Lashkar Ab’ad – Laser enrichment
Lashkar Ab’ad – Laser enrichment
Lashkar Ab’ad was Iran’s pilot plant for laser isotope separation until 2003. This site contained equipment including copper vapor lasers (CVL) that were designed to produce enrichment levels of 3.5-7%. The IAEA reported that the facility would have been capable of HEU production once all planned equipment was installed. There were several foreign suppliers to the laser enrichment program, including the United States, Germany, and Russia.
Iran took steps to conceal this facility from the IAEA. The IAEA first asked to visit Lashkar Ab’ad in May 2003 after the NCRI identified the site and said it was related to gas centrifuge activities. Iran eventually relented and allowed inspection in August 2003. Iran initially declared that Lashkar Ab’ad was devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, and claimed that its laser program was unrelated to uranium enrichment. Iran also claimed that no nuclear material had been involved in the experiments.
Iran changed its declaration and acknowledged to the IAEA in late-October 2003 that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had been established at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000, after initial development work was conducted at TNRC. Iran also stated that uranium laser enrichment experiments had been conducted in late 2002 and early 2003 using previously undeclared imported natural uranium metal. It was only after this October revelation that the IAEA was allowed to take environmental samples at this site. Some of the material and equipment from Lashkar Ab’ad was moved to Karaj in May 2003 to avoid detection by the IAEA.
In its report of February 2008, IAEA safeguards officials visited Lashkar Abad and reported that the laboratories were currently run by a private company producing and
developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. The report also noted that the former laser equipment has been dismantled with some of it stored at the site. The IAEA added: “The management of the company provided detailed information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work, and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.”
In 1991, Iran contracted to purchase a turn-key, industrial scale conversion facility from China. This contract was eventually canceled as a result of US pressure, but Iran retained the design information and built the plant on its own. Construction of the UCF began in the late 1990s.
The UCF consists of several conversion lines, including the line for the conversion of yellowcake to UF6. The annual production capacity of the UCF is 200 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6. The UF6 iis slated for the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. The UCF is also able to convert yellowcake, LEU and depleted uranium into UO2 and depleted uranium metal.
Pars Trash (Tarash)
Pars Trash (Tarash)
Pars Trash, a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric located in Tehran, is another centrifuge site that received equipment from Kalaye Electric in particular for Iran’s P-2/IR-2 centrifuge development effort.
Pars Trash, a small company employing about ten people, is located in Tehran among warehouses and light industrial buildings about a kilometer west of the Kalaye Electric facility. It manufactured the centrifuge’s outer casings. These are the thick aluminum tubes that house the centrifuge rotor assembly and, in the case of an accident, prevent broken pieces of the thin-walled rotor assembly, which can act like shrapnel, from injuring or even killing bystanders. Pars Trash was originally a small private factory involved in making automobile parts. It went bankrupt and was bought by the Kalaye Electric Company, or its subsidiary Farayand, for the three expensive computer-operated machine tools it owned, which could be adapted to the manufacture of centrifuge components.
An engineer married to the plant manager is believed to have been the backbone of the operation. She programmed and set up the machines to make centrifuge components and ensured their quality, before turning the operation over to a technician who subsequently operated the automated machines to produce thousands of components.
The current status of operations at Pars is unknown as IAEA inspectors had access to the site only while Iran was adhering voluntarily to the Additional Protocol.
Iran’s Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium URANIUM …
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Work on Iran’s uranium centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985. ….. From 1981 to 1993 Iran has carried out bench scale preparation of UO2 at ENTC. …
On Nov. 10, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report charging Iran with violating its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In particular, the IAEA said that Tehran had been conducting experiments with imported nuclear material without informing the agency. The report also revealed that Iran had carried out a variety of clandestine nuclear activities for more than two decades. In doing so, it had deceived the agency on numerous occasions by concealing facilities and providing the IAEA with incomplete and false information. A discussion of the IAEA’s revelations follows.
Iran’s gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment program dates back to 1985 and currently consists of a small pilot facility at Natanz and a larger commercial facility under construction at the same location. Uranium-enrichment facilities can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, as well as fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors.
Iran had previously claimed its gas-centrifuge program was completely indigenous and had not been used to test nuclear material, but both of these claims were proven false by the IAEA.
The IAEA first visited the Natanz facility in February. Its advanced state of operation led the agency to suspect that Iran had tested the centrifuges with nuclear material without first notifying the agency—a violation of its safeguards agreement. (See ACT, November 2003.) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that IAEA environmental sampling showed that particles of both low-enriched and highly enriched uranium (LEU and HEU) had been present during that time at the Natanz facility, suggesting possible confirmation of the inspectors’ suspicions. Although LEU is used in civilian power plants, HEU can be used to build nuclear weapons. The presence of this material could be evidence that Iran produced weapons-grade uranium at Natanz and has nuclear material that it has not yet declared to the IAEA—each a violation of its safeguards agreement. At the time, however, Iran blamed the material’s presence on contaminated, imported components and continues to do so.
Meanwhile, Iran introduced nuclear material into the Natanz facility’s centrifuges under IAEA safeguards in June, although the IAEA Board of Governors had issued a statement earlier that month encouraging Iran not to do so. Tehran accelerated its tests in August but, in an October deal with European foreign ministers, agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities. At the time, Iran did not say when the suspension would take effect, but the new IAEA report says Iran told the IAEA that it would suspend its enrichment activities effective Nov. 10. (See ACT, November 2003.)
Iran also admitted Oct. 21 to using small amounts of uranium hexafluoride to test centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran between 1999 and 2002, according to the report. Centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas in cylinders to increase the concentration of the relevant isotopes. Iran had previously acknowledged producing centrifuge components there but denied conducting any tests with nuclear material. Iran dismantled “the test facility at the end of 2002,” according to the report.
Activities at the Kalaye facility have been contentious because Iran had hindered IAEA investigations there and prevented agency inspectors from conducting environmental sampling until August. These samples also detected HEU and LEU particles, a finding Iran also attributes to contaminated components. Tehran maintains it only enriched uranium at Kalaye to a degree that is not suitable for weapons.
Iran continued to obstruct the IAEA’s investigation of the Kalaye facility until recently, according to the report. Tehran initially told agency inspectors that the centrifuges had been destroyed but later admitted to their existence and allowed the IAEA to inspect them Oct. 30-31. The components had been stored elsewhere in Iran, but it is unclear how the agency became aware of this fact.
In the Nov. 24 issue of Time magazine, ElBaradei said that five European and Asian countries supplied Iran with the components and that the agency will discuss the matter with those governments.
In a further misstep, Iran tested the centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride imported in 1991. A June agency report pointed out that Iran not only violated its safeguards agreement by failing to report the imported material but also could not account for some of the material, raising suspicions that Iran had conducted illicit enrichment experiments. At the time, Iran said the material had leaked from its containers.
According to the report, Iran told the IAEA Oct. 21 that it had been pursuing a laser-based uranium-enrichment program since 1991. An August IAEA report stated that Iran had previously acknowledged a research and development program involving lasers, but not an enrichment program.
IAEA inspectors visited a site called Lashkar Ab’ad in August. Although they did not find any activities related to uranium enrichment being conducted there, the agency asked Iran to confirm that there had not been any past “activities related to uranium laser enrichment” at any location in the country and to allow environmental sampling at that location. Iran allowed inspectors to conduct sampling on Oct. 6 and told the IAEA Oct. 21 that it conducted laser-enrichment experiments with undeclared imported uranium metal at a site in Tehran until October 2002.
Iran later told the IAEA during an Oct. 27-Nov. 1 visit that it had established “a pilot plant for laser enrichment” at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000 and conducted enrichment experiments there between October 2002 and January 2003. Iran dismantled the equipment in May and presented it to IAEA inspectors on Oct. 28, according to the report.
The IAEA found that Iran separated a “small amount” of plutonium from spent fuel produced in a research reactor in Tehran—an action Iran was obligated to report to the IAEA. Reprocessing activities have caused concern because Iran has nearly completed a light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr and has announced plans to build a heavy-water reactor, each of which produce plutonium. LWRs are considered more proliferation resistant. Such reprocessing can also produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Iran announced in March that it had completed a facility located near Isfahan for converting uranium oxide into uranium hexafluoride. Iran first told the IAEA that it had completed the facility without having tested it with nuclear material but later admitted to conducting uranium-conversion experiments in the early 1990s. (See ACT, September 2003.) Iran was required to disclose these experiments to the IAEA.
According to the November report, Iran told the IAEA Oct. 9 that it conducted previously undisclosed uranium-conversion experiments with multiple phases of the conversion process between 1981 and 1993. Iran also admitted that it was planning to produce uranium metal for use in its laser-enrichment program. In June, a Department of State official noted that Iran would most likely use uranium metal in nuclear warheads.
The report also states that Iran failed to provide design information about the facilities where the concealed nuclear activities took place, as is required by its safeguards agreement.
Uranium Conversion Facility
In September 1995, China’s ambassador to Iran admited that China was selling uranium enrichment technology to Iran, and in early 1996 China informed the IAEA of the proposed sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. The United States and China reached agreement in October 1997 that China would halt assistance to Iran’s nuclear efforts. China pledged to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion facility (UCF) and to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, but said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran would use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. According to some reports, at that time the UCF plant was close to completion and was anticipated to be operational by 2000. Some reports suggested that by that time Chinese assistance had enabled Iran to complete construction of the UCF plant. In December 1998, US intelligence reports were publicly cited as having revealed that two Russian nuclear research institutes were actively negotiating to sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a uranium-conversion facility.
The UCF was a facility declared to the IAEA in 2000 and subsequently under construction at Esfahan. In February 2003, before the top officials of the Ministry of Science, Iranian President Mohammad Khatanmi reportedly announced a program for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which was to include the UCF in Esfahan. At the UCF Facility in Esfahan, using the yellow cake prepared at Ardekan, a number of by-products including uranium hexofloride (UF6), metallic uranium, and uranium oxide (UO2) were produced. These were later used for uranium enrichment.
The IAEA received preliminary design information on the UCF under construction at ENTC in July 2000, and had been carrying out continuous design information verification (DIV) since then. In that design information, the facility was described as being intended for the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF6 for enrichment outside Iran, and for the subsequent conversion (at the UCF) of the enriched UF6 into low enriched UO2 enriched uranium metal and depleted uranium metal.
In a letter to the IAEA dated 9 October 2003 from Mr. E. Khalilipour, Vice President of the AEOI, Iran provided information that had not been provided earlier on research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes, including acknowledgement of laboratory and bench scale experiments. Specifically, Iran confirmed that, between 1981 and 1993, it had carried out at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) bench scale preparation of UO2 and, at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), bench scale preparation of ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC), UO3, UF4 and UF6. In the same letter, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the IAEA. These activities were carried out at TNRC and ENTC.
In addition to the issues associated with the testing of UCF processes, the IAEA had previously raised with Iran questions related to the purpose and use of nuclear material to be produced at UCF, such as uranium metal. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that the uranium metal had been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as previously stated, but also for use in the laser enrichment programme.
In the meetings held between 27 October and 1 November 2003, Iran provided additional information about these experiments. According to Iranian officials, the experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved pressed or sintered UO2 pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had been irradiated in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation was carried out at TNRC in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment. Iran stated that these experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry.
On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports, and design information for ENTC and JHL, covering these activities.
An IAEA Report dated 10 November 2003 found that Iran had failed to report the production of UO2 targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at TNRC. It also found that Iran had failed to provide design information for the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC.
The UCF project was not one of the projects Iran agreed to suspend voluntarily. The IAEA was informed in February 2004 that Iran would start the Esfahan ICF project in March 2004. In early 2004 AEOI Director Reza Aqazadeh announced that the Esfahan UCF project was in the experimental stage and that the center would soon begin experimental production. He stated that the Esfahan UCF center would produce all the raw materials needed for fuel cycle activities, including hexafluoride uranium, metal uranium, and uranium oxide.
It was reported by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a anti-government Iranian politial action group linked to organizations on the US terror watch list, on 9 March 2004 that Alireza Jafarzadeh, who disclosed in August 2002 Iran’s facilities at Natanz and Arak, said Iranian leaders decided at a recent meeting to seek an atom bomb “at all costs” and begin enriching uranium at secret plants. “They set a timetable to get a bomb by the end of 2005 at the latest,” the former spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran said. “They will heavily rely on smaller secret enrichment sites at Karaj, Esfahan and at other places.”
On 12 June 2004 Iran rejected European demands that it freeze additional parts of its atomic program, including the heavy-water reactor. “We will not accept any new obligation,” Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said at a news conference. “If anyone asks us to give up Esfahan industries to change yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas or to give up heavy-water facilities in Arak, we cannot accept such an extra demand that is contradictory to our legal rights.”
Iran informed the Agency that it was conducting hot tests at UCF that would generate UF6 product. One such test, which generated about 30–35 kg of UF6, was conducted between May and June 2004. In March 2004, Iran began testing the process lines involving the conversion of UOC into UO2 and UF4, and UF4 into UF6. As of June 2004, 40 to 45 kg of UF6 had been produced therefrom. A larger test, involving the conversion of 37 tons of yellowcake into UF4, was initiated in August 2004.
On 18 June 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak and the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.
On 19 September 2004 the IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution Saturday that it was necessary for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities immediately. Iran promised before to comply, but had only partially suspended its uranium enrichment program and never for very long.
On 21 September 2004 Iran informed the IAEA that it had started converting uranium into the gas needed for enrichment purposes, a process that had sparked renewed concerns about a possible bomb program. Reza Aghazadeh, Iran’s Vice-President and energy chief said the Islamic Republic was already converting part a large amount of raw uranium into the gas (hexafluoride) used by nuclear centrifuges to make enriched uranium. This larger test involving 37 tonnes of yellowcake had been planned for August/September 2004. If all 37 tonnes of yellowcake were converted, that would produce enough uranium metal that, when enriched, would yield about 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough to make up to five atomic bombs.
According to Iran’s declaration of 14 October 2004, 22.5 tons of the 37 tons of yellowcake had been fed into the process and that approximately 2 tons of UF4, and 17.5 tons of uranium as intermediate products and waste, had been produced. There was no indication as of that date of UF6 having been produced during this later campaign.
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (Persian: غلامرضا آقازاده) (born Khoy, Iran on 15 March 1949) is anIranian Politician. Aghazadeh served as the Vice President for Atomic Energy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran up until July 2009.
He has a Bachelor of Science in Accounting and Computer Engineering from University of Tehran. He moved to the US for further studies but returned in late 1978 as the revolution against the Shah began to unfold. He was an active member of the opposition, and in 1979 became a director of the ultra-populist IRP newspaper Jomhuri Eslami, run by Mir-Hossein Mousavi. In 1980, Musavi became foreign minister and made Aghazadeh his deputy in charge of economic relations and finance.
Two years later, as Musavi became prime minister, Aghazadeh was made state minister for executive affairs, a post attached to the premier’s office. Later he held the title of deputy PM for executive affairs in charge of Iran’s oil barter deals with foreign states and companies under a countertrade system started in 1982. He co-ordinated policies of various ministries through the PM’s office. His talents earned him the post of Iran’s Minister of Petroleum in October 1985. He held this position until 1997 when he was replaced by Bijan Namdar Zanganeh after the election of then reformist president Mohammad Khatami. He was then promoted to the post of Vice President for Atomic Energy. He held this position from 1997 to 2009.
Aghazadeh is also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.
On July 16, 2009, the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency reported that Gholam Reza Aghazadeh had resigned as Iran’s Nuclear Chief for unspecified reasons, a resignation of intense interest in such a difficult time.
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Bijan Namdar Zangeneh
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Article: Ex-Soviet arms may be in Iran // Nuclear warheads missing in Kazakhstan
LONDON Iran has obtained at least two nuclear warheads that had been reported missing from Kazakhstan, a newspaper said Thursday.
The article, based on a secret report from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency, again raises questions about whether the successors to the Soviet Union will be able to control their weapons.
The newspaper, the European, did not say how it had obtained the intelligence report. It quoted the report as saying several nuclear warheads vanished from the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, which the republic’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, closed in early 1992.
The European said some intelligence sources believe Nazarbayev was behind the secret …
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Sanam Industrial Group
Sanam Industries Group
No.28, Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Tel : +98-21-2949508,9 +98-21-2935281 Fax : +98-21-2948301
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) is a leading industrial and military subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Armed Forces Logistics. More than 13 large factories with over 10,000 expert personnel are involved in manufacturing a vast variety of military and non-military products, which are partially exported. AIO’s factories are equipped with modern facilities and supported with long experiences, which have led to high quality products according to international standards.
Military products include different types of weapons such as guns, rockets, missiles, mortars, bombs, rocket launchers, field kitchens, gyroscopes, transportation means, police equipment, and helmets. Technical and engineering services include precision machining, metal forming, trading & software services, quality control environmental test, dimensional measurement, heat treatment & coating, C.N.C. machine, and C.M.M. measurement.
Iran’s missile program reportedly includes production plants in Esfahan and Semnan, as well as at design centers in Sultanatabad, Lavizan and Kuh-e Bagh-e-Melli on the outskirts of Teheran. Although the location of the Kuh-e Bagh-e-Melli is uncertain, but the Sultanatabad and Lavizan facilities are apparently located in extremely close proximity.
The Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), also known as the SANAM Industrial Group, is the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) liquid fuel missile design and manufacturing arm, attached to Department 140 of the DIO Missile Industries Group [other reports claim that it is in charge of Iran’s solid-fuel missile program]. Sanam Industries Group is said to be the lead organization for the development of the Shahab-3 missile.
It was reported in July 1998 that China Great Wall Industries Corporation had negotiated a contract with the Missiles Industry Group [also said to be known as the Sanam Industries Group or Department 14] to provide telemetry infrastructure for test flights of Iran’s Sahab-3 and Sahab-4 ballistic missiles.
Iran said on 14 April 1999 that it had successfully fired a medium- to long-range anti-aircraft missile dubbed Sayyad-1, which it claimed was developed by the Defense Ministry’s Aerospace Industries Organization. In September 1999 Aerospace Industries Organization unveiled the country’s first indigenously-built jet engine, the Tolu-4. This low-to-medium-thrust turbofan is designed mainly for civil applications. Apparently of Russian origin, it is believed to be the product of local final assembly of components produced in Russia. The Lavizan Technical and Engineering Complex includes faculties of installations industries and metallurgy. Baltic States Technological University in Saint Petersburg has reportedly contracted with the DIO’s Sanam College to help Iran design long-range solid fuel rocket boosters. The organizations jointly created a center known as Persepolis as part of an agreement concluded in 1996. Iranian students from the Sanam Industrial group were expelled on 22 June 1998 from Ustinov Military Mechanics State Technical University as part of Russia’s international obligations to control the spread of missile technology, days after both houses of the US Congress passed sanctions on Moscow. Encouraging the strikes and demonstrations that led to the downfall of the Shah’s regime, Iman Khomeini requested soldiers to abandon their barracks. The revolt spread to the the regime’s most strategic strongholds, including the Shah’s special guards, and several officers of the guard stationed at Lavizan Military Base were killed by revolutionary soldiers on the anniversary of Ashura [the day of mourning and commemoration of the martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson Imam Hussein, massacred by the Caliph Umayed Yazid in AD 680].
Like many military organizations, the SANAM Industrial Group subsidiary of AIO produces non-military products to meet domestic and export markets demands. In addition to military products, AIO’s products include: household, automotive parts, stainless steel dishes, and industrial equipment. Non-military products include TVs, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, various types of grinding wheels, stainless steel dishes, industrial fans, motor pumps, automotive parts (axle- cylinder body- propeller shafts- fuel pumps- steering system- electromotor for power window- washer wiper pump- engines). Using Korean SAMSUNG technology, the SANAM Washing Machine is a powerful, economic and durable washing machine with after sale service. The SANAM Washing Machine is a semi-automatic with 3kg capacity equipped with timer drier and two separate motors. SANAM Industrial Group in Parchin is licensed by the Italian company Lombardini to produce internal combustion engines below 50 kW, including a wide range of air and liquid cooled diesel and spark-ignition engines that are used in automotive, agricultural, industrial and marine applications.
In 1992, the US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee said there was a “98 per cent certainty that Iran already had all [or virtually all] of the components required for two to three operational nuclear weapons made with parts purchased in the ex-Soviet Muslim republics.” In April 1998 the Jerusalem Post ran a series of alarmist articles claiming Iran had nuclear weapons, based on claims that a defecting Iranian nuclear scientist had delivered details of Tehran’s weapons program to Israel. The Jerusalem Post reported that Iranian government documents discussed Tehran’s efforts to purchase nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics. According to the documents, “Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them”. In one of the documents, dated December 1991, the deputy head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards tells Atomic Energy Agency chief Rezi Amrullahi that “two war materiel of nuclear nature” had arrived from Russia and were being held by the guards. According to another (in 1992), the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area. A third document (also dated 1992) discusses the production of a solid fuel missile prototype, Zalzal 300, completed in Lavizan which was soon to be ready for launch.
The accuracy of these various claims is uncertain, and it is probable that these claims are in fact incorrect. These reports are almost certainly the product of efforts by the Israeli government to pressure the United States into stronger trade sanctions on Russia.
Sources and Resources
- Iran has up to 4 nuclear bombs By STEVE RODAN Jerusalem Post 09 April 1999 — Iranian Revolutionary Guards official quotes an engineer identified as Turkan as saying that the nuclear warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
- IRAN HAS FOUR NUCLEAR BOMBS ICEJ NEWS SERVICE April 9, 1998 — Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them. In 1992 the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
- Missile Threat from Iran By Kenneth R. Timmerman Reader’s Digest January 1998
- Aerospace Industries Organizations Homepage
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The Czech engineering firm, Skoda, considers selling nuclear technology to Iran; Skoda first attempts to do so in cooperation with Germany’s Siemens. When Siemens refuses, Skoda pursues the matter on its own with the support of Czech industry minister, Vladimir Dlouhy. However, sharp Western protests causes Skoda to abandon the effort. Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda’s nuclear division, says later that Skoda would not sell nuclear technology directly to Iran until adequate nuclear safeguards were in place. Svitak, however, indicates that Czech nuclear technology sold to Russia could end up in Iran.
—”Something Clunky Out East,” Economist (London), 18 February 1995, pp. 68-69.
Iranian arms dealers Mehdi Kashani and Musa Khair Habibollahi purchase the small Hartenholm airport located north of Hamburg in Germany. The Iranians have reportedly been using the airport as a transit point for smuggling weapons-related materials and technology since sometime after 1985, and according to Western intelligence officials, continue to use the airport for smuggling nuclear weapons-related items and other goods under the new management of another Iranian, Nick Ahmed Semnar. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]
—Chris Hedges, “Nuclear Trail—A Special Report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran’s Arms Program,” The New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1.
9 March 1993
Factory officials at a beryllium plant in Ustkamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, say that an Iranian delegation had visited the plant in August 1992 but deny that any sale took place. The British Broadcasting Corporation reports, however, that the Iranians purchased beryllium, a key component in nuclear weapons production, as well as 100 tons of uranium on that occasion.
—Agence France Presse, 9 March 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.
[ . . . ]
A US House of Representatives subcommittee investigation documents that over 230 companies from the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, including over 50 US businesses, have sold materials and equipment to Iran useful in the production of weapons of mass destruction. These transactions were made with the approval of their government export-control officials, according to Kenneth R. Timmerman. Timmerman claims that since the US Congress passed additional restrictions on sensitive technology sales to Iran in October 1992, US companies have been permitted by the US Commerce Department to export centrifuges, gas separation devices, gas chromatographs, machine tools, mass spectrometers, and million-dollar supercomputers to Iran that can assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Between January 1993 and June 1993, one of these sensitive US high-technology exports was shipped straight to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration of the Department of Commerce Iain Baird calls Timmerman’s claims misleading, citing the Commerce Department’s full compliance with the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act. Baird adds that a $1 million computer exported to Iran was actually an outdated computer “attached to a well-logging system used in the oil and gas industry” which was not considered a national security concern.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Caveat Venditor,” The New York Times, 25 October 1993, p. A19; Iain Baird, “Letter: On Trade Surveillance; U.S. Monitors High-Tech Exports to Iran,” The New York Times, 3 November 1993, p. A26.
[ . . . ]
2 September 1993
The Intelligence Newsletter reports that the French firm CKD is delivering nuclear materials to Iran. The report also says that a secret clause in a French-Iranian agreement, signed on 29 December 1991, provides for the resumption in 1994 on construction on three reactors in Iran.
—Intelligence Newsletter, 2 September 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.