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Meanwhile, the Cold War rivals carried out more nuclear tests—by 1958,
the United States had conducted 197, the Soviet Union 103 and the United
Kingdom 21.

[ . . . ]

Meanwhile, three atmospheric tests in 1960 had signalled France’s entry into the nuclear club. In an increasingly toxic atmosphere of distrust and recrimination, the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee convened in Geneva.25 It considered a joint US–Soviet initiative that set general and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal, but did not get far.26 In August 1961, the Berlin Wall went up.


President John F. Kennedy had decided to revive Eisenhower’s test-ban
initiative when he took offi ce in January 1961, but was unable to take
the issue forward in his fi rst couple of years. Using the French tests as
an excuse, fi rst the United States and then the Soviet Union broke their
moratoria and resumed testing, both with greatly accelerated programmes.


After September 1961 and throughout 1962, the Soviet Union conducted
an estimated 93 atmospheric tests, and the United States 39. During that
time the United States also experimented with 67 underground tests, while
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom each conducted two.27

** [from document linked below from UNIDIR – 2009]

The global alarm system supporting the Treaty—the verification regime being built around the world to ensure compliance with the ban—moves toward completion. It has already proven itself admirably. In 2006, with only 60% of the system complete, a low-yield nuclear test conducted by North Korea was detected by 20 stations (both seismic and radionuclide) around the globe. Since then more than 60 monitoring stations have been added to the system, and the capacity to detect noble gases—the smoking gun of a nuclear explosion—has been doubled from 10 systems to 20.

[etc.]

Three years later, after intense and sometimes dramatic negotiations, the
CTBT was overwhelmingly adopted by the UN General Assembly. On
24 September 1996, it was opened for signature. The President of the
United States signed first, using John F. Kennedy’s pen. The foreign ministers from China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom followed, as others queued up. By 7 March 1997, when the treaty was handed over to Vienna, the host city for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 142 states, including Iran and Israel, had signed.
In accordance with the treaty, the CTBTO’s Provisional Technical Secretariat established an international monitoring system with seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound sensors located around the world, feeding
information into the International Data Centre in Vienna.

[Excerpts from – ]

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf
It is my hope that this project, generously funded by the Governments
of Finland, Japan and Norway and written by Dr Rebecca Johnson, with
all the authority she bestows on the historical account, will provide the
international community with insights and signposts as to how to bring this
important Treaty into force and give it the teeth, through the International
Monitoring System embodied in the Treaty, that the world needs and
demands.
Patricia Lewis
Director, UNIDIR (1997–2008)

******

Chapter 7
Designing a robust verifi cation regime ……………………………………. 145
The International Monitoring System ………………………………… 148
The seismic signature ……………………………………………….. 151
Detecting airborne radioactivity …………………………………. 152
Hearing underwater explosions …………………………………. 154
Picking up shockwaves …………………………………………….. 154
Satellites and electromagnetic pulse monitoring ……………. 155
Interpreting IMS data ……………………………………………….. 155
On-site inspections ………………………………………………………… 157
Intrusion versus protection ………………………………………… 160
Transparency ………………………………………………………….. 162
Phased inspections, decision-making and access …………… 163
National technical means …………………………………………. 166

Chapter 9
Securing the CTBT ……………………………………………………………… 209
Field exercises in on-site inspections …………………………………. 212
Civilian benefi ts of the CTBT …………………………………………… 215
Unfi nished business ………………………………………………………. 216
Provisional application of the CTBT:
only as a last resort ……………………………………………….. 227
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………….. 231

***

SPECIAL COMMENT


The publication of this book is indeed very timely.
As the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons once again comes
to the fore of the international agenda, a new political momentum gathers
behind the comprehensive test.
For too long now this Treaty has been a hostage of fortune: left on the
sidelines because circumstances in the international arms control regime
were not conducive to agreement of any kind, let alone those measures
already widely supported and enacted around the globe, such as the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
It is time to write a new chapter in the fi ght against nuclear weapons. A
chapter that will see no more countries entering the nuclear weapons club
and no new nuclear weapons entering the arsenals of existing members. A
chapter that will erase once and for all the scar of nuclear weapons testing
from the Earth. The time has come for this Treaty, and the global alarm
system that supports it, to enter into force.
We are ready to begin.
One hundred and eighty nations have signed up to the Treaty’s principles,
150 of whom have ratifi ed their commitment. A de facto norm against
testing waits to be inscribed in the international rule book proper.
The global alarm system supporting the Treaty—the verification regime being built around the world to ensure compliance with the ban—moves toward completion. It has already proven itself admirably. In 2006, with only 60% of the system complete, a low-yield nuclear test conducted by North Korea was detected by 20 stations (both seismic and radionuclide) around the globe. Since then more than 60 monitoring stations have been
added to the system, and the capacity to detect noble gases—the smoking gun of a nuclear explosion—has been doubled from 10 systems to 20.

In short, the Treaty is standing at the door, waiting to enter. This opportunity is knocking and we must answer. It is a call for determined leadership, a call to action. The time of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is now.
Tibor Tóth
Executive Secretary
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

***&&&&*****

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION


They were not told what had happened, why it had happened,
what was wrong with them. Their hair was falling out, fi nger nails were falling off—but they were never told why.


Darlene Keju-Johnson, Marshall Islands,
speaking about the impact of fi rst thermonuclear bomb test,
codenamed Bravo, on Bikini Atoll, 1 March 1954.1


From the first atomic explosion above New Mexico in July 1945 to the
underground nuclear test conducted by North Korea in October 2006,
nuclear testing has defi ned the nuclear age.
The first nuclear explosion was codenamed Trinity and carried out in
Alamogordo, New Mexico. It was followed by the detonation of a uranium
bomb over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Three days later, a plutonium
bomb exploded directly above Japan’s largest Catholic cathedral, in the
port city of Nagasaki. These explosions carried materials from the surface—
soil, vegetation and the remains of people and buildings—miles into the
sky in pillars of radioactive dust that folded and billowed, dripping streams
to the ground in what onlookers likened to huge suppurating mushrooms.
These explosions heralded the nuclear age, in which tens of thousands of
weapons were made, deployed and nearly unleashed.
During the 1950s and 1960s, conducting nuclear test explosions became
the public proof that a states’ scientists had mastered the technology to
make nuclear weapons. When even more powerful thermonuclear bombs were developed in the 1950s, some explosions yielded a force equivalent to several millions of tons of TNT. The radioactive mushroom clouds rising high above the Pacific, the United States, Kazakhstan and Siberia prompted calls for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Launched in the mid-1950s, as fallout from nuclear explosions spread around the world, the campaigns to end nuclear testing engaged nuclear and non nuclear governments and a wide cross-section of civil society, starting with doctors and scientists, women’s groups and grassroots activists. When dentists found radioactive strontium from these tests in children’s teeth and doctors and scientists raised concerns about long-lasting damage to human health and the Earth’s environment, public opposition to nuclear weapons accelerated.
In 1954, India and Japan separately called for a total ban on nuclear testing, a demand taken up by civil society as a first step toward nuclear disarmament. [But, in the 1963 timeline listed on my blog post immediately prior to this one – India is listed as actively testing nuclear weapons – in 1963 – why does that not appear in this document? – my note].

Despite widespread calls for a CTBT, efforts to negotiate were derailed time and again. In 1963, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom finally managed to agree the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and so halted the most visible and environmentally dangerous explosions.2
The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
prohibited the development of nuclear devices—and therefore any
testing—by its non-nuclear-weapon states parties, who comprised the
majority of members of the United Nations. But nuclear testing by the five nuclear-weapon states defined in the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which are also the P-5 permanent members of the UN Security Council) continued, mostly underground. China and France, which were further behind in their nuclear weapon programmes, refused to join the PTBT and continued testing in the atmosphere over the next decade.
Twenty years and more than 2,000 nuclear tests later, a CTBT was finally
put back on the negotiating table. The main purpose by this time was to cap
nuclear weapon development by the P-5 and apply additional constraints
on three states outside the NPT with de facto nuclear weapons programmes
(the D-3: India, Israel and Pakistan). Yet little serious consideration was
given to holding plurilateral negotiations solely among the P-5 and D-3.
The negotiations were undertaken multilaterally as a process of intentional
regime-building not only to impose legal restraints on these eight, but
because of the higher normative value and collective “ownership” associated with multilateral regimes.
By the time negotiations on a CTBT opened in the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) on 25 January 1994, the dynamics among the key negotiating states illustrated not only different views on the value of a test ban, but competing motivations for and against nuclear disarmament.


Only six states had conducted a nuclear explosion prior to 1994 when
the negotiations opened. Those in favour of a test ban argued that it
would contribute to preventing the development of new and destabilizing
weapons, protect against further environmental damage, curb proliferation
and contribute to the process of disarmament. Those that sought to prevent a test ban, by contrast, regarded nuclear weapons as conferring deterrence or stability and opposed a CTBT on grounds that it would close off options to develop or modernize nuclear arsenals and might impair the ability of the laboratories to maintain the safety and reliability of existing weapons.
Three years later, after intense and sometimes dramatic negotiations, the
CTBT was overwhelmingly adopted by the UN General Assembly. On
24 September 1996, it was opened for signature. The President of the
United States signed first, using John F. Kennedy’s pen. The foreign ministers from China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom followed, as others queued up. By 7 March 1997, when the treaty was handed over to Vienna, the host city for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 142 states, including Iran and Israel, had signed.
In accordance with the treaty, the CTBTO’s Provisional Technical Secretariat established an international monitoring system with seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound sensors located around the world, feeding
information into the International Data Centre in Vienna.

Scientists and technicians from many of the signatory states have been trained to work with these technologies, while diplomats and experts have negotiated sensitive issues such as what procedures, rights and responsibilities should go into the operations manual for the conduct of on-site inspections.
As of 31 December 2008, 180 states have signed the CTBT. Of these, 148
have ratifi ed. The CTBTO looks ready to implement the treaty, but is stuck
in legal limbo. Incompatible political objectives between some of the key
states during the final months of the negotiations resulted in treaty text
that made entry into force contingent on the signature and ratification
of 44 states with nuclear programmes or capabilities, which were listed
in an annex to the treaty. Though the CTBT is one of the best-supported
treaties in history, nine of the necessary 44 have not ratified, so the treaty is prevented from entering into force.

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf

***

This book tells the story of how the CTBT was fought for, achieved, and
also undermined. At the centre are the dynamics, objectives and tactics of
the main nuclear and non-nuclear players as the treaty was multilaterally
negotiated in the CD from January 1994 to September 1996. Particular
emphasis is given to four key elements: the campaigning that impelled the
nuclear-weapon states to the table; the zero-yield scope7 that means that
this treaty bans all nuclear explosions in all environments; the multilateral
verifi cation regime and the CTBTO; and the entry-into-force provision that
many consider the treaty’s greatest weakness. This history charts several
earlier attempts to ban testing and looks at the prenegotiation phase that
framed disarmament objectives for the 1990s and put the CTBT back onto
the negotiating table. It does not gloss over the problems encountered
and created in the process of negotiation, but seeks to understand how
they came about in order to suggest ways to overcome the obstacles now
faced by the treaty and non-proliferation regime. Bringing the story up to
date, the last two chapters consider what lessons can be learned for future
multilateral negotiations and what now needs to be done to bring the CTBT
into force.
Although efforts to get a total test ban were an enduring feature of the Cold
War, the 1994–1996 negotiations were infl uenced by broader multilateral
dynamics and concerns, making the CTBT an unmistakable product of
post-Cold War security considerations. Some things went right, and some
went wrong. The negotiations simultaneously reflected Cold War attitudes and the transition to a “new world order”, though not, perhaps, what President George H.W. Bush had envisaged in 1991.8 As attitudes toward nuclear weapons began to change with the end of the Cold War, the test ban negotiations posed new or different challenges for the P-5, the D-3 and the international community as the restraints and expectations of Cold War relations were transformed.

[ . . . ]

The chapters that follow reveal that the CTBT negotiations were essentially
a process of conflict resolution between the objectives, postures and politics of fewer than 25 of the negotiating parties, informed and infl uenced by a number of civil society actors in a range of expert and advocacy capacities.
The outcomes on scope, verifi cation and entry into force were wrought
by three levels of simultaneous policy-shaping interactions: domestic,
international and transnational. Agendas, options and interests were
contested and determined not only by government representatives, but also among national and transnational civil society actors, between government and non-governmental actors within a particular state, and also across these levels, with information exchange and links occurring between governments and domestic actors on different sides.

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf

***

Settling for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1954 to 1963)—during which
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and United States abandoned the
search for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but agreed to ban testing in
the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, leaving underground
testing unregulated. During this period the fi rst anti-nuclear movements
were born, involving professionals (notably scientists and physicians) and
citizens, including women’s groups.

[etc.]

1954–1963: SETTLING FOR THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY
After 1945, the United States turned down international proposals that
would have prohibited nuclear arsenals, and intensifi ed the development
and testing of new types of these weapons. Rather sooner than Washington
had anticipated, the Soviet Union conducted its fi rst atomic explosion in
1949. The nuclear arms race was launched.

The United States accelerated its programme with one underground test in 1950 and 15 above-ground explosions in 1951.

In 1952, when the United States carried out 10 nuclear tests, the United Kingdom joined the club with an atmospheric explosion on the Australian island of Monte Bello on 3 October.

In 1953, in the midst of the Korean War, US planners were shocked when the Soviet Union demonstrated its mastery of nuclear weapon technology by detonating a thermonuclear device just one year later than the United States had managed.

In March 1954 the rest of the world woke up to the dangers when a US
thermonuclear test, codenamed Castle Bravo, produced a much greater
yield than anticipated.5

The huge blast vaporized part of the Bikini Atoll and contaminated nearby islanders. It also caused severe radiation sickness and at least one death among Japanese fishermen on a nearby trawler, the misnamed Lucky Dragon, provoking protests in the Japanese parliament, which demanded a suspension of nuclear testing.

On 2 April 1954, Prime Minister Nehru of India called for an immediate “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing. Nehru’s proposal for a test ban was submitted for consideration to the UN Disarmament Commission on 29 July 1954, and from then on a CTBT became a consistent demand from the growing number of developing states that formed the Movement of Non-Aligned States, of which Nehru became a leading light.6
Meanwhile, the Cold War rivals carried out more nuclear tests—by 1958, the United States had conducted 197, the Soviet Union 103 and the United Kingdom 21.

Not all policymakers in these states supported the race to acquire nuclear weapons, however, and the mid-1950s witnessed a flurry of disarmament initiatives. The United Kingdom, together with France, put forward a three-stage plan for nuclear disarmament in June 1954. The Soviet Union submitted similar proposals in May 1955, which it followed by declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing in June 1957, later extended by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, on condition that no other state tested.7

By 1957, as the United Kingdom conducted its first thermonuclear
test, nuclear testing had become “a burning public issue”,8 with women’s
groups, scientists and doctors at the forefront of raising public awareness of
the dangers of radioactive fallout.
Peace-oriented organizations, such as the Nobel-prize-winning Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Religious Society of Friends (the Quakers), had begun protesting against nuclear weapons soon after the fi rst bombs were detonated, but they received little attention initially.

Scientists involved in the Manhattan Project raised ethical, political and technical questions about controlling and using nuclear weapons and materials, and in 1945 some of them founded The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.9 These scientists were among the earliest non-governmental actors to integrate and publish information . . .

[etc.]

Meanwhile, three atmospheric tests in 1960 had signalled France’s entry into the nuclear club. In an increasingly toxic atmosphere of distrust and recrimination, the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee convened in Geneva.25 It considered a joint US–Soviet initiative that set general and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal, but did not get far.26 In August 1961, the Berlin Wall went up.


President John F. Kennedy had decided to revive Eisenhower’s test-ban
initiative when he took offi ce in January 1961, but was unable to take
the issue forward in his fi rst couple of years. Using the French tests as
an excuse, fi rst the United States and then the Soviet Union broke their
moratoria and resumed testing, both with greatly accelerated programmes.


After September 1961 and throughout 1962, the Soviet Union conducted
an estimated 93 atmospheric tests, and the United States 39. During that
time the United States also experimented with 67 underground tests, while
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom each conducted two.27

***

After 1963, nuclear testing continued out of sight. The PTBT left the nuclear scientists free to experiment with underground testing technologies, which were then refined to fuel the next three decades of the arms race with new and advanced weapons systems. (although, there were only three countries that even agreed in part to that ban as it states in the text – “Although negotiated by only three states, others were invited to accede to
the PTBT, and over a hundred did. France declined to join and carried on
testing in the atmosphere over the Pacific until 1974, when Australia and
New Zealand initiated a case in the International Court of Justice, citing
the PTBT as applicable law in their bid to halt French testing. China, which
conducted its fi rst nuclear test in 1964, also chose not to join.”)

***

[ . . . ]

With the right to nuclear energy emphasized as the primary incentive for non-nuclear weapon states, the NPT’s reflection of a prevalent belief that this technology could provide cheap, safe and clean energy for all has become increasingly problematic in the twenty-first century security environment.

The NPT’s recognition of the status quo with regard to the five defined nuclear powers led to more stringent and heavily policed obligations being imposed on the rest, whose only option in joining the NPT would be as non-nuclear weapon states. Although the ENDC played a signifi cant role in ensuring that the NPT would link disarmament with non-proliferation, the Cold War powers maintained overall control by tabling identical treaty drafts and, finally, their joint draft treaty.

One immediate consequence of the treaty’s “inequalities” was that a number of states with nuclear programmes or aspirations (for example, Argentina, Brazil, France, India, as well as several African states) abstained on the UN resolution recommending adoption of the NPT in June 1968, and—in a move that was to be echoed 28 years later with the CTBT—India publicly declared its refusal to join the NPT, on the grounds that it was discriminatory.44

***

[from – ]

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf

***

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