears to have been victimized by scam artists
offering low-grade reactor fuel and radioactive trash, useless for making fission
weapons, Possibly of greater import are its efforts to acquire a complete
nuclear weapon. Stories circulated in 1998 that bin Laden offered a Kazakh
arms dealer two million pounds for a weapon, and that Al Qaeda actually
bought 20 tactical nuclear warheads from the ‘‘Chechen mafia’’ for $20 million
and two tons of opium.13 Also, former CIA director George Tenet recounts in
his book, At the Center of the Storm, that the agency in 2001 had received ‘‘a
stream of reliable reporting’’ that senior Al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia had
been negotiating for the sale of three Russian tactical nuclear devices.14

Al Qaeda’s leaders have not been shy about claiming success in its
nuclear ventures. Bin Laden announced in a late 2001 interview that ‘‘we have
chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent’’ and his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri told the same correspondent in 2004 that the group had succeeded in
purchasing some ‘‘suitcase’’ nuclear weapons, and that such items were widely
available on the ‘‘black market’’ in Central Asia.15 Most observers are skeptical
of such claims, citing the group’s technical inexperience, its pariah status, the
failure to detonate such a weapon and other factors. Importantly, an extensive
search of government buildings, military compounds, terrorist camps, safe
houses and the like in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom found no
trace of fissile materials or a weapon.16 Predictable denials have come from
Russia: then Russian president Vladimir Putin stated in a 2002 interview that he
was ‘‘absolutely confident’’ that terrorists in Afghanistan do not possess Soviet
or Russian weapons of mass destruction.17 Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s evident
Nuclear Smuggling
13 Riyad Alam al-Din et al., ‘‘Report Links Bin Laden, Nuclear Weapons,’’ Al-Watan al-Arabi,
November 13, 1998, p. 20-21, Marie Colvin, ‘‘Holy Warrior with U.S. on His Sights—Focus—
Bomb—Profile—Osama bin Laden,’’ The Sunday Times, August 16, 1998. global.factiva.com/
14 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, (New York: HarperCollins 2007), p. 272.
15 Sara Daly et. al. Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three
Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism. (Santa Monica RAND 2005), pp. 26-27.
16 Thom Shanker, ‘‘U.S. Analysts Find No Sign bin Laden Had Nuclear Arms,’’ February 21
2002, p.1. CNN.com., ‘‘Was al Qaeda Working on a Super Bomb?’’ January 24, 2002. http://www.isis.-
17 RAND Aum, p. 45.
Summer 2008 | 439

determination to acquire a nuclear weapon and the possibility that some such
weapons are unaccounted for or at least not under Russian control are
disconcerting, to say the least.
For a nation-state, smuggling is one pathway, if not the preferred one,
to a nuclear bomb. Unlike terrorists, states have various legitimate options for
engaging a supplier country including official diplomatic ties, open contacts
with officials, scientists and so on. In the case of Iran, a cozy nuclear
relationship with Russia, epitomized by, but not limited to, the construction
of a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant at Busehr is a continuing source of
proliferation concern. Some U.S. officials believe that Iran could leverage
the relationship to expand contacts with Russia’s nuclear entities and to
acquire information and materials directly applicable to a nuclear weapons
program. For Iran, the chances of pulling off a clandestine procurement effort
for nuclear wares seem much higher than for an internationally proscribed
group such as Al Qaeda.
Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities are very much matters of
conjecture. The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran is an
awkward document, one subject to widely divergent interpretations, but
providing a more benign assessment of Iran’s nuclear capabilities than
probably is warranted. It judges with moderate to high confidence that Iran
does not now have a nuclear weapon or sufficient fissile material to make one.
However, it won’t rule out that it could have acquired a weapon or the
necessary explosive ingredients from abroad. According to the estimate, Iran
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but just what activities are
subsumed under the term ‘‘program’’ is unclear.18 For example, available
intelligence might indicate that Iran suspended efforts to retrofit long-range
rockets for nuclear warheads, but fail to detect continued clandestine procurement
activities for fissile materials and other bomb components.
Moreover, the NIE judges that Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program
faces major technical challenges and probably won’t yield enough highly
enriched uranium (HEU) until 2010–2015 timeframe. This strengthens the case
for diplomatic approaches to Iran (as opposed to tougher sanctions and
military strikes). Yet what lethal nuclear items Iran may already possess cannot
be inferred from the performance of its uranium conversion and enrichment
facilities nor from the spotty intelligence that apparently shaped the NIE.
Indeed, Iran’s highly publicized nuclear energy program could serve as a
convenient cover for a parallel small scale – but potentially dangerous –
weapons-building effort that relies extensively on black market operations to
obtain strategic nuclear wares.
Iran’s black market dealings are shrouded in mystery, but its procurement
networks for nuclear bomb ingredients have most likely focused
18 ‘‘Key Judgments from a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity,’’ New
York Times, December 4, 2007.

on the former Soviet Union.19 As a 2001 Department of Energy report noted,
‘‘Iran, among others, has tried to exploit Russia’s nuclear security problems
by attempting to acquire fissile materials’’20 Iran reportedly maintains an
active network of front companies and espionage agents inside Russia to
facilitate its WMD procurement objectives. Furthermore, Iranian legal
nuclear cooperation with Russia could mask and facilitate a variety of
illegal transfers, and also give Iran plausibility regarding its motives and
In addition, Iran, like other aspiring nuclear actors, may seek weapons
components by means of smuggling chains that they either patronize or
control. For instance, in mid-2007 British authorities reported disrupting an
alleged plot by a British company to smuggle Russian-origin HEU to Iran by
way of Sudan. According to an account in the London Observer, ‘‘A group of
Britons was tracked as they obtained weapons-grade uranium from the black
market in Russia. Investigators believe that it was intended for export to Sudan
and on to Iran.’’ The investigators reportedly had evidence that the material
was destined for Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The incident may represent
a sample of a wider proliferation problem. As a British parliamentarian who
monitors export control matters observed, ‘‘If one company is involved, how
many others might be out there?’’21
Russia, of course, has long been notorious for its leaky nuclear
stockpiles. Whether or not Iran (or other sinister actors) has been able to
exploit gaps in Russian nuclear security to procure the ingredients for a
bomb is an open question. Russian officials share Western skepticism about
Iran’s near-term ability to develop a nuclear weapon but some less publicized
signals from Russia should be cause for concern. In a post 9/11
conversation reported by former CIA director George Tenet, then Russian
president Vladimir Putin told Bush that he could not account for the
security of nuclear materials during his predecessor’s administration.22
(The well-publicized problems of the Yeltsin era – a near-bankrupt economy,
disarray within the nuclear complex, and a rising tide of criminality
and corruption – certainly provided a window for consequential proliferation
Then, at a press conference in June 2002, General Yury Baluyevsky,
outgoing chief of the Russian general staff, made the startling announcement
that ‘‘Iran does have nuclear weapons. Of course these are nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. I mean they are not ICBMs with a range of more
than 5,500 kilometers.’’ Baluyevsky did not elaborate on how Iran acquired
Nuclear Smuggling
19 As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran would have every incentive to
keep such dealings secret.
20 Department of Energy MPC&A Program: Strategic Plan, Washington, July 2001, p. 2.
21 Mark Townsend, ‘‘MI-6 Probes UK Link to Nuclear Trade with Iran,’’ The Observer, June 10,
22 George Tenet, In the Center of the Storm, (New York: HarperCollins 2007), p. 272.
Summer 2008 | 441

the weapons or the wherewithal to manufacture them.23 In a later statement,
the general maintained that Iran would not be able ‘‘to develop
nuclear weapons either in the near or in the distant future,’’ but the context
of the remarks indicated that he was referring to Iran’s indigenous enrichment
program, which would explain the contradiction.24 Baluyevsky’s
assertion is not incompatible with the NIE’s judgment that Iran stopped
its nuclear weapons program in 2003, conceivably having gotten much of
what it wanted by then.
Of course, it is hard to distinguish fact from fiction (or disinformation)
in deciphering commentary on proliferation issues. Yet given Russia’s
history of leaky nuclear stockpiles, the warnings about Iran have the ring
of plausibility. While Western experts debate the sophistication and spin
speed of Tehran’s centrifuges, Iran already could have obtained a nuclear
weapons capability of sorts through clandestine transfers from the former
USSR. The NIE’s conclusions substantially weaken the case for war with
Iran (and rightly so, in this writer’s opinion), however, possibly for the
wrong reasons. Consider that even a small number of ‘‘non-strategic’’ or
defensive nuclear warheads in Iran’s possession could be delivered with
devastating effect to Western targets via Iran-linked terrorist groups such
as Hezbollah or Hamas. There is no hard evidence of such a capability,
but the signs are disturbing enough to warrant caution in dealing with
Tehran. Indeed, Washington eventually may have to acknowledge that, as
former chief of U.S. Central Command John Abizaid puts it, ‘‘there are
ways of living with a nuclear-armed Iran,’’ however unpalatable the
To some, the threat of a nuclear Iran or (especially) a nuclear Al Qaeda
may seem greatly overblown. Yet it cannot be dismissed entirely. Certainly, it’s
conceivable that, in the 16 years since the Soviet collapse, given Iran’s multifaceted
nuclear relationship with Russia, and the distressing economic circumstances
that afflicted Russia’s nuclear complex in the 1990s, that Iran could
have managed to acquire enough fissile material for at least one bomb.
Moreover, despite official Russian assurances, it requires a leap of faith to
believe that all tactical nuclear warheads and small atomic munitions are safely
locked down and accounted for in Russia. Conditions for a black market in
weapons and other nuclear assets, thus, could have materialized in the
confused post Soviet years, even if adversaries’ ability to exploit this opportunity
was problematic.
23 Safa Haeri, ‘‘Iran Has Nuclear Bomb, Says Top Russian General,’’ Iran Press Service, June 6,
24 Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, ‘‘Iran Has No Chance of Producing Nukes on its Own—
Russian Chief of Staff,’’ The Analyst, April 15, 2004.
25 Peter Baker, ‘‘Bush’s War Rhetoric Reveals the Anxiety that Iran Commands,’’ Washington
Post, October 19, 2007, p. 5.
442 |

Click to access lee.nuclearsmuggling.pdf


Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Increasing, Agency Warns

Wednesday, October 03, 2001

More than 20 attempts at smuggling nuclear materials have been confirmed this year, according to Jane’s Information Group Foreign Report. The incidents this year, in addition to more than 370 which have occurred in the last seven years — including 15 incidents involving plutonium or weapon-grade uranium — have prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency to step up its programs to improve the physical security of nuclear materials.

A collaborative law enforcement program under IAEA leadership was started earlier this year to help with the smuggling problem. In conjunction with the World Customs Organization, Interpol and the FBI, the IAEA program will seek better information exchanges between law enforcement agencies as well as training programs for police and customs organizations (Foreign Report, Oct. 4).

Even more IAEA action is needed to prevent nuclear materials from falling into terrorist hands, according to two nonproliferation specialists writing in Arms Control Today. George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler write that adoption of stronger physical protection standards against these threats is essential, and the sooner the better.

The two supported a recent decision by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to convene a meeting of experts to draft a new amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which currently only applies to nuclear materials in transit.

The new amendment should add some sort of verification or reporting requirement, Bunn and Steinhausler said, adding that the convention should apply to domestic facilities and include measures on preventing sabotage (Bunn/Steinhausler, Arms Control Today, Oct. 2001).



The EPA’s Superfund program was established in 1980 to locate, investigate, and clean up hazardous waste sites throughout the United States. Nationally, EPA’s Superfund program has located, analyzed and worked to clean up thousands of hazardous waste sites since 1980.

In New England, the Superfund program has carried out or is currently involved in the clean up of close to 500 such sites since the law went into effect.

Today, the six New England states have 115 toxic and hazardous waste sites on the Superfund National Priority List (NPL).



The 1978 discovery of toxic chemicals beneath the suburban infrastructure of Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York first illuminated the consequences of environmental neglect. For decades, many American businesses had disposed of hazardous waste improperly, contaminating tens of thousands of sites nationally, including nearly 250 within Region 2 alone. Accidents, spills, and leaks of hazardous materials resulted in land, water, and air that pose immediate and potential threats to public and environmental health.

Citizen reaction to these localized threats led Congress to establish the Superfund Program in 1980, an initiative designed to locate, investigate, and clean up the most hazardous sites nationwide. Superfund is officially called CERCLA, or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The EPA administers the Superfund Program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments.

The national EPA office that oversees management of the program is the Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI). The sites dealt with under Superfund are listed on the NPL, or National Priorities List. Superfund constitutes a crucial environmental and economic precedent within American legislative history.

1980 legislation to locate, investigate, and clean up hazardous waste sites in the United States
Basics | Find Sites | Emergency Response
Public Liaison | Pre-Remedial
Database Search | Enviromapper | Superfund HQ

EPA program providing funds for the redevelopment of real properties contaminated with hazardous waste
Basics | Funding Information | Sites in Region 2 | Project Fact Sheets
Resource Directory [33pp, 1.62M]
RCRA Corrective Action
Requires facilities managing hazardous waste to clean up environmental contaminants
RCRA Basics | RCRA Database | Facilities Near You | Environmental Indicators | Regulations and Policy | RCRA Hazardous Waste

Links By Region
Find cleanup information and sites
where you live and work
New Jersey | New York | Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands



New York Sites

Click on the headings to view sites by Name, County, City or Cleanup Type.
Site Name County City Cleanup Type
914th Airlift Wing – AFRC Niagara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Action Anodizing Plating And Polishing Corp. Suffolk County Nassau/Suffolk Co. line NPL
Akzo Nobel Polymer Chemicals LLC Niagara County Burt RCRA
Alcoa Incorporated St. Lawrence County Massena RCRA
Aluminum Company Of America St. Lawrence County Grasse River NPL
American Thermostat Company Greene County South Cairo NPL
American Candle Company Ulster County Saugerties RCRA
Amphenol Aerospace Delaware County Sidney RCRA
Anchor Chemicals Nassau County Hicksville NPL
Applied Environmental Services Nassau County Glenwood Landing NPL
Arch Chemicals Incorporated Monroe County Rochester RCRA
Arkema, Inc. Livingston County Piffard RCRA
Batavia Landfill Genesee County Batavia NPL
Bausch & Lomb Incorporated Monroe County Rochester RCRA
Bec Trucking Broome County Vestal NPL
Bioclinical Laboratories Inc. Suffolk County Hamlet of Bohemia NPL
Black & Decker US Incorporated Monroe County Brockport RCRA
Brewster Well Field Putnam County Brewster NPL
Brookhaven National Laboratory usdoe Suffolk County Upton NPL
Buffalo Color Erie County Buffalo RCRA
Byron Barrel And Drum New York Genesee County Batavia NPL
C & J Disposal Leasing Co. Dump Madison County Eaton NPL
C W M Chemical Services Llc Niagara County Model City RCRA
Carroll And Dubies Sewage Disposal Orange County Port Jervis NPL
Cayuga County Groundwater Contamination Site Cayuga County Union Springs NPL
Cecos International Incorporated Niagara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Cherokee Columbus Real Estate LLC Chenango County Bainbridge RCRA
Chevron Incorporated Dutchess County Glenham RCRA
Ciba Corporation Secure Landfill Warren County Queensbury RCRA
Ciba Geigy – Hercules Plant Site Warren County Queensbury RCRA
Circuitron Corporation Suffolk County Farmingdale NPL
Claremont Polychemical Nassau County Old Bethpage NPL
Clothier Disposal Oswego County Granby NPL
Colesville Municipal Landfill Broome County Colesville NPL
Computer Circuits Suffolk County Hauppauge NPL
Conklin Dumps Broome County Conklin NPL
Consolidated Iron And Metal Orange County Newburgh NPL
Cortese Landfill Sullivan County Tusten NPL
Crown Cleaners Of Watertown, Inc Jefferson County Village of Herrings NPL
Crumb Trailer Park Herkimer County West Winfield Removal
Diaz Chemical Corporation Orleans County Holley NPL
Dunkirk Acquisition Corporation Chautauqua County Dunkirk RCRA
Dupont Necco Park Niagara County Niagara Falls NPL
Durez Corporation Niagara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Dyno Nobel Incorporated Ulster County Ulster Park RCRA
Eastman Kodak Company – Kodak Park Monroe County Rochester RCRA
Edmos Corporation Nassau County Glen Cove RCRA
Ellenville Scrap Iron And Metal Ulster County Ellenville NPL
Endicott Village Well Field Broome County Endicott NPL
Facet Enterprises Inc. Chemung County Elmira Heights NPL
Fairchild Republic Company Nassau County Farmingdale RCRA
FMC Corp. Dublin Rd. Landfill Orleans County Ridgeway and Shelby NPL
FMC Corp. Middleport Niagara County Middleport RCRA
Forest Glen Mobile Home Subdivision Niagara County Niagara Falls NPL
Frontier Chemical Waste Process, Inc. – Pendleton Site Niagra County Pendelton RCRA
Frontier Chemical Waste Process, Inc. – Royal Avenue Facility
Nigara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Fulton Terminals Oswego County Fulton NPL
Fulton Ave. Nassau County Hempstead NPL
G.E.C. Alstrom Transportation Incorporated Steuben County Edison Drive Hornell RCRA
GCL Tie & Treating Inc. Delaware County Sidney NPL
GE Moreau Saratoga County South Glens Falls NPL
General Electric Company – CPP Fort Edward Washington County Fort Edward RCRA
General Electric Company – Hudson Falls Washington County Hudson Falls RCRA
General Electric – Auburn Plant Cayuga County Auburn NY RCRA
General Electric – River Road Schenectady County Schenectady RCRA
General Motors central Foundry Division St. Lawrence County Massena NPL
Genzale Plating Co. Nassau County Old Bethpage NPL
Goldisc Recordings Inc. Suffolk County Holbrook NPL
Gowanus Canal Kings County Brooklyn NPL
Griffiss Air Force Base Oneida County Rome NPL
Haviland Complex Dutchess County Town of Hyde Park NPL
Hertel Landfill Ulster County Plattekill NPL
Hiteman Leather Herkimer County West Winfield NPL
Hooker Chemical/ Ruco Polymer Corp. Nassau County Hicksville NPL
Hooker Chemical/ S-area Niagara County Niagara River NPL
Hooker – Hyde Park Niagara County Niagara Falls NPL
Hooker 102nd Street Niagara County East of Griffin Park in Niagara Falls NPL
Hopewell Precision Dutchess East Fishkill NPL
HQ 10th Mtn Division & Fort Drum Jefferson County Jones Street T4819 & Off North Memorial Drive P11 NY RCRA
Hudson Technologies Inc. Rockland County Hillburn NPL
Hudson River PCBs Washington County Hudson River New York from Hudson Falls to the Battery in New York City including Rensselaer Washington and Saratoga Counties. NPL
IBM Corporation – East Fishkill Dutches County Hopewell Junction RCRA
IBM Corporation – Endicott Broome County Endicott RCRA
IBM Corporation – Former Tioga County Owego RCRA
IBM Corporation – Kingston Ulster County Kingston RCRA
IBM Corporation – Poughkeepsie Dutches County Poughkeepsie RCRA
IBM Corporation – TJ Watson Research Center Yorktown Westchecter County Yorktown RCRA
Islip Municipal Sanitary Landfill Suffolk County Long Island NPL
Jackson Steel Nassau County Mineola/North Hempstead NPL
Jewett White Lead Company Richmond County Richmond Terrace Removal
Johnstown City Landfill Fulton County Johnstown City NPL
Jones Sanitation Dutchess County Hyde Park NPL
Jones Chemicals Inc. Livingston County Caledonia NPL
Katonah Municipal Well Westchester County Village of Katonah in the Town of Bedford NPL
Kenmark Textile Corp. Suffolk County Farmingdale NPL
Kentucky Avenue Well Field Chemung County Near Horseheads NPL
Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals, LLC Richmond County Staten Island RCRA
Lawrence Aviation Industries Inc. Suffolk County Port Jefferson Station NPL
Lehigh Valley Railroad Derailment Site Genesee County Leroy NPL
Li Tungsten Corporation Nassau County Glen Cove NPL
Liberty Industrial Finishing Nassau County Farmingdale NPL
Little Valley Cattaraugus County Little Valley NPL
Lockheed Martin Corporation – Ocean Radar and Sensor Systems Onondaga County Liverpool RCRA
Love Canal Niagara County Niagara Falls NPL
Ludlow Sand & Gravel County Paris Oneida NPL
Mackenzie Chemical Works Suffolk County Central Islip NPL
Malta Rocket Fuel Area Saratoga County Malta and Stillwater NPL
Marathon Battery Corp. Putnam County Cold Spring NPL
Mattiace Petrochemical Co. Inc. Nassau County Glen Cove NPL
McKesson Envirosystems Onondaga County Syracuse RCRA
Mercury Refining Inc. Albany County Colonie NPL
Mercury Refining Company Inc. MERECOsa Albany County Albany RCRA
Mohonk Road Industrial Plant Ulster County Marbletown NPL
Momentive Performance Materials Silicones, LLC Saratoga County Waterford RCRA
Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant Suffolk County Calverton RCRA
Nepera Chemical Plant Orange County Hamptonburgh NPL
Newtown Creek Kings County Brooklyn Study
Niagara County Refuse Niagara County Wheatfield NPL
Niagara Mohawk Power Co. saratoga Springs Saratoga County Saratoga Springs NPL
Niagara Mohawk Seventh North Onondaga County Syracuse RCRA
North Sea Municipal Landfill Suffolk County Southampton NPL
Northeast Environmental Services Madison County Lenox RCRA
Northrop Grumman Corporation – Bathpage Nassau County Bethpage RCRA
Occidental Chemical Corporation – Buffalo Avenue Niagara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Old Bethpage Landfill Nassau County Oyster Bay NPL
Old Roosevelt Field Contaminated Groundwater Area Nassau County Garden City NPL
Olean Well Field Cattaraugus County Olean NPL
Olin Corporation Niagara County Niagara Falls RCRA
Onondaga Lake Onondaga County City of Syracuse and Towns of Salina Geddes and Camilus NPL
Pasley Solvents & Chemicals Inc. Nassau County Hempstead NPL
Peter Cooper Cattaraugus County Gowanda NPL
Peter Cooper Markhams Cattaraugus County Dayton NPL
Pfohl Brothers Landfill Erie County Cheektowaga NPL
Philips Display Components Seneca County Seneca Falls RCRA
Plattsburgh Air Force Base Clinton County Plattsburgh NPL
Pollution Abatement Services Oswego County Granby NPL
Port Washington Landfill Nassau County North Hempstead NPL
Preferred Plating Corp. Suffolk County Babylon NPL
Pride Solvents & Chemical Company Incorporated Suffolk County West Babylon RCRA
Radium Chemical Company Inc. Queens County Woodside/Queen NPL
Ramapo Landfill Rockland County Hillburn NPL
Realco Incorporated Albany County Watervliet RCRA
Revere Smelting & Refining Corporation Of NJ Orange County Middletown RCRA
Reynolds Metals Company St. Lawrence County Massena NPL
Reynolds Metals Company St. Lawrence County Massena RCRA
Richardson Hill Road Landfill/pond Delaware County Richardson NPL
Robintech Inc./ National Pipe Co. Broome County Vestal NPL
Rosen Brothers Scrap Yard/dump Cortland County Cortland NPL
Rowe Industries Groundwater Contamination Suffolk County Village of Sag Harbor NPL
Rutherford Acquisition Corporation Orange County Harriman RCRA
Sabic Innovative Plastics US LLC Albany County Selkirk RCRA
Safety-Kleen Corporation – Congers 2-118-01 Rockland County Congers RCRA
Sarney Farm Dutchess County Amenia NPL
Schenectady International Incorporated – Congress Street Schenectady County Schenectady RCRA
Schenectady International Incorporated – Rotterdam Junction Schenectady County Rotterdam Junction RCRA
Sealand Restoration Inc. St. Lawrence County Lisbon NPL
Seneca Army Depot Seneca County Romulus NPL
Shenandoah Road Ground Water Contamination Site Dutchess County East FishKill NPL
Sidney Landfill Delaware County Sidney NPL
Sinclair Refinery Allegany County Wellville NPL
Smithtown Ground Water Contamination Suffolk County Smithtown NPL
SMS Instruments Inc. Suffolk County Deer Park NPL
Solvent Savers Chenango County Lincklaen NPL
Solvents & Petroleum Service Incorporated Onondaga County Syracuse RCRA
Stanton Cleaners Area Ground Water Cont. Nassau County Town of Great Neck NPL
Star Anchors & Fasteners Orange County Mountainville RCRA
Stauffer Management Company Onondaga County Skaneateles Falls RCRA
Suffern Village Well Field Rockland County Suffern NPL
Syosset Landfill Nassau County Oyster Bay NPL
Tecumseh Redevelopment, Inc. Erie County Lackawanna RCRA
Textron Realty Operations Incorporated Niagara County Wheatfield RCRA
Tri-cities Barrel Broome County Adjacent to Old Route 7 in Fenton NPL
Triumvirate Environmental Incorporated. Queens County Astoria RCRA
Tronic Plating Co. Inc. Suffolk County Farmingdale NPL
USDOE Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory Schenectady County Niskayuna RCRA
Vestal Water Supply Well 1-1 Broome County Vestal NPL
Vestal Water Supply Well 4-2 Broome County Vestal NPL
Volney Municipal Landfill Oswego County Volney NPL
Von Roll Isola USA Incorporated – Riverview Schenectady County Schenectady RCRA
Warwick Landfill Orange County Warwick NPL
Watervliet Arsenal Albany County Watrevliet RCRA
West Valley Demonstration Project USDOE Cattaraugus County West Valley RCRA
Western NY Nuclear Service Center Cattaraugus County Ashford RCRA
White Mop Wringer Montgomery County Fultonville RCRA
Wide Beach Development Erie County Brant NPL
Wyeth – Ayerst Laboratories Rockland County Pearl River RCRA
Xerox Corporation Monroe County Webster RCRA
York Oil Company Franklin County Next to the Town Hall and the Moira Town Highway Garage NPL



Threat and Contaminants
Before the site was remediated, on-site soils, sludges, sediments, and surface water were contaminated with phenolics,
heavy metals, volatile organic compounds, and PCBs. The ground water, which is contaminated, is not used by area
residents for drinking water. Wetlands and wildlife inhabiting the wetlands near the site were threatened by contaminants.

York Oil Company
New York
EPA ID#: NYD000511733
Congressional District(s): 24
Next to the Town Hall and the Moira Town Highway Garage
Proposed Date: 7/1/1982
Final Date: 9/1/1983
Site Description
The York Oil Company recycled waste oil at this 17-acre site, 1 mile northwest of Moira, from 1962 until 1975. The
facility’s operators collected crankcase and industrial oils, some containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), from
sources throughout New England and New York. They stored or processed the oils at the site in eight aboveground
storage tanks, three earthen-dammed settling lagoons, and at least one underground storage tank. The recycled
PCB-contaminated oil either was sold as No. 2 fuel oil or was used in dust control for the unpaved roads in the vicinity of
the site. During heavy rains and spring thaws, the oil-water mixture from the lagoons often would overflow onto
surrounding lands and into adjacent wetlands, which the company purchased in 1964. Contamination at the site first was
reported by a state road crew in 1979. In 1982, the County assumed title because of unpaid property taxes.
Approximately 1,700 people live within a 3-mile radius of the site; 400 live within a mile. Residents rely on private wells
for drinking water; 13 wells exist within 1/2 mile of the site. Recent sampling of well water in the area has revealed no
site-related contaminants.
Site Responsibility: This site is being addressed through federal, state, and potentially responsible parties’ actions.


The actions that have been performed at the site, to date, have resulted in the removal of approximately
27,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil/water and 230 drums of PCB-contaminated debris from the site. In addition,
15,000 tons of steel from waste oil storage tanks was decontaminated, cut up, and disposed of off-site.
Approximately 21,000 tons of contaminated soils and sediments from the Site Proper were excavated and treated and
approximately 18,000 tons of contaminated sediments from the Contamination Pathways were excavated and treated. All
of the treated material was placed under a cap on the Site Proper.

Off-Site Contamination: The first stage of the long-term cleanup dealt, primarily, with the source control. The second
phase studied the Contamination Pathways, particularly the lead- and PCB-contaminated wetlands. The State began an
intensive study of the problem in 1986, which was continued by EPA in September 1988. In September 1998, EPA
selected a remedy for the Contamination Pathways. It features the excavation of contaminated sediments, followed by
solidification/stabilization and on-site disposal, natural attenuation of the ground water contamination, institutional
controls to prevent the installation and use of ground water wells, and long-term ground water monitoring. The remedial
design was completed in September 1999; construction commenced in September 1999 and was completed in
September 2002.

The site is being addressed in three stages: emergency actions and two long-term remedial phases focusing on source
control and contamination pathways.
Response Action Status
Emergency Actions: In 1980, EPA began emergency cleanup activities at the site. It secured the site to limit access and
to reduce the threat of direct contact with hazardous substances and removed oil and contaminated water from the
lagoons, which then were filled with a concrete by-product and sand. The top 3 feet of oil-soaked soil were excavated
from the neighboring wetlands. Contaminated oil was transferred to aboveground storage tanks, and contaminated soil
was contained on-site. Contaminated water from one of the lagoons was treated and discharged into the wetlands. An
interceptor trench was dug to alter the flow of surface water and ground water. In 1983, EPA conducted additional
emergency actions including the collection of oil seeping into drainage ditches, the installation of a new filter fence
system, and the posting of warning signs. EPA developed a schedule for collecting oily leachate and replacing sorbent
pads and began monitoring the site. In August 1992, EPA stabilized leaking tanks and drums. In December 1994, EPA
removed PCB-contaminated oil and drums of PCB-contaminated debris from the site, and decontaminated, cut up, and
disposed of off-site several waste oil storage tanks. In December 1995, EPA installed another interceptor trench to
collect oil seeping into the wetlands.
Source Control: Upon completion of a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) conducted to determine the
nature and extent of contamination at the site and to evaluate remedial alternatives in 1988, EPA selected a remedy for
controlling the source of the contamination. It featured: (1) excavating approximately 22,000 cubic yards of contaminated
soils and 8,000 cubic yards of contaminated sediments and solidifying this material on-site; (2) installing deep ground
water draw-down wells at the edges of the site to collect the sinking contaminated plume; (3) installing shallow

dewatering wells to collect contaminated ground water and oil during excavation; (4) treating these liquids and
discharging the clean ground water in accordance with state environmental requirements; (5) removing about 25,000
gallons of contaminated tank oils, as well as other oils collected at the site, to an EPA-approved facility to be incinerated;
(6) cleaning and demolishing the empty storage tanks; (7) backfilling the solidified soil into the excavated areas; and (8)
inspecting the site every five years to assure that human health and the environment continue to be protected.




Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories

Other (Former) Names of Site: Lederle Laboratories, American Cyanamid Company
EPA Identification Number: NYD054065909
Facility Location: 401 North Middletown Road, Pearl River, New York

Site Map
Facility Contact Name: Michael Kontaxis, (845) 602-2500
EPA Contact Name: Andy Park, (212) 637-4184, park.andy@epa.gov
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) Case Manager: Paul Patel, (518) 402-8602, appatel@gw.dec.state.ny.us, and
Keith Gronwald, (518) 402-8589, khgronwa@gw.dec.state.ny.us
Last Update: April 2007
Environmental Indicator Status:

Human Exposures Under Control [PDF 2.65 MB, 13 pp] has been verified.
Groundwater Contamination Under Control [PDF 1.72 MB, 9 pp] has been verified.
Site Description

The plant is located on 401 North Middletown Road in the village of Pearl River on a 580-acre site that lies within Clarkstown and Orangetown in Rockland County, New York. The facility is located about 1.5 miles north of the New Jersey State border and 20 miles northwest of New York City. It is bounded by Middletown Road on the East, Crooked Hill Road to the south, and forested and residential areas to the west and north respectively.

The facility produces pharmaceutical products, generating hazardous wastes (e.g., spent solvents, toxic and mixed wastes) and large quantities of nonhazardous solid waste (e.g., incineration ash, composting and wastewater sludge) in the process. Hazardous wastes are stored in 250 55-gallon containers on-site. Releases of contaminants have occurred from the leachate generated at landfills, the burning of solvents in an open pit, leaks of industrial wastewater from underground sewers, and chemical spills.

There are four landfills at this site (1, 2, 2A, and 3A). Landfills 1, 2, and 2A received a mix of waste including incinerator ash, glass, debris, plant trash and rubbish, vitamins, wastewater treatment plant sludge, fermentation cake, animal remains, and small quantities of laboratory chemicals. These three landfills were closed in early 1980 and they were covered with a relatively low permeability material to prevent water seepage. However, groundwater monitoring indicates that releases of organic contaminants have occurred from these units. Landfill 3A, which remains open, receives solid waste generated onsite and operates under a New York State Part 360 Solid Waste Management permit.

The landfill area is in the western portion of the facility, adjacent to Muddy Creek, which bisects the Wyeth-Ayerst facility, flowing into the Pascack Brook and then discharging into the Hackensack River. The nearest New York State regulated freshwater wetland is located about 1.5 miles northwest of the site.
Site Responsibility and Legal Instrument

A NYS Part 373 hazardous waste management permit regulates the storage and management of hazardous waste in tanks, containers including lab packs, the treatment of hazardous wastes, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action.
Permit Status

A NYS Part 373 hazardous waste permit was issued September 28, 1993 and expired September 29, 1998. This permit has been extended as required by State law and will stay in effect until issuance of the renewal permit.
Potential Threats and Contaminants

Several chlorinated and non-chlorinated volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and semi-volatile organic compounds (SVOCs) have been detected in the groundwater at this site. A few of these organic constituents, such as chloroform and 1,1,1-trichloroethylene, have been found to exceed New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) groundwater quality protection standards. These exceedances have been limited to on-site areas: one immediately down-gradient of the closed landfills, and one close to the burn pit.
Soils have been found to be contaminated with mercury and methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) at two different spill locations. This contamination has been removed by direct excavation.

This solid waste landfill has released mercury and phenols into the groundwater. Mercury has been found also in a routine excavation near Building 100.

Wyeth-Ayerst is located in Rockland County, which is serviced by a public water supply system. Contaminated groundwater from the site is not used for any purpose on-site or off-site. However, the State considers all its groundwater to be a potential source of potable water and thus it should be remediated to groundwater quality protection standards.

Current groundwater monitoring data indicates that the contaminated groundwater generated from releases at the landfills does not migrate off-site nor does it adversely impact Muddy Creek. Further contamination is not leaving the landfills. Trespassers are kept off most of the site by fencing and security, and groundwater exposure is unlikely should they gain access to the site.

There are no known direct potential threats to humans from the site’s contaminated soil. The closed landfills are covered and the contaminated soils were removed from areas where spills have occurred. Contaminated ash remaining in the burn pit remains inaccessible to trespassers because of site security and fencing.
Cleanup Approach and Progress

The closed landfills were investigated during the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) and found to have contaminated groundwater flowing under them. Wyeth-Ayerst is implementing a three year natural attenuation and monitoring program, with the intention of demonstrating that the groundwater contamination will meet the State’s protective standards before reaching the property line of the facility. Actual groundwater data for the first year verifies this conclusion.

A number of interim corrective measures (ICMs) have been implemented at the site: eight hazardous waste above-ground storage tanks were closed in 2002, including two 100,000-gallon spent combined-acid filtrate tanks and their bottom sludge; removal of 598 tons of discolored soil in the vicinity of the tanks contaminated with methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK); an ICM program repaired or replaced 9,200 feet of ruptured underground sewers servicing production and pilot plant buildings, by placing new plastic piping inside the old pipeline, and excavating and removing several severely damaged sections of sewer pipe.

In April 1998 the facility discovered a mercury spill of unknown origin while doing routine maintenance outside a building. An ICM removal action was immediately implemented, and 144 cubic yards of mercury-contaminated soil were excavated and replaced with clean fill. The contaminated soil was sent off-site for mercury recovery.
Site Repository

Copies of supporting technical documents and correspondence cited in this site fact sheet are available for public review at:

Division of Solid and Hazardous Materials
Bureau of Radiation & Hazardous Site Management
625 Broadway, 8th Floor
Albany, NY 12233-7252

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) makes its public records available for a review under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).



Western New York Nuclear Service Center
Other (Former) Names of Site: Nuclear Fuels Service

EPA Identification Number: NYD986905545
Facility Location: 10282 Rock Spring Road, West Valley, New York

Site Map
Facility Contact Name: Colleen Gerwitz, (716) 942-4435
EPA Contact Name:
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) Case Manager: Tim DiGiulio, (315) 426-7471, txdigiul@gw.dec.state.ny.us
Last Updated: October 2006
Environmental Indicator Status: Human Exposures Under Control [PDF 8.06 MB, 6 pp] has been verified.
Groundwater Contamination Under Control [PDF 15.85 MB, 8 pp] has been verified.

Western NY Nuclear Service Center fact sheet [PDF 10.02 KB, 2 pp]

The inspection of some of the documents cited in the site fact sheet may require a formal request under the United States Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).




Rationale and References: A RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) of the State Licensed Disposal Area (SDA) at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center has been completed. Results of the RFI indicate that subsurface soils beneath a former surface impoundment and immediately adjacent to the disposal trenches are contaminated with mixed (radioactive and hazardous) waste constituents. Classes of constituents detected in trench leachate include volatile and semi-volatile organics, PCB’s metals and cyanide. Additional details on the nature of contamination can be found in the “RCRA Facility Investigation for NYSERDA – Maintained Portions of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center, Final Report, E & E, December 1994 .


(From the listing above for Western NY Service Center)



Nuclear Plants in the US – Power Plants – 2008

old, new and about to be built