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***

Freddie Mac Update
March 2009

Table of Contents
VI Mortgage Funding
Freddie Mac Overview
U.S. Housing Market
Credit Guarantee Business
Investment Management Business
Global Debt Funding Program

For more information about Freddie Mac and its business, please see the company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
including the company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008, which are available on the Investor Relations
page of the company’s Web site at www.FreddieMac.com/investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Web site at
www.sec.gov.

$ Trillions U.S. Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding
2007 $ Trillions
FRE/FNM Total Portfolio 5.0
FRE/FNM Eligible 10.4
Total US Residential Mortgages 12.0

$19.7  $12.0  $12.2  $12.4  $13.3  $11.2  $10.1  $5.5  $3.7  $2.9
2015 2010 2009 2008  2007 2006 2005 2000 1995 1990
Est.    Est.    Est.    Est.
Sources: Freddie Mac Total Portfolio: Monthly Volume Summary, January 2008; Fannie Mae Total Portfolio: Monthly Summary, January 2008,
“Book of Business”; Total US Residential MDO: Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts, December 11, 2008. The MDO forecast for
2008 through 2011 is based on the December 2008 forecast of Freddie Mac’s Chief Economist. Forecasted figures for 2012 through 2015 are
from the Homeownership Alliance, based on an 8.25% annual growth rate, and assume a constant FHA & VA share of MDO; FRE/FNM Eligible
MDO: Nets out an assumed 15% jumbo share of single-family conventional MDO.

http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf

***

Treasury actions:


» Entered into a Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement with each GSE
• Each Agreement provides a commitment for an indefinite time period for a maximum amount of $100 billion for each GSE, which Treasury committed to increase to $200 billion
• Freddie Mac received $13.8 billion on November 24, 2008, and expects to receive an additional $30.8 billion in funding in March 2009
» Created a GSE Credit Facility
• Short-term facility is available to Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks at LIBOR + 50 basis points
• Facility available until December 31, 2009
» Announced an MBS Purchase Program
• Treasury will purchase GSE mortgage-backed securities in the open market
• Program will expire on December 31, 2009
.. The Fed resumed purchases of Agency securities for its System Open Market Account (SOMA) for the first time since 1981
» Purchased a total of $14.5 billion of Agency discount notes, $46.8 billion of Agency longterm debt securities and $280.2 billion of Agency MBS as of March 16, 2009
» “The Federal Reserve continues to purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand the quantity of such purchases and the duration of the purchase program as conditions warrant.” Federal Open Market Committee, January 28, 2009

pp.7

We fulfill our mission through a diversity of mortgage
products

Total mortgage portfolio purchases
twelve months ended Dec. 31, 2008

$389.8 Billion

Total mortgage portfolio
As of December 31, 2008

$1.9 Trillion

(pp. 23)

http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf

great charts, info and interesting facts, numbers, guesstimations

***

Most of the new loans were bundled together by government-sponsored-entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and sold to financial companies as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

Creative financiers then sliced and diced the CDOs into structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and sold them worldwide to investors. Investors were reassured because the risk of default was insured through credit default swaps (CDSs) from blue chip insurance companies that included American International Group (AIG).

However, bubbles all eventually burst. According to the Case-Shiller home price index, between July of 2006 and November of 2008, the average value of a home declined 25%. When the housing prices declined, many homeowners with high-risk loans were in serious trouble. Mortgage defaults and home foreclosures quickly followed.

Financial firms and the Federal Reserve compounded the problem. The Federal Reserve held the federal funds rate at 1% for too many months following the 2002 recession. With money flowing freely for loans, both financial firms and consumers acquired far too much debt.

Financial investment firms obtained permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2005 to increase their leverage from 10 to 1 to over 30 to 1. They went on a spending spree and purchased billions of dollars worth of CDOs from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. “Rest easy” was the slogan, because the CDOs were insured through CDSs and therefore the high leverage was “safe.”

When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008, its leverage was 34 to 1. The assumption of the financial community was that blue chip companies like American International Group (AIG) through credit default swaps (CDS) would be able to insure the mortgage securities. However, when the bubble burst, AIG was overwhelmed with the magnitude of the losses.

In response to the bursting of the housing and leveraged debt bubbles, the federal government nationalized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and essentially took control of AIG. A $700 billion Troubled Asset Recovery Plan (TARP) was passed by Congress and billions of dollars were quickly transferred to the banking industry to shore up weak capitalization.

As the economy struggles forward in 2009, unemployment claims are increasing and housing starts are the lowest recorded. Economists hope that there will be a recovery in the second half of 2009. Even if there is an economic recovery, the gross domestic product (GDP) may end up in the negative column for 2009.

When the bubbles burst in October of 2008, all equities markets crashed. The equities market indices remain at levels down over 40% from the peak in October of 2007.

Given this unique economic environment with perhaps the most serious recession in seven decades, should charities be interested in issuing gift annuities? And will donors be interested in purchasing gift annuities at the American Council on Gift Annuities Rates effective February 1, 2009?

http://www.acga-web.org/ShouldCharitiesPromoteGiftAnnuities2009.pdf

***

Saturday, January 31, 2009

REITs May Save $10 Billion With Stock Dividends; Strategy Spreads Across the Pond
We welcome prolific and urbane Zero Hedge to the REIT beat with their report on Simon Property Group’s (SPG) decision to join the list of REITs paying dividends in stock. The list continues to grow, seemingly limited only by the relatively lethargic schedule of dividends and earnings announcements. As Bloomberg reports in video below, cash savings for REITs may total up to $10 billion.

But investors won’t be so lucky. As usual, the only riskless constituency in this whole equation is Uncle Sam. Shareholders, who have been mercilessly pounded Justin Volpe’s billy club by falling share prices for months, will still be obligated to pay taxes on their slice of the cashless REIT dividend pie. If the video does not load, you can view it here.

Click here for a list of REITs paying dividends in stock”

http://www.reitwrecks.com/2009_01_01_archive.html

***

Servicing Default Management: An Overview of the Process and Underlying Technology

TowerGroup
November 15, 2002
16 Pages

– Pub ID: TWR848154

$1,750 US Dollars online download of report

Servicing default management for mortgages comprises the most critical processes for protecting servicing and loan portfolio value. The total mortgage delinquency rate-which includes loans 30, 60, and 90 days delinquent-declined throughout the 1990s but is now at the highest level in over a decade.

Additional Information

Highlights

  • Servicing default management is the management of credit, collateral, and operations risk on nonperforming mortgage loans. There are four broad functions within servicing default management: collections, loss mitigation, foreclosure management, and asset recovery. Loss mitigation may include collections, workouts, loan modifications, and alternatives to foreclosure such as deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and preforeclosure sales. Foreclosure and legal services include foreclosure (and sometimes bankruptcy) process management. Asset recovery includes real estate owned (REO) property disposition and guarantor claims reimbursement.
  • The servicer balances the desire to keep the loan performing (and the borrower in the home) with the investor’s need to protect its interest in the collateral. The servicer risks higher unreimbursed default management expenses, while the investor and guarantor incur economic losses from unpaid loan principal, foreclosure costs, REO holding costs, and REO disposition costs.
  • Investment in technology for default management in mortgage servicing has been low over the past two years relative to loan origination IT spending but is now picking up. Key investment areas include business process (workflow) automation and loss mitigation decisioning technology.
  • In mortgage finance, lenders typically lose money during the loan origination process and earn profits in secondary marketing and loan servicing. Servicing default management is therefore a servicing profit preservation process. With historically high mortgage lending volume set to fall in 2003 and beyond, mortgage servicers will look to default management as a way to control costs and maintain profit margins.Related Reports:
    Real Estate Loans & Credit Lines in the US – Industry Risk Rating Report
    Lights-Out Processing: Elements of Mortgage Origination and Fulfillment Systems for the Future
    Mortgage Lending In Poland – 2009
    Mortgage Banking
    Business Trends: European Retail Banking Technology 2008 (Customer Focus)
    UK Mortgage Intermediary Distribution 2008
    Real Estate Loans & Credit Lines in the US – Industry Market Research Report
    2009 Trends to Watch: Retail Banking Technology
    Targeting Property Investors in Australia 2008
    Building Societies in Australia – Industry Risk Rating Report
  • http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display.asp?productid=848154&g=1

    ****

    MICA
    Mortgage Insurance Companies of America
    2008-2009 Fact Book & Member Directory
    Introduction
    Founded in 1973, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America is the trade association representing the private mortgage insurance (PrivateMI) industry. MICA’s members expand homeownership
    opportunities by enabling home buyers to purchase homes with low down payment mortgages.

    MICA acts as an educator and conduit of information on legislative and regulatory changes and represents the industry’s positions on Capitol Hill.
    The association also serves as a liaison to other housing trade organizations and the federal secondary mortgage market agencies. MICA strives to enhance the general public’s understanding of the vital role PrivateMI plays in housing Americans.

    The PrivateMI industry’s mission is to help put as many people as possible into homes they can afford and to ensure that they stay in those homes.
    By insuring conventional low down payment home mortgages, MICA’s members have made homeownership a reality for more than 25 million families.

    MICA’s 2008-2009 Fact Book and Member Directory explains the PrivateMI industry and introduces its participants. The following sections detail what PrivateMI is and how it works, the nature
    of mortgage default risk, the market for PrivateMI, the industry’s financial performance and the challenges that lie ahead for housing.

    WHAT IS PRIVATEMI
    Traditionally, lenders have required a down payment of at least 20 percent of a home’s value. For most first-time home buyers, saving money for such a sizeable down payment is the greatest barrier to homeownership. Lenders will approve a mortgage with a smaller down payment, however, if the mortgage is covered by PrivateMI.

    PrivateMI, also known as mortgage guaranty insurance, protects a lender if a homeowner defaults on a loan.

    Lenders generally require mortgage insurance on low down payment loans
    because studies show that a borrower with less than 20 percent invested in a house is more likely to default on a mortgage. In effect, the mortgage insurance company shares the risk of foreclosure with the lender. Low down payment loans also are referred to as high-ratio loans (loan-to-value ratio), indicating the relationship between the amount of the mortgage loan and the value of the property.

    The home buyer and the mortgage insurer share a common interest in the mortgage financing transaction because they each stand to lose in the event of default. The borrower will lose the home and the equity invested in it, and the mortgage insurer will have to pay the lender’s claim on the defaulted loan. Thus, both the insurer and the borrower are concerned that the home is affordable not only at the time of purchase, but throughout the years of homeownership.

    PrivateMI is the private sector alternative to non-conventional, government-insured home loans. Mortgages backed by the government are insured by the Federal Housing Administration or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs or the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service.

    Generally, home buyers must make a down payment of at least 3 to 5 percent of a home’s value to be considered for PrivateMI. PrivateMI is available on a wide variety of conventional mortgages, including most fixed and adjustable rate home loans, giving borrowers the freedom to choose the type of loan that best suits their needs. Both private and government mortgage insurance premiums are tax deductible for many borrowers who purchase or refinance a home between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.

    PrivateMI should not be confused with mortgage life insurance, which pays an outstanding mortgage debt if the borrower holding the insurance policy dies.

    http://www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/2008-2009.pdf

    ***

    During the 1920s, rising real estate
    prices allowed most foreclosed
    properties to be sold at a profit, and
    more than 50 mortgage insurance
    companies flourished in New York.
    Since mortgage insurance was
    considered a low-risk business,
    the firms were virtually unregulated
    and thinly capitalized. Most had
    little experience with sound credit
    underwriting. This situation went
    relatively unnoticed until the Great
    Depression.
    With the catastrophic collapse of
    real estate values in the 1930s, New
    York’s entire mortgage insurance
    industry folded. As a result, the
    governor commissioned a study
    to examine the problems that had
    developed in mortgage lending and
    insurance. The study—known as
    the Alger Report—recommended
    prohibiting conflicts of interest;
    setting stringent capital and reserve
    requirements; and adopting sound
    appraisal, investment and accounting
    procedures. The report became a
    blueprint for a strong post-World
    War II mortgage insurance industry
    built on new regulations and financial
    structures. The industry’s sound
    regulatory and financial foundation

    [Etc.]

    http://www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/2008-2009.pdf

    ***

    Jay Bybee, the chief of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), sends a classified memo to White House counsel Alberto Gonzales. The contents will never be divulged, but the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) will later learn that it regards the authority of the OLC, the attorney general, the Justice Department, and the State Department in interpreting treaties and international law. [American Civil Liberties Union, 1/28/2009 pdf file]

    Entity Tags: American Civil Liberties Union, Alberto R. Gonzales, US Department of State, US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Jay S. Bybee

    Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

    http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a011102bybeeinterpretmemo#a011102bybeeinterpretmemo

    ***

    Fusion center

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Ju07termauctionfacility-01
    Jump to: navigation, search

    A Fusion Center is a terrorism prevention and response center, that were were started as a joint project between the Department of Homeland Security and the US Department of Justice‘s Office of Justice Programs between 2003 and 2007.

    The fusion centers gather information not only from government sources, but also from their partners in the private sector[1][2]

    They are designed to promote information sharing at the federal level between agencies such as the CIA, FBI and Department of Justice) and at the state and local level. There are more than forty fusion centers with up to fifteen more are planned. Fusion centers may also be affiliated with an Emergency Operations Center that responds in the event of a disaster.

    Content

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    Existing Fusion Centers

    • The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC)
    • Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC)
    • Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) in Los Angeles
    • Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (NEORFC)
    • Michigan Intelligence Operation Center (MIOC)
    • Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC)

    See Also

    References

    1. ^ Monahan, T. 2009. The Murky World of ‘Fusion Centres’. Criminal Justice Matters 75 (1): 20-21.[1]
    2. ^ http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/smashing-intelligence-stovepipes?page=0%2C1

    External links

    Video

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_center

    ***

    History
    Diagram of Total Information Awareness system, taken from official (decommissioned) Information Awareness Office website (click to enlarge)

    The IAO was established after Admiral John Poindexter, former United States National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan and SAIC executive Brian Hicks approached the US Department of Defense with the idea for an information awareness program after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[2]

    Poindexter and Hicks had previously worked together on intelligence-technology programs for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DARPA agreed to host the program and appointed Poindexter to run it in 2002

    The IAO began funding research and development of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program in February 2003 but renamed the program the Terrorism Information Awareness Program in May that year after an adverse media reaction to the program’s implications for public surveillance. Although TIA was only one of several IAO projects, many critics and news reports conflated TIA with other related research projects of the IAO, with the result that TIA came in popular usage to stand for an entire subset of IAO programs.
    The TIA program itself was the  systems-level  program of the IAO that intended to integrate information technologies into a prototype system to provide tools to better detect, classify, and identify potential foreign terrorists with the goal to increase the probability that authorized agencies of the United States could preempt adverse actions. As a systems-level program of programs, TIA’s goal was the creation of a  counterterrorism information architecture  that integrated technologies from other IAO programs (and elsewhere, as appropriate). The TIA program was researching, developing, and integrating technologies to virtually aggregate data, to follow subject-oriented link analysis, to develop descriptive and predictive models through data mining or human hypothesis, and to apply such models to additional datasets to identify terrorists and terrorist groups.

    Among the other IAO programs that were intended to provide TIA with component data aggregation and automated analysis technologies were the Genisys, Genisys Privacy Protection, Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery, and Scalable Social Network Analysis programs.

    On August 2, 2002, Dr. Poindexter gave a speech at DARPAtech 2002 entitled  Overview of the Information Awareness Office [3] in which he described the TIA program.

    In addition to the program itself, the involvement of Poindexter as director of the IAO also raised concerns among some, since he had been earlier convicted of lying to Congress and altering and destroying documents pertaining to the Iran-Contra Affair, although those convictions were later overturned on the grounds that the testimony used against him was protected.

    On January 16, 2003, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation to suspend the activity of the IAO and the Total Information Awareness program pending a Congressional review of privacy issues involved.[4] A similar measure introduced by Senator Ron Wyden would have prohibited the IAO from operating within the United States unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress, and would have shut the IAO down entirely 60 days after passage unless either the Pentagon prepared a report to Congress assessing the impact of IAO activities on individual privacy and civil liberties or the President certified the program’s research as vital to national security interests. In February 2003, Congress passed legislation suspending activities of the IAO pending a Congressional report of the office’s activities (Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, No.108–7, Division M, §111(b) [signed Feb. 20, 2003]).

    In response to this legislation, DARPA provided Congress on May 20, 2003 with a report on its activities.[5] In this report, IAO changed the name of the program to the Terrorism Information Awareness Program and emphasized that the program was not designed to compile dossiers on US citizens, but rather to research and develop the tools that would allow authorized agencies to gather information on terrorist networks. Despite the name change and these assurances, the critics continued to see the system as prone to potential misuse or abuse.

    As a result House and Senate negotiators moved to prohibit further funding for the TIA program by adding provisions to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004[6] (signed into law by President Bush on October 1, 2003). Further, the Joint Explanatory Statement included in the conference committee report specifically directed that the IAO as program manager for TIA be terminated immediately.[7]

    IAO research

    IAO research was conducted along five major investigative paths: secure collaboration problem solving; structured discovery; link and group understanding; context aware visualization; and decision making with corporate memory.

    Among the IAO projects were:

    Genisys

    Genisys aimed at developing technologies which would enable  ultra-large, all-source information repositories .[8]

    Vast amounts of information were going to be collected and analyzed, and the available database technology at the time was insufficient for storing and organizing such vast quantities of data. So they developed techniques for virtual data aggregation in order to support effective analysis across heterogeneous databases, as well as unstructured public data sources, such as the World Wide Web.  Effective analysis across heterogenous databases  means the ability to take things from databases which are designed to store different types of data — such as a a database containing criminal records, a phone call database and a foreign intelligence database. The World Wide Web is considered an  unstructured public data source  because it is publicly accessible and contains many different types of data — such as blogs, emails, records of visits to web sites, etc — all of which need to be analyzed and stored efficiently.[8]

    Another goal was to develop  a large, distributed system architecture for managing the huge volume of raw data input, analysis results, and feedback, that will result in a simpler, more flexible data store that performs well and allows us to retain important data indefinitely.  [8]

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery (EELD) development of technologies and tools for automated discovery, extraction and linking of sparse evidence contained in large amounts of classified and unclassified data sources (such as phone call records from the NSA call database or bank records).[9]

    EELD was designed to design systems with the ability to extract data from multiple sources (e.g., text messages, social networking sites, financial records, and web pages. It was to develop the ability to detect patterns comprising multiple types of links between data items or people communicating (e.g., financial transactions, communications, travel, etc.).[9]

    It is designed to link items relating potential  terrorist  groups and scenarios, and to learn patterns of different groups or scenarios to identify new organizations and emerging threats.[9]

    Scalable Social Network Analysis

    Scalable Social Network Analysis (SSNA) aimed at developing techniques based on social network analysis for modeling the key characteristics of terrorist groups and discriminating these groups from other types of societal groups.[10]

    Jason Ethier, of Northeastern University said the following in his study of SSNA:

    The purpose of the SSNA algorithms program is to extend techniques of social network analysis to assist with distinguishing potential terrorist cells from legitimate groups of people … In order to be successful SSNA will require information on the social interactions of the majority of people around the globe. Since the Defense Department cannot easily distinguish between peaceful citizens and terrorists, it will be necessary for them to gather data on innocent civilians as well as on potential terrorists.
    —Jason Ethier[10]

    Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID)
    Diagram (from official IAO site) describing capabilities of the  Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID)  project[11]

    The Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) project developed automated biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great distances for  force protection , crime prevention, and  homeland security/defense  purposes.[11]

    It’s goals included programs to:[11]

    * Develop algorithms for locating and acquiring subjects out to 150 meters (500 ft) in range.
    * Fuse face and gait recognition into a 24/7 human identification system.
    * Develop and demonstrate a human identification system that operates out to 150 meters (500 ft.) using visible imagery.
    * Develop a low power millimeter wave radar system for wide field of view detection and narrow field of view gait classification.
    * Characterize gait performance from video for human identification at a distance.
    * Develop a multi-spectral infrared and visible face recognition system.

    Effective Affordable Reusable Speech-to-text (EARS)

    Effective Affordable Reusable Speech-to-text (EARS) to develop automatic speech-to-text transcription technology whose output is substantially richer and much more accurate than previously possible. EARS was to focus on everyday human-to-human speech from broadcasts and telephone conversations in multiple languages. [12] It is expected to increase the speed with which speech can be processed by computers by 100 times or more.[13]

    The intent is to create a core enabling technology (technology that is used as a component for future technologies) suitable for a wide range of future surveillance applications.[12]
    Bio-Surveillance

    Bio-Surveillance to develop the necessary information technologies and resulting prototype capable of detecting the covert release of a biological pathogen automatically, and significantly earlier than traditional approaches.[14]

    Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE)

    Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE) focused on developing automated technology capable of identifying predictive indicators of terrorist activity or impending attacks by examining individual and group behavior in broad environmental context and examining the motivation of specific terrorists.[15]

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP)

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) was intended to harness collective intelligence by researching market-based techniques for avoiding surprise and predicting future events. The intent was to explore the feasibility of market-based trading mechanisms to predict political instability, threats to national security, and other major events in the near future.[16]

    Babylon

    Babylon to develop rapid, two-way, natural language speech translation interfaces and platforms for the warfighter for use in field environments for force protection, refugee processing, and medical triage.[17]

    Genoa / Genoa II

    Genoa and Genoa II focused on providing advanced decision-support and collaboration tools to rapidly deal with and adjust to dynamic crisis management and allow for inter-agency collaboration in real-time.[18][19] Another function was to be able to intelligently make estimates of possible future scenarios to assist intelligence officials what to do[13], in a manner similar to the DARPA’s Deep Green program which is designed to assist Army commanders in making battlefield decisions.

    TIDES

    Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (TIDES) developing advanced language processing technology to enable English speakers to find and interpret critical information in multiple languages without requiring knowledge of those languages.[20]

    Outside groups (such as universities, corporations, etc) were invited to participate in the annual information retrieval, topic detection and tracking, automatic content extraction, and machine translation evaluations run by NIST.[20]

    Communicator
    Diagram (from official IAO site) describing capabilities of the  Communicator  project

    Communicator was to develop  dialogue interaction  technology that enables warfighters to talk with computers, such that information will be accessible on the battlefield or in command centers without ever having to touch a keyboard. The Communicator Platform was to be both wireless and mobile, and to be designed to function in a networked environment.[21]

    The dialogue interaction software was to interpret the context of the dialogue in order to improve performance, and to be capable of automatically adapting to new topics (because situations quickly change in war) so conversation is natural and efficient. The Communicator program emphasized task knowledge to compensate for natural language effects and noisy environments. Unlike automated translation of natural language speech, which is much more complex due to an essentially unlimited vocabulary and grammar, the Communicator program is directed task specific issues so that there are constrained vocabularies (the system only needs to be able to understand language related to war). Research was also started to focus on foreign language computer interaction for use in supporting coalition operations.[21]

    Live exercises were conducted involving small unit logistics operations involving the United States Marines to test the technology in extreme environments. [21]

    Components of TIA projects that continue to be developed

    Despite the withdrawal of funding for the TIA and the closing of the IAO, the core of the project survived.[22] Legislators included a classified annex to the Defense Appropriations Act that preserved funding for TIA’s component technologies, if they were transferred to other government agencies. TIA projects continued to be funded under classified annexes to Defense and Intelligence appropriation bills. However, the act also stipulated that the technologies only be used for military or foreign intelligence purposes against foreigners.[23]

    TIA’s two core projects are now operated by Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) located among the 60-odd buildings of  Crypto City  at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, MD. ARDA itself has been shifted from the NSA to the Disruptive Technology Office (run by to the Director of National Intelligence). They are funded by National Foreign Intelligence Program for foreign counterterrorism intelligence purposes.

    One technology, now codenamed  Baseball  is the Information Awareness Prototype System, the core architecture to integrated all the TIA’s information extraction, analysis, and dissemination tools. Work on this project is conducted by SAIC through its Hicks & Associates, consulting arm that is run by former Defense and military officials and which had originally been awarded US$19 million IAO contract to build the prototype system in late 2002.[24]

    The other project has been re-designated  TopSail  (formerly Genoa II) and would provide IT tools to help anticipate and preempt terrorist attacks. SAIC has also been contracted to work on Topsail, including a US$3.7 million contract in 2005.
    Media Coverage

    The first mention of the IAO in the mainstream media came from New York Times reporter John Markoff on February 13, 2002.[25] Initial reports contained few details about the program. In the following months, as more information emerged about the scope of the TIA project, civil libertarians became concerned over what they saw as the potential for the development of an Orwellian mass surveillance system.

    On November 14, 2002 the New York Times published a column by William Safire in which he claimed  [TIA] has been given a $200 million budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans. [26] Safire has been  credited  with triggering the anti-TIA movement.[27]

    Concerns and criticism

    Extensive criticism of the IAO has come from across the political spectrum, from neo-luddite anarchists to right-wing constitutionalists.

    Critics believe that massive information aggregation and analysis technologies are a grave threat to privacy and civil liberties. Many fear that allowing a government to monitor all communications, and map social networks will give them the ability to target dissenters or political threats. Critics claim that this concern is not unfounded, citing COINTELPRO and other government programs that targeted peaceful political activists in the U.S. Programs such as those the IAO funded would greatly enhance their ability to identify, track, infiltrate, and target such groups. Such a system of surveillance is a necessary component of a strong totalitarian state.

    Proponents believe that development of these technologies is inevitable and that designing systems and policies to control their use is a more effective strategy than opposition.

    See also

    * Mass surveillance
    * ADVISE
    * Combat Zones That See, or CTS, a project to link up all security cameras citywide and  track everything that moves .
    * ECHELON, NSA worldwide digital interception program
    * Carnivore, FBI US digital interception program
    * Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act
    * Intellipedia, a collection of wikis used by the U.S. intelligence community to  connect the dots  between pieces of intelligence
    * Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange
    * TALON
    * Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulations
    * Information Processing Technology Office

    References
    1. ^  Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly Dead?  (in English). Electronic Frontier Foundation (official website). 2003. http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    2. ^ a b Harris, Shane (Feb. 23, 2006).  TIA Lives On  (in English). National Journal. http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-16.
    3. ^ Overview of the Information Awareness Office
    4. ^ Search Results – THOMAS (Library of Congress)
    5. ^ http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/tia-exec-summ_20may2003.pdf
    6. ^ Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–87, § 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003)
    7. ^ 149 Cong. Rec. H8755—H8771 (24 September, 2003)
    8. ^ a b c  Genisys  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Genisys.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    9. ^ a b c  Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/EELD.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    10. ^ a b Ethier, Jason.  Current Research in Social Network Theory  (in English). Northeastern University College of Computer and Infomation Science. http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/perrolle/archive/Ethier-SocialNetworks.html. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    11. ^ a b c  Human Identification at a distance  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    12. ^ a b  EARS  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/EARS.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    13. ^ a b Belasco, Amy (January 21, 2003).  EFF: Memorandum Regarding TIA Funding  (in English). Electronic Frontier Foundation. http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/belasco-memo.php. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    14. ^ BSS
    15. ^ WAE
    16. ^ FutureMap
    17. ^ Babylon
    18. ^  Genoa  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Genoa.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    19. ^  Genoa II  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/GenoaII.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    20. ^ a b  TIDES  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/TIDES.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    21. ^ a b c  Communicator  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Communicator.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    22. ^ Wanted: Competent Big Brothers, Newsweek, 8 February 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    23. ^ The Total Information Awareness Project Lives On, Technology Review, 26 April 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    24. ^ TIA Lives On, National Journal, 23 February 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    25. ^ Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S. – New York Times
    26. ^ You Are a Suspect
    27. ^ Big Brother …

    Further reading

    * Copies of the original IAO web pages formerly available at http://www.darpa.mil/iao/ (June 12, 2002–June 3, 2003) can be found at Archive.org, Internet Archive

    * John Poindexter, Overview of the Information Awareness Office (Remarks as prepared for delivery by Dr. John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office, at the DARPATech 2002 Conference) (August 2, 2002).

    External links

    Information Awareness Office

    Media coverage

    * Harris, Shane (February 26, 2006).  TIA Lives On . The National Journal. http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm.
    *  Pentagon Defends Surveillance Program . The Washington Post. May 20, 2003.
    * Webb, Cynthia L. (May 21, 2003).  The Pentagon’s PR Play . The Washington Post.
    * Bray, Hiawatha (April 4, 2003).  Mining Data to Fight Terror Stirs Privacy Fears . The Boston Globe. pp. C2.
    * McCullagh, Declan (January 15, 2003). News.com.com  Pentagon database plan hits snag on Hill . CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1023-980889.html News.com.com.
    * Markoff, John (February 13, 2002).  Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S. . The New York Times. pp. (first mainstream media mention of IAO). http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20A11F734580C708DDDAB0894DA404482#.

    Academic articles

    * K. A. Taipale (2003).  Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data . Columbia Sci. & Tech. Law Review 5 (2): 1–83 (TIA discussed 39–50). http://ssrn.com/abstract=546782.

    * Robert Popp and John Poindexter (november/december 2006).  Countering Terrorism through Information and Privacy Protection Technologies  (PDF). IEEE Security & Privacy: 18 –26. http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/2006.data-surveillance.pdf.

    Critical views (established sources)

    *  TIA: Total Information Awareness . American Civil Liberties Union. January 16, 2004. http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/14956res20040116.html.
    * Charles V. Peña (November 22, 2002).  TIA: Information Awareness Office Makes Us a Nation of Suspects . Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/research/articles/pena-021122.html.
    *  Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly Dead? EFF: It’s Too Early to Tell . Electronic Frontier Foundation. http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php.
    * Epic.org  Total  Terrorism  Information Awareness (TIA): Latest News . Electronic Privacy Information Center. http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/ Epic.org.
    * SPTimes.com  A Times Editorial: Unfocused data-mining . St. Petersburg Times. January 24, 2003. http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/24/Opinion/Unfocused_data_mining.shtml SPTimes.com.

    Critical views (less well recognized)

    * Russ Kick.  Information Awareness Office Website Deletes Its Logo . The Memory Hole. http://www.thememoryhole.org/policestate/iao-logo.htm.

    Proponent views

    * Mac Donald, Heather (January 27, 2003).  Total Misrepresentation . The Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/137dvufs.asp.
    * Levin, Jonathan (February 13, 2003).  Total Preparedness: The case for the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness project . National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levin021303.asp.
    * Taylor, Jr., Stuart (December 10, 2002).  Big Brother and Another Overblown Privacy Scare . The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2002-12-10.htm.

    Accord:

    * Shane Ham & Robert D. Atkinson (2002).  Using Technology to Detect and Prevent Terrorism  (PDF). Progressive Policy Institute. http://www.ppionline.org/douments/IT_terrorism.pdf.
    *  Safegaurding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism  (PDF). DOD Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC). March 2004. http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.

    Also:

    * Ignatius, David (August 1, 2003).  Back in the Safe Zone . The Washington Post. pp. A19 (discussing opposition to the IAO FutureMap project). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10955-2003Jul31.html.

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office
    Categories: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | Government databases in the United States | Mass surveillance

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    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office

    Information Awareness Office
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Information Awareness Office seal

    The Information Awareness Office (IAO) was established by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in January 2002 to bring together several DARPA projects focused on applying information technology to counter asymmetric threats to national security. The IAO mission was to  imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition information technologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, information systems that will counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness .

    Following public criticism that the development and deployment of these technologies could potentially lead to a mass surveillance system, the IAO was defunded by Congress in 2003, although several of the projects run under IAO have continued under different funding.[1][2]

    On January 16, 2003, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation to suspend the activity of the IAO and the Total Information Awareness program pending a Congressional review of privacy issues involved.[4] A similar measure introduced by Senator Ron Wyden would have prohibited the IAO from operating within the United States unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress, and would have shut the IAO down entirely 60 days after passage unless either the Pentagon prepared a report to Congress assessing the impact of IAO activities on individual privacy and civil liberties or the President certified the program’s research as vital to national security interests. In February 2003, Congress passed legislation suspending activities of the IAO pending a Congressional report of the office’s activities (Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, No.108–7, Division M, §111(b) [signed Feb. 20, 2003]).

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office

    ***

    [1] It has also been described only as the software system which controls the download and dissemination of the intercept of commercial satellite trunk communications.[2]

    The system has been reported in a number of public sources.[3] Its capabilities and political implications were investigated by a committee of the European Parliament during 2000 and 2001 with a report published in 2001,[4] and by author James Bamford in his books on the National Security Agency of the United States.[2]

    In its report, the European Parliament states that the term ECHELON is used in a number of contexts, but that the evidence presented indicates that it was the name for a signals intelligence collection system. The report concludes that, on the basis of information presented, ECHELON was capable of interception and content inspection of telephone calls, fax, e-mail and other data traffic globally through the interception of communication bearers including satellite transmission, public switched telephone networks (which carries most Internet traffic) and microwave links. The committee further concluded that  the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed .[4]

    Bamford describes the system as the software controlling the collection and distribution of civilian telecommunications traffic conveyed using communication satellites, with the collection being undertaken by groundstations located in the footprint of the downlink leg.

    The ability to intercept communications depends on the medium used, be it radio, satellite, microwave, cellular or fiber-optic.[4]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADVISE

    ***

    Among the IAO projects were:

    Genisys

    Genisys aimed at developing technologies which would enable  ultra-large, all-source information repositories .[8]

    Vast amounts of information were going to be collected and analyzed, and the available database technology at the time was insufficient for storing and organizing such vast quantities of data. So they developed techniques for virtual data aggregation in order to support effective analysis across heterogeneous databases, as well as unstructured public data sources, such as the World Wide Web.  Effective analysis across heterogenous databases  means the ability to take things from databases which are designed to store different types of data — such as a a database containing criminal records, a phone call database and a foreign intelligence database. The World Wide Web is considered an  unstructured public data source  because it is publicly accessible and contains many different types of data — such as blogs, emails, records of visits to web sites, etc — all of which need to be analyzed and stored efficiently.[8]

    Another goal was to develop  a large, distributed system architecture for managing the huge volume of raw data input, analysis results, and feedback, that will result in a simpler, more flexible data store that performs well and allows us to retain important data indefinitely.  [8]

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery (EELD) development of technologies and tools for automated discovery, extraction and linking of sparse evidence contained in large amounts of classified and unclassified data sources (such as phone call records from the NSA call database or bank records).[9]

    EELD was designed to design systems with the ability to extract data from multiple sources (e.g., text messages, social networking sites, financial records, and web pages. It was to develop the ability to detect patterns comprising multiple types of links between data items or people communicating (e.g., financial transactions, communications, travel, etc.).[9]

    It is designed to link items relating potential  terrorist  groups and scenarios, and to learn patterns of different groups or scenarios to identify new organizations and emerging threats.[9]

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP)

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) was intended to harness collective intelligence by researching market-based techniques for avoiding surprise and predicting future events. The intent was to explore the feasibility of market-based trading mechanisms to predict political instability, threats to national security, and other major events in the near future.[16]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office

    ***

    Poindexter is  getting the ‘data-mining’ power to snoop on every public and private act of every American,  hyperventilated William Safire of The New York Times, in a November 14 column that helped touch off a frenzy of similar stuff. The Homeland Security Act, claimed Safire, would put Poindexter in control of a vast government database, containing  every purchase you make with a credit card, every magazine subscription you buy and medical prescription you fill, every Web site you visit … complaints from nosy neighbors to the FBI,  and much more.

    http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2002-12-10.htm

    ***
    There is something very sick about it,  said Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.). She demanded that Congress  end the careers of whoever it was who thought that up.  Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon, who made headlines when he and another senator disclosed the program Monday, called it  a runaway horse that needs to be reined in.  Even one of the Pentagon’s pals, Republican Sen. John Warner of Virginia, was running for cover, agreeing that the plan was  a very significant mistake.

    By Tuesday Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had officially disowned the idea.  I share your shock at this kind of program,  he told Congress.  We’ll find out about it, but it is being terminated.

    And then yesterday the official who oversaw the program, former Reagan-era national security adviser John Poindexter — a man who seems to have one of those indelible  official bad person’  signs attached to him because of his role in the Iran-contra affair — indicated he would resign.
    And with that, Washington’s gods of conformity will be appeased. Purged of this unconventional, off-the-wall idea, the capital can return to its normal play-it-safe rules.

    These events, alas, embody a fundamental problem with Washington, though not the one Congress was so indignant about. The nation’s capital operates as a zero-defect culture, one where failure is impermissible. In that respect, it is the opposite of what’s creative and dynamic about America. The second-guessers and headline-hunters who populate Congress lack the essential American willingness to take risks, to propose outlandish ideas and, on occasion, to fail.

    I’m not necessarily arguing for the futures market in terrorism. It would have the same problem as any unregulated market: A trader with inside information could skew outcomes — place a bet on assassination, say, and then help others do it. And it does sound callous to let people bet directly on the possibility that a regime could be overthrown or a leader killed — even though markets are implicitly doing that all the time.

    The point is that for all its defects, the political futures market was an interesting, unconventional idea for capturing information that’s  on the street  — the subtle tips and clues that ordinary people know but that are often lost to our intelligence agencies. My response to critics would be: Okay, if this approach is wrong, what’s a better idea? But I doubt any brave soul will be funding a similar project soon.

    As it happens, on the day the futures-market flap broke, I was attending a conference sponsored by DARPA, the very agency that launched this insidious assault on conventional thinking. The topic of the conference was  Life Sciences, Complexity and National Security,  or in more blunt terms, the intersection of biology and warfare.

    The point of the meeting was to think, provoke and discuss — in the hope of making the nation safer. To get some outside ferment, DARPA invited a dozen or so scientists, some business consultants, two journalists and a novelist. We all came away astonished by the boldness and creativity of some of the research DARPA is funding with America’s tax dollars.

    Here are some of the projects DARPA is sponsoring: teaching a rat how to get water just by thinking about it; creating an electronic substitute for the part of the brain known as the hippocampus, so that we might eventually be able to download memories or complex instructions, or to communicate brain to brain; building artificial organs and prostheses that could greatly increase human performance; making pills that could alter soldiers’ metabolisms so they could go days without food, sleep or water.

    And there’s more in DARPA’s magic box: bio-inspired robots, modeled partly on cockroaches, that have supple, flexible legs and can scramble over rocky terrain and up stairs; honeybees that can detect explosives; and systems for remotely monitoring mental states through MRIs and other screening technology, so that authorities might someday detect the intent to hijack an airliner the way a metal detector can now find a gun.

    Are some of those ideas off the wall? You bet. Will they all work out? Of course not. Do some of them pose ethical or legal dilemmas? Probably. But is the country better off because DARPA is willing to take risks and fund unconventional research? Absolutely.

    It’s impossible in the early stages of research to know which are the good ideas and which are the clinkers. But the notion that people who propose unconventional ideas should be punished is . . . well, it’s downright un-American.

    © 2003 The Washington Post Company

    Back in the Safe Zone

    By David Ignatius
    Friday, August 1, 2003; Page A19

    Members of Congress were queuing up this week to express their indignation at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s proposal to create a futures market where investors could bet on the likelihood of terrorist attacks.

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10955-2003Jul31.html

    ***
    ADMINISTRATION
    TIA Lives On

    By Shane Harris, National Journal
    © National Journal Group Inc.
    Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006

    A controversial counter-terrorism program, which lawmakers halted more than two years ago amid outcries from privacy advocates, was stopped in name only and has quietly continued within the intelligence agency now fending off charges that it has violated the privacy of U.S. citizens.

    It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of the classified intelligence budget.

    Research under the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness program — which developed technologies to predict terrorist attacks by mining government databases and the personal records of people in the United States — was moved from the Pentagon’s research-and-development agency to another group, which builds technologies primarily for the National Security Agency, according to documents obtained by National Journal and to intelligence sources familiar with the move. The names of key projects were changed, apparently to conceal their identities, but their funding remained intact, often under the same contracts.

    It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of the classified intelligence budget. However, the projects that moved, their new code names, and the agencies that took them over haven’t previously been disclosed. Sources aware of the transfers declined to speak on the record for this story because, they said, the identities of the specific programs are classified.

    Two of the most important components of the TIA program were moved to the Advanced Research and Development Activity, housed at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md., documents and sources confirm. One piece was the Information Awareness Prototype System, the core architecture that tied together numerous information extraction, analysis, and dissemination tools developed under TIA. The prototype system included privacy-protection technologies that may have been discontinued or scaled back following the move to ARDA.

    A $19 million contract to build the prototype system was awarded in late 2002 to Hicks & Associates, a consulting firm in Arlington, Va., that is run by former Defense and military officials. Congress’s decision to pull TIA’s funding in late 2003  caused a significant amount of uncertainty for all of us about the future of our work,  Hicks executive Brian Sharkey wrote in an e-mail to subcontractors at the time.  Fortunately,  Sharkey continued,  a new sponsor has come forward that will enable us to continue much of our previous work.  Sources confirm that this new sponsor was ARDA. Along with the new sponsor came a new name.  We will be describing this new effort as ‘Basketball,’   Sharkey wrote, apparently giving no explanation of the name’s significance. Another e-mail from a Hicks employee, Marc Swedenburg, reminded the company’s staff that  TIA has been terminated and should be referenced in that fashion.

    Sharkey played a key role in TIA’s birth, when he and a close friend, retired Navy Vice Adm. John Poindexter, President Reagan’s national security adviser, brought the idea to Defense officials shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The men had teamed earlier on intelligence-technology programs for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which agreed to host TIA and hired Poindexter to run it in 2002. In August 2003, Poindexter was forced to resign as TIA chief amid howls that his central role in the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s made him unfit to run a sensitive intelligence program.

    It’s unclear whether work on Basketball continues. Sharkey didn’t respond to an interview request, and Poindexter said he had no comment about former TIA programs. But a publicly available Defense Department document, detailing various  cooperative agreements and other transactions  conducted in fiscal 2004, shows that Basketball was fully funded at least until the end of that year (September 2004). The document shows that the system was being tested at a research center jointly run by ARDA and SAIC Corp., a major defense and intelligence contractor that is the sole owner of Hicks & Associates. The document describes Basketball as a  closed-loop, end-to-end prototype system for early warning and decision-making,  exactly the same language used in contract documents for the TIA prototype system when it was awarded to Hicks in 2002. An SAIC spokesman declined to comment for this story.

    Another key TIA project that moved to ARDA was Genoa II, which focused on building information technologies to help analysts and policy makers anticipate and pre-empt terrorist attacks. Genoa II was renamed Topsail when it moved to ARDA, intelligence sources confirmed. (The name continues the program’s nautical nomenclature;  genoa  is a synonym for the headsail of a ship.)

    As recently as October 2005, SAIC was awarded a $3.7 million contract under Topsail. According to a government-issued press release announcing the award,  The objective of Topsail is to develop decision-support aids for teams of intelligence analysts and policy personnel to assist in anticipating and pre-empting terrorist threats to U.S. interests.  That language repeats almost verbatim the boilerplate descriptions of Genoa II contained in contract documents, Pentagon budget sheets, and speeches by the Genoa II program’s former managers.

    As early as February 2003, the Pentagon planned to use Genoa II technologies at the Army’s Information Awareness Center at Fort Belvoir, Va., according to an unclassified Defense budget document. The awareness center was an early tester of various TIA tools, according to former employees. A 2003 Pentagon report to Congress shows that the Army center was part of an expansive network of intelligence agencies, including the NSA, that experimented with the tools. The center was also home to the Army’s Able Danger program, which has come under scrutiny after some of its members said they used data-analysis tools to discover the name and photograph of 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta more than a year before the attacks.

    Devices developed under Genoa II’s predecessor — which Sharkey also managed when he worked for the Defense Department — were used during the invasion of Afghanistan and as part of  the continuing war on terrorism,  according to an unclassified Defense budget document. Today, however, the future of Topsail is in question. A spokesman for the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, N.Y., which administers the program’s contracts, said it’s  in the process of being canceled due to lack of funds.

    It is unclear when funding for Topsail was terminated. But earlier this month, at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, one of TIA’s strongest critics questioned whether intelligence officials knew that some of its programs had been moved to other agencies. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., asked Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and FBI Director Robert Mueller whether it was  correct that when [TIA] was closed, that several … projects were moved to various intelligence agencies…. I and others on this panel led the effort to close [TIA]; we want to know if Mr. Poindexter’s programs are going on somewhere else.

    Negroponte and Mueller said they didn’t know. But Negroponte’s deputy, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, who until recently was director of the NSA, said,  I’d like to answer in closed session.  Asked for comment, Wyden’s spokeswoman referred to his hearing statements.

    The NSA is now at the center of a political firestorm over President Bush’s program to eavesdrop on the phone calls and e-mails of people in the United States who the agency believes are connected to terrorists abroad. While the documents on the TIA programs don’t show that their tools are used in the domestic eavesdropping, and knowledgeable sources wouldn’t discuss the matter, the TIA programs were designed specifically to develop the kind of  early-warning system  that the president said the NSA is running.

    Documents detailing TIA, Genoa II, Basketball, and Topsail use the phrase  early-warning system  repeatedly to describe the programs’ ultimate aims. In speeches, Poindexter has described TIA as an early-warning and decision-making system. He conceived of TIA in part because of frustration over the lack of such tools when he was national security chief for Reagan.

    Tom Armour, the Genoa II program manager, declined to comment for this story. But in a previous interview, he said that ARDA — which absorbed the TIA programs — has pursued technologies that would be useful for analyzing large amounts of phone and e-mail traffic.  That’s, in fact, what the interest is,  Armour said. When TIA was still funded, its program managers and researchers had  good coordination  with their counterparts at ARDA and discussed their projects on a regular basis, Armour said. The former No. 2 official in Poindexter’s office, Robert Popp, averred that the NSA didn’t use TIA tools in domestic eavesdropping as part of his research. But asked whether the agency could have used the tools apart from TIA, Popp replied,  I can’t speak to that.  Asked to comment on TIA projects that moved to ARDA, Don Weber, an NSA spokesman said,  As I’m sure you understand, we can neither confirm nor deny actual or alleged projects or operational capabilities; therefore, we have no information to provide.

    ARDA now is undergoing some changes of its own. The outfit is being taken out of the NSA, placed under the control of Negroponte’s office, and given a new name. It will be called the  Disruptive Technology Office,  a reference to a term of art describing any new invention that suddenly, and often dramatically, replaces established procedures. Officials with the intelligence director’s office did not respond to multiple requests for comment on this story.

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    http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm

    ***

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office

    See also

    * Mass surveillance
    * ADVISE
    * Combat Zones That See, or CTS, a project to link up all security cameras citywide and  track everything that moves .
    * ECHELON, NSA worldwide digital interception program
    * Carnivore, FBI US digital interception program
    * Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act
    * Intellipedia, a collection of wikis used by the U.S. intelligence community to  connect the dots  between pieces of intelligence
    * Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange
    * TALON
    * Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulations
    * Information Processing Technology Office

    References

    ***
    ****
    COINTELPRO
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Common name     Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Abbreviation     FBI
    Seal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    agency information
    Motto     Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity
    Agency Overview
    Formed     1908
    Employees     30,847[1] (June 30, 2008)
    Annual Budget     6.4 billion USD (2007)[1]
    Legal personality     Governmental: Government agency
    Jurisdictional Structure
    Federal agency
    (Operations jurisdiction)     United States
    Legal jurisdiction     As per operations jurisdiction.
    Governing body     United States Congress
    Constituting instrument     United States Code Title 28 Part II Chapter 33
    General nature

    * Federal law enforcement
    * Civilian agency

    Operational Structure
    Headquarters     J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, D.C.
    Sworn members     12,737 (June 30, 2008)[1]
    Unsworn members     18,110 (June 30, 2008)[1]
    Agency executives

    * Robert S. Mueller III, Director
    * John S. Pistole, Deputy Director
    * List of FBI Directors, Other directors

    Child agencies

    * FBI Academy
    * FBI Laboratory
    * Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)
    * Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)
    * Counterterrorism Division (CTD)
    * FBI Police (FBIP)

    Major units
    5
    Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU)
    Law Enforcement Bulletin Unit (LEBU)
    Hostage Rescue Team (FBI) (HRT)
    Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
    FBI Police
    National Security Branch (NSB)
    Field offices     56: List of FBI Field Offices
    Notables
    People

    * John Edgar Hoover, Director, for being the founding director
    * William Mark Felt, former Federal Agent, for whistle blowing, Watergate scandal
    * Joseph Leo Gormley, Forensic Scientist, for expert testimony

    Programmes

    * FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives
    * FBI Most Wanted Terrorists
    * National Incident Based Reporting System
    * Uniform Crime Reports

    Significant Operation

    * COINTELPRO

    Website
    http://www.fbi.gov/

    COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counter Intelligence Program) was a series of covert and often illegal projects conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation aimed at investigating and disrupting dissident political organizations within the United States. The FBI used covert operations from its inception, however, the formal COINTELPRO operations took place between 1956 and 1971.[2] The FBI motivation at the time was  protecting national security, preventing violence, and maintaining the existing social and political order.

    According to FBI records, 85% of COINTELPRO resources were expended on infiltrating, disrupting, marginalizing, and/or subverting groups suspected of being subversive,[3] such as communist and socialist organizations; the women’s rights movement; people suspected of building a  coalition of militant black nationalist groups  ranging from the Black Panther Party and Republic of New Afrika to  those in the non-violent civil rights movement  such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and others associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Congress of Racial Equality, and other civil rights groups; a broad range of organizations labelled  New Left , including Students for a Democratic Society, the National Lawyers Guild, the Weathermen, almost all groups protesting the Vietnam War, and even individual student demonstrators with no group affiliation; and nationalist groups such as those  seeking independence for Puerto Rico.  The other 15% of COINTELPRO resources were expended to marginalize and subvert  white hate groups,  including the Ku Klux Klan and National States’ Rights Party. [4]

    The directives governing COINTELPRO were issued by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who ordered FBI agents to  expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize  the activities of these movements and their leaders.[5][6]
    Methods

    According to attorney Brian Glick in his book War at Home, the FBI used four main methods during COINTELPRO:

    1. Infiltration: Agents and informers did not merely spy on political activists. Their main purpose was to discredit and disrupt. Their very presence served to undermine trust and scare off potential supporters. The FBI and police exploited this fear to smear genuine activists as agents.
    2. Psychological Warfare From the Outside: The FBI and police used myriad other  dirty tricks  to undermine progressive movements. They planted false media stories and published bogus leaflets and other publications in the name of targeted groups. They forged correspondence, sent anonymous letters, and made anonymous telephone calls. They spread misinformation about meetings and events, set up pseudo movement groups run by government agents, and manipulated or strong-armed parents, employers, landlords, school officials and others to cause trouble for activists.
    3. Harassment Through the Legal System: The FBI and police abused the legal system to harass dissidents and make them appear to be criminals. Officers of the law gave perjured testimony and presented fabricated evidence as a pretext for false arrests and wrongful imprisonment. They discriminatorily enforced tax laws and other government regulations and used conspicuous surveillance,  investigative  interviews, and grand jury subpoenas in an effort to intimidate activists and silence their supporters.
    4. Extralegal Force and Violence: The FBI and police threatened, instigated, and themselves conducted break-ins, vandalism, assaults, and beatings. The object was to frighten dissidents and disrupt their movements. In the case of radical Black and Puerto Rican activists (and later Native Americans), these attacks—including political assassinations[who?] — were so extensive, vicious, and calculated that they can accurately be termed a form of official  terrorism .

    The FBI also conducted more than 200  black bag jobs ,[17][18] which were warrantless surreptitious entries, against the targeted groups and their members.[19]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO

    ***

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Total_Information_Awareness_–_system_diagram.gif

    ***

    Fusion center

    A Fusion Center is a terrorism prevention and response center, that were were started as a joint project between the Department of Homeland Security and the US Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs between 2003 and 2007.

    The fusion centers gather information not only from government sources, but also from their partners in the private sector[1][2]

    They are designed to promote information sharing at the federal level between agencies such as the CIA, FBI and Department of Justice) and at the state and local level. There are more than forty fusion centers with up to fifteen more are planned. Fusion centers may also be affiliated with an Emergency Operations Center that responds in the event of a disaster.Existing Fusion Centers

    * The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC)
    * Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC)
    * Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) in Los Angeles
    * Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (NEORFC)
    * Michigan Intelligence Operation Center (MIOC)
    * Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC)

    See Also

    * Surveillance
    * ADVISE
    * TALON
    * Total Information Awareness

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_center

    *Bob Hardin

    Home / NCJRS Abstract

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    NCJRS Abstract

    The document referenced below is part of the NCJRS Library collection.
    To conduct further searches of the collection, visit the NCJRS Abstracts Database.

    How to Obtain Documents

    NCJ Number:     NCJ 208661
    Title:     Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center
    Journal:     Homeland Defense Journal  Volume:2  Issue:11  Dated:December 2004  Pages:8 to 14
    Author(s):     Randy Gaddo
    Publisher Url*:     http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/
    Publication Date:     12/2004
    Pages:     7
    Type:     Program/project description/evaluations
    Origin:     United States
    Language:     English
    Annotation:     This article describes the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC), which is an operational clearinghouse of terrorist-related intelligence information.
    Abstract:     Bob Hardin, the first and only director of GISAC, began the task of developing the GISAC in October 2001. At that time he had no staff, no budget in the middle of a State budget year, a broad mission statement, and only a vague concept of what the organization was to become. Hardin learned about the contemporary nature of terrorist-related intelligence information, its sources, its importance, who needs it, and when they need it. GISAC’s organization is multilayered, with a two-way conduit as the nucleus of an intelligence web. This web can transfer information from local first responders and citizens to the State level and on to the highest Federal levels of the homeland security intelligence network and then back again. GISAC is the focal point for the collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism intelligence information that relates to Georgia. It is staffed by a team of representatives from various States organizations. GISAC headquarters in Atlanta houses an operations center that can be activated in a terrorist-related emergency anywhere in the State. It becomes the  nerve  center in a crisis. A digital mapping system allows real-time tracking of incidents or reports. GICAC’s web is cast in many directions to obtain hundreds of pieces of information daily. These are studied to determine whether they require further investigation. A law enforcement-sensitive intelligence bulletin is issued monthly to all associated law enforcement sources. GICAC is also part of the Multi-State Information Sharing Analysis Center, which has the broad mission of providing a focal point for collected information on cyber threats to critical infrastructures.
    Main Term(s):     Domestic Preparedness
    Index Term(s):     Police information systems ; Intelligence acquisition ; Intelligence units ; Police intelligence operations ; Intelligence analysis ; Intelligence files ; Counter-terrorist tactics ; Counter-terrorism intelligence ; Georgia (USA)

    To cite this abstract, use the following link:
    http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=208661

    * A link to the full-text document is provided whenever possible. For documents not available online, a link to the publisher’s web site is provided.

    Freedom of Information Act | Privacy Statement | Legal Policies and Disclaimers | USA.gov

    U.S. Department of Justice | Office of Justice Programs | Office of National Drug Control Policy

    http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=208661

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_center

    ****

    Health Information Resource Database

    [Inclusion of an information resource in this database does not imply endorsement
    by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.]
    Information Network for Public Health Officials

    Contact Information
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
    4770 Buford Highway, MS-K39
    Atlanta, GA 30341
    770-488-2432 (Voice)
    770-488-8300 (FAX)

    Internet Resources

    Abstract
    The Information Network for Public Health Officials (INPHO) was initiated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 1992 as part of its strategy to strengthen the infrastructure of public health in the United States. The ultimate goal of INPHO is to improve the health of Americans through more effective public health practice. The INPHO initiative addresses the serious national problem that public health professionals have lacked ready access to much of the authoritative, technical information they need to identify health dangers, implement prevention and health promotion strategies, and evaluate health program effectiveness. INPHO utilizes state-of-the-art telecommunications and computer networks to give state and community public health practitioners new command over information resources.There are three essential components of the INPHO vision: linkage, information access, and data exchange. INPHO computer networks and software link local clinics, state and federal health agencies, hospitals, managed care organizations and other providers, eliminating geographic and bureaucratic barriers to communication and information exchange. Public health practitioners have unprecedented electronic access to health publications, reports, databases, directories, and other information. High speed communications capacity enables them to communicate and exchange data locally and across the nation on the full universe of public health issues.
    Publications
    Keywords
    You may search for other related entries in the database under the following topics.

    * Health Care
    * Health Care Technology
    * Public Health
    * Public Health Professionals
    * Telehealth
    * Telemedicine

    Notes
    Audit
    Date Entered: 12/1/1997
    Date Edited: 12/2/2004
    Date Revised: 4/30/2002
    Health Referral Number: HR2686
    Accession Number:
    NHIC Home Page

    http://www.health.gov/nhic/nhicscripts/Entry.cfm?HRCode=HR2686

    ****
    The standardized health data repository used by OASIS is currently populated with Vital Statistics (births, deaths, infant deaths, fetal deaths, induced terminations), Georgia Comprehensive Cancer Registry, Hospital Discharge, Emergency Room Visit, Arboviral Surveillance, Risk Behavior Surveys (Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), and Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS)), STD, and Population data. Other datasets/data sources will be added. We welcome inquiries about translating your data into more meaningful information through OASIS. If more detailed information is needed, please contact us.

    List of Indicators in Oasis

    Indicators in each tool are selectable by a variety of population, disease, and survey characteristics. Where applicable, you can choose data by age groups, race, ethnicity, sex (person), census tract, county, health district, legislative district, state (place), and year (time).

    All tables and maps pertain to place of residence, not occurrence.

    http://oasis.state.ga.us/

    ***
    http://www.health.state.ga.us/

    The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is a state-based surveillance system, administered by the Georgia Deparment of Human Resources, Division of Public Health, in collaboration with the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Georgia has been part of the system since 1984, gathering information about knowledge, attitudes, and health behaviors, including:
    * Binge Drinking
    * Breast Cancer Screening
    * Cervical Cancer Screening
    * Cholesterol Screening
    * Cigarette Smoking
    * Colorectal Cancer Screening
    * Diabetes
    * Fair or Poor Health
    * Flu Shot
    * Fruits & Vegetables
    * HIV/AIDS Testing
    * Hypertension
    * No Health Insurance
    * Overweight or Obese
    * Physical Activity
    * Pneumonia Immunization
    * Seat Belt Non-use

    Information collected from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveys is used to:

    * Track trends in behavior change among the population
    o Healthy People 2010
    * Determine priority health issues and develop plans to address them
    * Monitor the effectiveness of interventions

    SEARCH THIS SITE

    * BRFSS Main Page
    * Healthy People 2010
    * Publications and Related Links

    * Contact Information
    * (404) 463-2450
    * Fax: (404) 463-0780
    * e-mail: GA-BRFSS@
    dhr.state.ga.us

    http://www.health.state.ga.us/epi/brfss/index.asp

    ***

    Publications and Related Links

    BRFSS Publications

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2006 Report PDF
    This report presents 2006 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 18 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2005 Report PDF
    This report presents 2005 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 18 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2004 Report PDF
    This report presents 2004 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 18 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2003 Report PDF
    This report presents 2003 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 18 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2002 Report PDF
    This report presents 2002 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 19 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2001 Report PDF
    This report presents 2001 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 19 Public Health Districts.

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2000 Report PDF
    This report presents 2000 BRFSS data for Georgia and for the 19 Public Health Districts.

    Health Behaviors and Prevention Practices: BRFSS 6-Year Trend Report, 1993-1998 PDF
    6-year trend report on the health practices and behaviors of Georgians from 1993 to 1998, based on data from the Georgia Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).

    Health Risk Behaviors Among Georgia Adults, 1992 – 1993 PDF
    This report provides an in-depth profile of the health practices and behaviors of Georgians in 1992 and 1993 as well as overall trends in behavior since 1984, based on data from the Georgia Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).

    BRFSS Related Links

    * CDC BRFSS Data

    http://www.health.state.ga.us/epi/brfss/publications.asp

    ****

    http://www.health.state.ga.us/pdfs/epi/BrfssReport2006.pdf

    Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) Year 2006 Report PDF

    http://oasis.state.ga.us/
    ***
    http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:pe3dD72h22EJ:www.nga.org/Files/ppt/0403bioterrorismToomey.ppt+Georgia+Information+Sharing+and+Analysis+Center+(GISAC)&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

    *  Strong State-based Epi Capacity
    * District Epidemiologists
    * District Emergency Preparedness Coordinators and Specialists
    * District Risk Communicators
    * Public Health District Liaisons
    * Office of Health Information and Policy
    * “OASIS” – On-line Statistical Information System

    the html version of the file http://www.nga.org/Files/ppt/0403bioterrorismToomey.ppt.
    Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.

    Information Sharing

    Kathleen E. Toomey, M.D., M.P.H.

    Division of Public Health

    Georgia Department of Human Resources

    Georgia Public Health and Homeland Security

    Information Sharing for Homeland Security Response

    Public Health

    Health Care Providers

    Law enforcement

    Emergency management

    Public

    Media

    External

    Internal

    State

    District

    Local

    Georgia Public Health

    State-based Public Health

    – State Office (Atlanta)

    – 19 Public Health Districts

    159 County Boards of Health

    Pre-2001 Communication Infrastructure

    o Georgia was an original INPHO state

    o Connectivity between State and District offices only

    o No systematic communication with any Homeland Security partners

    “Internal” public health communication only

    Pre-2001 information infrastructure

    State Health

    Officer

    Commissioner, DHR

    Governor’s Office

    District Health

    Directors

    DPH Epi
    DPH Emergency

    Preparedness Team

    CDC

    District

    Epis

    GPHLab

    DHR Risk

    Communications

    District Risk

    Communications

    District

    Emergency

    Coordinators

    GEMA

    District/County PH

    Local Officials

    Law Enforcement

    EMS

    EMA

    Hospitals

    Infection Control

    Practitioners

    Emergency Rooms
    Community Health

    Centers

    Local MDs

    GA Information

    Sharing &

    Analysis Center

    (GISAC)

    EMAs

    Office of

    Homeland Security

    Media

    Public Health Response Communication Chain

    General Public

    Dept

    Ag

    Homeland Security Agencies

    Current Georgia Model

    Homeland Security Task Force

    William W. “Bill” Hichens, Jr.

    Director – Georgia Office of Homeland Security Major General

    David Poythress

    Adjutant General of Georgia – Georgia Department of Defense

    Mike Sherberger

    Director – Georgia Emergency Management Agency

    Lonice C. Barrett

    Commissioner – Georgia Department of Natural Resources

    Kathleen E. Toomey, M.D., M.P.H.

    Director – Division of Public Health – Georgia Department of Human Resources

    Harold Linnekohl

    Commissioner – Georgia Department of Transportation

    Frank V. Rotondo

    Executive Director – Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police

    Sheriff Stanley Tuggle

    Georgia Sheriffs’ Association

    Chief Rebecca Denlinger

    Georgia Association of Fire Chiefs

    George A. Ellis

    Colonel/Commissioner – Georgia State Patrol

    Vernon M. Keenan

    Director – Georgia Bureau of Investigation

    Georgia Homeland Security Task Force

    o Created October 2001

    o Director of Public Health is full member

    o PH representation on multi-disciplinary working groups
    o Weekly Meetings with in-depth information sharing

    GISAC

    (Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center)

    o Co-located with the Atlanta FBI office

    o Collects, evaluates, and disseminates intelligence and threat information

    Department of Agriculture Coordination

    * Active member of Homeland Security Task Force  and working groups
    * Legislation – made animal diseases reportable
    * Reporting system for animal diseases, parallel to  Public Health system
    * Web-based disease reporting
    * Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis  Center – notifications and access to secure web site
    * Training – including Ag inspectors of retail  establishments and food processing plants

    Public Health Epidemiologic & Health Data Infrastructure

    * Strong State-based Epi Capacity
    * District Epidemiologists
    * District Emergency Preparedness Coordinators and Specialists
    * District Risk Communicators
    * Public Health District Liaisons
    * Office of Health Information and Policy
    * “OASIS” – On-line Statistical Information System

    SENDSS State Electronic Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System

    Communications about Public Health Threats

    * 1-866-PUB-HLTH (PH, GEMA, Medical Community)    24/7 Toll-free Reporting
    * Incident Reports (GEMA, GISAC, HLS)
    * Protocol Development for Response to Suspicious  Substances (FBI, GEMA, Lab, Epidemiology,  Emergency Preparedness)
    * Forensic Epidemiology Training with Law Enforcement

    http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:pe3dD72h22EJ:www.nga.org/Files/ppt/0403bioterrorismToomey.ppt+Georgia+Information+Sharing+and+Analysis+Center+(GISAC)&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
    ****

    GACP Georgia Homeland Security Task Force

    Sonny Perdue – Governor
    Georgia’s Plan for Homeland Security

    In the Amended FY 2002 and FY 2003 appropriation recommendations, the Governor provides funding to match available federal dollars for Georgia’s Plan for Homeland Security. Due to the events of September 11, 2001, much scrutiny was given to the current coordination of terrorism prevention and preparedness by various state agencies.

    As part of the recommendation, the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) will be created, constructed and equipped. There is a recognized need to establish a single point, state level contact for collecting, analyzing and disseminating credible threat intelligence, information, and data from and to government agencies, the private sector and identified infrastructure targets.

    Staff from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Public Safety, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Department of Human Resources Division of Public Health, Georgia Technology Authority, Georgia National Guard, the Department of Natural Resources, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Military will operate the GISAC and will produce daily situation reports, special analyses, warnings and bulletins as necessary. $1,022,488 was recommended as the state’s portion of a 50% federal match to construct the GISAC in amended FY 2002. $377,000 in matching funds is recommended in FY 2003 in the Department of Public Safety to equip the center. The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety is currently serving as the Director of Homeland Security for the State of Georgia.

    Another component of this recommendation is to provide additional staff and associated expenses to the Department of Public Safety, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigations to handle the increased responsibilities associated with the operation of the GISAC and other related activities. An additional $795,744 state match was recommended in the amended FY 2002 budget for the three agencies and $1,298,238 state match is recommended in the FY 2003 budget. $75,000 in additional funding match for amended FY 2002 will allow the Department of Natural Resources to more adequately equip the current emergency preparedness and response staff. Along with the additional funding in amended FY 2002, $141,762 state match is , recommended for FY 2003 for additional equipment needs.

    Part of the Homeland Security Plan will be addressed by the Division of Public Health by enhancing preparedness and detection activities and enhancing the response capacity. Various changes such as increasing the number of and investigation capacity of district epidemiologists throughout the state, training public health staff and community partners to recognize and respond to bio terrorism, and enhancing traditional disease surveillance mechanisms and rapid communication, notification, and collaboration with federal agencies such as Centers for Disease Control and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. A total of $698,750 is recommended in amended FY 2002 and $2,060,000 in FY 2003 to match federal funding for bio terrorism preparedness and response for the Division of Public Health.

    Report to the Governor
    September 2002

    Submitted by Executive Director, Frank V. Rotondo
    Georgia Homeland Security Website: http://www.gahomelandsecurity.com/

    GACP Three Phase Response Phase I
    GACP RESPONSE

    Outreach and Planning:

    * Georgia Homeland Security Task Force: The GACP has been represented on the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF) since November 2001. The GACP Executive Director and the Police Chief of the Hapeville Police Department are permanent members of the GHSTF. The initiatives of the GHSTF are crucial to the fighting terrorism, securing our homeland, and protecting our citizens.
    * Jurisdictional Vulnerability Assessment Survey: The GACP coordinated a statewide comprehensive risk analysis to identify potential terrorists targets, potential threats to local assets and infrastructure, and the emergency plans available to respond to any actual attack.
    * All Hazards Councils: Sixteen police chiefs were named to serve on the state’s eight regional All Hazards Councils.
    * Senate Bill 385: GACP, through the efforts of the their legislative liaison and with the full support of the Association’s Executive Board and membership, helped facilitate the passage of this bill by the 2002 legislature. Along with a number of essential components, the Governor was provided with the authority to enact emergency procedures specific to terrorism.
    * Georgia Law Enforcement Certification Program: A new standard was added to the state certification program requiring agencies to establish written criteria for meeting preparedness objectives in the prevention of incidents of terrorism or mass destruction.

    Communication and Technology:

    * Emphasis on technology and information sharing is critical for all homeland security initiatives. GACP worked diligently to ensure all relevant intelligence and sensitive information relating to our state or national security is in the hands of the right people at the right time. Immediate communication capabilities and access to current information are fundamental building blocks for all homeland security initiatives. Critical homeland security information must be quickly disseminated to state and local law enforcement officials and others who play key roles in the protection of our communities.
    * Planning, which started prior to the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, continued with a greater degree of urgency. In 2000-2001, the GACP, with the support of CJCC, was proactive in securing federal money under an anti-terrorism initiative to provide computers and networking capability to local law enforcement agencies. Over 135 police departments in the State of Georgia who did not have a single computer or on-line access received free computers, Internet access, e-mail, and tech support. This initiative has provided small departments with the capability to respond effectively to sensitive homeland security information.

    Training:

    * Since the 9-11 attacks, the GACP has been at the forefront of providing homeland security training to all police chiefs/heads of law enforcement agency and other law enforcement personnel. Through coordination with the Georgia Public Safety Training Center, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, the U. S. Department of Justice and others, an excellent curriculum has been identified and made available to law enforcement personnel throughout the state.
    * The GACP has included numerous blocks of instruction in homeland security and terrorism at the Winter and Summer Training Conferences and at seminars conducted around the state.
    * To date, GACP has made available through our delivery or approval over 2000 direct training hours specifically addressing homeland security and/or terrorist activities to police chiefs/heads of law enforcement agencies.

    Phase II
    GACP STRATEGIES AND INITIATIVES

    What the Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police is doing now:

    Outreach and Planning:

    * Networking with the Georgia Association of Fire Chiefs, the Georgia Sheriffs Association and other agencies to develop and implement a method for measuring and monitoring the quality and quantity of homeland security-related information and training that is reaching the local responder level across the state.
    * Providing pertinent information to the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
    * GACP, through coordination with the DeKalb County Police Department and the DeKalb County Homeland Security Chief, is providing an experienced investigator to serve full time as the GACP representative, working in conjunction with the GBI to follow-up on breeches of homeland security. Investigative findings are presented to the GHSTF for dissemination of all pertinent data to law enforcement agencies.
    * The Georgia Law Enforcement Certification Program is monitoring the revised standards for emergency preparedness during the certification and re-certification process.

    Communication and Technology:

    * During the summer of 2002, GACP began coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children to distribute free computers, scanners, printers, software, technical support and on-line service to  first responder  departments. Virtually every department in the state is eligible to benefit from this program. Hundreds of new computer systems are currently  on the way  to departments across the state. These computer systems are linked via Internet with the Amber Alert Plan and Levi’s Call, and are also available for any and all other law enforcement needs, including those related to homeland security initiatives. To date in excess of 250 computer orders have been placed; this is the highest response of any state in the nation. The actual number of computers distributed in 2002 will be monitored and reported in the next report.
    * The GACP utilizes their network capabilities to quickly disseminate homeland security alerts and other critical information related to terrorist activities, as well as upcoming training opportunities on terrorism, and relevant legislative updates.
    * The GACP reviews, filters and provides pertinent homeland security information to law enforcement authorities through the GACP server.
    * The GACP with the assistance of the Georgia Technology Authority maintains a website, http://www.gachiefs.com, providing a resource link to the State Homeland Task Force, and other sites of interest, many of which address homeland security issues.
    * The GACP continues work to provide computer systems to all departments to enhance the flow of crucial information.

    Training:

    * The GACP provides constant and recurring training on unique and/or specific terrorist threats, appropriate methods of deployment, resources and tools available, etc.
    * Out of the approximately 15,000 – 20,000 contact hours of training provided by GACP to heads of law enforcement agencies each year, we project between 2,000 and 4,000 hours will be dedicated to homeland security and terrorists activities.
    * The GACP coordinates with the Georgia Public Safety Training Center, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, the U. S. Department of Justice and others, to ensure state-of-the-art training is identified and provided to law enforcement personnel throughout the state.

    Phase III
    GACP GOALS AND NEEDED FUNDING

    Outreach and Planning:

    * Establish a position for a local law enforcement liaison coordinator to travel throughout the state to provide assistance to local departments, assess needs and vulnerabilities, and establish mutual aid compacts with other local agencies, as well as state and federal agencies. This expertise is critical to ensure all local departments have a well-developed, comprehensive plan that is well coordinated with other emergency services. While the 9-11 attacks occurred in major metropolitan areas, the vulnerability of small communities with significant assets is great, and we must provide these local law enforcement jurisdictions with all requisite resources. With funding for one position, GACP could hire an employee to undertake this mission critical initiative.
    * The GACP, through its 16 representatives on the GEMA All Hazards Council, will work to communicate between state and local responders and disaster planners to further develop and implement the Homeland Security strategy. Regional councils will begin meeting this fall.

    Communication and Technology:

    * Use the above requested position for the evaluation all law enforcement notifications (be on the lookout or BOLO) issued by the federal, state or local agencies to immediately determine applicability for local law enforcement agencies and disseminate needed information through a secure GACP server. Funding for a secure server would be necessary. Due to the volume and critical nature of these notifications, this area has been identified as a potential risk if sufficient resources are not dedicated to the review, evaluation and dissemination of all pertinent data.
    * The law enforcement must remain vigilant and ensure the flow of information. However, we must use caution not to overwhelm local law enforcement with extraneous information, while ensuring all critical data is provided for their immediate response.

    Training:

    * The GACP will continue identify and deliver state-of-the-art training to over 550 Police Chiefs and Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies each year, with a significant emphasis on homeland security and terrorism.
    * Ensure initiatives of the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force are presented to the newly appointed police chiefs/heads of law enforcement agencies at the Chief Executive Training (New Chiefs School) conducted by the GACP.

    http://www.gachiefs.com/GACPPrograms_HomelandSecTaskForce.htm

    ***
    GHSTF
    Georgia Homeland Security Task Force

    http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0509FUSION.PDF

    2005

    Issue Brief

    Contact: Joe Trella, 202/624-8566 or jtrella@nga.org
    July 7, 2005
    State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions

    Executive Summary
    State intelligence fusion centers—central locations at which local, state and federal officials work in close proximity to receive, integrate and analyze information and intelligence—can be instrumental in improving the quality of intelligence by closing information gaps that previously have hampered counterterrorism efforts at the state and local level. As a result, fusion centers have become a major focus of homeland security programs in several states.
    However, because standards for organizational design and operational methods still are emerging (see the earlier NGA Center for Best Practices issue brief “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers”), the form and function of intelligence fusion centers vary from state to state. This issue brief provides a state-by-state overview of the status and structure of state intelligence fusion centers, along with state-reported requirements for additional federal funding. The information included in this issue brief was compiled through a direct survey of state homeland security directors conducted by the NGA Center for Best Practices.
    The survey, conducted during late spring and early summer of 2005, identified several common intelligence fusion center operating elements. For example:

    • Most centers include staff from multiple agencies at the state, local, and federal levels;

    • The centers maintain clear and direct communication channels to field officers and policy makers; and,

    • Centers are designed to be multi-purpose, focusing not only on terrorism prevention but also on fighting crime in general.

    At the same time, several variations in the structure of intelligence fusion structures also were identified. For example:

    • Some centers only have analytical roles while others also have the personnel and capabilities to act on intelligence;

    • Some centers have a regional outlook, sharing information among states; others have a vertical structure, connecting states to local and federal agencies, but not to other states; and

    • Some centers are contained within the federally led joint terrorism task forces; others are independent.

    Introduction
    Four years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, state homeland security efforts are shifting from improving response capabilities to preventing terrorist attacks. One critical component identified by state officials in the prevention of attacks is the need to close gaps in the intelligence community through the development and implementation of state intelligence fusion centers (IFC). The IFCs encourage collaboration among local, state and federal officials and across myriad disciplines while integrating homeland security and counterterrorism efforts at all levels of government. A previous issue brief published by the NGA Center for Best Practices (Center), titled “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion
    Centers,” outlined key issues challenging states as they form intelligence fusion centers. Those challenges include legal limits and cultural barriers to information sharing; the need for start-up and long-term operational funding; and privacy concerns.
    To assess activities at the state level, the Center surveyed the state homeland security directors on the status of their intelligence fusion centers, how those centers are structured, and what assistance the federal government should provide to the states to further develop and integrate state centers into a national “system of systems.” This issue brief provides a state-by-state overview of the status and structure of state intelligence fusion centers, along with reported requirements for additional federal resources.

    Fusion Center Status by State

    Arizona
    Arizona’s ACTIC is a cross-jurisdictional partnership managed by the Arizona Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, integrating state, local, and federal law enforcement, as well as first responders, emergency management and–when appropriate–the private sector. A 24/7 Watch Center is the central location for all information coming into and out of the ACTIC.
    The mission of the ACTIC is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies. Mission execution will be guided by the understanding that the key to effectiveness is the development and sharing of information between participants to the fullest extent as is permitted by law or agency policy.

    Driving Forces: Governor Janet Napolitano’s Arizona Homeland Security Plan
    Build Out Funds: State Homeland Security Grant–$3.5 million
    2004 LETPP–$1.8 million
    State Appropriated Funds–$150,000
    Federal Agency Funds–$500,000
    Duration to Build: 1 Year
    Facility Opened: October 1, 2004–Governor dedicated October 19, 2004
    Location: North Phoenix with easy multiple freeway access
    Facility Description: 61,000 square foot block building, three 800kw backup generators and a block fenced parking with security gates & armed guard
    Occupancy Capacity: 282 workstations
    Federal/State/Local Suite 100–157 workstations
    FBI/JTTF/FIG Suite 150–125 workstations

    Participating Agencies:
    FBI, ATF, US Postal Inspector, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Marshal’s Service, ICE, AZDPS, Arizona National Guard, Arizona Capitol PD, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Air Marshal Service, Rocky Mountain Information Network, AZDOC, AZMVD, Phoenix PD, Mesa PD, Glendale PD, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
    U.S. Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Scottsdale PD and Tempe PD.

    Additional Arizona DPS Occupants:
    Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Squad
    HazMat/EOD/WMD Unit
    Computer Forensics Lab
    Criminal Investigations Research Unit–CIRU
    Geographical Information Systems–GIS
    Violent Criminal Apprehension Program–ViCAP
    The ACTIC is a component of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Domestic Preparedness Command. It provides a real-time informational link between state, local, and federal law enforcement and first responder agencies. It functions as a multi-agency, all-crimes effort staffed by members of the Department of Public Safety, other state, local, and federal Agencies. The Center is co-located with the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, which will centralize the counter terrorism effort and greatly enhance interagency cooperation and information flow. The ACTIC is responsible for:

    o providing tactical and strategic intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination support to state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies;

    o maintaining and disseminating ongoing threat analysis for the state and its critical infrastructure;

    o providing informational support to the Governor and other governmental leaders;

    o maintaining a secure Web site to disseminate intelligence and critical information accessible to all law enforcement and first responder agencies;

    o maintaining the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) secure Web site portal for the dissemination and exchange of information to law enforcement and public and private stakeholder agencies that support homeland security efforts;

    o functioning as the State’s central point of dissemination for Homeland Security Threat Level Conditions and other information generated by the FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office and other state, local, and Federal agencies;

    o maintaining a formalized liaison program with private sector stakeholders responsible for critical infrastructures and terrorist incident response within Arizona;

    o maintaining a formalized liaison with other governmental agencies to support Arizona’s counter-terrorism efforts;

    o providing necessary training on intelligence and the role of the individual field officer and citizen in preventing terrorist attacks;

    o maintaining necessary databases to support on ongoing investigations;

    o incorporating existing database linkages to other law enforcement, government, and private agencies into the overall counter terrorist effort;

    o maintaining an intelligence liaison program that provides direct investigative and analytical support to other agencies;

    o maintaining a 24/7 contact phone number where citizens can report suspicious activity and agencies can request assistance;

    o maintaining a 24/7 research capability to support on going requests from state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies;

    o maintaining a central point of contact for coordinating the response to suspected biological incidents;

    o maintaining a central point of contact for the deployment of DPS and other state agency assets to support local agencies; and

    o maintaining a direct liaison with the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Terrorism Task Force and other state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies on ongoing investigations and items of interest.

    Arkansas
    Arkansas does not have a state intelligence fusion center. Arkansas has discussed the concept and will ultimately establish an intelligence center. Arkansas has not begun any implementing action to date.

    California
    The California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (STTAC) is a partnership of the California Department of Justice, the California Highway Patrol, the California Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and other state and federal agencies. The STTAC currently is organized with a Situation Unit, a Group Analysis Unit, and a Predictive Incident Indicators Analysis Unit. Currently, the STTAC provides statewide analysis products, information tracking, pattern analysis, geographic report linkages, and other statewide intelligence products, as well as regional investigative support throughout California.

    The plan to detect, deter, and prevent terrorism in California is based on public safety partnerships in information sharing, analysis, and investigation support. These partnerships bring together state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies, and their respective law enforcement, public safety, and criminal information systems. To complement the efforts of the federal government through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, California has created four mutually supporting Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers, aligned with the four FBI Field Offices in the state, and a State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center. The State Center is designed to provide California’s senior leaders with situational awareness of identified threats, visibility of and coordination with the critical infrastructure of the state, and constant access to the latest local, state and national intelligence products and assessments.

    At the local level, law enforcement and public safety agencies designate Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) who are trained in the review and assessment of local reporting and in conducting outreach to other public safety agencies, critical infrastructure operators, and community groups. The TLO is the local agency point of contact for all terrorism related alerts, requests for information, warnings and other notifications from state, regional or federal homeland security agencies. The TLO will review local agency reports, manage local reporting, and initiate or respond to requests for information. The TLO will have an ongoing relationship with other local agencies, especially those with daily contact in the community, and will develop relationships with critical infrastructure sites within their respective jurisdictions. Through a single Web-based state terrorism Web site the TLO and his agency will have access to all available terrorisms alerts, notices, information, and documents with searchable databases.

    There are four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs). Their areas of responsibility mirror those of the four FBI field offices in California, minimizing reporting conflicts, providing statewide coverage, and facilitating coordination with the FBI. The RTTACs will either be physically co-located with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) or will have close working relationships. The RTTACs and JTTFs will have mutual information exchanges, will share a common communications system, and have state and local investigative resources that can be available to the JTTFs. The RTTACs will develop a regional threat assessment intelligence picture, will have analytical functions, and will connect directly to each other and share information and produce intelligence reports and other products.

    They will use both raw data and analysis products from local agencies and will have ongoing collaboration the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center.
    The STTAC also has extensive Geographic Information System (GIS) data on the state’s critical infrastructure and potential vulnerabilities linked to incident reporting by local agencies and the RTTACs to provide a Predictive Indicators Database for our critical infrastructure sites and provide assessments on industry vulnerabilities.

    The STTAC monitors current law enforcement operations, conducts known terrorist group analysis, and monitors and supports national reporting and collection systems. The STTAC will provide 24/7 situational awareness for OHS and the state leadership, and has direct linkage to the National Counter Terrorism Center and their National Watch List through the Homeland Security Operations Center.

    The STTAC shortly will open a single Web-based terrorism-information portal for law enforcement and public safety agencies statewide. Through this site, every eligible TLO and senior public safety official can gain direct access to the entire range of law enforcement sensitive Homeland Security alerts, reports, analysis, and daily reporting. Further, this single site will provide a common point of entry for field reports, tips, alerts, and requests for information.

    The pool of information developed by California’s state, local, and regional agencies will be available to ongoing state and federal investigations and for analysis by both FBI and Homeland Security analysts to support their ongoing national and international investigations and assessments. The California system fully complements and serves the needs of both the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, providing access to information from the local police officer to national analyst and investigator, sharing access to information, and sharing relevant products to ensure better safety for our state and nation.

    Connecticut
    Connecticut is in the process of working with the Municipal Police Chiefs, the State Police, State Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, and the local office of the FBI to explore the possibility of a Fusion/Intelligence center.

    Delaware
    Delaware is in the process of developing a Fusion Center. Delaware currently has plans for a site being developed and is working on personnel and infrastructure programs to support the planning process. Expectations are that the IFC will be operational, on a limited basis, within six months.

    Georgia
    Georgia has a state-level agency dedicated solely to homeland security, anti-terrorism, and counter-terrorism operations (GISAC). GISAC’s mission is to enhance and facilitate the collection of intelligence information from local, state, and federal sources, and to integrate that intelligence information into a system that will benefit homeland security and counter-terrorism programs.
    The Georgia General Assembly legislated the GISAC mission through the Antiterrorism Act (OCGA 35-3-60), to “assist law enforcement personnel to identify, investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals or groups of individuals who illegally threaten, harass, terrorize, or otherwise injure or damage the person or
    ©NGA Center for Best Practices, 444 North Capitol St reet, Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001 5

    property of persons on the basis of their race, national origin, or religious persuasion,” and to establish “a special Antiterrorism Task Force within the Georgia Bureau of Investigation;” Antiterroristic Training Act (OCGA 16-11-150), makes it unlawful for a person to:
    “1) teach, train, or demonstrate to any other person the use, application, or making of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death to persons either directly, or through a writing, or over or through the computer, or compute network, if the person teaching, training, or demonstrating will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection; or
    2) assemble with one or more persons for the purpose of being taught, trained, or instructed in the use of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death of persons, if such person so assembling knows, has reason to know, or intends that such teaching, training, or instruction will be unlawfully employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection;” and Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Investigative Division Directive 8-8-18.

    This series of legislation gives GISAC the primary responsibility for developing and evaluating information about persons and/or organizations engaged in terrorist activities, investigating terrorist activities, and making liaisons with GBI work-units and other law enforcement agencies engaged in antiterrorism and counter-terrorism operations and investigations.

    State agencies and organizations that directly participate in GISAC are: Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GOHS); Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF); Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI); Georgia State Police (GSP); Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA); Georgia Department of Defense/Georgia National Guard (GANG); Georgia Sheriff’s Association (GSA); and Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP)

    GISAC not only incorporates state and local assets but federal agencies participate in GISAC as Homeland Security Partners. These agencies are: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Atlanta office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Atlanta Joint Terrorism Task Force.

    Staffing for GISAC is a multi-agency approach. GISAC has 18 persons employed on day-to-day operations. The staff breakdown is: Georgia Bureau of Investigation provides: (1) Inspectors, (1) Special Agents in Charge, (1) Assistant Special Agents in Charge, (2) Intelligence Analysts, and (7) Special Agents. Georgia State Patrol provides (1) Investigator/Analyst. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency provides (2) Critical Infrastructure Analysts. Georgia National Guard provides (1) Intelligence Analyst. Georgia Sheriff’s Association provides (1) Investigator/Agent. Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police provides (1) Investigator/Agent.

    GISAC duties and responsibilities are categorized by the following: 1) collection, analysis, and sharing of terrorism intelligence information; 2) terrorist threat assessment and monitoring; 3) terrorist incident response; and 4) development and implementation of special project, strategies, and initiatives.

    The primary function of GISAC is to collect, integrate, investigate, evaluate, and share information pertaining to possible terrorist activities in Georgia. As information is received at GISAC, it is initially documented by GISAC investigators and analysts, and then immediately evaluated by GBI supervisors, who filter, classify, disseminate, and when appropriate, conduct follow-up investigation and analysis.

    After review, the “raw” information is forwarded to GISAC’s GEMA, GANG, GSA, and GACP representatives, who review it within the context of their own particular areas of interest and responsibility. Those representatives subsequently may recommend certain actions to GISAC supervisors and/or their own agency/organization managers in order to disrupt or prevent possible terrorist attacks, or to mitigate and manage the consequences of an attack.

    ©NGA Center for Best Practices, 444 North Capitol St reet, Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001 6

    Hawai’i
    Hawai’i does not have a fully operational fusion center but needs to establish an IFC. This work is currently performed by the FBI/JTTF in Honolulu. The goal is to establish a 24/7 capability in the State EOC that will contribute to intelligence fusion. This capability also will provide early warning for natural hazards. Hawai’i has submitted a funding request to the state legislature to authorize eight new positions for the State Civil Defense Division. These positions coupled with a reorganization and subsequent assignment of other staff positions will provide the core 24/7 capability of Hawaii’s IFC.

    Illinois
    The Illinois State Police Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (STIC), consists of several units specializing in narcotics, violent crimes, sex offender registration, motor vehicle heft clearinghouse, and Terrorism Research. STIC became operational 24/7 on April 7, 2003, with the primary focus on terrorism. On September 1, 2004, STIC became a fusion center shifting the focus from strictly responding to terrorism-related requests, to providing assistance for all investigations.
    Currently, STIC is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week with 12 (18 are needed) Terrorism Research Analysts (TRSs) and four Watch Officers. The Terrorism Research Analysts are contractual employees, while the Watch Officers are sworn full-time Illinois State Police Officers. In addition, there is one full-time civilian employee (Terrorism Coordinator) who coordinates activity for all three shifts. The Command staff is comprised of one Lieutenant and two Master Sergeants.

    The remaining units falling under STIC work a normal day shift and are staffed with primarily full-time Illinois State Police civilian employees. Below is a breakdown of those employees by function.

    o Narcotics: one Narcotics Coordinator, three Intelligence Analysts (National Guard)

    o Violent Crimes: one Violent Crimes Coordinator, three Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)

    o Motor Vehicle Theft : one Motor Vehicle Theft Coordinator, two Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)

    o Sex Offender Registration: one Sex Offender Registration Coordinator, two Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)

    o Support staff

    The coordinators from each unit and representatives from the Command staff comprise a special group referred to as the TIG, Threat Integration Group. The TIG meets daily to review, analyze, and give direction concerning the activity reported during the previous 24 hours. The TIG is an essential tool for providing meaningful information to field officers and decision makers. Senior members of TIG may be called to meet at anytime should an incident or circumstances dictate.

    Indiana
    Indiana is in the process of starting an intelligence fusion center. The focus will be an all crimes 24/7 operation. Indiana is trying to get this started through a task force concept involving the Indiana State Police, Indianapolis Police Department, and the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. The Indiana State Council on Counter Terrorism has made the intelligence center a high priority in state government.

    Indiana’s Governor has introduced legislation to implement a new state agency, the state Homeland Security Department. Once the new agency has been established, the effort to start the intelligence center will pick up momentum.

    Indiana has been given $850,000 of 2004 DHS grant money that had been earmarked for this project. Indiana is in the process of securing additional grant funding through the 2005 DHS grant for homeland security. The goal is to have an operational IFC by the end of 2005.

    Iowa
    The State of Iowa is developing an intelligence fusion center using the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) as the  backbone.  Eight personnel in the Iowa Department of Public Safety have been reassigned to these intelligence duties, and their efforts are being leveraged with existing personnel of the DPS Intelligence Bureau. Additional employees, especially analysts, are still needed. Iowa also is in the process of identifying a physical location and purchasing equipment to support the personnel.

    Louisiana
    Louisiana is in the implementation stage of their fusion center. Sixty percent is complete.

    Maryland
    The Maryland ATAC Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) was established for the analysis and dissemination of information in statewide support of law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety, and homeland security.

    The primary function of the MCAC is to provide analytical support for all state, local, and federal agencies involved in law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety, and homeland security in Maryland. It is meant to provide strategic analysis to focus investigative activities being conducted by law enforcement agencies within the state and to enable public health and safety agencies to perform their protective functions. By design, the Center is not an investigative body, but is meant to address a serious analytical deficiency in the state. In addition, the Center, through its Watch Section, enables public and private entities within Maryland to receive and disseminate critical information to other similar entities established by other states, as well as with any national centers created by the federal government, such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), and CT Watch.

    The Executive Committee of the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) of Maryland has selected from the ATAC membership a director and two assistant directors of the MCAC. A captain of the Baltimore County Police Department is the Center’s director. A lieutenant of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police is an assistant director and supervises the Watch Section. A supervisory special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an assistant director and supervises the Strategic Analysis Section. The IT Support Section is supervised by an employee hired by the ATAC Executive Committee and reports to the MCAC Director. While the ATAC Executive Committee is the policy making body, relying heavily upon input from the general membership of the ATAC, the day-to-day operation of the MCAC is the responsibility of the assigned director and assistant directors. The MCAC management reports, and is responsible, to the ATAC Coordinator.

    The Center is not intended to supplant the numerous investigative bodies now in force within Maryland, such as ICE’s Technology Transfer Task Force, the various HIDTA investigative groups, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), etc., but to act in support of these bodies, enabling them to be more effective and focused in their important tasks.

    Center staff consists of assigned personnel from state, local, and/or federal agencies with homeland security, public safety, public health, and/or law enforcement responsibilities. It is intended that the Center be as inclusive as possible in order to promote efficiency in its critical functions and to achieve the desired synergistic effect.

    Michigan
    Michigan has discussed the feasibility of opening a Fusion Center. Plans have not proceeded beyond the discussion phase.

    Minnesota
    Minnesota is forming an intelligence center in conjunction with state, local, and federal partners. This center will be co-located in one facility. Currently, Indiana has deployed a Web site to facilitate collection of information and dissemination of intelligence over a three-state area. This Web site is utilized by Minnesota law enforcement and other public and private partners.

    Mississippi
    Mississippi does not have a fully operational Intel Fusion Center. Mississippi is in the process of developing a plan for such a center. Talks have been conducted with the National Guard, FBI, Highway Patrol, Public Health, and Mississippi Emergency Management, etc. All are in agreement, and Mississippi is planning to co-locate the center with the new Emergency Operations Center in Jackson.

    Missouri
    Missouri does not have an Intelligence Fusion Center. The Missouri State Highway Patrol does man an Intelligence Center but it only deals with state-centered activity and doesn’t bring all of the local and federal agencies together to combine the analysis and interpretation of the information that they could share. The state does participate in two ATACs (St. Louis and Kansas City). Further development of a Fusion Center will depend on the direction officials receive from the new administration.

    Montana
    The Montana All Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) has been in operation since the fall of 2004. MATIC is co-located with the Montana JTTF. The Center has one supervisory agent (State) and six analysts. The Center acts as a collection/dissemination point for information between state, local, and federal agencies. The MATIC is currently limited in adding more participating members because of space limitations.

    Nebraska
    Nebraska does not have a Fusion Center but has had discussions with the Nebraska State Patrol and the National Guard. Nebraska has not gone beyond the discussion point.

    North Dakota
    The North Dakota Homeland Security Fusion Center consists of four personnel from the following agencies; the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI), the Highway Patrol (HP), the National Guard (NG), and the Division of Emergency Management (DEM). The Bureau of Criminal Investigation is the lead agency. The IFC has three primary functions; intelligence, investigation, and operations.

    The IFC provides one central location for the investigation, intelligence collection, and dissemination of North Dakota homeland security information. The IFC analyzes relevant information to determine any homeland security threats, vulnerabilities, or concerns. The IFC is operational and provides intelligence information to our state. local, federal, and private partners. North Dakota is in the process of redefining policies and operational procedures.

    Ohio
    Ohio’s center, the Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC), has been in limited operation since January 25, 2005. The SAIC is a branch of the Ohio Homeland Security Division, under the Ohio Department of Public Safety. Ohio’s SAIC is operating currently with a core group of agencies: the Ohio State Highway Patrol, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the Ohio National Guard, the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, and Ohio Homeland Security personnel. As the SAIC builds in the next several months, it will add agencies such as local and county law enforcement, Ohio Departments of Health, Agriculture, Environmental Protection, Rehabilitation and Corrections, Transportation, and Justice Services.

    South Carolina
    South Carolina is in the process of creating Intel Fusion Center.

    South Dakota
    South Dakota does not have an Intelligence Fusion Center. South Dakota has discussed the possibility of implementing an Intelligence Fusion Center but has not yet taken any action. South Dakota is working with Minnesota to view the intelligence gathered by their Center. Minnesota’s intelligence is regional in nature and has given South Dakota insight into what is happening in this area of the United States.

    Vermont
    Vermont does not have an active Fusion Center but will be starting one. Currently, Vermont has a traditional criminal intelligence unit within the State Police. Vermont recognizes the importance of a Fusion Center for several years and it has been a long term goal. Vermont is in negotiations with a federal partner to establish a Fusion Center. The center model would be the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center. Upon approval, Vermont will move their intelligence unit to this center. The Vermont State Police Criminal Intelligence Unit would be the nucleus of the Fusion Center and other intelligence partners will be invited to join. Each unit that joins would maintain their current responsibilities to their respective agencies but would be part of a larger information sharing team.

    Washington
    Washington State has an operational fusion center (intel center) termed the Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC). This statewide integrated intelligence center is co-located with the FBI analytical center and includes state and local law enforcement. It will expand to regional centers in the near future. Additional partners from other than law enforcement are under consideration. This is an outstanding example of law enforcement in the state collaborating on a fusion center as state and local shares of federal grant funds are being jointly managed to stand up and operate the center.
    Washington State will be adding contract analysts to the Washington Joint Analytical Center soon, which will expand the capabilities of the center. The state’s original plan was to use commissioned law enforcement personnel; however, current ODP grants do not allow for the hiring of commissioned law enforcement personnel and restrict analyst hiring to contractors only.

    **

    What type of resources do the states need from the federal government to complete development or improve their centers (e.g. funding, access to certain information, expertise, training, etc.)?

    Arizona

    o Some method of sustainment funding that would ensure the continued operation of the state center. Realizing that the states must be a partner this could be a shared responsibility with funding coming from the federal system with the states providing either direct funding or more importantly in-kind funding in the form of personnel costs.

    o Allowing the states to hire full time analyst FTE’s. This is a critical component of any center. While the 2005 SHSG allows the hiring of contract analysts, it would be much more efficient if the analyst were hired as members of the respective agency. This would enhance recruitment efforts. The program could follow the COPS model, with funding stopping after a designated period of time and then the states would pick up the costs.

    o Removing some of the restrictions on the use of SHSG funds to allow the state to apply the funds where the intelligence center can best use them. This would include costs of phone and utility service. Specific overtime and travel for personnel assigned to the center.

    o A commitment from the federal government to provide staffing to support the state centers. This support could come in the way of analytical and technical services.

    o A larger commitment by the federal government and the SHSG program to the prevention effort. Prevention is the key to counter-terrorist operations and there needs to be more emphasis in this area. Expand the amount of funding available under the LETPP and keep this program separate from the general SHSG program in order to concentrate this effort on law enforcement.

    Arkansas

    o Training for analysts.

    o Sharing of expertise from other states.

    California

    o The accelerated fielding of the JRIES-SECRET system to allow for information sharing at the classified level between our RTTACS and their counterpart JTTFs.

    o Giving policy discretion for personnel costs associated with intelligence analysts and fusion center staffing.

    o Standardizing training that mirrors or includes both specific analyst skills and management of analytical process and products, and integration of state and local intelligence personnel into the FBI training courses to ensure compatibility of training and operations.

    o Conduct a national forum for best practices, lessons learned, key skill development and networking.

    Connecticut

    o Funding for training in the area of analyzing the information.

    o Securing the proper equipment.

    Delaware

    o Increasing funding to start up an IFC.

    o Assistance in purchasing necessary equipment (computers, teleconferencing capabilities, etc.).
    o Funding to support civilian analyst.

    o Training opportunities for these analyst and supervisors.

    o Connectivity to certain databases and information available to the law enforcement community currently housed with many of the federal agencies.

    Hawai’i

    o Funding for additional staffing (not through contract).

    o Equipment (i.e., computers and communications equipment).

    o Additional allocations for security clearances.

    Illinois

    o The largest challenge facing the STIC today remains continued funding to pay salaries and benefits to the contractual employees, approximately $950,000.00 annually. Not only is ISP concerned about the funding, but also by the limitations imposed upon the funding. Current rules governing federal funds will not allow paying for full-time employees, and labor issues within the state are forcing to the reduction of or elimination of contractual employees from the work force. In addition, it is difficult to train and keep contractual help since they are not being provided full-time benefits such as health care, life insurance, holidays, vacations, and retirement.

    o Analysts need the same training provided by the FBI, expertise in developing threat assessments, sharing of information at all levels and streamlining the flow of the information.

    Indiana

    o Funding from the federal government will continue to be a priority need. This includes start up funding and a commitment to long range funding.

    o Some defined best practices models would be helpful. Some centers are only terrorism focused, some are all crime. Some centers are closely aligned with the FBI JTTF’s and some are not. Some have been closely aligned with the FBI JTTF’s and are now changing that format.

    o Access to FBI (all federal agencies) intelligence information is in need of improvement.

    o There is still a lot of room for improvement in the relationship between local agencies and the FBI.

    o Various training opportunities exist, but literature points out that some or most may be in need of improvement to ensure it provides analysts with the necessary skill sets.

    Iowa

    o Funding for personnel that are assigned specifically to intelligence and information sharing activities is the most critical need. The character of U.S. law enforcement agencies is such that existing personnel typically are dedicated to response activities. Funding for intelligence and information sharing personnel could be implemented in a manner similar to the approach used for the COPS funding for hiring law enforcement personnel (where the funding for personnel is borne eventually by the agency).

    o Improved coordination among federal agencies, and between federal and state and local agencies. Leveraging and coordination of existing resources will help states and localities. This coordination can be done by increasing communication and interaction among such entities as the Homeland Security Advisory Committee, the U.S. DOJ Intelligence Coordinating Council and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council.

    o Support for standards for configuring and operating fusion centers. These standards already are being developed by jurisdictions that are configuring and operating fusion centers. As these centers are  stood up,  they will necessarily need to interact with one another. Standards will facilitate this interaction and connectivity. The federal government should support these standards.

    Louisiana

    o Technical advisors–advice from subject matter experts who can assist in informing the states of proven methods or even failures that have occurred in standing up fusion centers in other places.

    o Information–specifically, allowing the states to have a constant input of  timely  risk assessment information. Additionally, with the reorganization of responsibilities as well as the formation of new information centers, states may be unaware of regional operations that have value added fit, such as intelligence information products that may be beneficial to multiple states and the communities they serve.

    o Training– in the area of intelligence analysis (especially that which takes us past basic techniques) into areas of collection planning, bias identification, critical thinking, etc. does not meet a set standard. State analysts may not be working with the same common operating picture that effects the intelligence cycle.

    o Personnel–assistance from sources that could provide assistance in staffing the fusion center in the role of intelligence analysts or information specialists.

    Maryland

    o Funding directed towards fusion centers.

    o Allowable costs should be reviewed by a task group of states to make recommendations based on the reality of these centers.

    Michigan

    o Commitment from federal and local agencies to co-locate personnel with our intelligence section (and their funding commitments).

    o Operating from a facility that would house all personnel together

    Minnesota

    o Active communication with other state and locals on what is being developed and/or coordinating of how centers can be developed nationwide with national initiatives.

    o Federal funding for developing coordinated regional approaches.

    Mississippi

    o Funding–Mississippi planned to hire an intelligence director; however, federal ’05 funding was cut by about $10 million, and the state cut the Department of Public Safety budget by about $5 million.

    Missouri

    o Technical Assistance to help the state move the process forward.

    o Clarification of ODP’s position on the Intelligence Analyst positions.

    o Training.

    Montana

    o Funding to secure a location that will accommodate operations and allow for future growth.

    Nebraska

    o Funding to begin, maintain, and sustain an IFC.

    North Dakota

    o Funding for personnel, training and equipment.

    o DHS sponsored training for INTEL analysts.

    o An INTEL flowchart and/or guidance that describes how State Fusion Centers are incorporated into the Homeland Security INTEL community.

    o Training in critical infrastructure assessments.

    o Training in response to an incident.

    Ohio

    o Funding to purchase analytical software and an operating system.

    o Training in 28 CFR Part 23 and analytical training.

    o GIS capabilities must be updated and expanded.

    o “Fusion center” minimum standards.

    South Carolina

    o Access to certain information.

    o Analyst training.

    o Funding for more analysts.

    o Guidance from DHS in how they want us to develop the IFC.

    South Dakota

    o Access to as much intelligence as possible.

    o Promote the sharing of intelligence between states. Promoting the sharing of intelligence should be supported from the top down to the local officials on the street. This sharing of intelligence/information with officials who have the responsibility for the protection of people and critical resources is vitally important. The more access the states have to intelligence, the better we will see trends in terrorism.

    o Review of the classification process. One thing that inhibits the sharing of intelligence is when it gets classified. Agencies that have the authority to classify intelligence should analyze their intelligence carefully to make sure it warrants being classified.

    Vermont

    o Federal recognition that state IFCs are the single point of contact for information sharing with the states. This recognition will further help identify the State’s role in protecting the country from another attack.

    o Funding.

    Washington

    o The authority for use of ODP grant funds for contract analysts has provided some relief. Contract analysts, however, must be hired under  contract,  and there is significant command/control, assignment of duties, and IRS issues associated with contractors vs. FTEs. The best course of action is to have the ability to use federal grant funds for law enforcement personnel participation.

    ©NGA Center for Best Practices, 444 North Capitol St reet, Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001 15

    http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0509FUSION.PDF

    Georgia
    Georgia has a state-level agency dedicated solely to homeland security, anti-terrorism, and counter-terrorism operations (GISAC). GISAC’s mission is to enhance and facilitate the collection of intelligence information from local, state, and federal sources, and to integrate that intelligence information into a system that will benefit homeland security and counter-terrorism programs.
    The Georgia General Assembly legislated the GISAC mission through the Antiterrorism Act (OCGA 35-3-60), to “assist law enforcement personnel to identify, investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals or groups of individuals who illegally threaten, harass, terrorize, or otherwise injure or damage the person or
    ©NGA Center for Best Practices, 444 North Capitol St reet, Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001 5

    property of persons on the basis of their race, national origin, or religious persuasion,” and to establish “a special Antiterrorism Task Force within the Georgia Bureau of Investigation;” Antiterroristic Training Act (OCGA 16-11-150), makes it unlawful for a person to:
    “1) teach, train, or demonstrate to any other person the use, application, or making of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death to persons either directly, or through a writing, or over or through the computer, or compute network, if the person teaching, training, or demonstrating will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection; or
    2) assemble with one or more persons for the purpose of being taught, trained, or instructed in the use of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death of persons, if such person so assembling knows, has reason to know, or intends that such teaching, training, or instruction will be unlawfully employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection;” and Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Investigative Division Directive 8-8-18.

    This series of legislation gives GISAC the primary responsibility for developing and evaluating information about persons and/or organizations engaged in terrorist activities, investigating terrorist activities, and making liaisons with GBI work-units and other law enforcement agencies engaged in antiterrorism and counter-terrorism operations and investigations.

    State agencies and organizations that directly participate in GISAC are: Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GOHS); Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF); Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI); Georgia State Police (GSP); Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA); Georgia Department of Defense/Georgia National Guard (GANG); Georgia Sheriff’s Association (GSA); and Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP)

    GISAC not only incorporates state and local assets but federal agencies participate in GISAC as Homeland Security Partners. These agencies are: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Atlanta office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Atlanta Joint Terrorism Task Force.

    Staffing for GISAC is a multi-agency approach. GISAC has 18 persons employed on day-to-day operations. The staff breakdown is: Georgia Bureau of Investigation provides: (1) Inspectors, (1) Special Agents in Charge, (1) Assistant Special Agents in Charge, (2) Intelligence Analysts, and (7) Special Agents. Georgia State Patrol provides (1) Investigator/Analyst. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency provides (2) Critical Infrastructure Analysts. Georgia National Guard provides (1) Intelligence Analyst. Georgia Sheriff’s Association provides (1) Investigator/Agent. Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police provides (1) Investigator/Agent.

    GISAC duties and responsibilities are categorized by the following: 1) collection, analysis, and sharing of terrorism intelligence information; 2) terrorist threat assessment and monitoring; 3) terrorist incident response; and 4) development and implementation of special project, strategies, and initiatives.

    The primary function of GISAC is to collect, integrate, investigate, evaluate, and share information pertaining to possible terrorist activities in Georgia. As information is received at GISAC, it is initially documented by GISAC investigators and analysts, and then immediately evaluated by GBI supervisors, who filter, classify, disseminate, and when appropriate, conduct follow-up investigation and analysis.

    After review, the “raw” information is forwarded to GISAC’s GEMA, GANG, GSA, and GACP representatives, who review it within the context of their own particular areas of interest and responsibility. Those representatives subsequently may recommend certain actions to GISAC supervisors and/or their own agency/organization managers in order to disrupt or prevent possible terrorist attacks, or to mitigate and manage the consequences of an attack.

    ©NGA Center for Best Practices, 444 North Capitol St reet, Suite 267, Washington, D.C. 20001 6

    http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0509FUSION.PDF

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    Gwinnett County, Georgia Chooses Solution for Integrated Justice Data Sharing

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    Jun 26, 2008, News Report

    Found in: Public Safety / Justice / Homeland Security

    Gwinnett County, Georgia, located 30 miles northeast of Atlanta, is implementing Agile Technologies’ Judicial Inquiry System (JIS), Judicial Data Exchange (JDX) and Criminal Investigation (CI) suite of products. With a population of approximately 780,000, and a projected population of 1.2 million in 2010, Gwinnett County will use Agile Technologies to integrate the Metatomix technology with its current Criminal Justice Information System Community of Interest (CJIS COI) infrastructure to maximize justice data sharing. The integration will simplify current processes, facilitate data movement and govern data access. As a result, the county expects to systematically improve the operational efficiency of the existing criminal justice systems by streamlining information and data entry. The implementation will be executed by Agile Technologies.

    After an extensive search, we concluded that the team of Agile Technologies and Metatomix offered the most proven experience in the justice industry as well as the range of technology solutions that best suited our needs,  said Superior Court Judge Melodie Conner.  Agile Technologies and Metatomix’s demonstrated commitment to and success with similar CJIS projects at the county and state level, as well as the implementation team’s local presence, were both important factors in our decision. We look forward to this implementation because we are confident it will enable more effective, more efficient judicial processes in our county.

    http://www.govtech.com/gt/374309?topic=117680

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    http://www.govtech.com/gt/374309?topic=117680

    ***
    CJIS COI Chairperson

    Services>CJIS>CJIS COI Chairperson     Print

    Alarm Registrations
    Animal Shelter
    Bids & Proposals
    Birth Certificate
    Building Permits
    Business License
    CJIS
    About CJISNET4
    Vision Statement
    Mission Statement
    Governance
    Goals & Objectives
    COI Roles & Responsibilities
    Current Projects
    CJIS Strategic Plan
    CJIS COI Chairperson
    Cable Companies
    Citizen Self Service
    Death Certificate
    Disability Parking Permits
    Driver’s License
    Firearm Permit
    GIS Data Browser
    Gwinnett County Public Library
    Gwinnett County Transit
    Gwinnett LIFE Publication
    Health & Human Services
    Homeowners Associations
    HUD Grants 2010
    Marriage License
    Motor Vehicle – Auto Tag
    Municipal Codes
    Neighborhood Watch
    Notary Public
    Occupation Tax Certificate
    Park Guide
    Passports
    Police Reports
    Property Taxes
    Purchasing
    Senior Services
    Surplus Sales
    Transportation Service Request
    Trash Pickup – Waste Disposal

    Gwinnett County Criminal Justice Information System Community of Interest Chairperson

    Judge George Hutchinson III has been elected as the CJIS COI Chairperson for the 2008-2009 year. He will replace Judge Melodie Conner who has served as the CJIS COI Chairperson since 2003. Judge Hutchinson was appointed in January 2008 by the Superior Court Judges to serve as the Chief Magistrate Judge for Gwinnett County after serving four years as a full-time Magistrate Judge.

    He is responsible for supervising the 26 full-and part time Magistrate Judges who not only handle cases filed in their courts, but also preside on behalf of judges in other County courts. Prior to his tenure in Magistrate Court, he was an assistant district attorney for 15 years, first in the Coweta Judicial Circuit and then in Gwinnett County. In 1995, he became the attorney in charge of the White Collar Crime Unit in the Gwinnett County District Attorney’s office.
    Judge George Hutchinson III,
    Chief Magistrate

    Judge Hutchinson is currently a member of the Executive Committee of the Magistrate Council of Georgia representing Region Nine and was a member of the 2006 – 2007 Leadership Gwinnett class. He has served on the CJIS COI since early 2008 and has participated in several of the CJIS workshops over the past five years. Judge Hutchinson’s years of experience as a prosecutor and as a judge will provide valuable insight to the CJIS project.

    Judge Conner has been a Superior Court Judge in Gwinnett County since July 1998. She graduated from UGA Law School in 1986.

    The CJIS project began in Gwinnett County in 2003. Judge Conner was elected as the first CJIS COI Chairperson and continued to serve until 2008. Judge Conner’s knowledge of the judicial system was invaluable in helping to establish the CJIS project here in Gwinnett County. The COI greatly appreciates her dedicated service to the project and continued service on the COI.

    http://www.gwinnettcounty.com/cgi-bin/gwincty/egov/ep/gcbrowse.do?channelId=-53280&pageTypeId=536880235

    ***
    Software and Technology Services
    Metatomix, Inc.
    SnapshotPeople
    Company Overview

    Metatomix, Inc. provides semantic middleware solutions to justice and public safety, financial services, life sciences, and manufacturing organizations. It offers Judicial Inquiry System, which provides real-time criminal and civil history inquiry functionality to local, state, and national systems; and Judicial First Appearance that provides information to law enforcement booking agents. The company also provides Criminal Investigation, which combines real-time property, vehicle, warrant, and incident reports with criminal and civil history inquiry; Judicial Data Exchange, which provides real-time information exchange between law enforcement, courts, and attorneys; and Judicial Arraignment …

    Metatomix, Inc. provides semantic middleware solutions to justice and public safety, financial services, life sciences, and manufacturing organizations. It offers Judicial Inquiry System, which provides real-time criminal and civil history inquiry functionality to local, state, and national systems; and Judicial First Appearance that provides information to law enforcement booking agents. The company also provides Criminal Investigation, which combines real-time property, vehicle, warrant, and incident reports with criminal and civil history inquiry; Judicial Data Exchange, which provides real-time information exchange between law enforcement, courts, and attorneys; and Judicial Arraignment Calendar that provides information to law enforcement booking agents regarding the criminal and civil history of sexual offenders/predators. In addition, it offers Cross-Sell 360°, which provides a contextual view of the customer in real-time by leveraging integrated, insightful, and actionable information; Catastrophic Modeling 360° that gathers risk data, transforms the data into the modeling input values, validates data quality, initiates risk models, and displays the results in a real-time dashboard for the analysts; and Intelli-claim, an ASP claims management system that implements a solution to facilitate the management and resolution of the claims process between financial institutions. Further, the company provides semantic middleware framework for manufactures, which gathers data from multiple airbus modeling and design systems; data integration solutions; and application development solutions, such as m3t4 Studio, an eclipse based development and execution environment for the semantic services applications. Furthermore, it offers pre-built and pre-packaged components for creating and running semantic technology applications. Metatomix, Inc. was formerly known as Centerville Technologies, Inc. The company was founded in 2000 and is based in Dedham, Massachusetts.
    Detailed Description

    Dedham Place
    3 Allied Drive
    Suite 210
    Dedham, MA 02026
    United States
    Founded in 2000
    Phone:
    781-907-6700
    Fax:
    781-907-6701

    http://www.metatomix.com
    Key Executives
    Mr. Jeffrey P. Dickerson
    Chief Executive Officer
    Mr. Tim Cunningham
    Co-Founder
    Mr. Colin Britton
    Co-Founder
    Mr. Patrick Curley
    Senior Vice President of Engineering
    Age: 48
    Mr. Howard Greenblatt
    Chief Technology Officer
    Compensation as of Fiscal Year 2008.
    Key developments for Metatomix, Inc.
    Metatomix Inc. Extends Reach with New Strategic Partners
    02/2/2009

    Metatomix Inc. announced Recognos Financial and DOBBS, RAM & Co. (DRC) have joined its Partner Program. Recognos Financial will base its semantic solutions for customers in the financial services industry on the Metatomix semantic platform. DRC will offer its customers the option to integrate Metatomix’s technology with their existing criminal justice infrastructure to enable far greater, more efficient data sharing. Recognos Financial has extensive real-world experience helping financial services customers solve sophisticated data challenges with innovative technology. Recognos Financial will use Metatomix’s semantic solution to help financial services companies correlate the very large volume of detailed data included in lengthy and numerous prospectuses. With the Metatomix solution, this data will be presented to financial services companies’ customers on-line in a highly interactive, intuitive format. Metatomix’s semantic technology will also correlate and integrate data between both internal and third party sources without requiring changes to existing systems. The end result is a solution that rapidly and intelligently integrates vast internal and external data sources in a format conducive to analysis.
    Dougherty County, Georgia Selects Metatomix for Integrated Justice Data Sharing
    01/26/2009

    Metatomix Inc. announced that the City of Albany and Dougherty County, located southwest of Atlanta, Georgia, is implementing its Justice Data Exchange (JDX), Justice Inquiry System (JIS) and Justice First Appearance (JFA) applications as the foundation of the County’s Criminal Justice Information Sharing project. Dougherty County, with a population of approximately 100,000, will begin integrating phase one of the project immediately and expects all phases to be complete in less than three years. The project will allow nearly 30 local law enforcement agencies and courts to share pertinent information seamlessly by simplifying current processes, facilitating data movement and governing data access. As a result, the county expects to systematically improve the operational efficiency of the existing criminal justice systems by streamlining information and data entry. Metatomix’s JDX enables real-time, bi-directional, cross-agency information sharing without forcing local agencies to lose control of their data. The JIS solution is used by both law enforcement agencies and courts to collect criminal and civil history, and property, vehicle, warrant and incident reports across local, state and national systems from a single interface. Metatomix’s JFA application provides complete and accurate information to law enforcement booking agents regarding the criminal and civil history of suspects both at the time of booking and later during trial.
    State of Ohio Supreme Court Selects Metatomix for Justice System Data Sharing
    10/27/2008

    Metatomix Inc. announced that the State of Ohio Supreme Court (SCO) is implementing the company’s Judicial Inquiry System (JIS) product to share information among 385 court systems with more than 530 court divisions state-wide. Metatomix’s JIS product will enable the SCO, as well as state agencies such as the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI), Bureau of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, to share, integrate and access cross-agency data in real-time. By providing the SCO with real-time access to cross agency information, JIS will not only improve the accuracy of information, but also provide significant time savings. The overall result for the SCO will be a more effective judicial decision-making process.

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    ***
    What is ARJIS?

    The Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS) was created as a joint powers agency (JPA) to share information among justice agencies throughout San Diego and Imperial Counties, California. ARJIS has evolved into a complex criminal justice enterprise network used by 71 local, state, and federal agencies in the two California counties that border Mexico. The secure ARJISnet intranet integrates more than 6,000 workstations throughout the 4,265 square miles of San Diego County. There are more than 11,000 authorized users generating more than 35,000 transactions daily.

    ARJIS is used for tactical analysis, investigations, statistical information, and crime analysis. The ARJIS governance structure promotes data sharing and cooperation at all levels for member agencies, from chiefs to officers to technical staff. ARJIS is now a division of SANDAG (San Diego Association of Governments), which has enhanced opportunities at the federal and state level by providing advocacy services and enhancing funding opportunities.

    ARJIS is responsible for major public safety initiatives, including wireless access to photos, warrants, and other critical data in the field, crime and sex offender mapping, crime analysis tools evaluation, and an enterprise system of applications that help users solve crimes and identify offenders. ARJIS also serves as the region’s information hub for officer notification, information sharing, and the exchange, validation, and real-time uploading of many types of public safety data.

    http://www.arjis.org/WhatisARJIS/tabid/54/Default.aspx

    ***
    http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:WZZdwaTOCcwJ:www.leitsc.org/Files/Acronyms.doc+Criminal+Justice+Information+System+Community+of+Interest+(CJIS+COI)&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

    This is the html version of the file http://www.leitsc.org/Files/Acronyms.doc.
    Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.

    LEITSC Compiled Justice Related Acronyms:

    General, Associations, Federal and Information Sharing Initiatives

    ***
    State and Local Fusion Centers

    Many states and larger cities have created state and local fusion centers to share information and intelligence within their jurisdictions as well as with the federal government. The Department, through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, provides personnel with operational and intelligence skills to the fusion centers. This support is tailored to the unique needs of the locality and serves to:

    * help the classified and unclassified information flow,
    * provide expertise,
    * coordinate with local law enforcement and other agencies, and
    * provide local awareness and access.

    As of February 2009, there were 58 fusion centers around the country. The Department has deployed 31 officers as of December 2008 and plans to have 70 professionals deployed by the end of 2009. The Department has provided more than $254 million from FY 2004-2007 to state and local governments to support the centers.

    The Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), which allows the federal government to move information and intelligence to the states at the Secret level, is deployed at 27 fusion centers. Through HSDN, fusion center staff can access the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a classified portal of the most current terrorism-related information.

    The Department has deployed intelligence officers to state fusion centers in:

    * Arizona
    * California
    * Colorado
    * Connecticut
    * District of Columbia
    * Georgia
    * Florida
    * Illinois
    * Indiana
    * Louisiana
    * Maryland
    * Massachusetts
    * Michigan
    * Minnesota
    * Missouri
    * New Jersey
    * New York
    * North Carolina
    * Ohio
    * Oregon
    * South Carolina
    * Texas
    * Virginia
    * Washington
    * Wisconsin

    The Department has also deployed support to fusion centers in New York City, Los Angeles and the Dallas region.
    This page was last reviewed/modified on March 11, 2009.

    http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm
    ***
    Committees & Working Groups

    Homeland Security Advisory Council. Provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary on matters related to homeland security. The Council comprises leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia.

    Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnership. Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among federal, state, local and tribal governments, and the owners and operators of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.

    The DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. Advises the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the DHS Chief Privacy Officer on programmatic, policy, operational, administrative and technological issues relevant to the Department that affect individual privacy, data integrity and data interoperability and other privacy related issues.

    This page was last reviewed/modified on April 25, 2008.

    http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/committees/

    ***
    Information Sharing & Analysis
    I Want to…

    * Check the threat level
    * Report suspicious activity
    * Protect myself online
    * Read infrastructure news
    * Find out what’s being done to increase local community safety

    The Department of Homeland Security takes the lead in evaluating vulnerabilities and coordinating with other federal, state, local and private entities to ensure the most effective response. Much of this task involves assessing critical infrastructure, the physical and virtual assets, systems, and networks so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety.

    Central to this task is collecting, protecting, evaluating and disseminating information to the American public, to state and local governments and to the private sector.
    Activities & Programs

    * Threat Level
    * Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
    * State and Local Fusion Centers
    * More Activities & Programs »

    Publications

    * Daily Open Source Report
    * National Strategy for Homeland Security
    * Privacy Office Reports and Statements
    * More Publications »

    Laws & Regulations

    * Homeland Security Presidential Directives
    * Handling Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
    * Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CII Act) (PDF, 11 pages – 53 KB)
    * More Laws & Regulations »

    Committees & Working Groups

    * Homeland Security Advisory Council
    * Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnership
    * Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee

    http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/

    ***
    Office of Intelligence and Analysis

    * Homeland Security Intelligence Analytic Priorities
    * DHS Intelligence Enterprise
    * State and Local Fusion Centers
    * Information Sharing
    * National Security Systems

    Mission Statement

    To provide homeland security intelligence and information to the Secretary, other federal officials, and our state, local, tribal, and private sector partners.

    The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is a member of the national Intelligence Community (IC) and ensures that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the Department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector, and in the IC.

    I&A works closely with DHS Component intelligence organizations as well as state, local, tribal and private sector entities to ensure non-traditional streams of information are fused with traditional IC sources to provide a complete assessment of threats to the nation.

    The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in his capacity as the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT), implements his mandate to integrate the Department’s intelligence components and functions—the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE)—by driving a common intelligence mission.

    The DHS IE comprises I&A and the intelligence elements of:

    * U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
    * U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
    * U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
    * U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
    * Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

    I&A is also the Executive Agent for the DHS State and Local Fusion Center Program.  The Under Secretary leads several additional activities for the Department, such as information sharing, stewardship of National Security Systems, and management of classified information systems security.
    Homeland Security Intelligence Analytic Priorities

    I&A seeks to optimize the capability of DHS to collect and analyze intelligence and information and produce finished analyses tailored to the needs of our key customers. I&A provides the country’s leaders at all levels of government with a timely, actionable, and complete understanding of homeland security threats to facilitate informed decision-making, policies, and appropriate operational responses.

    We are guided by the IC’s key principles: a commitment to change the intelligence culture from “need to know” to “responsibility to provide”; a strong, common direction for our enterprise; enhancement of our core capabilities of requirements, analysis, and dissemination; a renewed sense of purpose and accountability for our efforts; and an aggressive commitment to attracting and retaining a diverse, innovative, and world-class workforce. As important, we pursue our mission with respect for the Constitution and for the civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of the American people.

    I&A has five analytic thrusts, aligned with the principal threats to the Homeland addressed by DHS. The first is threats related to border security. We look at all borders – air, land, sea, and virtual – and analyze a range of interlocking threats to include narcotics trafficking, alien and human smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit transnational threats. We also monitor foreign government initiatives that affect border security.

    The second is the threat of radicalization and extremism. Our top priority is radicalized Islam (Sunni and Shia groups), but we also look at radicalized domestic groups. We do not monitor known extremists and their activities; instead, we are interested in the radicalization process – why and how people who are attracted to radical beliefs cross the line into violence.

    The third is threats from particular groups entering the United States – groups that could be exploited by terrorists or criminals to enter the Homeland legally or to bring in harmful materials. We further focus on travel-related issues of interest to the Department, such as visa categories and the Visa Waiver Program.

    The fourth is threats to the Homeland’s critical infrastructure and key resources. We integrate all source intelligence from the IC with information from critical infrastructure owners and operators, and, collaboratively with State and Local Fusion Centers, provide a comprehensive tactical and strategic understanding of physical and cyber threats to the critical infrastructure, including threats from nation-states, international and domestic terrorism, and criminal enterprises. Our threat assessments are integrated with other assessments of infrastructure vulnerabilities and the consequences of an incident to define all hazard infrastructure risk for risk-based prioritization and decision making.

    The fifth is weapons of mass destruction and health threats. We evaluate and establish a baseline of the actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the Homeland. We also support homeland-focused analysis of global infectious disease, public health, and food, agricultural, and veterinary issues. We provide tailored analytical support on these threats to our state, local, and tribal partners as well as members of the public health, technical, scientific, medical, and response communities.

    DHS Intelligence Enterprise

    I&A promotes a unified intelligence approach through common enterprise program and planning activities, including strategic planning, budgeting, workforce planning, and performance management, while evaluating and aligning resource decisions in coordination with component needs and with Department and national guidance.  We provide independent policy development, analysis and advice for the Under Secretary.

    I&A provides intelligence training to the DHS IE, as well as state, local, and tribal government personnel, in order to integrate and close gaps between domestic and national understanding of national security and all-hazards threats.  I&A addresses these issues through valuable educational and professional development opportunities, and is working to standardize and expand the competencies of its workforce at all levels.

    State and Local Fusion Centers

    DHS’ partners at state, local and tribal governments and the private sector gather information outside the boundaries of the IC.  Simultaneously, their information needs are not always recognized by traditional IC agencies.  To meet their own all-threats, all-hazards information needs, many states and larger cities have created fusion centers, which provide state and local officials with situational awareness.

    Fusion centers are the logical touch-points for DHS to access local information and expertise as well as provide them with timely, relevant information and intelligence derived from all-source analysis.  The result is a new intelligence discipline and tradecraft that gives us a new, more complete understanding of the threat.  DHS provides personnel and tools to the fusion centers to enable the National Fusion Center Network.

    Information Sharing

    Unifying and ensuring that the homeland security community is effectively aligned and engaged with our non-Federal colleagues is vital to securing the homeland.  Mission success requires collaborative action.  In order to address the information sharing and collaboration challenges, DHS has instituted a governance framework comprised of the Information Sharing Governance Board, the Information Sharing Coordinating Council, and Shared Mission Communities. Participation in these organizations is drawn from each of the Department components.

    Using this framework, DHS is developing and implementing effective information-sharing policies and collaborative programs required for mission success.  Building trusted relationships within DHS and with our federal, state, local, tribal and private sector partners enhances our ability to secure the homeland.

    National Security Systems

    As part of a Joint Program Management Office in partnership with the DHS Chief Information Officer, I&A provides program management, operational oversight, and strategic planning for classified networks and systems across the Department.  In DHS, the primary systems involved are the Homeland Secure Data Network, which facilitates the management of classified information up to the secret level, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, which is used to facilitate classified information management above the secret level.

    This page was last reviewed/modified on January 20, 2009.

    http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm

    ***
    ADL Southeast Region Sponsors Conference on Suicide Terrorism
    Receive ADL’s Law Enforcement Newsletter

    Register For Breaking News From ADL’s Terrorism Update Team

    Posted: November 24, 2003

    The Southeast Regional Office of the Anti-Defamation League, in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange, and the American Jewish Committee, sponsored a conference on suicide terrorism on November 14, 2003, in Atlanta. The purpose of the conference, entitled The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal Terrorism, was to educate nearly 250 law enforcement officers on the terrorist mindset and the implications for protecting the Georgia public.

    The keynote address was delivered by Dr. Anat Berko, a member of Israel’s Council for National Security and an expert on the criminal and moral aspects of the handlers of suicide terrorists.

    Dr. Robert Friedmann, Director of the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE), moderated a panel discussion focused on the implications of international terrorism for local law enforcement and preparations for counter-terrorism in Georgia. Panelists included Mark Guiliano, Supervisory Special Agent of the FBI; Robert Hardin, Inspector for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC); and Russell Andrews, Special Agent in Charge, GBI. Bob Hitchens, Director of the Georgia Homeland Security Office, also attended the conference.

    Not only was the partnership between ADL and law enforcement strengthened by this conference,  said Deborah Lauter, ADL Southeast Regional Director,  but it provided a much-needed opportunity for the various local, state and federal agencies to communicate and coordinate information on this critical topic. Participants heard an excellent briefing on what Israel is doing to understand and fight suicide terrorism, and they received specific information on how to prepare our local communities to respond in the event of future attacks on American soil.

    http://www.adl.org/Learn/ADL_and_Law/Conference_Suicide_Terrorism.asp

    http://www.govtech.com/gt/374309?topic=117680

    ***
    Fusion Center Intelligence Standards Focus Group Meeting

    Atlanta, Georgia

    August 24-25, 2004

    Meeting Summary

    Mr. Ken Bouche, cochair of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) and chairman of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), opened the meeting by welcoming the participants and asking members to introduce themselves.  The following individuals were in attendance:

    Lieutenant Colonel Norm Beasley

    Arizona Counterterrorism Information
    Center

    Chief Roger Bragdon

    Spokane, Washington, Police
    Department

    Mr. Hyuk Byun

    National Institute of Justice

    Dr. David Carter

    Michigan State University

    Mr. Stephen Clark

    Georgia Emergency Management
    Agency

    Dr. David Clopton

    National Institute of Justice

    Captain Daniel Cooney

    New York State Police

    Mr. C. Patrick Duecy

    Homeland Solutions LLC

    Mr. John T. Elliff

    Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Lieutenant Dennis Ellis

    Indiana State Police

    Mr. William Fennell

    U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

    Mr. Max Fratoddi
    Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Mr. Bob Hardin

    Georgia Bureau of Investigation

    Mr. Chris Holmes

    U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security

    Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer

    Seattle, Washington, Police Department

    Chief Mark Marshall

    Smithfield, Virginia, Police Department

    Mr. Jerry Marynik

    California Department of Justice

    Mr. J. Patrick McCreary

    U.S. Department of Justice

    Ms. Mary Meyer

    Minnesota Department of Public Safety

    Mr. Russ Porter

    Iowa Department of Public Safety

    Mr. Philip G. Ramer

    Florida Department of Law Enforcement

    Mr. Richard A. Russell

    U.S. Department of Homeland Security

    Mr. Clark Smith
    U.S. Department of Justice

    Lieutenant Colonel Mike Synders

    Illinois State Police

    Major Nicholas Theodos

    New Jersey State Police

    Mr. Mark Zadra

    Florida Department of Law Enforcement

    IIR staff in attendance:

    Mr. Bob Cummings

    Ms. Michelle Nickens

    Ms. Diane Ragans

    Mr. Bouche introduced Mr. Peter Modafferi, the chairman of the Fusion Center Intelligence Standards Focus Group.  Mr. Modafferi also welcomed the participants and stressed that their expertise and experience will be critical during the meeting as standards are vetted and developed.  Mr. Modafferi asked Mr. Richard Russell, from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to make a few opening remarks.  Mr. Russell spoke about the importance of intelligence and the benefits of a cohesive unit, where individuals work together, build trust, and learn from each other.  He explained that some organizations are using DHS funds to support a fusion center.  Mr. Russell informed the participants that his goal was to learn about the direction of this initiative, relay information to DHS, and ensure that the right people have the right information.  Mr. Russell summarized his comments by saying that the essential component of a fusion center is the human interaction and process of reviewing and assimilating data.  He said that when the roles of analysts and sworn personnel are put together, knowledge is gained.

    Mr. Bouche provided the participants an overview of the Global Initiative and its efforts.  He explained that after September 11, Global was tasked with developing the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP or “Plan”).  One of the NCISP recommendations regards the creation of a criminal intelligence coordinating council, now known as the CICC.  Mr. Bouche informed the participants that the CICC has conducted two meetings and is dedicated to supporting the mission of the NCISP.  He also mentioned that although the 9/11 Commission Report was well done, it does not mention local and state agencies.  He stressed that the federal government should not develop intelligence centers without considering the local and state agencies.

    Mr. Bob Cummings, Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) staff, reviewed the agenda and objectives for the meeting.  He encouraged participants to discuss best practices within their centers or initiatives.  He explained that some of the information resulting from this meeting may be distributed at the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s annual conference in November.  Ultimately, the materials will include suggestions and steps for agencies to establish fusion centers, model policies, and other examples and materials to help implement a fusion center concept.

    Mr. Cummings informed the participants that subsequent meetings may be needed to fully resolve the issues associated with fusion centers.  He explained that the comments and recommendations made during the meeting will be consolidated into a document that will be sent to the participants for further review and consideration.

    Mr. Modafferi presented a PowerPoint presentation (Attachment A) regarding the importance of intelligence, intelligence-led policing, and information sharing.  During his presentation, he mentioned the need to create a generation of officers that understand how information becomes intelligence and the importance of information sharing.  A portion of the presentation summarized the efforts of the Rockland County Intelligence Center, as well as the structure and organization of National Children’s Alliance.  He stressed that focus group members have an opportunity to make a positive impact on the law enforcement community by participating in this initiative.

    After Mr. Modafferi’s presentation, discussion ensued regarding the definition of a fusion center.  Based on the questions and comments offered during this discussion, many of the participants had different interpretations of the definition of a fusion center.  One of the major discussion points was whether the fusion center consists only of an intelligence center or if the fusion center also integrates public safety agencies and other responsibilities.  Other issues addressed included the roles and responsibilities of intelligence centers, handling classified information, and developing clear outcomes and expectations.  Some of the participants believed that fusion centers should focus on a particular need or issue, be proactive, and include prevention.  Others indicated that fusion centers should consist of a collaborative group of multifaceted personnel.  Still others thought that individual centers should be responsible for defining their own fusion center.  Issues also surfaced regarding the differences between local, state, tribal, and federal agencies.  After much discussion, Mr. Bouche summarized by stating that the focus group has a number of roles.  First, the group must identify the parameters of a fusion center for purposes of this initiative.  Second, the group needs to create standards for justice purposes and then invite other players to integrate additional roles and responsibilities, such as public safety agencies and the private sector.  In other words, he said the group should identify the best practices of establishing an intelligence center, offer steps to regionalize the center, and integrate it into the new world.

    Mr. Modafferi referred the participants to a summary document contained in their materials that outlined some of the issues and components for the group to discuss
    (Attachment B).  These issues are the foundation for building standards.  The remaining portion of this document summarizes the discussions and recommendations regarding these components.

    Governance

    Mr. Modafferi asked the group to discuss governance.  Participants provided examples of how their initiatives are governed and suggested options.  Mr. Philip Ramer, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), indicated that if agencies participating in the fusion center are asked to provide resources, they should have input.  Some initiatives are governed by state police, an appointed board, representatives from participating agencies, or a single agency.

    Mr. Bouche said that governance needs to be representative of those agencies that are willing to participate, whether it is with funds, resources, personnel, equipment, facilities, etc.  They should have a voice on a board or be a collective voice through an association.
    Mr. Modafferi agreed but stressed that a governance structure should not be directly representative, resulting in a large and overwhelming governing board or structure.  Mr. Bouche said that broad guidelines should be established to help local and state agencies, not hinder or bind them.  Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer, Seattle, Washington, Police Department, indicated that along with a governing board, bylaws and a process are needed.  Mr. Cummings summarized some of the common themes discussed.  The following issues were mentioned:

    * Handle all crime types in the centers.
    * Determine mechanism/capability for push-out strategic intelligence.
    * Establish linkage with private sector.
    * Ensure that participating entities are adequately represented.  (If agencies participate in a regional model outside their jurisdiction, a shared governance structure should be in place.)
    * Develop bylaws for the governance structure.

    Mission Statement

    Mr. Mark Zadra, FDLE, stated that a mission statement should include enough information to help leaders make decisions and deploy resources based on the needs of the customers.  Mr. Modafferi indicated the importance of knowing the center’s priorities and incorporating them into the mission.  Mr. Ramer suggested that the group make a general recommendation for a model.  The group recommended that fusion centers have a mission statement and asked that elements of a mission statement, as well as models, be provided in the final report.

    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

    Mr. Zadra suggested providing guidelines or a checklist for agencies to use when drafting and/or negotiating MOUs.  Chief Kimerer recommended developing a list of common elements.  The group agreed that agencies participating should consult their legal departments when drafting and signing MOUs.  A discussion ensued regarding the importance of trusted, personal relationships among participating agencies.  Chief Kimerer stressed that trust and fostering of relationships should be an overarching theme, addressed at each step of the process.

    Mr. John Elliff, Federal Bureau of Investigation, began discussing a number of critical elements that ultimately will impact the establishment and operation of fusion centers, such as financial records, privacy, public records, or intelligence services.  Mr. Modafferi recommended identifying the “hot” points and including them in the group’s discussions and recommendations.

    Mr. Cummings indicated that IIR would look at various MOUs and develop a standardized set of elements that should be included in fusion center MOUs.  In addition, example MOUs and other pertinent information will be obtained and included in the final report.

    Before ending the meeting for the day, Mr. Modafferi informed the participants that the next day’s meeting would be structured differently.  The group would be divided into three subgroups and given specific topics to discuss.  The meeting was adjourned at 5:00 p.m.

    August 24, 2004—Breakout Session

    The meeting was reconvened at 8:30 a.m.  Focus group participants were assigned to their subgroups.  The issues below summarize the discussion and recommendations for each group.

    Group A: Policies, Procedures, and Privacy

    Participants agreed that fusion centers should develop a policies-and-procedures manual that outlines the roles and responsibilities of the center.  Some of the other issues the group discussed included:

    * Ensure information is used for criminal investigations only.
    * Ensure validity and reliability of information.
    * Ensure policies exist regarding auditing requirements, retention, and purge.
    * Maintain a policy on access.
    * Maintain a privacy policy.

    The group offered sample language for standards regarding privacy:

    All centers will adopt and publish a policy that establishes a reasonable suspicion level or above to gain access to center materials.

    All centers will adopt and publish a policy regarding privacy considerations that is consistent with federal and state laws and policies, including 28 CR Part 23, Fair Information Practices, etc., as related to all criminal- and terrorist-related queries and investigations.

    Group B: Databases, Tools, Connectivity, Security, and Intelligence Services

    Group B agreed that centers should leverage systems that exist and are currently under development and allow for future connectivity to other states and federal systems.  The group recommended that centers use the Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Dictionary.  They also encouraged obtaining access to available databases and systems, such as Driver’s License, Motor Vehicle Registration, public sources, and the Regional Information Sharing Systems/Law Enforcement Online interconnection.

    The group was also tasked with discussing security needs.  The group agreed that appropriate security measures should be in place for a variety of issues such as the facility, data, and personnel.  The group recommended that fusion centers determine access levels and maintain a policy on the level of information released.  They also recommended using secure mechanisms such as encryption to safeguard data, conduct background checks for personnel, and maintain secret clearances.  Another suggestion was to create and provide a training component on security protocols.  Finally, the group recommended the following services for centers to offer or conduct:

    o Tactical response
    o Proactive strategic analysis
    o Intelligence support for investigations
    o Investigative response
    o Visual investigative analysis
    o Alert and notification
    o Deconfliction
    o Target identification
    o Critical infrastructure analysis
    o Criminal backgrounds/profiles compilation
    o Case correlation
    o Crime-pattern analysis
    o Association analysis
    o Telephone toll analysis
    o Flowcharting
    o Financial analysis
    o Strategic analysis
    o Intelligence reports
    o Intelligence briefings
    o Threat assessments
    o Investigative support

    Group C: Facility and location, communications, funding, training, and personnel

    Group C discussed the pros and cons of collocating participating agencies.  Collocating improves communications; however, multiple sites allow for mobile capacity.  The group considered providing a step-by-step guide for two tracks—collocating and not collocating.  The group considered the following logistical issues when addressing facility and location:

    o Connectivity (i.e., to Emergency Operations Center or other partners)
    o Scalability—future and emergency expansion
    o Security
    o Redundancy—infrastructure, resources, personnel, systems, etc.
    o Power
    o Continuity of functions and operations
    o Political issues
    o MOU to designate responsibilities of joint operations

    The group also agreed that it was important to identify a skeleton model for emergency operations, conduct a threat/vulnerability assessment, and ensure that the physical facility follows the appropriate Concept of Operations (ConOPS).  The group did not have adequate time to address the communications issue; however, they did offer the following observations:

    o Ensure secure and redundant communications.
    o Consider frequency and bandwidth limitations.
    o Consider a stand-alone security system (mobile).
    o Develop a policy for external and internal communications.
    o Consider implementing a communications plan.

    Group C discussed the need for funding and offered suggestions on how to identify funding opportunities.  It was recommended that funding be based on vulnerability/threat-based priorities.  In addition, the group discussed using federal funds as seed money, while creating a parallel budget for the city or state.

    Group C agreed that personnel should consist of a diverse and versatile group, including sworn and nonsworn positions.  The group offered an example staffing model and suggested that additional models be included in the final report.  The group also discussed the potential need of a permanent, full-time, civilian position to provide continuity and consistency in the long term (Facility Manager); the need to maintain a small core staff dedicated to specific functions, such as administration, information technology, communications, etc.; and the importance of ensuring equal or proportional representation of personnel from participating entities.  Finally, the group addressed training. The group agreed with the following:

    * Follow the guidelines and objectives outlined in the NCISP.
    * Ensure personnel meet the core minimum training standards contained in the Criminal Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy (CITCS) report.
    * Provide center personnel an overview of center operations policies and procedures and any unique protocols or communication needs.
    * Identify training needs and provide specialized training as appropriate.
    * Consider training needs associated with tactical and strategic intelligence.
    * Seek accredited or standards-compliant training programs.
    * Emphasize analysis and its link to intelligence-led policing.
    * Use model simulations, games, functional exercises, tabletops, and field exercises.

    At approximately 11:30 a.m., the groups presented their findings and recommendations to the full focus group.  After the presentations were concluded, IIR offered to consolidate discussion points, common themes, and recommendations.  In addition, IIR will develop a set of standardized guiding principles.  Once a draft report is compiled, it will be shared with the focus group members for review and consideration.  Additional meetings may be scheduled as needed.  Hearing no further business, the meeting was adjourned.

    http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:OLWlfeINSCwJ:www.it.ojp.gov/documents/20040824-25_Fusion_Ctr_Standards_summary.doc+Bob+Hardin+Georgia+Bureau+of+Investigation&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

    ***
    WIN     Western Identification Network
    WJIN.NET     World Justice Information Network
    XML     eXtensible Markup Language

    http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:WZZdwaTOCcwJ:www.leitsc.org/Files/Acronyms.doc+Criminal+Justice+Information+System+Community+of+Interest+(CJIS+COI)&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

    ***
    CORPORATE IT UPDATE-(C)1995-2008 M2 COMMUNICATIONS LTD

    Gwinnett County in the State of Georgia, USA, will install a suite of applications from Metatomix Inc for use by its criminal justice system. Metatomix is a supplier of software to the financial, judicial and public services sectors.
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    The County will make use of Metatomix’s Judicial Inquiry System, Judicial Data Exchange and Criminal Investigation suite of programs.

    The County will use the services of Agile Technologies LLC, a consultancy and integrations specialist, to integrate the new applications with the County’s existing Criminal Justice Information System Community of Interest (CJIS COI) infrastructure, according to the announcement today (25 June) by Agile.

    The County has a current population of 780,000 with 1.2m inhabitants projected by 2010. The upgrade to the County’s criminal justice system software is intended to integrate various data sources
    , provide a single searchable data pool, automate some judicial processes and improve investigatory efficiency by increasing the level of information sharing.

    ((Comments on this story may be sent to info@m2.com))

    Metatomix to supply software to Georgian County’s judicial system.
    Publication: Corporate IT Update
    Date: Wednesday, June 25 2008

    http://www.allbusiness.com/technology/software-services-applications-information/11414349-1.html

    ***
    Community of Interest (COI)

    What is a Community of Interest (COI), and why do they exist?

    A collaborative group of users that must exchange information in pursuit of its shared goals, interests, missions, or business processes and therefore must have shared vocabulary for the information exchanges.”—DoD 8320.2, December 2, 2004

    Community of Interest  is an organizational construct for working collaboratively to establish clusters of data interoperability that cross formal boundaries. COIs are important because they make explicit and widely visible (publish names, advertisements of what they doing, who’s involved etc.) vital information sharing task groups that would not otherwise be even recognized as organizations.

    What specific information sharing problems can COIs help with?

    COIs bring together participants in information sharing federations (connected net-centric capabilities plus the organizations that operate and develop them). These federations may be of varying degrees of  tightness;  i.e., the groups and capabilities involved in them retain more or less autonomy.

    COI participants are able to collaboratively make and maintain vocabulary choices, expresses in implementable artifacts, and other agreements on information sharing modalities. In tighter federations, COIs may actually constitute configuration control boards.

    COIs are generally responsible for publishing and managing metadata via the MDR and its federates as well as formulating and managing rules concerning usage of the net-centric capabilities they offer.

    COI vocabulary development is not a one-shot deal  Information Age players make data assets visible and accessible ASAP, while they pursue progressively more comprehensive vocabulary agreements in parallel. They refine and add capability to express concepts throughout operational life cycles using inputs from capability operators/developers within the federation, feedback from primary and other users, and the resources of multiple PoRs.

    COIs can also help with defining SLAs. In addition to procedural choices, SLA development and maintenance is part of the technical task . . . SLAs have technical aspects.

    Identification or formation of appropriate COI(s) to handle info sharing issues should not be tightly controlled. Chartering a new COI when needed is a good thing, and a large number will be required to deal with the many combinations and permeatations of information sharing relationships.

    How to find out about what COIs have been formed, their missions and their participants? (Hot button to COI Registry coming soon. Links to associate COIs and metadata assets in the MDR that they manage and/or use will also be possible in the near future).

    Relationships between COIs and metadata governance namespaces is being assessed as part of net-centric concept evolution/clarification (Point at COI Registry and COI Training site/materials if possible).

    Image:image1.gif

    Figure: COI support for Piloting Data Asset Visibility and Accessibility
    Contents

    * 1 COI Attributes
    * 2 COI verus Stovepipes
    o 2.1 Information Sharing Payoffs — specific use case examples
    o 2.2 Main_Page

    COI Attributes

    1. Formed to achieve Data Strategy goals with respect to a specific set of interrelated and regularly interacting data assets

    2. Composed of formal organizations and their assigned personnel engaged in cross-Component data sharing as producers, consumers, developers, and portfolio managers.

    3. Resourced by providing personnel and facilities from constituent formal organizations and their supporting programs

    4. Able to rapidly form and disband, shift focus, adjust goals and membership in response to changing circumstances

    5. Registered to make name, purpose, membership, metadata management activities and other attributes visible

    6. Frequently overlapping or even nested. All organizations and personnel  belong  to multiple COIs.

    COI verus Stovepipes

    When the COI concept was first introduced, some commentators opined that they are just a way of creating bigger clusters of tightly integrated activity that are totally isolated from one another; i.e.,  Stovepipes.  In this context, it is important to highlight the definition of COIs; viz.: that they are comprised of  frequent information trading (sharing) partners.  Partners are organizations, their constituent people, and their supporting information capabilities. Additionally and importantly, COIs are expected to be substantially overlapping and even nested vice discreet entities.

    This refers to the fact that rather than being confined to a single COI, any given information producer or consumer will most likely be a member of many COIs. Any net-centric capability will probably have to engage multiple COIs (info sharing agreements) in the course of a single orchestration. This is the normative condition. Additionally, COIs are constantly rearranging themselves and cross-fertilizing. Some COIs are peers, and some live in a hierarchy. New COIs form, old ones dissolve, and relationships shift around as the Enterprise adapts.

    Rather than being stovepiped, cross-COI connections are always present, cropping up and disappearing, among producer-consumers dealing in different information sharing clusters. Some of these clusters can become VERY large where many producer-consumers swarm on a common requirement (e.g.; time, location, and perhaps person). In using COIs to manage, ongoing visibility into their activites, transparency so decision makers can spot healthy convergence, highlight it and otherwise nurture it, is critical.

    Of major concern is the propensity for DoD, its parts and partners, to loose sight of the requirement to sustain a loosely coupled, highly transparent “process” and rush into the erection of formal bureaucratic resource sinks, which view their value in being enterprise-wide or “universal,” have flag level authority, and feel compelled to make and mandate arbitrary decisions. TOo be successful, COIs should base their engineering decisions mainly on direct reflections of operational reality as provided to them through network instrumentation and user feedback.

    Information Sharing Payoffs — specific use case examples

    http://metadata.dod.mil/mdr/ns/ces/techguide/community_of_interest_coi.html

    ***

    The JIS solution is used by both law enforcement agencies and courts to collect criminal and civil history, and property, vehicle, warrant and incident reports across local, state and national systems from a single interface. Metatomix’s JFA application provides complete and accurate information to law enforcement booking agents regarding the criminal and civil history of suspects both at the time of booking and later during trial.

    http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=2777880

    ***

    Community Of Interest
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    C.O.I., Community of Interest is a means by which network assets and or network users are segregated by some technological means for some established purpose. COI’s are a strategy that fall under the realm of Computer security which itself is a subset of Security engineering. Typically COI’s are set up to protect a Network infrastructure from a group or groups of users who are performing some esoteric functions. COI’s are also designed to protect their user community from the rest of the enclave user population.

    For an alternate definition in a different domain, see Communities of Interest.
    See also

    * Security engineering
    * Policy
    * Computer security policy
    * Network security policy
    * National security policy, Military strategy
    * Separation of mechanism and policy

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_Of_Interest
    Categories: Security

    *Civil History
    Civil case history reports include a record of any past or current liens, any bankruptcies on file and any past civil judgments against the subject. ERS obtains this information from a combination of two research methods: first, a special report is obtained from a major, established credit reporting agency. Next, United States Federal District and Bankruptcy Courts are searched for bankruptcies and for civil cases on the federal level.

    When a civil case is found, the following information is reported:

    * – Case Number
    * – File Date
    * – Cause (type of case)
    * – Parties Involved
    * – Judgement Date
    * – Judgement

    When a civil case is located, ERS uses the subject’s name to verify that the subject of the case is the same person as the subject of the search. Identifiers such as date of birth and social security number are not found on these cases. The most commonly used identifier for federal civil cases is the subject’s middle name or initial.

    The Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the information that reporting agencies such as ERS may provide. ERS complies with the Fair Credit Reporting Act by only publishing information on civil cases, liens and bankruptcies that were disposed of within seven years from the date of our report.

    You may also click here to read the Fair Credit Reporting Act as it pertains to Civil History reporting.

    Our Services

    * Criminal History
    * Civil History
    * Credit Reports
    * Motor Vehicle Reports
    * Employment History
    * Personal References
    * Federal Court Records
    * Education Verification
    * Pro Licensing Verification
    * Worker’s Comp Reports
    * Social Security Reports
    * HHS Exclusions
    * Sex Offender
    * Drug and Alcohol Testing
    * Patriot Act Search

    Patriot Act Search

    The Patriot Act Search involves searching for an individual or entity on 3 separate lists related to areas of national security:

    OFAC – The Office of Foreign Assets Control maintains a list of individuals who are involved in terrorism or international narcotics trafficking.

    Denied Persons List – The United States Commerce Department supplies a list of individuals and entities that are denied export privileges.

    OSFI – The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions provides a list of the names of individuals and organizations that are subject to United Nations Suppression of Terrorism regulations.

    Please ask an ERS representative about special considerations that must be taken into account when using the Patriot Act Search for employment purposes.

    ERS Employment Research Services (company involved in persons investigation for jobs)

    http://www.ers-services.com/services/civil.php

    ***
    Next-Generation Law Enforcement Fusion Centers: Crime Analysis in Action

    You May Also Like

    * Chicago Fusion Center Gives Police New Criminal Investigation Tools
    * Colorado’s Avalanche of Information

    Tools Sponsored By
    Stephen G. Serrao, Captain, New Jersey State Police (ret.)/Photo courtesy of Stephen G. Serrao

    Mar 17, 2009, By Stephen G. Serrao

    Every time a cop walks the beat, a trooper patrols the highway or a deputy questions a suspect, a key question enters their minds: Is everything as it should be?

    In the wake of major terrorism acts, that question has taken on national and global significance. You also hear: Are we safe? From my perspective as a law enforcement professional of 25 years, we are. Here’s why:

    Before 9/11, law enforcement agencies and professionals didn’t always know the significance of information in their possession — much less share that kind of intelligence with each other. Since then, officials have realized multiagency cooperation is the best way to deter terrorism and other criminal activities. While there’s still much progress to be made, officials have embraced the power of collaboration and are breaking down traditional barriers.

    Thankfully information sharing is now the rule. From 2004 to 2007, law enforcement agencies exchanged data on more than 100,000 terrorism-related threats, reports of suspicious activities and encounters with people on watch lists, according to the FBI.

    For years, law enforcement agencies favored the time-honored principle of not sharing clues and leads until an investigation was completed. They were more concerned about protecting their evidence until a court case could be fully developed. But now, most realize sharing information may reveal larger or wider patterns of activity, and it takes the combined data of federal, state and municipal agencies to understand such patterns. Meanwhile, new systems and oversight allow law enforcement to respect citizens’ privacy rights and civil liberties.

    Why Fusion Centers?

    Fusion centers are best equipped to oversee and manage the complex role of information sharing and facilitate cooperation between sometimes competing interests. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defines a fusion center as  an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources.

    Fusion centers are staffed by multiagency personnel with the technological capabilities to fuse and join millions of records concerning suspicious activities, terrorism and crime found in computer-aided dispatch systems, records management systems (RMS) and records held at regional information sharing systems. With the latest technology, fusion centers can store, search, retrieve and analyze data no matter what form it takes — whether it’s a suspicious activity report, a phone call transcript, a handwritten note or unstructured data, such as e-mail attachments.

    Besides effectively sharing intelligence and information among federal, state and local government agencies, fusion centers can also provide real-time threat assessments and situational awareness to enhance the safety and security of critical public and private infrastructure.

    The DOJ’s Fusion Center Guidelines assert,  Leaders must move forward with a new paradigm on the exchange of information and intelligence.  With more than 60 fusion centers firmly established throughout the country, public safety leaders have heeded this directive and established information sharing across agency borders.

    Today’s Fusion Centers

    While the pieces are in place to deliver on the most rigorous fusion center objectives, a real concern is whether they are moving beyond just tactical information sharing and analysis.

    The bigger question remains: How prepared are agencies to anticipate criminal activity and terrorist attacks? That’s where strategic intelligence analysis must come into play. In reality, most fusion center staff have a tactically oriented mindset, looking back in time to gather evidence for a prosecution. However, more work is needed to gather and share strategic information so we can discern patterns of activity and connect the dots to thwart organized criminal groups — such as the Mafia, street gangs or terrorism networks — before a crime is perpetrated. Anticipating crime is a fundamentally

    1 | 2  Next >

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    http://www.govtech.com/gt/627276
    (See page two below)

    Next-Generation Law Enforcement Fusion Centers: Crime Analysis in Action

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    different and critical role for a strategic intelligence analyst.

    Let’s examine how strategic thinking and analysis could be employed for threat assessment.

    In Los Angeles, for example, some 500 suspicious packages are reported to authorities each year. They come in all shapes and sizes and are found in airports, stadiums, and on buses and trains, among other places.

    The discoveries are documented, such as in a local jurisdiction’s RMS, but that’s where things end in many cases. Even though some fusion centers are equipped with the latest data integration, intelligence management, search and analysis technologies, the qualified personnel necessary to analyze the data and create an action plan are not always in place. Without such strategic levels of examination, the information remains in silos, disconnected and tactical — and no patterns are observed.

    Take the critical infrastructure protection initiative as another example. It directs law enforcement to keep a watchful eye on communication hubs, energy production facilities, water reservoirs and fuel refineries. That’s a critical first step, but who can affirm with any confidence which facilities are more likely to be attacked than others and which are current or long-term targets? More strategic analysis is needed.

    Keeping these points in mind, the 1999 Columbine High School tragedy offers a law enforcement primer for strategic response. As you may recall, teenage gunmen who telegraphed their actions in the days preceding the tragedy killed 15 people including themselves. While debate about how soon officers should have entered the high school has resulted in policy changes for both police departments and schools, Columbine illustrates how strategic analysis should be employed to anticipate threats and reduce loss of life and damage.

    This strategic approach involves trained analysts using technology in a three-step scientific method:

    * develop a hypothesis of the problem/threat;
    * conduct information gathering on aspects of the issue; and
    * form a hypothesis that cannot be disproved, which becomes a theory and should drive both short- and long-term policing strategies.

    Such a process can be difficult and costly. But fusion centers are positioned to deliver this critical decision-making. In fact, law enforcement professionals at all levels must have this conversation about strategic versus tactical methods, and put the tools and personnel in place to uncover the potentially bigger threats and the proper responses.

    Strengthening Fusion Centers

    While challenges remain, there are positive developments. The National Information Exchange Model, a national standard under adoption across the nation, is a major step forward toward strengthening information sharing and fusion centers. It requires that data be captured uniformly across the board for effective information exchange. For example, automobile manufacturers wouldn’t think of making wheel rim sizes incompatible with available tire sizes. Why should intelligence sharing be any different?

    In addition, RMS and other law enforcement software and services mentioned earlier are a dramatic leap forward. Used to their fullest extent, such technical infrastructure, helps fusion centers tackle mountains of data to create actionable information. They enhance a multidisciplinary approach and minimize duplication. They help organizations discover unexpected facts and connect patterns of behavior between individuals, groups and events.

    In the Analysis

    The next-generation fusion center will make the best use of strategic analysts and robust technologies. It will mitigate the temptation to look backwards and instead direct our attention to predicting and preventing in real time, rather than just responding to criminal and terrorist threats.

    Capt. Stephen G. Serrao is a former chief of the New Jersey State Police Counter-Terrorism Bureau, and now helps shape the direction of intelligence management software as director of Product Management of the Americas Region for Memex Inc., a worldwide provider of intelligence management, data integration, search and analysis solutions, http://www.memex.com. Serrao can be reached at steve.serrao@memex.com.

    http://www.govtech.com/gt/627276?id=627276&full=1&story_pg=2

    ***
    Counterintelligence Field Activity
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) was a United States Department of Defense (DoD) agency whose size and budget were classified. The CIFA was created by a directive from the Secretary of Defense (Number 5105.67) on February 19, 2002.[1] On August 8, 2008, it was announced that CIFA would be shut down.[2]
    Contents

    * 1 Mission
    * 2 Organization
    * 3 Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) database
    * 4 Privacy issues
    * 5 Shut Down
    * 6 See also
    * 7 Notes
    * 8 References
    * 9 External links

    Mission

    A common purpose and a strong commitment to shared goals guide the work at CIFA. During the current fiscal year, these goals are:

    * To effectively and efficiently manage and oversee the Defense Department counterintelligence enterprise.
    * To synchronize Defense counterintelligence activities across the department, in coordination with the national intelligence community.
    * To manage priority counterintelligence plans and projects in fulfillment of national, department and combatant commander requirements.
    * To select and develop unique counterintelligence operational support capabilities and make them available to the wider intelligence community.
    * To serve as the primary source of career development and training for counterintelligence professionals.
    * To identify, develop and field advanced technologies for counterintelligence.
    * To create a joint, interoperable and synchronized approach to counterintelligence as a distinct intelligence discipline.
    * To assess the feasibility of a department-level joint operational element for Defense counterintelligence.[3]
    Organization

    As of December 2007, the Director of CIFA Col. James T. (Tom) Faust (ret.), U.S. Army[4] has announced he will be stepping down in order to accept a position with the U.S. Army assistant deputy chief of staff for intelligence. Deputy Director John O’Hara will serve as acting director until a new director is named. Faust takes over his position with the Army in early 2008.[5]

    The Director of DoD CIFA reports directly to DoD’s Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

    The offices of Chief of Staff, Office of General Counsel, and Office of the Inspector General report directly to the Director of CIFA.

    CIFA is then broken into four directorates: Program Management, Information Technology, Operational Support and Training and Development.

    Program Management is responsible for budgeting, management and accountability.

    Information Technology is responsible for planning and managing special technology needs of the counterintelligence enterprise.

    Operational Support plans, directs and manages counterintelligence activities and coordinates offensive counterintelligence campaigns.

    Training and Development sets performance assessment standards and assures that defense counterintelligence training and education programs, as well as instructors, maintain accreditation and certification.[6]

    Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) database

    DoD’s CIFA manages the database of  suspicious incidents  in the United States or the Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). It is an intelligence and law enforcement system that is a near real-time sharing of raw non-validated information among DoD organizations and installations. Feeding into JPEN are intelligence, law enforcement, counterintelligence, and security reports, information from DoD’s  Threat and Local Observation Notice  (TALON) reporting system of unfiltered information, and other reports.

    There are seven criteria taken into account in the creation of a TALON report:

    * Nonspecific threats.
    * Surveillance.
    * Elicitation.
    * Tests of security.
    * Repetitive activities.
    * Bomb threats.
    * Suspicious activities and/or incidents
    Army regulation 190-45, Law Enforcement Reporting, states that JPEN may be used to share police intelligence with DOD law enforcement agencies, military police, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies.

    Privacy issues

    The domestic collection of data by military agencies was strictly regulated in the wake of COINTELPRO by the laws such as the Privacy Act of 1974, which strengthened and specified a United States citizen’s right to privacy as noted in the Fourth Amendment United States Constitution. In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States found in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) the right to privacy against government intrusion was protected by the  penumbras  of other Constitutional provisions. The DoD has reflected these in its own guidelines that have been in place since 1982[7].

    CIFA’s similar collection and retention of data on peace groups and other activists has promoted parallels to be drawn between the two programs by civil rights groups like the ACLU[8], and intelligence officials[9][10] who find the prospect of the military tracking peace groups again to be worrisome.

    After ACLU filed multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding information gathering on peace groups and NBC did a report[11] citing a Quaker group planning an anti-enlistment action that was listed as a  threat , a review of CIFA activities was ordered by then Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone[12], who stated at the time that it appeared that there had been several violations.

    A complaint requesting the expedition of the FOIA requests[13] by the ACLU was ruled in their favor by a federal court. The released documents showed that at least 126 peace groups’ information had been held past required removal dates. The DoD has since stated that it has removed all improperly kept data.

    The Bush Administration has broadly defended all of its domestic spying activities by stating that they are acting within the law as provided by the Constitution. Specifically, Article Two of the United States Constitution that suggests that the President has the chief responsibility to protect America from attack. In addition to Article Two, the President (and CIFA) may rely on Congress’ specific Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists ( AUMF ), and the War Powers Resolution as foundation, though many Congressional representatives asked about this have stated that they do not support this interpretation, and that it was not their intention on signing the AUMF to give the Executive Branch the ability to conduct domestic spying outside of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

    Shut Down

    On April 1, 2008, the Pentagon’s top intelligence official (James R. Clapper, the undersecretary of defense) recommended the dismantling of the CIFA program.[14].

    On August 8, 2008, it was announced that CIFA would be shut down and its activities would be subsumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.[15]

    See also

    * Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (2001)
    * Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
    * USA PATRIOT Act, specifically USA PATRIOT Act, Title II entitled Enhanced Surveillance Procedures
    * Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    * Economic Espionage Act of 1996
    * Privacy Act of 1974
    * Counter-terrorism

    Notes

    1. ^  Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity.  U.S. Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.67, 19 February 2002.
    2. ^  Unit Created by Rumsfeld Shut Down.  Gulf Times, 6 August 2008.
    3. ^ Counterintelligence Field Activity.  Strategic Goals.  cifa.mil.
    4. ^ CIFA Director biography
    5. ^ CIFA Director Selected As U.S. Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, cifa.mil.
    6. ^ Organizational Chart, cifa.mil.
    7. ^ DoD 5240 1-R Procedures on Domestic Intelligence
    8. ^ Documents Shed New Light on Pentagon Surveillance of Peace Activists (10/12/2006)
    9. ^ Pincus, Walter.  Defense Facilities Pass Along Reports of Suspicious Activity.  Washington Post, 11 December 2005, Page A12.
    10. ^ Freedom’s TALON
    11. ^ Myers, Lisa et al.  Is the Pentagon spying on Americans?  MSNBC, 14 December 2005.
    12. ^  DoD Orders Review of Anti-Threat Intel-Gathering System.  DoD Press Release, December 2005.
    13. ^ ACLU Complaint
    14. ^ Warrick, Joby.  Intelligence-Gathering Program May Be Halted.  Washington Post, 2 April 2008.
    15. ^  Unit Created by Rumsfeld Shut Down.  Gulf Times, 6 August 2008.

    References

    * DoD Directive Number 5105.67
    * The Privacy Act Of 1974 – 5 U.S.C. § 552a As Amended
    * Office of the Secretary of Defense
    * Counterintelligence to the Edge
    * Military Police bulletin, April 2006
    * Pentagon admits errors in spying on protesters
    * Pentagon Expanding Its Domestic Surveillance Activity

    External links

    * Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFAas) official website
    * The Pentagon’s Counterspies: The Counterintelligence Field Activity – Documents Describe Organization and Operations of Controversial Agency and Database, National Security Archive, The George Washington University, September 17, 2007

    Intelligence agencies and organizations of USA
    Intelligence Community
    Central Intelligence Agency A Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency A United States Army Military Intelligence A Defense Intelligence Agency A Marine Corps Intelligence Activity A National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency A National Reconnaissance Office A National Security Agency A Office of Naval Intelligence A Coast Guard Intelligence A Federal Bureau of Investigation  A Drug Enforcement Administration A Bureau of Intelligence and Research A Office of Intelligence and Analysis A Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence A Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
    Other
    Director of National Intelligence A Strategic Support Branch A National Clandestine Service A National Counterproliferation Center A National Counterterrorism Center A President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
    Defunct
    Office of Strategic Services A Office of Special Plans A Counterintelligence Field Activity
    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterintelligence_Field_Activity
    Categories: 2002 establishments | 2008 disestablishments | Defunct United States intelligence agencies

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterintelligence_Field_Activity

    ***

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    Welcome

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    May 17, 2006
    FBI Launches Criminal Civil Rights Investigation of NYPD Over RNC Protests
    Rnc_cops_5_17

    Democracy Now has learned the Justice Department has launched a criminal investigation of the New York Police Department over the NYPD’s treatment of protesters during the Republican National Convention. During the week of the 2004 convention, police arrested some 1800 protesters—more than at any previous political convention in the country’s history. [includes rush transcript]

    Democracy Now has learned the Justice Department has launched a criminal investigation of the New York Police Department over the NYPD s treatment of protesters during the Republican National Convention. Last week the FBI sent the New York Civil Liberties Union a letter asking the group for assistance in what it described as a “pending criminal civil rights investigation into the New York City Police Department’s arrest of certain individuals in connection with their protest activity at the Republican National Convention in August of 2004.” The letter went on to state “We are attempting to determine if any police officers” conduct violated federal civil rights statutes.

    During the week of the 2004 convention, police arrested some 1800 protesters—more than at any previous political convention in the country’s history. It is unclear as to the extent of the Justice Department s criminal investigation of the NYPD, but the FBI appears to be focusing on the arrest of Dennis Kyne, a Gulf War veteran turned anti-war activist. Kyne was arrested on the steps of the New York Public Library on multiple charges including inciting a riot. His case went to trial but it was dismissed after his legal team presented videotaped evidence that proved the police lied to the court. As part of the criminal investigation, the FBI is seeking to interview other protesters whose constitutional rights have been violated by the police.

    The police department has acknowledged it has opened its own investigation into the arrest of Kyne and is cooperating with the FBI. The announcement of the FBI investigation of the NYPD comes just week after the city’s own Civilian Complaint Review Board issued a report criticizing the actions of two deputy police chiefs during the convention. We are joined now in our Firehouse studio by attorney Gideon Oliver who is representing Dennis Kyne and other protesters arrested during the convention.
    * Gideon Oliver , attorney for Dennis Kyne and other protesters arrested during the convention.

    Rush Transcript
    This transcript is available free of charge. However, donations help us provide closed captioning for the deaf and hard of hearing on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution.
    Donate – $25, $50, $100, More…

    AMY GOODMAN: We’re joined right now in our Firehouse studio by attorney Gideon Oliver. He’s representing Dennis Kyne and other protesters arrested during the convention. Welcome to Democracy Now

    GIDEON OLIVER: Good morning. Thanks so much for having me.

    AMY GOODMAN: It’s very good to have you with us. So, the Bush administration Justice Department is launching an investigation into the New York Police Department’s activities during the Republican Convention. Can you explain how you found this out and what you think?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Certainly. Well, the first I heard of this—the first I heard of an FBI investigation was yesterday, late yesterday afternoon, actually, although I understood that as a result of a letter that John Conyers and several other House Judiciary members sent to Attorney General Gonzales last year, that the Department of Justice would be launching some kind of investigation. So, this is the first I’ve heard that something is actually going on, so it was really only yesterday.

    AMY GOODMAN: Explain what happened to your client, to Dennis Kyne.

    GIDEON OLIVER: Dennis, on August 31, 2004, went to the steps of the New York Public Library at around 6:00 p.m., was there for a few minutes before police began—before a large number of NYPD officers began searching people’s backpacks and arresting people, which caused many of the folks who were at the library to get upset and to chant and do other entirely peaceful things, as a result of which the police officers gave dispersal orders. And Dennis was arrested as he was walking away and leaving and yelling at the police. And as he was being placed under arrest, when he was on his knees with his hands behind his back, the then Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, the top lawyer for the Police Department, came over to him and pointed to him and said, “This one is discon and resisting.”

    AMY GOODMAN: Discon?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

    AMY GOODMAN: And who was the officer?

    GIDEON OLIVER: The deputy then, it was Stephen Hammerman, was then—he’s no longer the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters. Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters Hammerman then walked over to a Legal Bureau lieutenant who was nearby and said, “We’ve got one of the troublemakers from Pataki’s the other night,” referring to Dennis. So it was very eerie, because at least he knew who Dennis was from a protest several days before and referred to him as a troublemaker, was pleased he had been arrested and ordered that he be charged with something he was absolutely not doing, which was resisting arrest.

    AMY GOODMAN: You had this on film?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Yes.

    AMY GOODMAN: This is what broke this case?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Well, what happened is that the District Attorney, based on Officer Matthew Wohl’s sworn accusatory instrument in Dennis’s case, prosecuted him. It was the first jury trial to result from the RNC. And Officer Wohl testified that he observed Dennis resisting arrest by kicking and screaming like a little child. When asked how he was moving around, he said, “Well, his heart was moving, his chest was moving.”

    AMY GOODMAN: His heart was moving?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Yes. And after Officer Wohl testified, we turned over some videotape to the District Attorney one evening, and then the next morning they sort of pulled us into the hallway and said, “Why didn’t you show this to us earlier?” They obviously understood very quickly that the officer hadn’t told the truth, and, you know, we said, “Well, why didn’t he tell the truth? Why didn’t you dismiss the case?”

    AMY GOODMAN: So, this Officer Wohl is being investigated by the FBI?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Well, it appears so. I know, as a matter of fact—

    AMY GOODMAN: They name him in the letter that we saw.

    GIDEON OLIVER: Yes. They spell his name wrong, but yes, they do name him.

    AMY GOODMAN: How do you spell his name?

    GIDEON OLIVER: It’s “W-o-h-l” and they spell it “W-h-o-l.” Perhaps a minor detail, but it’s a very, very long time—I mean, Dennis’s trial was in December of 2004, so this is a real long time to have waited to investigate what is really a flagrant, I think, example of what was a much larger problem during the RNC, which is to say the Police Department had a policy of clearing the streets and then kind of sorting everything out in criminal court, in terms of making it sound as though the arrests were legitimate later, which is an enormous problem that’s frankly ongoing in terms of the Police Department’s policing of protest activities, certainly.

    AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Gideon Oliver, attorney representing Dennis Kyne, arrested at the Republican National Convention, and others. These cases leading to the Justice Department, the FBI sending a letter to the New York Civil Liberties Union, saying they’re investigating the Police Department over criminal civil rights violations? Criminal violations. Can you describe other cases that you know about? We have some video, and you know some of that video.

    GIDEON OLIVER: Certainly. Well, during the RNC, five was the golden number. That is to say, arresting officers were to arrest, the Police Department says, up to five individuals in a mass arrest situation, and in fact, Officer Wohl swore that he arrested five individuals that day at the library. And as it turns out, we have video of the arrests of all five of those individuals, and Officer Wohl doesn’t appear anywhere near them at any time. It appears that he was at the back of a prisoner transport vehicle.

    And so, the first arrest that occurred at the library that day were of two French Canadian men and a woman from Portland, who were arrested for attempting to hang a banner. They didn’t even hang it. They just held it up. A police captain came up to them and said, “You can’t hang a sign on Parks Department property. You can hold it, but you can’t hang it.” And then, within four or five seconds, a number of other captains and officers swept in and simply arrested them, which seemed to, you know, just flabbergast the crowd, the people who were there.

    AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to show for our radio listeners some of the videotape on our website at democracynow.org. Now, the John Conyers letter to the Justice Department pointed out that 91% of the protesters arrested had their charges dropped. 91% had their charges dropped or were found to be not guilty after trial, and that about 400 protesters were let off the hook after video evidence emerged proving that the protesters had been wrongly accused as a result of police perjury, the tampering of evidence or other deceptions. That’s quite astounding.

    GIDEON OLIVER: Yes.

    AMY GOODMAN: 91%.

    GIDEON OLIVER: Absolutely. And it’s also, I think, important to note that what we’re talking about in terms of the violations of law or alleged violations of law we’re talking about, we’re talking about things like disorderly conduct or parading without a permit, and when a police officer swears out an accusatory instrument that initiates a criminal proceeding, it’s a misdemeanor to tell a lie in a document like that. And many, many of the police officers who swore out these instruments during the convention simply did not tell the truth. It’s a huge, huge problem. So I’m very interested to see what comes of this FBI investigation. If it’s, you know, just did Officer Matthew Wohl tell a lie when he was on the stand in Dennis’s case? That’s open and shut. But if it’s how could this have been such a widespread practice, that would be a very interesting question to have a more definitive answer to.

    AMY GOODMAN: And on Democracy Now , we showed the videotape that was doctored by the Police Department, that was proved in court when the longer video was brought out that showed precisely the opposite of what they supposedly said happened.
    GIDEON OLIVER: I believe that was in connection with Alexander Dunlop’s case. He was arrested on August 27, allegedly in connection with the Critical Mass bike ride. It turned out he had lived in the neighborhood and was going to get some sushi, and he was a guy with a bike, and they were arresting people with bikes. And in connection with his case, the District Attorney’s office turned over one videotape that did not show him acting, you know, completely reasonably and trying to figure out how to get out of the police trap, and Eileen Clancy from I-Witness video discovered that the video was incomplete, comparing it to another copy that had been turned over in another case. It’s extremely troubling. These are extremely troubling practices.

    AMY GOODMAN: Does this go to an issue of conspiracy?

    GIDEON OLIVER: Well, I think it depends what you mean by “conspiracy.” I think certainly at this point the fact that Commissioner Kelly and Paul Browne are so adamant about defending all of the practices of the Police Department in connection with the convention, despite really overwhelming evidence that there were serious problems, certainly points toward premeditation and post hoc rationalization, so I would certainly call it a conspiracy, at least in the technical legal sense.

    AMY GOODMAN: So 1,800 people arrested, largest in any convention in the history of conventions. Over 1,600 of them, these cases were dropped or shown in trial, acquitted, etc. We want to thank you very much for being with us, Gideon Oliver, attorney representing protesters arrested at the Republican National Convention. We’ll certainly continue to follow the story, and we’ll also link to the stories we covered at the Republican Convention, including Alex Dunlop__ and the video we showed there of the man who went out to buy sushi and was arrested for protesting.

    Creative Commons License The original content of this program is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. Please attribute legal copies of this work to democracynow.org. Some of the work(s) that this program incorporates, however, may be separately licensed. For further information or additional permissions, contact us.

    http://www.democracynow.org/2006/5/17/fbi_launches_criminal_civil_rights_investigation

    ***
    #
    “Toxins ‘R’ Us”

    Is your lipstick laden with lead? Is your baby’s bottle toxic? The American Chemistry Council assures us that “we make the products that help keep you safe and healthy.” But U.S. consumers are actually exposed to a vast array of harmful chemicals and additives embedded in toys, cosmetics, plastic water bottles and countless other products. U.S. chemical and manufacturing industries have fought regulation, while Europe moves ahead with strict prohibitions against the most harmful toxins.
    Listen to this Column
    Filed under Weekly Column
    #
    “Jailing Kids for Cash”

    As many as 5,000 children in Pennsylvania have been found guilty, and up to 2,000 of them jailed, by two corrupt judges who received kickbacks from the builders and owners of private prison facilities that benefited. The two judges pleaded guilty in a stunning case of greed and corruption that is still unfolding. Judges Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. and Michael T. Conahan received $2.6 million in kickbacks while imprisoning children who often had no access to a lawyer. The case offers an extraordinary glimpse into the shameful private prison industry that is flourishing in the United States.

    Listen to this Column
    Filed under Weekly Column

    * Lawyers’ Group Urges Bush Be Arrested or Barred from Canada in First Trip Abroad Since Leaving Office

    BLOG

    *
    Amy Goodman’ New Column, “Those Hit Hardest Get No Bailout”

    Taxpayers’ bailout money for AIG bonuses has rightfully provoked a massive backlash against AIG, Wall Street, President Barack Obama and his economic advisers, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers. The U.S. public now owns 80 percent of AIG. The outrage is bipartisan.

    Listen to this Column

    Filed under Weekly Column

    Wednesday, March 18, 2009

    * Headlines
    * Public Outcry Forces Lawmakers to Say They’ll Recoup Millions in AIG Bonuses, But Why Not the Billions in Taxpayer Bailout Funds?
    * Mark Danner: Bush Lied About Torture of Prisoners

    Tuesday, March 17, 2009

    RECENT SHOWS
    Thursday, March 19, 2009

    * Headlines
    * “Perp Walks Instead of Bonuses”: Veteran Journalist Robert Scheer on AIG Bonuses, the “Backdoor Bailout” and Why Obama Should Fire Geithner, Summers

    Today’s Show

    * Headlines
    * Israel Promises Internal Probe After Soldiers Describe Civilian Killings, Lax Rules of Engagement in Gaza Attack
    * Palestinian Doctor, Peace Advocate Recounts Israeli Attack on Home that Killed 3 Daughters, Niece
    * Protest Planned Outside NY Immigration Office to Stop Deportations of 30,000 Haitians

    http://www.democracynow.org/2006/5/17/fbi_launches_criminal_civil_rights_investigation

    ***
    Blackwater

    Blackwaterhead3

    Blackwater Worldwide and the Private Security Industry

    Democracy Now  offers groundbreaking coverage on the private military company Blackwater Worldwide. The North Carolina-based firm operates under a multi-million dollar contract to protect U.S. officials and facilities. It’s been allowed close to free reign under a murky legal environment that offers little to no oversight over its operations.

    Investigative journalist and Democracy Now  correspondent Jeremy Scahill offers regular reports. He is author of “Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army.”

    March 04, 2009: Blackwater CEO Erik Prince Resigns in Latest Attempt to Rebrand Tarnished Mercenary Firm
    Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, has announced his resignation as the company’s CEO. The move comes weeks after the company changed its name to Xe in an attempt to rebrand the firm.

    November 19, 2008: Steve Fainaru on ‘Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq’
    Top Justice Department prosecutors are reportedly reviewing a draft indictment against six Blackwater security guards who opened fire in a crowded Baghdad square more than a year ago killing seventeen Iraqi civilians. The indictments would mark the first time armed private contractors from the United States face justice. We speak to Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington Post correspondent Steve Fainaru about his new book Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq.

    August 28, 2008: EXCLUSIVE: House Oversight Chair Henry Waxman Calls for Cancellation of Blackwater’s Contract in Iraq
    In an exclusive interview with Democracy Now  correspondent Jeremy Scahill, Congressman Henry Waxman, chair of the powerful House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, calls on Sen. Barack Obama to cancel the private military firm Blackwater’s Iraq contract if Obama is elected president. Serious questions remain about what Obama will do with this massive private shadow army in Iraq.

    June 02, 2008: Blackwater: From the Nisour Square Massacre to the Future of the Mercenary Industry

    May 23, 2008: ‘War, Inc.’: John Cusack’s New Film Satirizes the Corruption, Profiteering and Hubris Behind the Iraq War

    May 02, 2008: Southern California Residents Gear Up for New Fight to Stop Secretive Expansion by Military Firm Blackwater

    April 07, 2008: State Dept. Renews Blackwater Contract in Iraq Despite Pentagon Labeling Sept. Baghdad Killing of 17 Civilians ‘A Criminal Event’

    December 19, 2007: EXCLUSIVE…Blackwater Sued Again For Sept. 9th Attack, Five Iraqis Dead, Ten Wounded

    December 19, 2007: TV BROADCAST EXCLUSIVE: Iraqi Witnesses, Victims Describe Blackwater Shooting in Harrowing Detail

    December 10, 2007: What is Blackwater’s Role in the 2008 Presidential Race?

    November 09, 2007 An Act of Terrorism? Blackwater Sniper Shot Dead Three Iraqi Guards At Iraqi Media Center in February

    November 08, 2007: As Blackwater Is Implicated in Another Deadly Shooting in Iraq, Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) Urges Passage of the Stop Outsourcing Security (SOS) Act

    October 18, 2007: ‘They Protect People’s Lives’—One Month After Baghdad Killings, Bush Defends Blackwater USA

    October 11, 2007: EXCLUSIVE–Family Members of Slain Iraqis Sue Blackwater USA for Deadly Baghdad Shooting

    October 11, 2007: Ex-U.S. Official in Iraq on Iraqi Efforts to Ban Blackwater: ‘I Was Surprised it Had Taken This Long’

    October 11, 2007: Blackwater Loses Bid to Reject Wrongful Death Suit in Afghan Plane Crash

    October 3, 2007: Mr. Prince Goes to Washington: Blackwater Founder Testifies Before Congress

    September 27, 2007: Michelle Bachelet on Chilean Troops Working For Blackwater in Iraq and Fujimori’s Extradition to Peru

    September 24, 2007:Blackwater Back on Patrol in Baghdad As Shootings Probe Continues

    September 18, 2007:Can Iraq (or Anyone) Hold Blackwater Accountable for Killing Iraqi Civilians? A Debate On the Role of Private Contractors in Iraq

    May 23, 2007:Pivotal Family Lawsuit Against Blackwater USA Blocked from Court—and Moved to Panel with Company Ties

    May 23, 2007:Jeremy Scahill Responds to Blackwater CEO Erik Prince, Visits Blackwater Sites and Prince’s Hometown

    May 11, 2007:Author and DN  Correspondent Jeremy Scahill Testifies in Landmark House Hearing on Defense Contracting

    April 19, 2007:Blackwater Plans for New Military Facility Near San Diego Draws Fire From Residents, Peace Activists and Local Congressmember

    March 21, 2007:Part II–Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army

    March 20, 2007:Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army

    February 08, 2007:Blackwater USA Takes Congressional Hot-Seat as Landmark Hearing Probes Mercenary Firm’s Role in Iraq

    January 26, 2007:Our Mercenaries in Iraq: Blackwater Inc and Bush’s Undeclared Surge

    April 20, 2006:Blackwater in the Crosshairs: The Families of Four Private Security Contractors Killed in Fallujah File a Ground-Breaking Lawsuit

    February 22, 2006:EXCLUSIVE: Al Jazeera Reporters Give Bloody First Hand Account of April ’04 U.S. Siege of Fallujah

    September 23, 2005:Blackwater Down: Fresh From Iraq, Private Security Forces Roam the Streets of an American City With Impunity

    September 16, 2005:The Militarization of New Orleans: Jeremy Scahill Reports from Louisiana

    September 12, 2005:Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans

    June 21, 2005:Private Warriors: New PBS Doc Questions Role of Military Contractors in Iraq
    December 23, 2004:A New Poverty Draft: Military Contractors Target Latin America For New Recruits

    April 01, 2004:Blackwater USA: Building the ‘Largest Private Army in the World’

    http://www.democracynow.org/features/blackwater_usa

    ***
    September 16, 2005
    The Militarization of New Orleans: Jeremy Scahill Reports from Louisiana
    Neworleansswat

    We go to Louisiana to speak with Democracy Now  correspondent Jeremy Scahill who has been in New Orleans this past week. He has been looking into how the city has changed to a militarized zone and what that means for the residents who left. [includes rush transcript]

    Well the Central Business District and the historic French Quarter were neighborhoods in New Orleans that saw relatively little damage. This weekend the city will start re-opening those areas and a few others for businesses and residents to return. However, many are concerned about what will happen to the city’s poor, black residents whose neighborhoods were mostly destroyed.

    Democracy Now correspondent Jeremy Scahill has been in Louisiana this past week. He has been looking into how the city has changed to a militarized zone and what that means for the residents who left.

    * Jeremy Scahill, Democracy Now  producer and correspondent.

    Rush Transcript
    This transcript is available free of charge. However, donations help us provide closed captioning for the deaf and hard of hearing on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution.
    Donate – $25, $50, $100, More…

    AMY GOODMAN: He joins us on the phone from Baton Rouge. Welcome, Jeremy.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Good to be with you, Amy.

    AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about what you have been seeing, who you’ve been talking to this week?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, I mean, in the days that have passed, the week or so since you were here this past weekend, we have seen a real increase in the militarization of the city. It’s turned into a much greater state of lockdown. You have more military checkpoints set up. You have less of a civilian presence in large parts of the city and much more of a military presence. I mean in fact, I still have only seen one FEMA vehicle, the entire time I have been here. That wasn’t even staffed. It was just a FEMA vehicle parked on a median near the Hyatt hotel where the main headquarters is of the so-called Operational Emergency Command of the military and various branches of the government coordinating their so-called disaster response. But there are soldiers all over the city. What’s incredible is that you see them doing almost nothing. They’re either just standing around or sitting around. There’s very little work being done by the military. You do see units like the 82nd airborne patrolling the streets. It looks like the aftermath of a massacre or war zone where you have soldiers patrolling around. You also see a tremendous increase in the number of private security contractors who have arrived on the scene.

    It’s interesting, we talked earlier this week about the Blackwater mercenaries and I talked about my hour-long conversation with them when they had first arrived here, and I reported that they were saying they were on contract with the Department of Homeland Security. This, of course, was denied by the federal government. Well, now they have been forced to admit, the federal government, that Blackwater is on federal contract with FEMA to protect—so-called protect, its rebuilding or reconstruction efforts in Louisiana. This is just one of the firms that is getting now federal money. I think that these firms view the current situation in Louisiana as the biggest pot of federal money to put their hands into since the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. I also, two days ago, had the chance to meet one of the wealthiest of citizens of New Orleans, F. Patrick Quinn III. He is the single greatest owner of private rooms in New Orleans. He owns the largest hotel chain in the state of Louisiana, to cater to hotels. He is currently—he told me that his hotels are being looked at by FEMA to house the workers for the long haul of the so-called reconstruction. I was talking to him, as his head of security and after he pulled off in his S.U.V., about 30 Mexican workers came out of his hotel, and one of his security guards said that they had been brought in from Texas, and in fact another news report, about Patrick Quinn, said that he had brought in workers from Texas as well. So, we have the reality of these shelters full of people wanting work and then you see Mexican workers being brought in from Texas, and when they’re done, doing this dirty work, they will be put on the back of trucks, piled into trucks and they go to wherever it is that they were staying.

    This man, Patrick Quinn is bidding for these contracts where FEMA potentially could come in and rent out hundreds and hundreds of rooms in his hotel and other businesses are struggling to simply stay alive or scramble to get federal money to rebuild, he is standing to gain a tremendous amount of money from these lucrative federal contracts. It must be noted that he is a major contributor to the Republican party. In fact, his wife was just elected in the special election to the state Senate. Her name is Julie Quinn. And Amy, he has brought in security from a company called B.A.T.S. in Alabama: Bodyguard And Tactical Services. And I was talking to his head of security, I told him I was from New York, he said, I’ve been to New York during the daily news strike, referring to the strike the at the New York Daily News. Democracy Now  co-host, Juan Gonzalez, is a Daily News columnist was one of the leaders of the strike. I told him that Juan Gonzalez was a colleague of mine and he told me that he spiked Juan Gonzalez’s car. He said he had put sugar in the gas tank of Juan Gonzalez’s car. The man’s name is Michael Montgomery, and he is the head of security for B.A.T.S. Security in Alabama, bragging about spiking the car of Juan Gonzalez and other strike leaders in the New York Daily News strike. He is heading up security for the Decatur Hotel chain, owned by Patrick Quinn, a major businessman in New Orleans, his wife a Republican state senator. This is just one example of cronyism that we see on the ground where the wealthy Republican contributors are being considered now for these tremendous federal contracts.

    AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Jeremy Scahill, he is the Democracy Now  Correspondent on the ground now in New Orleans, Baton Rouge. You also spent time at the jail, which is the converted Greyhound Train Station, is that right? Run by the head of the Angola prison, the largest prison in this country.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Right. One of the things that happened, and it was something we’re going to be looking at very closely on democracy now , continue to in the coming weeks, that is what happened to the prisoners who were inside the Orleans parish prison as well as other facilities as prisoners now start to get released. They’re going to be telling their stories, and one of the makeshift places that they took people was the—they converted the Greyhound and Amtrak terminals into prisons where they brought people, and so they’re using the concrete areas where the buses would pull in to house prisoners and they shipped them off to various parts of the country. In that downtown area, it’s really sort of desolate and abandoned, and now they call it “Camp Greyhound” where they’re running a prison. This is the major question that still looms in the air here, and that is-–what is going to happen to all of these people who were arrested the night before the hurricane struck, for instance, on minor violations who should have been processed in a matter of hours and then released, and they have been shipped all over the country, all over the state. Now you have lawyers scrambling to try to track down where people are, and make sure that they can get out.

    One of the great concerns right now in New Orleans is businessmen talking openly of wanting to see New Orleans change, to change it completely in a demographic sense, geographically, politically, racially. You have this overt rhetoric. Well, as residents of New Orleans come back in and they try to go back to the apartments they were rent stabilized, the houses they were renting, they face a city that has repressive laws that do not protect tenants. You have an overt agenda to change the racial makeup of the city, the economic makeup of the city, and you have these very wealthy people hiring private mercenary types to guard their property and their interests. Then you also have the National Guard and the Army inside of the city now, and so the potential for conflict with residents coming back in is very great. A lot of people are very concerned now with this Marshal Law still in effect with the military curfew in effect, that that is going to remain as people come back and live here. It’s one thing to have Martial law when you have a depopulated city. It’s another thing to have it when you have people who want to go about the business of rebuilding their lives, particularly when they are being told by very wealthy, powerful people backed up by men with guns that they are not welcome in the city that they have lived in their whole life. We have a potential, I think, for serious, overt conflict, hot conflict here in New Orleans as people start coming back in.

    AMY GOODMAN: And Jeremy, we all went over to Southern University, a black college in Baton Rouge where some of the evacuees had gathered to talk about how they can be a part of the planning for the reconstruction. Very difficult, because the most disempowered people have been sent off to areas all over the country, from Utah to Cape Cod, often not knowing when they were getting on a bus or perhaps a plane, where they were actually going to land. While they were sent off there, do they have the money even to return, let alone be a part of how this city will be rebuilt?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Right. I was just watching CNN and they were interviewing a guy they’re called the pied piper of hurricane Katrina, a guy from Ohio, who has come to the Houston Astrodome to recruit 100 people who are—who had left New Orleans to try to bring them to settle in Ohio. I mean, what they’re really trying to do is to settle the poor and the African-American populations of New Orleans elsewhere. And to make New Orleans a nice, white city, for white, rich businessmen. There’s no other way to put it. That’s exactly what we’re seeing right now. They want to take areas for instance like the ninth ward and turn them into big—you know, Wal-Mart type neighborhoods. In fact, we heard mayor Nagin talk yesterday about how one of the first things they want to do is set up a gigantic Wal-Mart so people returning can have a place to shop in New Orleans. This hurricane is the greatest thing to happen to Wal-Mart since the superstore. And this is a very serious racist series of actions that we’re seeing here right now. This is has everything to do with class and everything to do with race, and it’s very, very frightening. And yes, we attended a conference where grassroots activists are talking about a plan for rebuilding New Orleans, but it’s on right now, and they’re not a part of it. The people that are a part of it are old-time Louisiana white Republican families working in conjunction with their friend, mayor Ray Nagin, and there’s no other way to put it. They love Ray Nagin. He’s pro-business. He’s their guy.

    Look at the comments of James Rice, a local businessman, who is one of the leaders of the private Audubon Place, the gated community. The only privately owned in the city of New Orleans. He told The Wall Street Journal, “Those who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a completely different way, demographically, geographically and politically. I’m not just speaking for myself here. The way we have been living is not going to happen again or we’re out.” James Rice has brought in Israeli para-militaries to guard his facility. It’s Israeli company that brags about having former members of the Shin Beit, the GSS, the Israeli Defense Forces. He has brought them in. I was talking to them in front of his property. Some of them participated in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and these are guys now who are patrolling outside on St. Charles avenue in front of Audubon Place and will potentially come into conflict with residents of New Orleans. What on earth are Israeli paramilitaries doing on the streets of New Orleans? These are the questions that people need to ask right now, defending a man like James Rice who was called for the poor to not be allowed back into New Orleans.

    AMY GOODMAN: And Jeremy, as people are—some people slowly making their way back, reports of the spraying of the city with pesticide that’s never been used on urban populations and they’re mixing it with blue dye so that the pilots can see where they have sprayed, I think its called something like NALID, have you seen planes dispersing this pesticide?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: I remember the other night you called me and you alerted me to this, and just today I had seen what I thought were some sort of spy drones because really, what we have seen here is sort of—some people are calling it “New Oraq” instead of New Orleans, because of all of the various forces, the Halliburtons, the KBR’s, the Blackwaters that are here now, the connections to Iraq are so incredible. The same looters who have raided the federal funds in Iraq, U.S. funds in Iraq, are looting federal funds here in New Orleans. Yes, I saw the drones flying overhead. I’m concerned, very concerned of the toxic waste that they’re now dumping on the city in addition to the horribly unsafe waters that flow through the city and continue to flow through the city.

    AMY GOODMAN: Jeremy Scahill, thank you for being with us. Jeremy, speaking to us from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This is democracy now

    Creative Commons License The original content of this program is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. Please attribute legal copies of this work to democracynow.org. Some of the work(s) that this program incorporates, however, may be separately licensed. For further information or additional permissions, contact us.

    http://www.democracynow.org/2005/9/16/the_militarization_of_new_orleans_jeremy

    ***

    September 12, 2005
    Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans
    Katrinablackwater

    In addition to the thousands of military troops patrolling the streets of New Orleans, there are also scores of private soldiers that are now spreading out across the city, like those from the Blackwater Security firm. Democracy Now  correspondent Jeremy Scahill reports. [includes rush transcript]

    * Jeremy Scahill, Democracy Now  producer and correspondent.
    –Read: &quot;Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans&quot;

    Rush Transcript
    This transcript is available free of charge. However, donations help us provide closed captioning for the deaf and hard of hearing on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution.
    Donate – $25, $50, $100, More…

    AMY GOODMAN: Meanwhile, in New Orleans it is a militarized zone. When we came into the French Quarter on Saturday, we met some, well, interesting people.

    AMY GOODMAN: Did you just get here?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 1: We have been here a couple days.

    AMY GOODMAN: Yeah? Who are you working for?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 1: Blackwater.

    AMY GOODMAN: And who are they working for?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 1: Really don’t—don’t have any way to tell you that. You know, we just do our assignments, and we go from there.

    AMY GOODMAN: What’s your assignment today?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 1: I’m not at liberty to discuss. I’m sorry.

    AMY GOODMAN: Have any of your guys just come back from Iraq, by any chance?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 1: Last year.

    AMY GOODMAN: Have you?

    BLACKWATER MERCENARY 2: Last year. Who are you guys with?

    AMY GOODMAN: Blackwater. Today we’re going to talk about that with Democracy Now  correspondent, Jeremy Scahill. We have been traveling through New Orleans together. Jeremy, you wrote a piece this weekend called “Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans.”

    JEREMY SCAHILL: That’s right, Amy. And the Blackwater mercenaries became very well known internationally a few years back when four of their men were killed in Fallujah, Iraq. Two of them had their bodied burned and then hung from a bridge. And that resulted in the massive retaliatory onslaught against Fallujah that resulted in tens of thousands of people having to flee the city and scores of people being killed, and now Fallujah has become an international symbol of resistance, and that goes back to those killings of the four Blackwater workers.

    Well, as I was walking with Daniela Crespo through the streets of the French Quarter, we were talking to two New York City police officers when an unmarked vehicle pulled up, and there were three heavily armed men inside dressed in khaki outfits, and they asked the New York police officers, “Do you know where the Blackwaters guys are?” And my ears immediately perked up, because, of course, having covered Iraq for a long time, I know well who the Blackwater mercenaries are. And the New York police officer said, “Well, they’re down the street that way. There are lots of them around here.” And then I said to the New York police officer, “Blackwater? You mean, like the guys in Iraq?” And he said, “Yeah. They’re all over the place.”

    And so, we tracked them down, found them down the street, and just approached the Blackwater mercenaries and began talking to them. Two of the guys that we talked to had served on the personal security details of L. Paul Bremer, the American pro-counsel in Iraq originally, the head of the occupation, as well as the U.S. ambassador—former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte. One of the guys had just gotten back from Iraq two weeks ago. These are some of the most highly trained killers, professional killers in the world. And they had served in Iraq in a number of cities and in a number of capacities.

    And one of them was wearing a golden badge, that identified itself as being Louisiana law enforcement, and in fact, one of the Blackwater mercenaries told us that he had been deputized by the governor of Louisiana, and what’s interesting is that the federal government and the Department of Homeland Security have denied that they have hired any private security firms, saying that they have enough with government forces. Well, these Blackwater men that we spoke to said that they are actually on contract with the Department of Homeland Security and indeed with the governor of Louisiana. And they said that they’re sleeping in camps organized by the Department of Homeland Security.

    One of the Blackwater guys said that when he heard New Orleans, he asked, “What country is that in?” And he was bragging to me about how he drives around Iraq in what he called a State Department issued level five explosion-proof BMW. This, as U.S. soldiers don’t even have proper armor on their Humvees and other vehicles. And so, we also overheard one of the Blackwater guys talking to, we presume, a colleague, complaining that he was only being paid $350 a day plus his per diem, and that other firms were paying much more. And we’re seeing many of these Blackwater mercenaries and other private security agents roaming the streets of New Orleans.

    And what’s significant is that the way it’s being reported and the way the company is presenting it is that they are here to help with the hurricane relief efforts, but they told us clearly that they are engaged in quote, “stopping criminals” and that they’re actually patrolling the streets. In fact, we saw them take over a building on Bourbon Street when we were walking around with them. And now they have set up shop there on Bourbon Street in the French Quarter. So this is very, very disturbing, I think, for anyone who knows the record of Blackwater. Of course, they do not ask questions first. They shoot first, and that is their reputation in Iraq. And so, Americans should be asking right now what these kinds of trained killers are doing on the streets of New Orleans, apparently on contract from the Department of Homeland Security.

    AMY GOODMAN: And Jeremy, as we went around, saw other figures, we didn’t know who they worked for, like those in front of Hibernia Bank, as we were driving by and John Hamilton was filming. They flagged down our car. They said, “Stop the filming.” And we said, “Why?” And they said, “We just said ‘stop the filming.’” They said, “These are our streets,” and made clear next to their sports shirt, you could see clearly that they were carrying guns.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Yes, that’s right. And they also alleged that they had been deputized. And another key point is that these Blackwater guys said that they were given the authority to use lethal force, as well as the power to make arrests. And when we asked them about this use of them in the United States, they said that they believe that we’re going to see a lot more of this and that this is a trend. So, I think that this is a very, very disturbing development that we are seeing here on the streets of New Orleans, Amy.

    AMY GOODMAN: Well, if you want to read “Overkill” by Jeremy Scahill and Daniela Crespo, go to our website at DemocracyNow.org.

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    ***
    September 23, 2005
    Blackwater Down: Fresh From Iraq, Private Security Forces Roam the Streets of an American City With Impunity
    Katrinablackwater

    In this week’s cover story in The Nation, Democracy Now  correspondent Jeremy Scahill reports on how mercenaries from private security firms like Blackwater USA and BATS are patrolling the streets in New Orleans. [includes rush transcript]

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    In his article in The Nation, Jeremy Scahill writes:

    “As business leaders and government officials talk openly of changing the demographics of what was one of the most culturally vibrant of America’s cities, mercenaries from companies like DynCorp, Intercon, American Security Group, Blackhawk, Wackenhut and an Israeli company called Instinctive Shooting International (ISI) are fanning out to guard private businesses and homes, as well as government projects and institutions. Within two weeks of the hurricane, the number of private security companies registered in Louisiana jumped from 185 to 235. Some, like Blackwater, are under federal contract. Others have been hired by the wealthy elite”

    * Jeremy Scahill, Democracy Now  correspondent.
    –Read Jeremy Scahill’s article: &quot;Blackwater Down&quot;

    Rush Transcript
    This transcript is available free of charge. However, donations help us provide closed captioning for the deaf and hard of hearing on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution.
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    AMY GOODMAN: Jeremy, can you talk about the security scene that is enforcing what Naomi Klein has just described to us?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: One of the things that I think is really important to point out is that the very forces that Naomi’s talking about that are now trying to implement these sort of austerity measures in some ways and then these policies that target the poor. The forces that are implementing these policies are being backed up now by the very forces that we see operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. You have the U.S. military, of course and the National Guard and there’s an enormous number—It seems like everyone with a badge and gun is now descending on New Orleans. But you also have these private security companies like Blackwater. We have talked extensively about the role of Blackwater in New Orleans here on Democracy Now .

    I think we have to view this in the context of what we have seen for decades, in U.S. foreign policy and that is the hidden hand of the free market and the corporate elite, and then the iron fist of military force. So, these measures are being backed up by these private security firms. One of the people who’s brought in private security companies is a powerful businessman by the name of James Reese. He lives in the wealthy, elite, gated community of Audubon Place. They have the only privately owned street in the city of New Orleans. Well, he brought in a company called Instinctive Shooting International, which is an Israeli firm, and it’s actually owned and operated by a guy who lives in New Jersey and has had contracts to train New York City police officers, but he is an Israeli martial arts expert.

    This is part of a bigger trend of outsourcing the training of homeland security to Israeli firms. He brought in these Israeli paramilitaries one of whom bragged to me about having been involved with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. They’re standing there in front of the Audubon Place community. I went up and talked to them, and one of the guys said to me, we fight the Palestinians all day every day of our lives, and then tapping on his M-16, he said, most Americans, when they see this, they get scared. It’s enough to scare them away. But a lot of Americans, I think, would be shocked to know there are Israeli paramilitaries patrolling the streets of a U.S. city.

    But what’s more significant is who James Reese is, the man who brought them in. He serves in Mayor Ray Nagin’s administration. He also runs a powerful business lobby, and Naomi has talked about him as well. He also was quoted openly in the Wall Street Journal saying he doesn’t want black people or poor people to return to New Orleans. These kinds of sentiments are then being backed up by these military and paramilitary forces. Blackwater is also a very interesting case. They got a lucrative $400,000 contract from the federal government to provide security for FEMA reconstruction projects.

    The head of Blackwater, the founder, is a man named Eric Prince. He is a mega-billionaire from Michigan. His father was a close friend of Gary Bauer. His father helped to found the Family Research Council. His sister, Betsy, is married to Dick DeVos, who is going to be the gubernatorial candidate of the Republican Party in the state of Michigan. He, Dick DeVos, is the son of Richard DeVos, the founder of Amway, the greatest benefactor in the history of the Republican Party, the man who largely funded the Republican revolution in 1994, this Christian fundamentalist corporation, Amway. So he comes from a powerful Michigan family. He has given hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Republican Party. He started this firm Blackwater Security. He himself is a former navy S.E.A.L. He staffs it with people he describes as patriots, although, it’s interesting, they have been doing recruiting in Chile, hiring men who were trained under Augusto Pinochet’s regime. So these forces are now—there are about two hundred of them—in New Orleans right now. One hundred and sixty-four of them are on a no-bid federal contract with FEMA to provide protection for these sites. This is part of a bigger push by these paramilitary firms to gain contracts here in the United States. For instance, Blackwater seized on the fact that four of their employees were killed in Fallujah in March of 2004. Eric Prince viewed this as a profit moment. So, what he did is hired—

    AMY GOODMAN: This is that horrible moment—

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Where we saw the charred bodies. They were hanged, and it resulted in the massive U.S. onslaught against Fallujah that resulted in tens of thousands of people having to flee the city, scores of people being killed, innocent civilians. Of course, now Fallujah has become an international symbol of resistance against the U.S. occupation in Iraq. Well after these four Blackwater mercenaries were killed in Fallujah and then their bodies mutilated and hung from a bridge, Eric Prince hired the Alexander Group which is a powerful Republican lobby firm tied to House Majority Leader, Tom DeLay, and then hired a former C.I.A. Department of—C.I.A., State department official, named Coffer Black, to help promote their cause in Washington. I

    In fact, just as the hurricane was hitting, another high-level person from the Pentagon was hired by the Prince Group, the parent company of Blackwater, Joseph Schmitz. He had just resigned as the Inspector General of the Pentagon. He himself was involved with numerous scandals. So he is then brought on board, and then they get this contract. What’s interesting is that when I spoke to the Blackwater mercenaries in New Orleans, they said clearly, we’re here on a Department of Homeland Security contract.

    That was denied by the Department of Homeland Security. One them showed me a badge, said he had been deputized by the Governor of the State of Louisiana. That was then denied. Well, after this report came out, and it went all over the web, and we talked about it on Democracy Now , the response was tremendous.

    Blackwater was then under siege from reporters confronting them with this, and they were forced to admit and so was the federal government, that in fact, Blackwater was on the Department of Homeland Security contract and that, in fact, they did operate with a letter from the Governor of the State of Louisiana, authorizing them to carry loaded weapons. So they’re patrolling in unmarked cars around the streets, and they said that they were confronting criminals and stopping looters.

    JUAN GONZALEZ: You actually interviewed some who claimed to have been involved in shootouts and to have actually shot people?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Right, and this is something that really underscores the danger of having these kinds of private security forces on the streets. I was—I walked down to a hotel on the corner of Bourbon and Canal in the French Quarter called the Astor Crown Plaza. It’s a five star hotel operated by one of the wealthiest businesspeople in the state of Louisiana, a man named F. Patrick Quinn III. He is married to Republican State Senator, Julie Quinn. They are a powerful Louisiana Republican family. He is the owner of the largest hotel chain in the state of Louisiana, and is a powerhouse hotel owner in the South, in general.

    I was talking to his head of security, a guy named Michael Montgomery. He told me he was with a company based in Alabama called Body Guard and Tactical Security. Actually, Juan, when I was talking to him, he—I said that I was from New York, and he said, “Oh, I was in New York once.” I said, “Oh, yeah?” He said, “I was there for the New York Daily News strike,” and I naively thought somehow that he was an employee, that he had been an employee of the Daily News and I said, “My colleague and friend, Juan Gonzalez, was one of the leaders of that strike. He goes,  Oh, I know Juan Gonzalez. I spiked his car.” I said, what do you mean? He goes,  I was working security there, and we spiked about forty Daily News employees’ cars at La Guardia airport. He said he put sugar in the gas tanks of the car. So that was my introduction to the guy. So we start talking, and then I asked him, well—

    JUAN GONZALEZ: So you solved the riddle of that big repair bill I had back in 1990.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Well, what’s interesting, Juan, is you could send it to the BATS Company, Bodyguard And Tactical Security, except they don’t exist. I talked to the Secretary of State offices in Alabama and Louisiana. There’s no company called BATS registered. They were wearing uniforms that said Bodyguard and Tactical Security. So as I talked to him, this representative from the phantom company hired by a powerful Republican businessman, married to a Republican State Senator, a major donor to the Republican party and the Bush-Cheney campaign, operator of a five star hotel, that’s, he said, under consideration for lucrative FEMA contract to house their workers, it’s interesting, because the hotel remains pretty much empty. There are no FEMA workers coming in there.

    But as I talked to this man who said that he had spiked your car, he told me a very scary story, that I think is the source for potential litigation against these private security firms. Michael Montgomery, the head of BATS, said that on the second night he was in New Orleans he was going to pick up one of Mr. Quinn’s associates. They got stopped in the ninth ward. He said they came under fire from a group of people on an overpass that he described as black gang bangers. He said, “At the time I was on the phone with my business partner.” I said, “What did you do then?” He said, “I dropped the phone and opened fire.” I said, “With what kind of weapons?”—“AR-15 assault rifles and Glock 9’s.” Fired up at the people he described as black gang bangers on this bridge. I said, “Then what happened? Did you kill them?” He said, “Well, let’s just put it this way, I heard a lot of moaning and screaming, and the shooting stopped. Enough said.”

    Well then he said that the Army came and responded to the incident, surrounded them and thought that “we were the enemy.” That’s how he said it. He said, “I then explained to the Army soldiers that we were security. They didn’t care. They didn’t file a report. They left.” Five minutes later, Louisiana State Troopers come. They ask what happened. He explains the story to them. They then ask him, “How do we get out of the city.”

    So this is the climate of impunity. This man—and as Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights points out, how do we know that he was fired upon? How do we know what that incident was? Why wouldn’t law enforcement file any kind of report on a shootout in which this guy is openly bragging to having shot up a bunch of people he described as black gang bangers on an overpass?

    So if I, as an investigative journalist, cannot track down this company, what if you were one of the people who was shot and wounded by this guy? What if you are the family member of someone who was killed by him and you cannot trace down this company? In fact, the Louisiana agency that governs and licenses private security firms, when I talked to them, they were furious, and they say that they are going to be serving papers on him today to cease and desist operating as a security officer in the State of Louisiana.

    What’s key is that he was hired by Patrick Quinn. Patrick Quinn is liable for the torts of his employees. So if this man, in fact, did shoot up a bunch of people, Patrick Quinn, this wealthy, powerful businessman is also responsible for it. What’s interesting is that Patrick Quinn, bringing in an apparently unlicensed company to provide security, is that while you have shelters teeming with people desperate for work, Patrick Quinn is bringing in Mexican workers from Texas to clean out his hotel, and because of Davis-Bacon, they don’t have to pay them—because of the wipe out of the Davis-Bacon Act, they don’t have to pay them livable wages. So that’s why they don’t want to go in and hire, for instance, African-American men and women to come and clean the hotel, because that gives them jobs and keeps them in the community. Instead, you bring in cheap labor from Texas, Mexicans piled on the back of a truck.

    AMY GOODMAN: Soon after you did your piece, Jeremy, on Blackwater, when you first got down to New Orleans, and we posted it on the website, we started to get letters and email. There’s an email petition of Blackwater employees. Describe it.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Yeah, the Blackwater employees and families have initiated a petition against me. What’s interesting is that they don’t take issue with any of the facts that I have reported. They take issue with the fact that I quote one of the Blackwater employees complaining that he’s only getting paid $350 because normally, they get $1,000 or more—

    AMY GOODMAN: A day.

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Right, a day. They say they’re just trying to provide for their families and put food on the table. These guys are making $1,000-plus a day in Iraq and have all sorts of tax breaks. Well, now they’re complaining of only getting $350 a day.

    The letter, this petition goes on to talk about how they’re like any computer programmer or any auto worker. What’s interesting is—I don’t know about you, but I have never met an auto worker who makes $1,000 a day.
    AMY GOODMAN: Naomi Klein, you can describe how this security scene that Jeremy is describing on the streets of New Orleans fits in to your assessment of purging the poor?

    NAOMI KLEIN: Well, Amy, I think what it really underscores is the violence of the economic project itself. I mean, what we are talking about is a wrenching process of uprooting hundreds of thousands of people, who are deeply rooted culturally, historically, economically, in the city of New Orleans. New Orleans is a city with a rich radical history, and people aren’t going to accept this without a fight. That’s why the radical gentrifiers of New Orleans are arriving with their own private armies.

    You know, I was talking about this with Jeremy yesterday. It’s almost like a kind of yuppy sci-fi version of old-school colonial warfare. It’s like the military industrial complex has been replaced by the mercenary condominium complex. Because, what we are talking about here, the characters that Jeremy is describing like Quinn and Reese, these are the key land developers in New Orleans. They are the ones who are hiring these mercenaries to be the muscle behind the projects. So, I think that that is really the message.

    But there’s something else at play. You hear these names like Blackwater and then on the contracting side, the people getting the job to rebuild New Orleans are Bechtel, Halliburton, Fluor. These are the same companies that are in Iraq and Afghanistan. And they arrived very, very quickly, and the reason they arrived so quickly is because reconstruction now is a standing multi-billion dollar industry, global industry. Whenever there is a war or natural disaster, they move in instantly, often with pre-signed contracts.

    You know, we were all in New Orleans, and I think, you know, that city needs a lot of things. It needs pumps. It needs affordable housing. It needs water, and it needs electricity, but I didn’t see any shortage of law enforcement. As Jeremy said, you know, everybody with a badge and gun is there. So, the presence of these privatized police forces, I think is more ideological than it is anything else. Ideology is really driving the reconstruction project, and if you listen to what’s being said by groups like the Republican Study Committee, they’re very clear about this.

    They talk in the language of experimentation. They talk, like Ted said, “Bringing free market ideas to the disaster zone is white hot right now.” Treasury secretary, John Snow, said, you know, “This is a time for all sorts of experiments.” It’s almost like they’re putting on lab coats and seeing this area of massive humanitarian devastation as a place where they can vindicate their ideology. Their ideology, you know, suffered a pretty serious blow by the disaster itself.

    I mean, there was talk in the first couple of days after the levees broke, that this was going to be for neoconservativism what the fall of the Berlin wall was for communism. That this was itself this incredibly graphic, damning event for the ideology of privatization, and Harry Belafonte, the other night, you know, he had a great quote at the fund-raiser organized by Wynton Marsalis where he said “This was the result of a political authority that subcontracts its responsibility to the private sector and abdicates responsibility altogether,” but of course what Jeremy is describing is a radical abdication, further abdication in response to the disaster.

    What I saw when I was in New Orleans was really the emergence of an absolutely unmasked corporate military state. Now, I know these sound like buzz words, but I’ll give you an example. One of the images that’s really stuck in my mind is the conversion of a huge Wal-Mart into a military base in downtown New Orleans. They call it Camp Wal-Mart. So here you have—and we even hear people suggesting that Wal-Mart should replace FEMA at running disaster response.

    Another example of this is: There’s a building in Baton Rouge, which is the Capital Annex, which is attached to the state legislature. It’s where a lot of the government offices are located. Well, after the flood, the state—the Capital Annex building was opened up to many of the business groups that we have been discussing.

    So, now, you have in that building, a complete merger of government interests. You have got the Mayor’s office working out of that building. You have the state legislature working out of that building, but you also have James Reese’s business association. You also have Greater New Orleans, Inc., which is a private lobby group representing everyone from Shell and Chevron to Coca-Cola, in that building. Then you have the Association of Conventions and Tourism, which is another private business group in that building.

    Every morning—I was told this by the Assistant Secretary of Economic Development for Louisiana, he said, every morning there’s an 8:30 meeting where seven to ten people from government and business sit down and plan the reconstruction of New Orleans. So, it is literally the merger—completely unmasked—of corporate and state interests. There’s no distinction. No, they’re not inviting the Teacher’s Union to be at these meetings. They’re not inviting housing rights activists to be at the meetings. You even see this in the repopulation plans for this city.

    JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, Naomi, if I can just interrupt, because we have to cut this segment off, I’d like to ask Jeremy, any final remarks?

    JEREMY SCAHILL: Senator Barak Obama has questioned giving this $400,000 contract to the Blackwater security firm. I think that’s a question that people need to be posing to their officials, because Congress could move swiftly to cut the welfare chain off for these private security firms, and it’s something concrete that people can do right now as we look at the reconstruction of New Orleans, is to insure that as people do try to come back and rebuild their communities, that they don’t have to face down the very paramilitary thugs that are killing people in Iraq.

    AMY GOODMAN: Jeremy Scahill, Naomi Klein, thanks so much for being with us. This is Democracy Now

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    Defense Intelligence Agency
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    DIA  redirects here. For other uses, see Dia.
    This article is missing citations or needs footnotes. Please help add inline citations to guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (January 2009)
    Defense Intelligence Agency
    Seal of the DIA
    Seal of the DIA
    Agency overview
    Formed     1 October 1961
    Employees     Approx. 16,500 (35% military, and 65% civilian)
    Annual budget     Classified
    Agency executive     Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA, Director
    Website
    http://www.dia.mil

    The Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, is a major producer and manager of military intelligence for the United States Department of Defense, employing over 16,500 military and civilian employees worldwide. The Defense Intelligence Community is headed by the DIA, through its Director (who chairs the Military Intelligence Board), and coordinates the activities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force intelligence components. The DIA and DIC provide military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners within the Department of Defense and the United States Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition. DIA, designated in 1986 as a Defense Department combat support agency, was established in 1961 as a result of a decision by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, under President John F. Kennedy. The Department of Defense created DIA with the publication of Directive 5105.21,  Defense Intelligence Agency  on 1 August, effective 1 October 1961. DIA was preceded by the Counter Intelligence Corps.
    Contents

    * 1 History
    * 2 Overview
    o 2.1 Mission
    o 2.2 Vision
    o 2.3 DIA seal
    * 3 DIA organization
    * 4 See also
    * 5 References
    * 6 External links

    History

    After World War II until the creation of DIA, the three Military Departments collected, produced and distributed their intelligence for individual use. This turned out to be duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each department provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense or to other governmental agencies.

    The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 wanted to correct these deficiencies by assigning responsibility for Unified and Specified Command intelligence support. However, the intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, the coordination was poor and the first results were short of national reliability and focus. As a result of this poor organization, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the Joint Study Group in 1960 to find better ways for organizing the nation’s military intelligence activities.

    Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of his decision to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency in February 1961. He ordered them to develop a concept plan that would integrate all the military intelligence of the DoD. During the spring and summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (soon to become DIA’s first director) took the lead in planning and organizing this new agency. The JCS published DoD Directive 5105.21,  Defense Intelligence Agency  on 1 August, and DIA began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space on 1 October 1961.

    DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. The new Agency’s mission was the continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Other objectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

    Following DIA’s establishment, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of defense intelligence. A year after its formation, in October 1962, the Agency faced its first major intelligence test during the superpower confrontation that developed after Soviet missiles were discovered at bases in Cuba by U.S. Air Force spy planes.

    In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School (now the National Defense Intelligence College), and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the  A  and  B  Buildings at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

    The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963. Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attaché System – the last function the Services transferred to DIA.
    During these early years of DIA’s existence, Agency attempts to establish itself as DoD’s central military intelligence organization met with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency’s ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the war increased defense intelligence’s involvement in efforts to account for American service members missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

    During the 1960s, DIA analysts focused on: China’s detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its Cultural Revolution; increasing unrest among African nations; fighting in Cyprus and Kashmir; and the missile gap between the US and the Soviets. In the late 1960s, crises that tested intelligence responsiveness included: the Tet Offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria; North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo; and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

    The early 1970s were transitional years as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating its functions and establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. Challenges facing DIA at this time included: the rise of Ostpolitik in Germany; the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast; and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam.

    The Agency’s reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970s, as decision makers increasingly recognized the value of its products. Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende’s regime in Chile, and the prisoners of war being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved: détente; the development of arms control agreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; and global energy concerns.

    Intense Congressional review during 1975-76 created turbulence within the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many Intelligence Community functions. At the same time, with American involvement in Vietnam ending, defense intelligence faced a significant decline in resources. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified Commands, and also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). Faced with similar resource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. Despite these and other Community-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the loss of resources during the 1970s limited the Community’s ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

    As resources declined, intelligence requirements expanded. By the late 1970s, Agency analysts were focused on Lebanon, China, South Africa, terrorism, and Southeast Asia POW issues. In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA’s relationship with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Secretary assigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resource area to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisory responsibility regarding policy matters. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the time centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijacking, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Middle East tensions.

    Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American embassy in Teheran in 1979. Also, of serious concern were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, border clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II.

    Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA’s national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support.

    DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both field commanders and national-level decision makers. DIA’s publication in 1981 of the first in a series of whitepapers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled Soviet Military Power met with wide acclaim. Ten such booklets were published subsequently over roughly the next decade. World crises continued to flare and included the downing of two Libyan Su-22s by American F-14s over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian air raids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

    Other analysis at this time was focused on the war over the Falkland Islands, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. Other DIA analytical efforts during the mid-1980s centered on the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency’s first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the previous year during a series of crises–the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro, unrest in the Philippines, and counter-terrorist operations against Libya.

    Also at this time, the Agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union, counter-narcotics, war fighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. DoD moved decisively to improve its automated data bases and apply additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

    Designated a combat support agency under the Goldwater-Nicholas Defense Reorganization Act, DIA moved quickly to increase cooperation with the Unified & Specified Commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine. Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran–Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation Earnest Will while closely monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS Stark, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The  Toyota War  between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA’s heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

    Subsequently, the Agency provided threat data on  hot spots  throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing the impact of changes in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decision makers with intelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, events surrounding the downing of several Libyan jets, the civil war in Liberia, and the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Weapons acquisition issues, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism, likewise, remained high priority issues.

    With the end of the Cold War, defense intelligence began a period of reevaluation following the fall of Communism in many of the East European countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoing economic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production, DoD-wide, as resource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agency objectives and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the concept of functional management to better address unified & specified command intelligence issues.

    In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation Desert Storm began, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligence support effort. Most of them associated in some way with the national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in The Pentagon to integrate the intelligence being produced throughout the Community. DIA sent more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations to provide intelligence support. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern times.

    The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the Army for over 20 and 50 years respectively, became part of DIA in January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.

    Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, DIA has been active in nuclear proliferation intelligence collection and analysis with particular interests in North Korea and Iran as well as counter-terrorism. DIA was also involved with the intelligence build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was a subject in the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq. The Defense Intelligence Agency has conflicted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collection and analysis on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and has often represented the Pentagon in the CIA-DoD intelligence rivalry due to DIA’s alleged clandestine HUMINT collection and often overlapping analysis products. Operational military intelligence has also been a focus, particularly in Iraq with insurgency threats and asymmetric warfare. The DIA is responsible for assessing the current and projected national security threats to the United States as well as presenting these assessments to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The DIA still actively maintains its responsibility for conventional strategic and operational military intelligence.

    Overview
    The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base

    DIA’s Director is a three-star military officer who serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence. The Director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community. The exact numbers and specific budget information are not publicly released due to security considerations. DIA has major operational activities at The Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. [show location on an interactive map] 38°50?53?N 77°00?43?W? / ?38.848°N 77.012°W? / 38.848; -77.012, the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, Alabama. DIA is a member of the United States Intelligence Community, reporting to the Director of National Intelligence.

    DIA possesses a diverse workforce skilled in the areas of military history and doctrine, economics, physics, chemistry, world history, political science, bio-sciences, computer sciences, and many other fields of expertise.

    The Agency responds to the needs of a variety of customers from the President of the United States to the soldier in the field. Its work encompasses all aspects of military intelligence requirements – from highly complex missile trajectory data to biographical information on foreign military leaders.

    In August 2008, the agency announced that it would subject each of its 5,700 prospective and current employees to a polygraph interrogation at least once annually.[1]

    Mission

    DIA’s mission is to provide timely and objective military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners. It is considered to be a member of the Intelligence Community. The director of DIA is the main adviser to the United States Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters related to military intelligence. Under the support of the Military Intelligence Board, DIA unifies the Defense Intelligence Community on major issues such as the number of deployed forces, assessments, policy, and resources. To help weapon systems planners and the Defense community, DIA plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.

    Vision

    Integration of highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading edge technology to discover information and create knowledge that provides warning, identifies opportunities, and delivers overwhelming advantage to the nation’s warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.

    DIA seal

    The dark blue background of the seal signifies the unknown, or the threats and challenges of the world around us. The flaming gold torch symbolizes the Intelligence function, lighting the way to a known world symbolized by the blue-green planet. The eternal search for knowledge and truth is the worldwide mission of DIA. The two red ellipses symbolize the technical aspects of intelligence today and in the future. The 13 stars and the wreath identify DIA as a Department of Defense organization.

    DIA organization

    DIA is led by a Director, typically a three-star military officer. The current director is Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA, who assumed command in March 2009. Letitia A. Long was appointed deputy director in May 2006, and Phillip R. Roberts has served as chief of staff since March 2007.
    Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA; 17th Director of DIA

    DIA is organized into these primary operational directorates:

    Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH): This directorate manages DIA’s and the DoD’s human source intelligence collection, including the Defense Attache System, and is the primary interface between the Department of Defense and the National Clandestine Service. DH conducts worldwide strategic HUMINT collection operations in support of DoD, national intelligence requirements, and military operations. It deploys teams of linguists, field analysts, case officers, interrogation experts, technical specialists, and special forces.

    Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection (DT): Collects Measurement and Signature Intelligence which is technical intelligence that – when collected, processed, and analyzed by dedicated MASINT systems – results in intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. This often includes radar intelligence, acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological intelligence. DIA is the central agency for MASINT collection within the US Intelligence Community.

    Directorate for Analysis (DI): Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities, transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), terrorism, and missile systems and contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the President’s Daily Brief. The Directorate of Analysis also manages the National Center for Medical Intelligence, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, and the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agency’s facilities as well as in the field.

    Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff (J2): Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence for defense policy and war planning.

    Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DJ): Fuses tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence assets and serves as the center for coordination of these assets in response to combatant command requirements. The DIOCC is closely integrated with the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to provide a unified Department of Defense intelligence command center to combine operations with intelligence and advise the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, warfighters, and the DNI’s National Intelligence Coordination Center.

    DIA also runs the National Defense Intelligence College.

    See also
    Military of the United States portal

    * Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
    * Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
    * Missile and Space Intelligence Center
    * Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
    * Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (US Strategic Command)
    * Office of Naval Intelligence
    * Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
    * Coast Guard Intelligence Center
    * National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
    * National Security Agency
    * US Intelligence Community
    * United States Director of National Intelligence
    * Defense Attaché System
    * Strategic Support Branch
    * National Defense Intelligence College
    * Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
    * US Intelligence Community A-Space

    References

    1. ^ Hess, Pamela,  Pentagon’s Intelligence Arm Steps Up Lie-Detector Efforts , Arizona Daily Star, August 24, 2008.
    External links

    * DIA official site
    * JCS J2 official site
    * Missile and Space Intelligence Center
    * National Ground Intelligence Center
    * National Air and Space Intelligence Center
    * Office of Naval Intelligence
    * Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
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    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Agency
    Categories: United States Department of Defense agencies | Defense Intelligence Agency | Military intelligence agencies

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Agency

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    Business Transformation Agency
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Business Transformation Agency logo

    The Business Transformation Agency (BTA) is an organization of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) responsible for guiding the Department’s business operations modernization. Founded in October 2005, the agency fosters business operations support for the American warfighter and seeks to provide accountability to the American taxpayer by systematically improving DoD’s business processes, ERP systems and investment governance. To accomplish the goal of providing consistency, consolidation and coordination across the Department of Defense, the BTA produced the Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) — an integrated and executable roadmap that observes the standards laid out in the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA). The ETP and the BEA enable the Department to transform business operations to achieve improved warfighter support while enabling financial accountability across the Department of Defense.
    Contents

    * 1 Business Transformation
    * 2 Organization
    o 2.1 Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive
    o 2.2 Enterprise Integration
    o 2.3 Enterprise Planning and Investment
    o 2.4 Priorities & Requirements – Financial Management
    o 2.5 Priorities & Requirements – Human Resource Management
    o 2.6 Priorities & Requirements – Supply Chain Management
    o 2.7 Warfighter Requirements
    o 2.8 Chief of Staff
    * 3 History
    * 4 References
    * 5 External links
    * 6 See also

    Business Transformation

    In the last decades of the 20th century, the Department of Defense business model was configured to support a military dependent on large-scale weapons systems and prepared for sustained, predictable battlefield engagements in specific parts of the world. With the challenges that face the US military in the 21st century, the DoD seeks to allow the defense business enterprise to adapt, flex and react effectively to the needs of its modern joint warfighter. Transformation seeks to make DoD business operations more agile, lean and rapid. The Department calls its approach to this “federated” – meaning that uniformed and civilian leadership at all levels in the DoD are accountable for transformation progress. This effort is structured to support four strategic objectives:

    * Develop and provide support for US joint warfighting capability
    * Enable rapid access to information for strategic decisions by fostering the development of interoperable and efficient ERP systems
    * Reduce the cost of Defense Business operations
    * Improve financial stewardship to the American people

    The Defense Business Systems Management Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, leads the Transformation endeavor. The BTA serves as a catalyst for transformation by coordinating and integrating transformation activity at the DoD enterprise level.

    Organization

    The BTA is divided into 8 directorates organized around the functions of supporting defense business transformation. Overseeing these directorates is Director David M. Fisher, author of Optimize Now (or else ) (ISBN 0-595-29837-0), a guide to successful organizational transformation.

    Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive

    The DBSAE provides direct oversight of 27 DoD-wide ERP programs. Notable among these programs are the Defense Travel System (DTS), the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).

    Enterprise Integration

    EI works to ensure fast adoption of DoD-wide information and process standards as defined in the BEA. They seek to eliminate burdensome processes that hinder successful, speedy deployment of ERP capabilities within the DoD components.

    Enterprise Planning and Investment

    EP&I provides investment management leadership for DoD Enterprise-level business systems. It coordinates the efforts of DoD’s acquisition policy as outlined in the DoD 5000 series pertaining to business systems. The Directorate also provides input for the Quadrennial Defense Review. EP&I is responsible for the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA), the Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) and the March Congressional Report (MCR). EP&I is the result of a merger of the former directorates Transformation Priorities & Requirements and Investment Management.

    Priorities & Requirements – Financial Management

    P&R-FM is the primary link to the Principal Staff Assistants within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DoD-level organizations; in particular the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and OSD (Comptroller). They ensure that the financial visibility priorities and requirements of these client organizations are reflected in the BEA and ETP, and in the guidance for business system investment management.

    Priorities & Requirements – Human Resource Management

    P&R-HRM is the primary link to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) regarding all human resource management related transformation activities. They align functional priorities and requirements of these client organizations in the BEA and ETP, and in the guidance for business system investment management.

    Priorities & Requirements – Supply Chain Management

    P&R-SCM serves as the primary link to the Principal Staff Assistants within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DoD-level organizations as they relate to Supply Chain Management. They ensure that functional priorities Material Visibility, Common Supplier Engagement, Acquisition Visibility, and Real Property Accountability are reflected in the BEA and the ETP, and in the guidance for business system investment management.

    Warfighter Requirements

    WR identifies and resolves urgent DoD business issues that are directly affecting the warfighter. The WR also serves as an advocate for the warfighter within the BTA. WR projects include economic roundtables that bring together organizations responsible for middle east economic redevelopment with warfighters who are about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. These roundtables establish a working relationship that can be continued once the warfighters are deployed.

    Chief of Staff

    The office of the Chief of Staff provides operational support for the employees at the BTA. This includes sections managing personnel, pay, planning, budgeting, infrastructure, IT and internal management activities.

    History

    The Business Transformation Agency was established by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on October 7, 2005.[1] The founding executives of the BTA were Co-Directors–Thomas Modly, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management, and Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation; Director of Transformation Planning and Performance–David Fisher; Director of Transformation Priorities and Requirements–Radha Sekar; Director; Director of Investment Management–Paul Ketrick; Director of Warfighter Support–Bob Love; Director of Information and Federation Management–David Scantling; and Director of Agency Operations–Navy Captain Michael Murphy.

    References

    1. ^ http://www.bta.mil/index.html

    External links

    * BTA Website
    * Defense Business Transformation website
    * DoD memo defining the organization of the BTA (PDF)

    See also

    * Business Transformation

    Agencies under the United States Department of Defense
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    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_Transformation_Agency
    Categories: United States Department of Defense agencies | 2005 establishments

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_Transformation_Agency
    ***
    Federal Voting Assistance Program
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    FVAP logo

    The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) administers the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act for the United States Secretary of Defense. FVAP is responsible for educating U.S. citizens worldwide of their right to vote, increasing participation, and enhancing the electoral process at the Federal, State and local levels.

    FVAP is also responsible for administering the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 for U.S. citizens abroad. FAVP allows eligible citizens to register to vote at 6000 Armed Forces Recruitment Offices nationwide.

    Voter education

    FAVP informs voters how to register and vote in elections and educates voters of any state specific laws.

    * Absentee Voting Frequently Asked Questions
    * Integrated Voting Alternative Site (IVAS)

    Forms

    * Federal Post Card Application
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    Further information: Official FVAP website

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Voting_Assistance_Program

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    National Intelligence Coordination Center
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    The National Intelligence Coordination Center was established on 1 October 2007 by the United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The center’s purpose is to give the DNI the means to more effectively and efficiently direct and integrate collection assets and activities of all national, defense and domestic intelligence organizations against standing and emergent strategic intelligence priorities.[1] [2]

    See also

    * Director of National Intelligence
    * DIOCC
    * DIA

    References

    1. ^  United States Intelligence Community 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration,  DNI, October 10, 2007
    2. ^  In new 500-day plan, ODNI previews the future,  Jason Miller, FCW.com, October 11, 2007

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Intelligence_Coordination_Center
    Categories: Director of National Intelligence | United States intelligence agencies

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Intelligence_Coordination_Center

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    Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    (Redirected from DIOCC)

    The Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) is a United States Department of Defense organization under the Defense Intelligence Agency that is responsible for integrated intelligence operations and collection. Located in the DIAC the DIOCC integrates into a single organization the functions of DIA’s Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) and the United States Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). The DIOCC also serves as the Defense Department’s focal point to interface with the newly established National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).[1]

    See also

    * United States Department of Defense
    * Defense Intelligence Agency
    * Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    * National Intelligence Coordination Center
    * Director of National Intelligence
    * Secretary of Defense

    References

    1. ^  DIA Update: Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center,  DIA Press Release, October 3, 2007

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Operations_Coordination_Center
    Categories: Defense Intelligence Agency | United States Department of Defense agencies | Military intelligence agencies | United States intelligence agencies

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DIOCC

    ***
    Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Please help improve this article or section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page. (January 2007)

    The Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC ISR) is a subordinate command of the United States Strategic Command, one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands under the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and co-located with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In its relatively new status, it serves as the epicenter for planning, execution and assessment of the United States military’s global Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations; a key enabler to achieving global situational awareness.
    Contents

    * 1 Mission
    * 2 Commander
    * 3 Mission Specifics
    * 4 Divisions
    * 5 See also

    Mission

    In support of USSTRATCOM’s global ISR mission, JFCC-ISR develops strategies and plans; integrates national, DoD, and international partner capabilities; and executes DoD ISR operations to satisfy combatant command and national operational and intelligence requirements.

    Commander

    Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, USA is the Commander, JFCC-ISR, and also serves as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in this dual-hatted position. The Commander, JFCC-ISR is responsible for coordinating global intelligence collection to address DoD worldwide operations and national intelligence requirements.

    Mission Specifics

    Established in March 2005 as a component of USSTRATCOM, and officially active on 4 November 2005, JFCC-ISR conducts planning to employ DoD ISR resources to meet national, departmental and combatant command requirements. In coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the military services and other mission partners, JFCC-ISR ensures the integration of DOD and national ISR efforts to satisfy combatant command and national operational and intelligence requirements. JFCC-ISR synchronizes the use of national, DoD, and allies’ ISR capabilities with employment of theater ISR resources and, when appropriate, with other collection activities, including human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and open source intelligence.

    JFCC-ISR planning includes an assessment of potential risks and intelligence gaps associated with proposed options, and recommends actions to mitigate risks and gaps. When options involve use of theater ISR assets, JFCC-ISR communicates with theater and service operations and intelligence staffs to coordinate operations and to resolve competition for ISR resources. JFCC-ISR monitors the execution of planned ISR activities. JFCC-ISR generates an ISR Global Situation Awareness display and shares data from that display with appropriate entities. As data is collected and becomes usable, JFCC-ISR ensures its availability to the widest body of operators, planners and analytic organizations. JFCC-ISR evaluates collected data and recommends adjustments to plans or other actions to improve collection results.

    JFCC-ISR plans, executes and integrates ISR activities in support of USSTRATCOM’s strategic and global missions. The JFCC-ISR AOI extends worldwide, from underwater to space and overlays, but does not affect other areas of responsibilities assigned to combatant commands. This AOI includes the full spectrum of military needs, including transnational threats, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Global War on Terror.

    Divisions

    The Component’s four Divisions include: Operations, Plans and Strategy, Assessments, and Special Activities. These divisions are spefically responsible for the following:

    * Develop and maintain a Global Situational Awareness display of deployed ISR
    * Participate in adaptive planning to support combatant commands’ Intelligence Campaign Planning efforts
    * Recommend allocation strategies based on operational and intelligence requirements
    * Help combatant commands synchronize DoD collection with activities of national/international ISR collectors
    * Recommend actions to persuade or dissuade adversaries through the use of ISR operations
    * Manage the special activities approval process to synchronize and optimize use of ISR assets
    * Help develop courses of action and options to mitigate consequent risks and gaps
    * Use modeling/simulation tools to test support plans and determine optimal allocation of ISR assets
    * Assess/identify/define gaps, shortfalls, priorities and redundancies of ISR capabilities
    * Integrate ISR Special Activities in support of combatant command requirements
    See also

    * Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    * United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Functional_Component_Command_for_Intelligence,_Surveillance_and_Reconnaissance
    Categories: Defense Intelligence Agency

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Functional_Component_Command_for_Intelligence,_Surveillance_and_Reconnaissance

    ***
    Unified Combatant Command
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references (ideally, using inline citations). Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (January 2009)
    Areas of Responsibility

    A Unified Combatant Command (UCC) is a United States joint military command composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is organized either on a geographical basis (known as  Area Of Responsibility , AOR) or on a functional basis. All UCCs are commanded by either a four star general or admiral and are considered  joint  commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation. UCCs (formerly known as  COCOMs , a term now reserved exclusively for the authority they hold, which is also called  combatant command ) are led by Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), formerly known as a regional  Commander-in Chief  (CINC; pronounced  Sink ).

    The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is updated annually in conjunction with the DoD Fiscal Year and can modify areas of responsibility or combatant command alignments or assignments.[1] As of January 2008, there were ten Unified Combatant Commands as specified in Title 10 and the latest annual UCP. Six have regional responsibilities, and four have functional responsibilities.
    Contents

    * 1 History
    o 1.1 Creation of USAFRICOM
    o 1.2 Former Unified Combatant Commands
    * 2 List of current Unified Combatant Commands
    * 3 Combatant Commanders
    * 4 Other Changes and Proposals
    * 5 References
    * 6 See also
    History

    President Truman approved the first Unified Command Plan on 14 December 1946.[2] It encompassed the following:

    * Alaskan Command
    * Atlantic Fleet
    * Caribbean Command
    * United States European Command
    * Far East Command
    * Northeast Command
    * United States Pacific Command

    The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clarified and codified responsibilities that CINCs and their predecessors (theater or area commanders) had undertaken since World War II, and which were first given legal status in 1947.

    The U.S. Atlantic Command became the Joint Forces Command in the 1990s after the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic had disappeared and the need rose for an integrating and experimentation command for forces in the continental United States.

    Regional CINCs were created in order to have a local supreme commander who could exercise unified command and control across service boundaries, ideally eliminating or diminishing interservice rivalries. CINCs reported directly to the United States Secretary of Defense, and through him to the President of the United States. One of the best known CINCs was Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) during Operation Desert Storm.

    On 24 October 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced that in accordance with Title 10 of the US Code (USC), the title of  Commander-in-Chief  would thereafter be reserved for the President, consistent with the terms of Article II of the United States Constitution. Thereafter, the military CINCs would be known as  combatant commanders , as heads of the Unified Combatant Commands.

    Creation of USAFRICOM

    Discussion of adding a sixth geographical command with an AOR aligned to Africa (which had previously been assigned to three separate Combatant Commands) began before the departure of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This sixth geographical combatant command for Africa (USAFRICOM) was approved 6 February 2007.

    U.S. Africa Command was established in October 2007 and operated under U.S. European Command during its first year. October 1, 2008 marked U.S. Africa Command’s transition to independent Unified Command Status. It is now focused on synchronizing hundreds of activities inherited from three regional commands that previously coordinated U.S. military relations in Africa.[3]
    Former Unified Combatant Commands

    * United States Atlantic Command – USLANTCOM (1947 – 1999)
    * United States Readiness Command – USREDCOM (1972 – 1987)
    * United States Strike Command – USSTRICOM (1961 – 1972)
    * United States Space Command – USSPACECOM (1985 – 2002)

    List of current Unified Combatant Commands

    Regional Responsibilities:

    * United States Africa Command – USAFRICOM (HQ: Kelley Barracks, in Stuttgart, Germany)
    * United States Central Command – USCENTCOM (HQ: MacDill AFB, in Tampa, FL)
    * United States European Command – USEUCOM (HQ: Patch Barracks, in Stuttgart, Germany)
    * United States Pacific Command – USPACOM (HQ: Camp H. M. Smith, in Honolulu, HI)
    * United States Northern Command – USNORTHCOM (HQ: Peterson AFB, in Colorado Springs, CO)
    * United States Southern Command – USSOUTHCOM (HQ: Doral (Miami), FL)

    Functional Responsibilities:

    * United States Joint Forces Command – USJFCOM (HQ: Norfolk, VA)
    * United States Special Operations Command – USSOCOM (HQ: MacDill AFB, in Tampa, FL)
    * United States Strategic Command – USSTRATCOM (HQ: Offutt AFB, in Omaha, NE)
    * United States Transportation Command – USTRANSCOM (HQ: Scott AFB, in St. Clair County, IL)

    Combatant Commanders

    Each combatant command is headed by a four star general or admiral selected by the Secretary of Defense and President and confirmed by Congress. Goldwater-Nichols also resulted in specific Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)[2] requirements for officers before they could attain flag or general officer rank thereby preparing them for duty in Joint assignments such as UCC staff or Joint Chiefs of Staff assignments, which are strictly controlled tour length rotations of duty. However, in the decades following enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, these JPME requirements have yet to come to overall fruition. This is particularly true in the case of senior naval officers, where sea duty/shore duty rotations and the culture of the naval service has often discounted PME and JPME as a measure of professional development for success. Although slowly changing, the JPME requirement still continues to be frequently waivered in the case of senior admirals nominated for these positions [4]

    The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may transmit communications to the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands from the President and Secretary of Defense and advises both on potential courses of action, but does not exercise direct military command over any combatant forces. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the service chiefs (also four stars in rank) are charged with the responsibility to  organize, train and equip  forces for use by the combatant commands and do not exercise any operational control over their forces.

    Each combatant command can be led by a general or flag officer from any of the services. Most commands have traditional service affiliations, but in recent years, non-traditional appointments have become more common. EUCOM was traditionally an Army command with USAF generals on occasion, but was held by a Marine from 2003 through 2006. CENTCOM was traditionally an Army and Marine command but the last commander was a Navy admiral. PACOM has always been commanded by a Navy admiral due to the wide expanse of ocean, although Air Force generals have been nominated for the post. U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was also a traditional Navy assignment until it was successively commanded by Marine, Army, and Air Force generals, thereby becoming the first to have had commanders from all four services (USACOM was redesignated as JFCOM in 1999).[5] CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM were traditionally Army general positions until the Marines received their first CinC assignments. This led the way for General Pace, a Marine, to become the first Marine Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ultimately Chairman. CCDRs are strong candidates for either position.

    Other Changes and Proposals

    At some points, there have been proposals to create some sort of Reserve Affairs Worldwide Support command for the Reserve and National Guard of the United States. Also considered was the United States Medical Command which was proposed but then abandoned.

    References

    1. ^  DefenseLINK – Unified Command Plan . United States Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand. Retrieved on 2009-01-15.
    2. ^ [1] The Development of Unified Command Structure for the U. S. Armed Forces, 1945-1950. Excerpted from Ronald H. Cole, et al, The History of Unified Command 1946-1993 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), pp. 11-21. Retrieved January 2005.
    3. ^ USAFRICOM Frequently Asked Questions
    4. ^ Leonard D. Holder, Jr., and Williamson Murray,  Prospects for Military Education,  Joint Force Quarterly 18 (Spring 1998), 86.
    5. ^  Joint Warfighting Center History . United States Joint Forces Command. http://www.jfcom.mil/about/jwfc_history.htm. Retrieved on 2007-02-06.

    See also
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    ***
    National Reconnaissance Office
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    National Reconnaissance Office
    National Reconnaissance Office
    Agency overview
    Formed     1961
    Headquarters     Chantilly, Virginia
    Employees     Approximately 3,000[1]
    Annual budget     Classified
    Agency executives     Scott F. Large, Director

    John T. Sheridan, Deputy Director
    Parent agency     Department of Defense
    Website
    http://www.nro.gov

    The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), located in Chantilly, Virginia, is one of the 16 intelligence agencies in the U.S. It designs, builds and operates the reconnaissance satellites of the United States government.[2] It also coordinates collection and analysis of information from airplane and satellite reconnaissance by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency.[3] It is funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, which is part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The agency is part of the Department of Defense.

    The NRO works closely with its intelligence and space partners, which include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the United States Strategic Command, Naval Research Laboratory and many other high level agencies and organizations. It has been proposed that the NRO share imagery of the United States itself with the newly-created National Applications Office for purposes of domestic law enforcement.[4] The NRO is responsible for operating ground stations around the world which collect and distribute intelligence gathered from reconnaissance satellites.
    Contents

    * 1 History
    * 2 Organization
    o 2.1  Strategic War Gaming Division
    * 3 Spacecraft
    * 4 See also
    * 5 References
    * 6 External links

    History

    Due to management problems and insufficient progress with the USAF satellite reconnaissance program (see SAMOS and MIDAS),[5]:23 the NRO was established on August 25, 1960.[6] The formation was based on a 25 August 1960 recommendation to President Eisenhower during a special National Security Council meeting, and the agency was to coordinate the USAF and CIA’s (and later the Navy and NSA’s) reconnaissance activities.[5]:46 The NRO’s first photo reconnaissance satellite program[citation needed] was the Corona program, the existence of which was declassified February 24, 1995, existed from August 1960 to May 1972, although the first test flight occurred on February 28, 1959. The Corona system used (sometimes multiple) film capsules dropped by satellites, which were recovered mid-air by military craft. The first successful recovery from space (Discoverer XIII) occurred on August 12, 1960, and the first image from space was seen six days later. The first imaging resolution was 8 meters, which was improved to 2 meters. Individual images covered, on average, an area of approximately 10 by 120 miles (16 by 190 km). The last Corona mission (the 145th), was launched May 25, 1972, and this mission’s last images were taken May 31, 1972.

    From May 1962 to August 1964, the NRO conducted 12 mapping missions as part of the  Argon  system. Only seven of these missions were successful.[citation needed]

    In 1963, the NRO conducted a mapping mission using higher resolution imagery, as part of the  Lanyard  program. The Lanyard program flew one successful mission.[citation needed]

    Missions of the NRO subsequent to 1972 are still classified, and portions of many earlier programs remain unavailable to the public.

    In 1985, a New York Times article exposed the existence and operations of the NRO.[7]

    The existence of the NRO was declassified by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence on September 18, 1992. [8]

    A Washington Post article in September 1995 reported that the NRO had quietly hoarded between $1 billion and $1.7 billion in unspent funds without informing the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, or Congress. The CIA was in the midst of an inquiry into the NRO’s funding because of complaints that the agency had spent $300 million of hoarded funds from its classified budget to build a new headquarters building in Chantilly, Virginia a year earlier. The presence of the classified new headquarters was revealed by the Federation of American Scientists who obtained unclassified copies of the blueprints filed with the building permit application. After 9/11 those blueprints were apparently classified. The reports of an NRO slush fund were true. According to former CIA general counsel Jeffrey Smith, who led the investigation:  Our inquiry revealed that the NRO had for years accumulated very substantial amounts as a ‘rainy day fund.’  [9]

    In 1999 the NRO embarked on a project with Boeing entitled Future Imagery Architecture to create a new generation of imaging satellites. A November 11, 2007 investigative report by The New York Times found that in 2002 the project was far behind schedule and would most likely cost $2 billion to $3 billion more than planned, according to NRO records. The government pressed forward with efforts to complete the project, but after two more years, several more review panels and billions more in expenditures, the project was killed in what the Times report calls  perhaps the most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50-year history of American spy satellite projects. [citation needed] [10]

    In what the government describes as a bizarre coincidence, NRO was planning an exercise [on] Sept. 11 [2001] in which an errant aircraft would crash into one of its buildings. But the cause wasn’t terrorism – it was to be a simulated accident.

    Officials at the Chantilly, Va.-based National Reconnaissance Office had scheduled an exercise that morning in which a small corporate jet would crash into one of the four towers at the agency’s headquarters building after experiencing a mechanical failure.

    The agency is about four miles from the runways of Washington Dulles International Airport. … Adding to the coincidence, American Airlines Flight 77 – the Boeing 757 that was hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon – took off from Dulles at 8:10 a.m. on Sept. 11, 50 minutes before the exercise was to begin. It struck the Pentagon around 9:40 a.m., killing 64 aboard the plane and 125 on the ground.

    In charge of the  exercise  was CIA man John Fulton, head of the NRO’s  Strategic War Gaming Division .[11] [See below.]

    In January 2008, the government announced that a reconnaissance satellite operated by the NRO would make an unplanned and uncontrolled re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere in the next several months. Satellite watching hobbyists said that it was likely the USA-193, built by Lockheed Martin Corporation, which failed shortly after achieving orbit in December 2006.[12] On February 14, 2008, the Pentagon announced that rather than allowing the satellite to make an uncontrolled re-entry, it would instead be shot down by a missile fired from a Navy cruiser.[13] The intercept took place on February 21, 2008.[14]

    In July 2008, the NRO declassified the existence of its Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites, citing difficulty in discussing the creation of the Space-Based Radar with the United States Air Force and other entities.[15]
    Organization

    The NRO is part of the Department of Defense. The Director of the NRO is appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the consent of the Director of National Intelligence, without confirmation from Congress. Traditionally, the position was given to either the Undersecretary of the Air Force or the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, but with the appointment of Donald Kerr as Director of the NRO in July 2005 the position is now independent.

    The NRO is staffed by personnel from the CIA, NSA, NGA, DIA, the military services, and civilian defense contractors.

    The Agency has the following directorates:- SIGINT Systems; Communications Systems; IMINT systems; and Advanced Systems and Technology.[16] (SIGINT=signals intelligence; IMINT=imagery intelligence.)

    Strategic War Gaming Division

    According to a pamphlet advertising a security conference in 2002, the NRO has a  Strategic Wargaming Division , then headed by John Fulton, who was  on staff for the CIA .[17]

    Spacecraft
    A Titan IV rocket taking a payload to space for the NRO on October 19, 2005

    The NRO spacecraft include:

    * Keyhole series—photo imaging:
    o KH-1, KH-2, KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A, KH-4B Corona (1959–1972)
    o KH-5—Argon (1961–1962)
    o KH-6—Lanyard (1963)
    o KH-7—Gambit (1963–1967)
    o KH-8—Gambit (1966–1984)
    o KH-9—Hexagon and Big Bird (1971–1986)
    o KH-10—Dorian (cancelled)
    o KH-11—Crystal and Kennan (1976–1988)
    o KH-12—Ikon and Improved Crystal (1990?–)
    o KH-13—(1999?)
    * Samos—photo imaging (1960–1962)
    * Poppy ELINT program (1962–1971) continuing Naval Research Laboratory’s GRAB (1960–1961)
    * Jumpseat (1971-1983) and Trumpet (1994-1997) SIGINT
    * Lacrosse/Onyx—radar imaging (1988–)
    * Canyon (1968-1977), Vortex/Chalet (1978–1989) and Mercury (1994-1998)—SIGINT including COMINT
    * Rhyolite/Aquacade (1970–1978), Magnum/Orion (1985–1990), and Mentor (1995-2003)—SIGINT
    * Quasar, communications relay
    * Misty/Zirconic – stealth IMINT
    * NROL-1 through NROL-26 – various secret satellites. NROL stands for National Reconnaissance Office Launch.

    See also

    * List of National Reconnaissance Office Directors
    * National Technical Means
    * Reconnaissance satellite

    References

    1. ^  NRO Factsheet  (Word Document). 1. http://www.nro.gov/nro_factsheet.doc. Retrieved on 2007-01-15.
    2. ^  Welcome to the NRO . http://www.nro.gov/index.html. Retrieved on 2007-01-15.
    3. ^  NRO Provides Support to the Warfighters , National Reconnaissance Office, press releases, April 28, 1998.
    4. ^  U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets – Documents Describe Use of Satellites in Support of Civil Agencies and Longstanding Controversy . National Security Archive, The George Washington University. 2008-04-11. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/index.htm. Retrieved on 2008-04-12.
    5. ^ a b Stares, Paul B..  The Militarization of Space  (html). p23,46. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19851201fabook11624/paul-b-stares/the-militarization-of-space-u-s-policy-1945-1984.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-24.
    6. ^ Jeffrey Richelson (1990). America’s Secret Eyes in Space. Harper & Row.
    7. ^ Bamford, James (1985).  America’s Supersecret Eyes In Space . The New York Times (New York: The New York Times). January 13, 1985. http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F30D10F73D5F0C708DDDA80894DD484D81.
    8. ^ Jeffrey T. Richelson (September 18, 2008).  Out of the Black: The Declassification of the NRO . National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 257. National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB257/index.htm. Retrieved on 2008-10-13.
    9. ^  Get Smarter: Demystifying the NRO . SECRECY & GOVERNMENT BULLETIN, Issue Number 39. Federation of American Scientists. August-September 1994. http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec39.html. Retrieved on 2008-10-13.
    10. ^ Philip Taubman (2007-11-11).  Failure to Launch: In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids . The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/washington/11satellite.html?pagewanted=all#step1. Retrieved on 2007-11-12.
    11. ^ John J. Lumpkin, Associated Press,  Agency planned exercise on Sept. 11 built around a plane crashing into a building , Boston Chronicle, Sept. 11, 2002.
    12. ^ John Schwartz (2008-02-05).  Satellite Spotters Glimpse Secrets, and Tell Them . The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/science/space/05spotters.html. Retrieved on 2008-02-05.
    13. ^ David Stout and Thom Shanker (2008-02-14).  U.S. Officials Say Broken Satellite Will Be Shot Down . The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/science/14cnd-satellite.html?pagewanted=print. Retrieved on 2008-02-14.
    14. ^ U.S. Department of Defense (February 20, 2008). DoD Succeeds In Intercepting Non-Functioning Satellite. Press release. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11704. Retrieved on 2008-02-20.
    15. ^ Colin Clark (2008-07-03).  Spy Radar Satellites Declassified . DoD Buzz, through Military.com. http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/07/03/spy-radar-satellites-declassified/. Retrieved on 2008-07-10.
    16. ^ :: Welcome to the National Reconnaissance Office ::
    17. ^ America’s Leadership Challenge (pre-event publicity pamphlet for National Law Enforcement And Security Institute [NLSI] conference  Homeland Security: America’s Leadership Challenge , Sept. 6, 2002).

    External links

    * NRO official website
    * National Security Archive: The NRO Declassified
    * Memo of Declassification of NRO
    * Additional NRO information from the Federation of American Scientists
    * America’s secret spy satellites are costing you billions, but they can’t even get off the launch pad U.S News and World Report, 8/11/03; By Douglas Pasternak
    * Agency planned exercise on Sept. 11 built around a plane crashing into a building, from Boston.com

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    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reconnaissance_Office
    Categories: United States Department of Defense agencies | United States intelligence agencies | Mass surveillance

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    ***
    Intelligence agencies and organizations of USA
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    Central Intelligence Agency A Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency A United States Army Military Intelligence A Defense Intelligence Agency A Marine Corps Intelligence Activity A National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency A National Reconnaissance Office A National Security Agency A Office of Naval Intelligence A Coast Guard Intelligence A Federal Bureau of Investigation  A Drug Enforcement Administration A Bureau of Intelligence and Research A Office of Intelligence and Analysis A Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence A Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
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    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reconnaissance_Office
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    ****
    *****
    A Washington Post article in September 1995 reported that the NRO had quietly hoarded between $1 billion and $1.7 billion in unspent funds without informing the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, or Congress. The CIA was in the midst of an inquiry into the NRO’s funding because of complaints that the agency had spent $300 million of hoarded funds from its classified budget to build a new headquarters building in Chantilly, Virginia a year earlier. The presence of the classified new headquarters was revealed by the Federation of American Scientists who obtained unclassified copies of the blueprints filed with the building permit application. After 9/11 those blueprints were apparently classified. The reports of an NRO slush fund were true. According to former CIA general counsel Jeffrey Smith, who led the investigation:  Our inquiry revealed that the NRO had for years accumulated very substantial amounts as a ‘rainy day fund.’  [9]

    In 1999 the NRO embarked on a project with Boeing entitled Future Imagery Architecture to create a new generation of imaging satellites. A November 11, 2007 investigative report by The New York Times found that in 2002 the project was far behind schedule and would most likely cost $2 billion to $3 billion more than planned, according to NRO records. The government pressed forward with efforts to complete the project, but after two more years, several more review panels and billions more in expenditures, the project was killed in what the Times report calls  perhaps the most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50-year history of American spy satellite projects. [citation needed] [10]

    In what the government describes as a bizarre coincidence, NRO was planning an exercise [on] Sept. 11 [2001] in which an errant aircraft would crash into one of its buildings. But the cause wasn’t terrorism – it was to be a simulated accident.

    Officials at the Chantilly, Va.-based National Reconnaissance Office had scheduled an exercise that morning in which a small corporate jet would crash into one of the four towers at the agency’s headquarters building after experiencing a mechanical failure.

    The agency is about four miles from the runways of Washington Dulles International Airport. … Adding to the coincidence, American Airlines Flight 77 – the Boeing 757 that was hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon – took off from Dulles at 8:10 a.m. on Sept. 11, 50 minutes before the exercise was to begin. It struck the Pentagon around 9:40 a.m., killing 64 aboard the plane and 125 on the ground.

    In charge of the  exercise  was CIA man John Fulton, head of the NRO’s  Strategic War Gaming Division .[11] [See below.]

    It has been proposed that the NRO share imagery of the United States itself with the newly-created National Applications Office for purposes of domestic law enforcement.[4] The NRO is responsible for operating ground stations around the world which collect and distribute intelligence gathered from reconnaissance satellites.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reconnaissance_Office

    ****
    ****
    National Applications Office
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    The National Applications Office is a United States Department of Homeland Security program that provides local, state, and federal officials with extensive access to spy-satellite imagery.[1] It has access to military satellites to observe the United States. It has been described as a clearinghouse for requests by law enforcement, border security, and other domestic homeland security agencies to access feeds from spy satellites that have collected data for mainly scientific and military uses in the past.

    Access to spy satellite surveillance tools allows Homeland Security and law enforcement officials to see real-time, high-quality images. This allows them to identify gang safehouses, border smuggler staging areas, or even hideouts of would-be terrorists. The spy surveillance satellites are considered by military experts to be far more powerful than those currently available to civilian officials. For example, they can take color photos, see through cloud cover and forest canopies, and use different parts of the light spectrum to locate traces left by chemical weapons. However, the full capabilities of these systems are among the most carefully held governmental secrets.

    As of October 2, 2007, the United States Congress has filed an injunction against the NAO, that orders it not to begin operations. This is due largely to questions about civil liberty issues.

    The NAO’s charter was signed in February 2008. On November 9, 2008 the Government Accountability Office released a recommendation that the NAO’s role be more strictly defined. This might be seen as evidence that the aforementioned civil liberty issues have not been sufficiently addressed.

    References
    1. ^ “Satellite-Surveillance Program to Begin Despite Privacy Concerns” by Siobhan Gorman, Wall Street Journal, retrieved October 2, 2008

    External links

    * National Applications Office: Fact Sheet Department of Homeland Security, August 15, 2007
    * U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets Documents Describe Use of Satellites in Support of Civil Agencies and Longstanding Controversy, National Security Archive, The George Washington University, April 11, 2008
    * Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2008
    * National Applications Office Charter
    * Government Accountability Office Recommendations

    This United States government-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.
    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Applications_Office
    Categories: United States government stubs

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Applications_Office

    ***

    * OCTOBER 1, 2008

    Satellite-Surveillance Program to Begin Despite Privacy Concerns

    * Article
    * Comments (5)

    more in Politics »
    By SIOBHAN GORMAN

    WASHINGTON — The Department of Homeland Security will proceed with the first phase of a controversial satellite-surveillance program, even though an independent review found the department hasn’t yet ensured the program will comply with privacy laws.

    Congress provided partial funding for the program in a little-debated $634 billion spending measure that will fund the government until early March. For the past year, the Bush administration had been fighting Democratic lawmakers over the spy program, known as the National Applications Office.

    The program is designed to provide federal, state and local officials with extensive access to spy-satellite imagery — but no eavesdropping — to assist with emergency response and other domestic-security needs, such as identifying where ports or border areas are vulnerable to terrorism.

    Since the department proposed the program a year ago, several Democratic lawmakers have said that turning the spy lens on America could violate Americans’ privacy and civil liberties unless adequate safeguards were required.

    A new 60-page Government Accountability Office report said the department  lacks assurance that NAO operations will comply with applicable laws and privacy and civil liberties standards,  according to a person familiar with the document. The report, which is unclassified but considered sensitive, hasn’t been publicly released, but was described and quoted by several people who have read it.

    The report cites gaps in privacy safeguards. The department, it found, lacks controls to prevent improper use of domestic-intelligence data by other agencies and provided insufficient assurance that requests for classified information will be fully reviewed to ensure it can be legally provided.

    A senior homeland-security official took issue with the GAO’s broad conclusion, saying the department has worked hard to include many layers of privacy protection. Program activities have  an unprecedented amount of legal review,  he said, adding that the GAO is seeking a level of proof that can’t be demonstrated until the program is launched.

    Homeland Security spokeswoman Laura Keehner said department officials concluded that the program  complies with all existing laws  because the GAO report didn’t say the program doesn’t.

    Addressing the gaps the agency cited, Ms. Keehner said current laws already govern the use of intelligence data and the department has an additional procedure to monitor its use. The department will also work with other intelligence agencies to  ensure that legal reviews and protection of classified information will be effective,  she said.

    In response to the GAO report, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi and other Democrats asked Congress to freeze the money for the program until after the November election so the next administration could examine it.

    But the bill Congress approved, which President George W. Bush signed into law Tuesday, allows the department to launch a limited version, focused only on emergency response and scientific needs. The department must meet additional requirements before it can expand operations to include homeland-security and law-enforcement surveillance.

    The restrictions were  the most we could have required without a complete prohibition,  said Darek Newby, an aide to Democratic Rep. David Price of North Carolina, who heads the House homeland-security spending panel.

    But California Rep. Jane Harman, who heads a homeland-security subcommittee on intelligence, said that even limited funding allows the department to launch the program, providing a platform to expand its surveillance whether or not privacy requirements are met.

    Having learned my lesson  with the National Security Agency’s warrantless-surveillance program, she said,  I don’t want to go there again unless and until the legal framework for the entire program is entirely spelled out.

    Rep. Thompson vowed to fight expansion of the program until privacy issues are further addressed.

    Write to Siobhan Gorman at siobhan.gorman@wsj.com
    Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A10

    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122282336428992785.html?mod=fox_australian

    ****

    In this memo, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff informs the Director of National Intelligence that he has received the report of the Civil Applications Committee Blue Ribbon Study Group and that he agrees with its recommendation to establish a Domestic Applications Office within DHS and proposes some joint measures to begin implementation of the recommendations.

    National Security Archive

    U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets

    Documents Describe Use of Satellites in Support
    of Civil Agencies and Longstanding Controversy

    National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 229
    Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson

    Originally Posted – September 14, 2007
    Updated – April 11, 2008

    For more information contact:
    Jeffrey Richelson – 202/994-7000

    Update – Washington, D.C., April 11, 2008 – The policy debate over using U.S. reconnaissance satellites to obtain imagery of targets in the United States dates back to the earliest days of spy satellites, according to an updated collection of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

    Obtained and edited by Archive senior fellow Dr. Jeffrey Richelson, the documents add significant historical context to current Congressional concerns (Document 46 and Document 50) about privacy and civil liberties guidelines for the new National Applications Office (Document 41 and Document 48).

    Additional historical documents include the charter for the Civil Applications Committee, the statement of authority for National Reconnaissance Program activities over the United States, as well as documents that focus on the question of   proper use  of the satellites and the risk to senior officials should the space assets be used inappropriately.

    Documents concerning current plans to establish a National Applications Office and associated Congressional concerns include the letter from the Secretary of Homeland Security to the Director of National Intelligence (reporting his interest in establishing a domestic applications office), expressions of Congressional concern, and the proposed charter (from February 2008).

    U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets
    By Jeffrey T. Richelson

    On August 15, 2007, the Wall Street Journal disclosed that the United States was planning to expand its use of reconnaissance satellites over the United States in support of civil agencies, in response to recommendations by an independent study group. (Note 1) The term  civil agencies  refers to agencies outside of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community – agencies which may have domestic or foreign missions, or both.

    As a result of the desire to employ reconnaissance satellites for law enforcement and border security purposes, in addition to their traditional use for mapping and disaster relief, the Department of Homeland Security, based on recommendations of an advisory group (Document 40) formulated plans to establish a Domestic Applications Office (subsequently retitled the National Applications Office) effective October 1, 2007.  The organization and functions of the new office were detailed in a DHS fact sheet, also released on August 15, 2007. However, concerns over privacy and civil liberties issues, particularly from members of the House Committee on Homeland Security, delayed creation of an operational office. (Document 45a, Document 46).

    On April 8, 2008 the Wall Street Journal reported that privacy and civil liberties concerning still constituted a roadblock. (Note 2) A charter (Document 48) submitted to Congress in February had not resolved the concerns of the chairmen and other key members of the House committee. In April a report by the DHS Inspector General’s office (Document 49) noted that while progress had made in addressing such concerns new civil liberties and privacy assessments were required before the NAO could become operational. Key members of the House committee complained in a letter (Document 50) to the Secretary of Homeland Security that his department resolving their concerns was the first priority, before taking actions (such as advertising for personnel) to turn the NAO from a concept into an active entity.

    The use of classified satellite reconnaissance systems – particularly imagery systems – to image targets in the United States has a lineage almost as old as the satellite reconnaissance program itself. One purpose was to allow the operators of U.S. spy satellites to determine the satellite’s actual capabilities, particularly with regard to resolution, by photographing targets of known dimensions. In addition, obtaining overhead views of particular types of facilities – both military and industrial – helped imagery interpreters to develop imagery interpretation keys. Those keys provided interpreters with an understanding of what a particular type of facility would look from directly overhead Thus, a 1967 document (Document 2) addressed to the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance contains a list of domestic targets restricted to military and industrial sites.

    But some civil agencies were also early users of satellite reconnaissance imagery – particularly that from versions of the KH-4 CORONA system (which included the KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B) and the KH-5 ARGON mapping system. The U.S. Geological Survey even established a special facility to exploit the satellite imagery it was provided to help it perform its mapping mission. Another early recipient was the Office of Emergency Preparedness, which requested imagery of the hundred-plus relocation sites controlled by the office. (Document 6) Such imagery was collected during  engineering passes  of the satellite over the U.S. – that is, during the first days after launch when the system was being tested, before being declared operational and ready for use against foreign targets.

    In an attempt to establish a forum to facilitate the use of satellite reconnaissance imagery for civil purposes, the ARGO program was established in 1968 – whose participants included, but were not limited to, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture. Also participating were key Intelligence Community agencies – the National Reconnaissance Office, National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. (Document 5)

    Despite the desire to expand the use of satellite imagery, there were still impediments to its full exploitation – including the need for highly trained interpretation skills, facilities to protect the data, inertia within potential civil users, the question as to who would pay for the cost of a civil applications program, and concerns that civil agency demands might compromise the primary foreign intelligence collection mission. (Document 10c)

    In 1973, the question of whether a civil applications subcommittee of COMIREX should be established was raised in a memo (Document 14b) from national security adviser Henry Kissinger. In 1975, the commission chaired by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, chartered to investigate CIA activities within the United States, recommended establishing just such a civil applications committee to enhance the effort. The result was a memorandum of agreement between Kissinger (in his role as national security adviser), the director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of Central Intelligence created a Civil Applications Committee, located within the Department of the Interior, and chaired by the director of the U.S. Geological Survey. Eleven departments and independent agencies would be represented on the committee. (Document 38) Included were the Environmental Protection Agency (Document 8) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (or its predecessors) – to detect violation of environmental regulations and in support of disaster relief operations respectively.
    Before assuming the vice-presidency in 1993, Al Gore had discussed with then-Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates the possibility of establishing a program for the exploitation of data already obtained by a variety of classified sensors – from reconnaissance satellites to the Navy’s Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) underwater hydrophones – to address environmental issues. In 1994 an Environmental Task Force appointed by the DCI examined whether classified data could be profitably used to address environmental questions. (Document 33) That examination produced the MEDEA program – under which specially cleared scientists, many outside of the government, were given access to classified data sets that could be used to examine issues such as deforestation. (Note 3)

    In addition to the MEDEA effort there were additional efforts made to make data from missile launch detection and imagery satellites available to aid in the detection of fires and volcanic activity. (Document 35-36) Thus, the infrared sensors on Defense Support Program satellites could detect and locate the dimensions of forest fires, while imagery satellites could periodically photograph volcanoes to produce imagery that could be used to look for signs of activity.

    Subsequent to 9/11, there were suggestions both by individual Congressmen such as Norman Dicks (D-WA), and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that current NRO systems could be used in support of homeland security missions. (Note 4) Those sentiments were echoed in the 2005 report, the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) Blue Ribbon Study (Document 40) , by an independent study group chaired by former NRO chief Keith Hall.

    The committee recommended replacing the CAC with a Domestic Applications Office within DHS – a recommendation that was approved in a May 2007 memo from the Director of National Intelligence, with the office given a less revealing name – the National Applications Office.
    The August 2007 press revelations produced concern both from civil liberties groups and members of Congress (Documents 44a-c) – who were concerned with plans to move beyond uncontroversial domestic uses for use in law-enforcement activities. Homeland security uses could include monitoring the border, studying infrastructure and mapping cities for special events to prepare security plans. Potential law-enforcement uses include monitoring a house or compound occupied by terrorists or other law enforcement targets (e.g. the Branch Davidians), searching for drug production facilities, examining crime scenes, and support to the FBI and local enforcement in their effort to provide security for national special security events (including political conventions and major sporting events). (Note 5)

    The past is not devoid of examples of use of satellite imagery for homeland security and law enforcement purposes and the confrontation of some of the issues involved. In 2006, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provided the FBI imagery of the area in Pittsburgh where the Major League All-Star game was to be held on July 11, as it had to the Olympics Intelligence Center at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. (Note 6) Reconnaissance satellites have reportedly been used to produce images of the Unabomber’s cabin and the land surrounding it, to count boat traffic at three specially protected sites along the Florida Keys, to examine civil disturbances in Detroit in the 1960s (Document 12), and to develop investigative leads for the EPA. (Note 7) The latter caused some concern at the CIA about the propriety of providing imagery that would aid EPA investigations. (Document 16)

    There are a number of concerns that are likely to be part of the current debate – the Posse Comitatus prohibition of using the military for law-enforcement (since the agency which operates U.S. reconnaissance satellites is part of the Defense Department), and a generalized fear of government spying exacerbated by portrayals in popular culture (Enemy of the State, 24) of satellites that can track individuals. (Document 45c and Document 45f)

    Concern over legal authorities and the propriety of domestic satellite collection have been present virtually since the inception of hte program. (Document 28b) Today, there is particular concern with possible violations of Fourth Amendment limitations on searches. While surveillance employing visible-light optical systems would not seem to be an issue, the possibility of employing other sensors – including radar and infrared imagery sensors, as well as measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) sensors (including multispectral and hyperspectral sensors, and non-imaging infrared sensors) – may run afoul of the Supreme Court’s Kyllo decision, which overturned a conviction that followed police employment of a thermal imaging system to detect heat sources within an individual’s house that indicated ongoing production of an illicit drug.

    Read the Documents
    Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
    You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

    Document 1: OEG, Memorandum for: WAT, Subject: Problems Relating to the Feasibility of the Use of KH Photography by Civilian Agencies, January 11, 1967. Top Secret
    Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST)

    This memo is addressed to  WAT  – William A. Tidwell, the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR). It discusses the potential problems in using  KH  or Keyhole imagery from the classified satellites operated by the NRO in support of civilian agency missions – which would include civilian agencies with domestic missions (including the U.S. Geological Survey) as well as those with foreign missions (including the Agency for International Development).

    Document 2: [Deleted], Chairman, COMOR Photo Working Group, Memorandum for: COMOR Photo Working Group, Subject: Revised List of Domestic Targets for KH-4, April 28, 1967. Top Secret. w/attachment: Domestic Targets for KH-4. Top Secret
    Source: CREST

    The targets for the KH-4 listed in the attachment consist largely of government military and atomic energy installations across the country, as well as several industrial installations. The timing of the memo and the explanation in the cover memo that coverage would be obtained during  engineering  passes suggest that the targets were to be photographed during the initial orbits of the KH-4B version of the Corona reconnaissance satellite – whose first launch occurred on September 15, 1967.

    Document 3: Thomas A. Parrott, AD/DCI/NIPE, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: ARGO Symposium, March 3, 1968. Secret
    Source: CREST

    This memo from the assistant director of the DCI’s National Intelligence Program Evaluation office concerns the discussion at a symposium held at the National Photographic Interpretation Center, related to an effort designated  ARGO  – the exploration of whether existing overhead photography could be used to aid the missions of civilian agencies. Among the topics discussed were the sharing of costs associated with modification of the missions and exploitation of imagery desired by civilian agencies.

    Document 4: Richards Helms, Director of Central Intelligence to Donald F. Hornig, March 20, 1968. Top Secret
    Source: CREST

    This letter from the Director of Central Intelligence to President Richard Nixon’s science adviser, notes his two greatest concerns with the use of satellite imagery for civilian purposes – protection of the source and assuring non-interference with national security missions.

    Document 5: Assistant to the Deputy Director, NPIC, Memorandum for the Record. Subject: ARGO Committee Meeting, 16 June 1968, Executive Officer Building, Room 303, 1000 Hours, n.d. Secret
    Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request

    This memo reports on the first meeting of a reconstituted ARGO committee. Among the potential uses of Keyhole imagery identified by department and agency representatives were hydrology and oceanography, mapping, emergency preparedness.

    Document 6: W.C. Truppner, Director, National Resource Analysis Center to Dr. D.H. Steininger, Chairman ARGO Steering Group, circa July 1968. Top Secret
    Source: CREST

    In this letter the director of the National Resource Analysis Center notes the desirability of obtaining KH-4  precontingency  imagery of 115 major metropolitan areas and that 70 had already been covered. The intent of the letter was to have the steering group request that the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) – the successor to COMOR – consider allocating time on subsequent KH-4 missions to coverage of the remaining metropolitan areas.

    Document 7: [Deleted], Chairman, COMIREX MC&G Working Group, Memorandum for Chairman, COMIREX, Subject: Satellite Photography of the U.S. for United States Geological Survey Mapping Activities, June 15, 1971. Classification Unknown. w/enclosure: Memorandum for USIB, Subject: Satellite Photography of the U.S. for United States Geological Survey Mapping Activities, n.d. Classification Unknown
    Source: CREST

    The memorandum for the COMIREX chairman, signed by the chairman of COMIREX’s Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Working Group, informs the chairman that the attached draft concerning satellite photography of the United States in support of the U.S. Geological Survey has been reviewed by the working group – which recommends approval by COMIREX and the U.S. Intelligence Board.

    The attached memorandum notes past decision to approve the use of the KH-4 and KH-5 imagery to produce imagery of areas of the continental U.S. (but not Hawaii) in support of USGS mapping requirements. Redactions in the first paragraph apparently refer to approval of the release of KH-9 imagery for mapping when it became available (the first KH-9 launch took place on the day the memo was written – June 15, 1971). The purpose of the memo was to recommend that the USGS be given authority to use similar data for Hawaii, and that the NRO be tasked to produce the necessary imagery.

    Document 8: Stanley M. Greenfield, Environmental Protection Agency, to [Roland Inlow] Chairman, COMIREX, January 12, 1973. Classification Not Known. w/enclosure: List of Environmental Protection Agency Personnel Requiring Clearances, n.d. Classification Unknown
    Source: CREST

    At the time this letter was written, Roland Inlow, was the chairman of COMIREX. It explains that the attached consists of EPA personnel requiring special clearances for access to information about  high technology reconnaissance systems  – that is, classified systems operated by the NRO. It also explains that EPA did not it feel it would be wise to develop an  environmental collection and exploitation  program without planning to use the capabilities  developed by other government agencies.

    Document 9: [Roland Inlow], Chairman, COMIREX to Dr. Stanley M. Greenfield, Environmental Protection Agency, March 2, 1973. Confidential
    Source: CREST

    Roland Inlow’s response to EPA official Stanley Greenfield’s letter informs Greenfield that the Director of Central Intelligence had approved special clearances for the individuals listed in the attachment to his letter – subject to background investigations. Inlow also noted that his security advisor would be available  to assure that your Control Officer has a full understanding of the security regulations.

    Document 10a: [Deleted], Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Use of [Deleted] Photography by the Civilian Sector and non-USIB Agencies, March 9, 1973. Secret

    Document 10b: Donald H. Steininger, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Use of the Reconnaissance Satellite Photography by the Civilian Sector and non-USIB Agencies, March 9, 1973. Secret

    Document 10c: Donald H. Steininger, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Use of the Reconnaissance Satellite Photography by the Civilian Sector and non-USIB Agencies, March 9, 1973. Secret
    Source: CREST

    At the time this memo was written, Donald H. Steininger was the Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA. In his memo to the DCI, Steininger, who had been involved in the ARGO effort, observed that while it was clear from the beginning that there was a great potential for using satellite photography for a variety of civilian purposes,  the government has been spectacularly unsuccessful in promoting substantial use of this intelligence material within the civilian agencies.  Steininger’s purpose was  to propose a course of action  that the intelligence community could take to  turn the situation around.

    Document 10c was the first declassified version released (in 2001), with specific references to satellite reconnaissance redacted. Document 10b (released in April 2004) is identical to Document 10a (released in August 2004) with the exception of the paragraph at the bottom of page 2 that was deleted from the April 2004 version (but not the 2001 version).

    Document 11: [Deleted], Note for: A/DD/S&T, Subject: Examples of Present and Past Civil Applications of Reconnaissance Imagery, March 16, 1973. Confidential
    Source: CREST

    This memo to the Associate Deputy Director of Science & Technology, Donald Steininger, was apparently authored by COMIREX chairman Ronald Inlow. It describes the subjects covered in three attached tabs. The tabs were not released with the memo.

    Document 12: NPIC, Questionable NPIC Projects, May 8, 1973
    Source: FOIA

    This memo was prepared by the National Photographic Interpretation Center in response to DCI James Schlesinger’s directive for CIA components to provide information on any activities that they might have undertaken outside the CIA’s charter. Item 4 notes a number of instances where NPIC examined  domestic coverage  – which included satellite imagery of natural and man-made disasters, one civil disturbance, and of facilities or areas related to emergency preparedness.

    Document 13: Note for: Chairman, COMIREX, Subject: Mississippi Flood Imagery, May 15, 1973. Classification Unknown
    Source: CREST

    This memo indicates that one or more U-2 aircraft were used to obtain imagery of areas of Mississippi inundated in a flood. The deletions in the released document may refer to actual or potential use of reconnaissance satellite systems. According to Document 12 some of imagery of the Mississippi floods was obtained by satellites.

    Document 14a: Chairman, Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Comments on Draft Memorandum from Henry Kissinger on Civil Use of Classified Reconnaissance Systems, Technologies and Products, July 31, 1973. Secret w/enclosure:

    Document 14b: Henry A. Kissinger, Memorandum for: The Secretary of the Interior et. al., Subject: Civil Use of Classified Reconnaissance Systems, Technologies, and Products, n.d. Secret
    Source: CREST

    Document 14a reports that a member of the NSC staff had forwarded to COMIREX a draft of a memo, to be signed by Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, intended  to update and regularize civil agency handling and uses of classified satellite photography acquired over the U.S.  The draft memo, Document 14b, calls for the DCI to establish a civil applications subcommittee of COMIREX to handle civil agency requests for classified satellite imagery.

    Document 15a: Paul V. Walsh, Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Federal Mapping Task Force Report, August 20, 1973. Classification Unknown

    Document 15b: Letter, [Deleted], Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget, to William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, September 18, 1973.

    Document 15c: 1973 Federal Mapping Task Force Report, Top Secret, n.d.

    Document 15d: [Deleted] Executive Secretary, United States Intelligence Board, Memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board, Subject: Federal Mapping Task Force, September 18, 1973. Top Secret w/enclosure: W.E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for: Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget, Subject: Federal Mapping Task Force Report, September 18, 1973. Top Secret
    Source: CREST

    These five documents revolve around the DCI reaction to the 1973 Federal Mapping Task Force- particularly with regard to the task force’s recommendation for greater use of TALENT KEYHOLE imagery, which at the time included imagery from the KH-9 area surveillance satellite system, for mapping purposes. The task force recommendations included expanded utilization of such imagery for the production of unclassified maps of the U.S.

    Document 16: Note for RSI, Subject: NPIC-EPA Relati onship – Additional Information, November 7, 1973. Classification Unknown
    Source: CREST

    This memo was addressed to RSI – Roland S. Inlow, the chairman of the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX). It reports that during a meeting with EPA personnel concern was expressed over EPA’s use of classified satellite imagery to develop investigative leads. The memo goes on to discuss the circumstances under which the imagery was obtained and the propriety of CIA involvement in helping EPA to develop such leads.

    Document 17: Lt. Col. Harold S. Coyle Jr,, Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Agriculture Department Study of Collection Resources, August 14, 1974, Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This memo from an NRO official discusses the interest of representatives of the Department of Agriculture in greater employment of NRO imagery satellites to provide information to their department. While it does not specifically refer to imaging of domestic sites in support of Agriculture, which also analyzes foreign agricultural developments, it also mentions the desire of the Department of the Interior to make greater use of NRO imaging assets.

    Document 18: Henry A. Kissinger, William E. Colby, and James T. Lynn, Subject: Establishment of the Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Photography of the United States, October 3, 1975. Secret
    Source: CREST

    This is the memo, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the director of the Office of Management and Budget, directed the Secretary of Interior to establish a Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Photography of the United States, specifies the committee’s functions and its membership, and the role of the DCI.

    Document 19: [Deleted], Memorandum for Mr. Plummer, Subject: Committee for Civil Applications, October 9, 1975. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This memo from a member of the NRO Staff to NRO director James Plummer, predicts that one of the consequences of the establishment of the Civil Applications Committee will be pressure for a greater use of NRO imagery satellites in support of civil agencies and suggests that it may be necessary to increase the number of satellite launches to satisfy the demand.

    Document 20: J.W. Plummer, Memorandum for Dr. Hall, ASD (I), Subject: Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Photography of the United States, October 14, 1975. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    In this memo, NRO director James Plummer provides Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) Albert Hall with requested recommendations on how to respond to the memorandum establishing the Civil Applications Committee (Document 18).  The issues Plummer suggests Hall raise include the film-limited nature of current imagery satellites, security requirements within the government, and the CAC being a possible vehicle for declassification of the  fact of  satellite photography.

    Document 21: Note for: Mr. Knoche, Gen. Wilson, October 14, 1975. Unclassified
    Source: CREST

    This memo, to senior Intelligence Community officials E. Henry Knoche and General Samuel Wilson, notes that the originally the memo signed on October 3, 1975 establishing the CAC (Document 18) was originally unclassified and the  Secret  classification was added after it was signed by the DCI William Colby.

    Document 22: [Deleted], Note for: General Wilson, Subject: DCI Response to Secretary Clements, re D/NRO as an ex officio Member of Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Photography of the US, November 26, 1975, Secret
    Source: CREST

    This memo to General Samuel Wilson reports that the Under Secretary of the Air Force – that is, the Director of the NRO, would sit on the CAC as an observer – a status preferred to that of full member for security considerations.

    Document 23:  Authority for the National Reconnaissance Program Domestic Satellite Reconnaissance Activities,  1976. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This memo, although undated, was clearly prepared in 1976 (as indicated by the last two digits of the control number) covers seven topics – background of the NRO, organization of the NRO, domestic requirements, implications of Executive Order 11905, the authority for the NRO to conduct domestic photographic and electronic collection activities, and implementation.

    Document 24: Charles W. Cook, Memorandum for Director, Program A, Director, Program B, Chairman, COMIREX, Subject: Domestic Imagery, undated (but from 1976), Top Secret w/att:  NRO Policy with Respect to Domestic Imagery
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This memo and its attachment, undated but from 1976, was written by the NRO’s deputy director and addressed to the heads of the Air Force and CIA components of the NRO as well as the chairman of COMIREX, were intended to formalize NRO policy with respect to domestic imagery – specifically the requirements for, as well as the acquisition and exploitation of domestic imagery with NRO systems.

    Document 25: J.W. Plummer, Director, NRO to Gen. Kulpa, Mr. Dirks, Capt. Darcy, Subject: Implementation of E.O. 11905, May 1976. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This memo, from the NRO director to the head of the Air Force, CIA, and Navy elements of the NRO, notes that President Ford’s recent executive order on foreign intelligence contains restrictions on surveillance activities – both electronic and visual within the United States or against U.S. persons overseas. It goes on to state the policies and procedures governing National Reconnaissance Program activities over the United States.

    Document 26a: Report of Meeting of Civil Applications Committee (of August 30, 1976), n.d. Top Secret

    Document 26b: Deputy Director of [Deleted], NRO Staff, Memorandum for: [Deleted], Subject: Civil Applications Committee Meeting, 30 August 1976. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    The first document provides a list of those attending the August 30, 1976 CAC meeting and their institutional affiliations – indicating representatives from five civil organizations. The second document informs its recipients of a briefing scheduled for potential civil agency users of NRO systems, and that a dry run will be held at the next meeting of the CAC. It also reports a CIA official’s view on the question of  proper use.

    Document 27a: Agenda, Seventh Meeting, Civil Applications Committee, 0930 Hours, October 6, 1976. Unclassified

    Document 27b: Untitled minutes of meeting of Civil Applications Committee, 0930 Hours, October 6, 1976. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records
    These two documents provide a summary of the agenda of the October 6, 1976 meeting of the CAC and the decisions taken at that meeting.

    Document 28a: Col. Frederick Hoffman, Memorandum for General Shields Subject: Propriety of Civil Applications Committee (CAC) Activities, February 10, 1978. Top Secret

    Document 28b: Brig. Gen. William L. Shields, Jr., Memorandum for Colonel Hoffman, January 26, 1978. Top Secret w/att: Brig. Gen. William L. Shields, Jr., Memorandum for the Record, January 26, 1978.  Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    The first memo indicates that Brig. Gen. Shields, the director of the NRO Staff had requested the staff to review the issue of the propriety of the CAC. The second memo is Shields’ request for the study, while the attachment to that memo spells out the specific areas of the general’s concerns – including that several senior intelligence officials would be  in a vulnerable position  if the satellites were to be used inappropriately based on the tasking of civil agencies.

    Document 29: Brig. Gen. William L. Shields, Memorandum for Chairman, COMIREX, Subject: Civil Applications of NRO Imaging Satellites, February 15, 1978. Top Secret
    Source: Declassified NRO Staff Records

    This is the memorandum referred to in Col. Hoffman’s memo of February 10, 1978 (Document 27b), which is signed by Shields and addressed to COMIREX chairman Roland Inlow. It raises the issue of obtaining further legal approval of the use of NRO systems for domestic purposes.

    Document 30: Chief, Requirements and Evaluation Staff, Memorandum for: See Distribution, Subject: NRP – – Civilian Applications, May 11, 1978. Secret. w/att: Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Resource Management, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Subject: Possible Areas to Expand Collection, May 8, 1978. Secret
    Source: CREST

    The cover memo requests comments from several CIA offices on a memo from DCI Stansfield Turner on possible areas to expand imagery and signals intelligence satellite collection. While it is clear that the collection would be undertaken in support of agencies outside of the national security community, It is not clear whether any of the uses envisioned in the printed memo would involve domestic coverage.

    Document 31: Providing KH-4 Material to EPA, NPIC Daily Diary, June 20, 1978. Classification Unknown
    Source: FOIA

    This item in the NPIC Daily Diary indicates that the Federal Preparedness Agency had been had been receiving KH-4 images during 1968-1971, and the Environmental Protection Agency would find the same imagery useful for some of their studies.

    Document 32a: Environmental Protection Agency Request for Support, NPIC Daily Diary, October 23, 1978. Classification Not Available.

    Document 32b: Support to EPA, NPIC Daily Diary, October 25, 1978. Classification Unknown

    Document 32c: Support to EPA, NPIC Daily Diary, November 1, 1978. Classification Unknown
    Source: FOIA

    The first item from the NPIC Daily Diary seems to indicate that the EPA requested coverage of satellite photography from either the KH-8 or KH-9 systems (both of which were operating in 1978, and neither of which had been declassified at the time that Document 19 was released in redacted form). Item 4 in the NPIC Daily Diary for October 25 indicates that NPIC followed up EPA’s request for satellite imagery by requesting approval from the Deputy Director of Science & Technology to provide the requested material. Document 19c indicates that the request was approved.

    Document 33: DCI Environmental Task Force, A Description of Procedures and Findings Related to the Report of the U.S. Environmental Task Force, January 21, 1994. Unclassified
    Source: Central Intelligence Agency

    Prior to his becoming Vice-President, Senator Al Gore raised the idea of making data already obtained by U.S. reconnaissance satellites and other intelligence sensors available to environmental scientists, both within and outside the government, to address environmental issues. This report summarizes the findings of the Environmental Task Force as to what classified data might be used to address a such issues.

    Document 34: Director of Central Intelligence, Government Applications Task Force (GATF), Pilot Project Study, October 1996
    Source: FOIA

    These briefing slides describe an effort that was complementary to MEDEA – the examination of the potential for increased use of classified imagery systems for civil agencies. It describes a number of pilot projects that were part of the study – projects relating to information requirements of the Interior, Agriculture, and Energy departments, as well as the Coast Guard, EPA, and FEMA.

    Document 35: Gil I. Klinger, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense (Space) and James F. Devine, Senior Adviser for Science Applications, U.S. Geological Survey, Memorandum of Agreement between the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Space and the U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior for Cooperation in Wildland Fire Detection, Volcanic Activity Monitoring, and Volcanic Ash Cloud Tracking, April 30, 1997. Unclassified
    Source: FOIA

    This memorandum of agreement concerns use of Department of Defense space systems (including reconnaissance and surveillance satellites) to wildland fire detection, volcanic activity monitoring and volcanic ash cloud tracking. Defense Support Program (DSP) infrared launch detection satellites have been used to monitor fires while imagery satellites can be used to monitor volcanic activity.

    Document 36: Department of Defense, [Deleted] Satellite Support to National Fire Detection, Global Volcano Monitoring, n.d. Classification Unknown
    Source: FOIA

    The deleted word in the title is apparently  Reconnaissance.  The document provides specifics on how the DoD would provide support to fire detection and volcano monitoring, as it agreed to do in the April 30, 1997 memorandum of agreement with the Interior Department (Document 19).

    Document 37: NRO, NRO Key to Acquisition Hazard Support System, June 29, 1998. Unclassified
    Source: http://www.nro.gov

    This NRO press release describes NRO involvement in the system used to warn of wildfire outbreaks and volcanic eruptions – also the subject of Document 19 and Document 20. It notes that the system will rely on ballistic missile warning satellites (DSP), civil satellites, and  other sensors  – presumably those operated by the NRO.

    Document 38: U.S. Geological Survey, Civil Applications Committee, July 2001. Unclassified
    Source: U.S. Geological Survey

    The suggestion of Henry Kissinger (Document 14a, Document 14b) in 1973 that a civil applications subcommittee of COMIREX should be established as a clearing house for civil agency requests for satellite imagery produced by classified systems resulted in the establishment, in 1975, of the Civil Applications Committee. This brochure describes the history of the committee, oversight, management of the sources of requested classified imagery, and membership.

    Document 39: U.S. Geological Survey, National Civil Applications Program, November 2002. Unclassified
    Source: U.S. Geological Survey

    This brochure concerns the use of classified imagery by one particular agency – the U.S. Geological Survey. It addresses the background of the NCAP, customers, key components of the NCAP (such the Global Fiducials Library, an archive of classified remote sensing data for more than 500 ‘environmental sensitive’ sites), as well as services and support.

    Document 40: Independent Study Group, Civil Applications Committee (CAC) Blue Ribbon Study, September 2005, Unclassified
    Source: http://www.fas.org

    The Independent Study Group, chaired by former NRO director Keith Hall, was established jointly by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence/Collection and the Director, U.S. Geological Survey to review the operation and future role of the Civil Applications Committee.

    The body of the report consists of eleven findings – concerning the role of the CAC process as a model for the future, the impediments to more extensive use of reconnaissance satellite data, and the need for a  balanced discussion of domestic use of [Intelligence Community] capabilities.  Its recommendations included the creation of a Domestic Applications Office within the Department of Homeland Security to manage a Domestic Applications of National Capabilities Program.

    Document 41: Michael Chertoff, Memorandum for: Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, Subject: CAC Blue Ribbon Study Group Recommendations – DHS Executive Agency of the Domestic Applications Group, March 14, 2006. Unclassified.
    Source: FOIA

    In this memo, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff informs the Director of National Intelligence that he has received the report of the Civil Applications Committee Blue Ribbon Study Group (Document 39) and that he agrees with its recommendation to establish a Domestic Applications Office within DHS and proposes some joint measures to begin implementation of the recommendations.

    Document 42: Dr. Maureen McCarthy, Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security MASINT: A Rich Stew of Signatures and Challenges, Facing the WMD Challenge, December 13, 2006. Classification Unknown
    Source: FOIA

    This presentation does not explicitly refer to the use of satellites to provide homeland security data. However, its relevance lies in its discussion of the use of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) related to homeland security – since some reconnaissance satellite systems produce MASINT and there may be legal issues – as indicated by the Kyllo case – as to which MASINT sensors can be employed for law enforcement purposes without a warrant.

    Document 43: Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: National Applications Office, August 15, 2007. Unclassified
    Source: http://www.dhs.gov

    The recommendation of the Independent Study Group (Document 24) to establish a Domestic Applications Office within the Department of Homeland Security ultimately resulted in a decision to establish a National Applications Office within the DHS, with initial operations to begin the fall of 2007. This fact sheet released by DHS provides an account of expectations for the office, background, organization, and the protection of civil liberties and privacy.

    Document 44a: Letter, Edward J. Markey, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, August 16, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 44b: Letter, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, August 16, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 44c: Letter, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security, Rep. Jane Harman, and Rep. Christopher P. Carney, to Michael Cherthoff, Department of Homeland Security and Charles Allen, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, September 6, 2007. Unclassified
    Sources: http://www.fas.org; http://hsc.house.gov

    Press disclosure of plans to establish the National Applications Office produced a flurry of Congressional inquiries, and eventually hearings, concerning the activities of the CAC, expectations for the National Applications Office, and how civil liberties would be protected. These letters ask for a variety of information with respect to those issues. The final letter requests a moratorium on the program  until the many Constitutional, legal, and organization questions it raises are answered.

    Document 45a: Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson,  Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: the Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of the National Applications Office,  September 6, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 45b: Written Testimony of Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, September 6, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 45c: Charles E. Allen, Department of Homeland Security, Statement for the Record before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, September 6, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 45d: Written Statement of Hugo Tuefel, Department of Homeland Security,
    before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, September 6, 2007. Unclassified
    Document 45e: Lisa Graves, Center for National Security Studies,  Big Brother in the Sky,  September 1, 2007. Unclassified

    Document 45f: Barry Steinhardt, American Civil Liberties Union,  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of Domestic Spy Satellites,  September 6, 2007. Unclassified
    Source: House Committee on Homeland Security

    These statements were presented at the September 6, 2007 hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security on  Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: the Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of the National Applications Office.  They present the views of the committee chairman, three representatives of the Department of the Homeland Security and two representatives of civil liberties group.

    Document 46: Letter from Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (and others) to Rep. David E. Price and Rep. Harold Rogers, September 26, 2007. Unclassified
    Source: House Committee on Homeland Security

    This letter, from seventeen members of Congress, including the chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the chairman of a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence subcommittee, expresses their concern at the Department of Homeland Security’s  lack of progress in creating the appropriate legal and operational safeguards necessary for ensuring that military spy satellites do not become the  Big Brother in the Sky.  It also specifies the information that Homeland Security has been asked to provide for reassurance.

    Document 47: Richard A. Best Jr. and Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, March 21, 2008
    Source: Federation of American Scientists

    This study by two Congressional Research Service specialists examines the background, current policies, and a variety of legal considerations (constitutional rights, statutory authorities and restrictions, and executive branch authorities) associated with the use of reconnaissance satellites to collect data about targets within the United States.

    Document 48: Department of Homeland Security, CHARTER: National Applications Office, February 2008. Classification Not Known
    Source: Federation of American Scientists

    This version of the charter for the NAO, completed in February 2008 discusses the history of the domestic uses of national technical means and the Civil Applications Committee; the CAC Blue Ribbon Study; the structure, responsibilities, and oversight of the NAO; Intelligence Community capabilities; how the NAO will function; the responsibilities of the parties to the charter (which include the Departments of Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), and implementation. The charter specifies that  The NAO will have no authority to accept requests to use IC capabilities to intercept or acquire communications.

    Document 49: Department of Homeland Security, Letter Report, National Applications Office Privacy Stewardship, April 2008. Unclassified
    Source: Department of Homeland Security

    Document 50: Letter, Rep. Bennie G. Thomson, Rep. Jane Harman, and Christopher P. Carney to Honorable Michael Chertoff, April 7, 2008. Unclassified
    Source: Federation of American Scientists
    This letter from the chairman of the House Committee Homeland Security and the chair and chairman of two of its subcommittees to the Secretary of Homeland Security complains that the Department of Homeland Security had failed to craft privacy or civil liberties guidelines for the National Applications Office’s law enforcement customers. In addition, according to the letter  this critical undertaking will be postponed until a unspecified time in the future  which  is unacceptable.  The letter goes on to discuss some of the issues involved in the use of reconnaissance satellites for domestic law enforcement purposes and stresses the need to establish sufficient privacy and civil liberties protections before commencing NAO operations.

    Notes

    1. Robert Block,  U.S. to Expand Domestic Use of Spy Satellites,  Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2007, pp. A1, A9.

    2. Siobhan Gorman, “Privacy Fears Threaten Satellite Program,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2008, p. A3.

    3. Jeffrey T. Richelson,  Scientists in Black,  Scientific American, February 1998.

    4. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report 107-149, To Authorize Appropriations for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government, The Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for Other Purposes, May 13, 2002, p. 21.

    5 . Block,  U.S. to Expand Domestic Use of Spy Satellites.

    6. William Mullen,  NGA Expands Customer Base for Special-Security Events,  Pathfinder, July/August 2006, pp. 18-19.

    7. Nancy Gibbs,  Tracking Down the Unabomber,  Time, April 15, 1996, pp. 38-41; Allan Sloan,  Big Brother Strikes Again,  Forbes, May 12, 1980, pp. 50-51

    http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/index.htm

    ***
    United States Intelligence Community
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    (Redirected from U.S. intelligence community)
    Jump to: navigation, search
    United States Intelligence Community seal.

    The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a cooperative federation of 16 separate United States government agencies that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities considered necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States. Member organizations of the IC include intelligence agencies, military intelligence, and civilian intelligence and analysis offices within federal executive departments. The IC is led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI,) who reports to The President of the United States of America.

    Among their varied responsibilities, the members of the Community collect and produce foreign and domestic intelligence, contribute to military planning, and perform espionage. The IC was established by Executive Order 12333, signed on 4 December 1981 by President Ronald Reagan.[1]
    Contents
    [hide]

    * 1 Purpose
    * 2 Organization
    o 2.1 Members
    o 2.2 Intelligence Community programs
    o 2.3 Organizational structure and leadership
    o 2.4 Interagency cooperation
    o 2.5 Budget
    o 2.6 Oversight
    * 3 References
    * 4 See also
    * 5 External links

    [edit] Purpose

    Executive Order 12333 charged the IC with six primary objectives[2]:

    * Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other executive branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
    * Production and dissemination of intelligence;
    * Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the U.S., international terrorist and/or narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, persons and their agents;
    * Special activities (defined as activities conducted in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the  role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly,  and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions);
    * Administrative and support activities within the U.S. and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
    * Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

    [edit] Organization

    [edit] Members
    The official seals of the 16 US Intelligence Community members.

    The IC consists of 16 members (also called elements). The Central Intelligence Agency is an independent agency of the United States government. The other 15 elements are offices or bureaus within federal executive departments. The IC is led by the Director of National Intelligence, whose office, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), is not listed as a member of the IC.

    * Independent agencies
    o Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
    * United States Department of Defense
    o Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR or AIA)
    o Army Military Intelligence (MI)
    o Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    o Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)
    o National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
    o National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
    o National Security Agency (NSA)
    o Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
    * United States Department of Energy
    o Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI)
    * United States Department of Homeland Security
    o Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
    o Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI)
    * United States Department of Justice
    o Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    o Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
    * United States Department of State
    o Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
    * United States Department of the Treasury
    o Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)[3]
    [edit] Intelligence Community programs

    IC activities are performed under two separate programs:

    * The National Intelligence Program (NIP), formerly known as the National Foreign Intelligence Program as defined by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended),  refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.  Under the law, the DNI is responsible for directing and overseeing the NIP, though the ability to do so is limited (see the Organization structure and leadership section).
    * The Military Intelligence Program (MIP) refers to the programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces. The MIP is directed and controlled by the Secretary of Defense. In 2005, the Department of Defense combined the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program to form the MIP.

    Since the definitions of the NIP and MIP overlap when they address military intelligence, assignment of Department of Defense intelligence activities to the NIP and MIP sometimes proves problematic.

    [edit] Organizational structure and leadership

    The overall organization of the IC is primarily governed by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and Executive Order 12333. The statutory organizational relationships were substantially revised with the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) amendments to the 1947 National Security Act.

    Though the IC characterizes itself as a  federation  of its member elements, its overall structure is better characterized as a confederation due to its lack of a well-defined, unified leadership and governance structure. Prior to 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was the head of the IC, in addition to being the director of the CIA. A major criticism of this arrangement was that the DCI had little or no actual authority over the budgetary authorities of the other IC agencies and therefore had limited influence over their operations.

    Following the passage of IRTPA in 2004, the head of the IC is the DNI. The DNI exerts leadership of the IC primarily through the statutory authorities under which he:

    * Controls the National Intelligence Program budget;
    * Establishes objectives, priorities, and guidance for the IC; and
    * Manages and directs the tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the IC.
    However, the DNI has no authority to direct and control any element of the IC except his own staff – the Office of the DNI – neither does the DNI have the authority to hire or fire personnel in the IC except those on his own staff. The member elements in the executive branch are directed and controlled by their respective department heads, all cabinet-level officials reporting to the President. By law, only the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the DNI.

    In the light of major intelligence failures in recent years that called into the question how well Intelligence Community ensures U.S. national security, particularly those identified by the 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States), and the  WMD Commission  (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction), the authorities and powers of the DNI and the overall organizational structure of the IC have become subject of intense debate in the United States.

    [edit] Interagency cooperation

    Previously, interagency cooperation and the flow of information among the member agencies was hindered by policies that sought to limit the pooling of information out of privacy and security concerns. Attempts to modernize and facilitate interagency cooperation within the IC include technological, structural, procedural, and cultural dimensions. Examples include the Intellipedia wiki of encyclopedic security-related information; the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Centers, Program Manager Information Sharing Environment, and Information Sharing Council; legal and policy frameworks set by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, information sharing Executive Orders 13354 and Executive Order 13388, and the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy.

    [edit] Budget

    The U.S. intelligence budget in 2008 was $47.5 billion[4], according to a disclosure required under a recent law implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. This figure is up from $43.5 billion in 2007.[5]

    In a statement on the release of new declassified figures, DNI Mike McConnell said there would be no additional disclosures of classified budget information beyond the overall spending figure because  such disclosures could harm national security.  How the money is divided among the 16 intelligence agencies and what it is spent on is classified. It includes salaries for about 100,000 people, multi-billion dollar satellite programs, aircraft, weapons, electronic sensors, intelligence analysis, spies, computers, and software.

    About 70 percent of the intelligence budget goes to contractors for the procurement of technology and services (including analysis), according to a May 2007 chart from the Office of the DNI. Intelligence spending has increased by a third over ten years ago, in inflation-adjusted dollars, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

    [edit] Oversight

    Intelligence Community Oversight duties are distributed to both the Executive and Legislative branches. Primary Executive oversight is performed by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Joint Intelligence Community Council, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of Management and Budget. Primary congressional oversight jurisdiction over the IC is assigned to two committees: the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee draft bills to annually authorize the budgets of DoD intelligence activities, and both the House and Senate appropriations committees annually draft bills to appropriate the budgets of the IC. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs took a leading role in formulating the intelligence reform legislation in the 108th Congress.

    [edit] References

    1. ^ United States Intelligence Community – Who We Are
    2. ^ Executive Order 12333 text
    3. ^ Members of the Intelligence Community
    4. ^ DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2008 National Intelligence Program
    5. ^ DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2007 National Intelligence Program

    [edit] See also

    * Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458
    * National Security Act of 1947, as amended
    * Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    * United States Joint Intelligence Community Council

    [edit] External links

    * Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding U.S. Intelligence
    * Department of Defense Directive Number 5143.01, November 23, 2005.
    * U.S. Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book
    * United States Intelligence Community website.

    [show]
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    Other
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    Portal
    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Community
    Categories: Executive branch of the United States government | United States intelligence agencies | Organizations established in 1981 | Intelligence communities

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._intelligence_community

    ****
    Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search

    The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is an office of the United States Department of Energy that focuses on gathering intelligence for the department. It provides information to the Secretary of Energy and senior policy makers. As a member of the Intelligence Community, it also provides the other intelligence agencies with technical analysis of foreign intelligence. The Office of Intelligence utilizes all of the Department of Energy’s resources to gather and analyze intelligence, including the national laboratories. Its expertise is in nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, nuclear energy, radioactive waste and energy security. Its most important function to the Intelligence Community is its assessments of foreign nuclear weapons programs. However, it also provides scientific expertise, analysis and technology. Currently, the office does not perform counterintelligence activities. These are handled by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

    [edit] References

    * Intelligence Community – Office of Intelligence
    * Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy
    * Office of Intelligence Appropriations Hearings

    [show]
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    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Intelligence_and_Counterintelligence
    Categories: United States intelligence agencies | United States Department of Energy agencies

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Intelligence_and_Counterintelligence

    ***
    The requested URL /1-members_energy.shtml was not found on this server.

    Intelligence Community – Office of Intelligence

    ***

    The Turning Point
    March 1999 marked a turning point in DOE’s counterintelligence program.
    That month Los Alamos National Security Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee was
    fired after allegedly failing a polygraph exam.11 (Lee had also allegedly failed to
    notify DOE officials about certain contacts with individuals in the PRC, to properly
    safeguard classified material, and to cooperate with authorities with regard to certain
    security matters. He pleaded guilty to one felony count of unlawful retention of
    national defense information; the government dropped 58 additional counts.12) In
    May of that same year, a bipartisan House Select Committee charged in a report that
    was declassified that the PRC had stolen U.S. nuclear weapons secrets. In June, the
    President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) criticized DOE for the
    “worst” security record on secrecy that panel members said they had ever
    encountered.13 The criticism was contained in a PFIAB report, the first of its kind to
    be publicly released in the panel’s 38-year history. Although the PFIAB dismissed
    assertions of wholesale losses of nuclear weapons technology as a result of
    espionage, the panel did concur, on balance, with the U.S. intelligence community’s
    assessment that the PRC had stolen classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that
    probably enabled the PRC to accelerate its development of nuclear weapons.14

    11 The most recent alleged espionage case with a DOE connection involves alleged PRC spy
    Katrina M. Leung, who the FBI said was a 20-year Bureau informant they now suspect was
    a “double agent” who provided classified material to the PRC. Leung allegedly had affairs
    with two former FBI agents, William Cleveland Jr., who, until he resigned his post on April
    10, 2003, was Director of Security at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
    James Smith. Leung received probation after pleading guilty to a tax charge and lying.
    Smith pleaded guilty to a felony false statement charge in 2004 and was sentenced to
    probation and three months home confinement. Cleveland was never charged with a crime.
    See Josh Gerstein, “Court Hears Arguments Over FBI Agent Accused of Exposing Probe,”
    New York Sun, Mar. 8, 2006. FBI officials reportedly have said that every PRC
    counterintelligence case investigated by the Bureau since 1991 may have been compromised
    by Leung, including that involving Wen Ho Lee. See Susan Schmidt and Dan Eggen, “FBI
    Assesses Potential Damage From Spy Scandal,” Washington Post, Apr. 13, 2003, p. A04.
    12 See CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets,
    by Shirley Kan.
    13 See President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Science At Its Best/Security At Its
    Worst, June 1999, p. 1.
    14 Ibid., p.4.

    Congress and the President responded to the panel’s report by establishing NNSA15
    and placing it charge of DOE’s national security-related nuclear programs.16
    In restructuring DOE and establishing NNSA, Congress created dual
    counterintelligence offices in DOE and NNSA, respectively. Within DOE, the
    already-existing Office of Counterintelligence was codified and made responsible for
    establishing counterintelligence policy for both DOE and NNSA. The department
    further directed that the office be responsible for implementing CI programs at non-
    NNSA facilities. Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence
    was created by statute to implement DOE counterintelligence policy, but only at
    NNSA facilities. Conferees further stipulated that a presidentially appointed, Senateconfirmed
    Under Secretary for Nuclear Security be designated to serve as NNSA
    Administrator, and that the Administrator report directly to the Energy Secretary.
    In approving this reorganization, conferees cited the PFIAB’s report, which
    blamed DOE’s counterintelligence failures on poor organization and a failure of
    accountability. Conferees also noted the PFIAB’s criticism of the DOE bureaucracy
    for being dysfunctional with regard to security matters, and incapable of reform.17
    Over time, this partially bifurcated CI structure has produced debate over its
    effectiveness. Critics warn that there is a lack of communication and coordination
    between the two offices that could undermine delicate counterintelligence
    investigations. Supporters of the dual office structure argue, however, that a
    separate, dedicated CI office within NNSA is necessary if counterintelligence
    protection of DOE’s national security laboratories is to receive the focus it warrants.

    Policy Issues For Congress
    In assessing the current debate over DOE counterintelligence policy, observers
    have generally focused on two interrelated questions. First, are DOE and NNSA
    effectively managing their CI programs? And second, is the current dual office
    organizational structure within DOE and NNSA flawed?

    15 NNSA facilities include the national security laboratories (Los Alamos National
    Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA;
    and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA); nuclear weapons
    production facilities (the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX; Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MO;
    the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, TN; the tritium operations facilities at the Savannah River Site,
    Aiken, S.C.; and the Nevada Test Site, NV); and a service center at Albuquerque, NM.
    Naval reactor facilities also fall within the NNSA.
    16 See S. 1059; conference report, H.Rept. 106-301; and P.L. 106-65, signed into law on
    October 5, 1999.
    17 See FY2000 conference report, H.Rept. 106-301, p. 927, which accompanied S. 1059.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33355.pdf

    ***
    The primary mission of the Office of Intelligence is to ensure that
    intelligence information requirements of the Secretary and senior
    policy makers are met. This is accomplished by the production of
    finished intelligence products covering a broad range of issues
    from national defense and energy security issues to nuclear
    reactor safety and science and technology. In addition to.
    Departmental support, the Office of Intelligence ensures that
    DOE’s technical, analytical, and research expertise is made
    available to the Intelligence Community in accordance with
    Executive Order 12333,  United States Intelligence Activities.
    The Office of Intelligence also provides threat assessment
    and counterintelligence support to DOE Headquarters and field
    operations.

    To fulfill its requirements under Executive Order 12333, Office of
    Foreign Intelligence staff represent the Department on various
    national-level bodies, such as the National Foreign intelligence Board,
    the Director of Central Intelligence Non-Proliferation Center, the Joint
    Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Scientific and Technical
    Intelligence Committee.

    The Office of Counterintelligence conducts a DOE-wide program  designed to
    detect, deter, and defeat foreign intelligence service actions to acquire
    classified or sensitive DOE information or materials. This program differs
    from the activities carried out by the DOE Office of Security Affairs
    which is responsible for personnel, physical, document, and communication
    security programs. Counterintelligence activities are carried out in
    cooperation with the DOE Office of Security Affairs, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Office of
    Counterintelligence staff represent the Department on the Interagency
    Advisory Group for Counterintelligence,

    The Office of Threat Assessment provides assessments of actual
    or potential adversaries and adversarial actions that could
    impact the security of DOE’s facilities and activities. ‘It also
    supports the total U.S. Government by providing technical capability
    to evaluate threats
    Deleted

    Threat Assessment activities are primarily carried out in support
    of the Office of Security Affairs and strengthen the-DOE’S
    security by providing specially tailored threat-related
    information. The Office of Threat Assessment also manages the
    Special Technologies Program
    Deleted

    the Department on the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
    Terrorism and the Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism.
    The office or intelligence Support and security provides general
    technical support to the Office of Intelligence. Key activities
    include automation and telecommunications functions, control and
    accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information for the
    Department of Energy and its field components, and development and
    conduct of specialized intelligence training for DOE, intelligence,
    and law enforcement personnel.

    SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

    During FY 1991, and continuing in FY 1992, the office of Intelligence
    had significant accomplishments in the areas of foreign intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and threat  assessment.  Some of the accomplish-
    ments were national in-scope and others contributed to the mission
    of other DOE program elements, such as arms control policy, physical
    protection of DOE facilities, and safeguard of classified information.

    Significant foreign intelligence accomplishments include:

    Deleted

    o      Major inputs to Intelligence Community assessments of
    nuclear weapons programs of high priority proliferant
    countries

    Deleted

    Deleted

    o     Participation in Intelligence Community assessment
    of issues related to dismantlement of nuclear
    weapons
    Deleted

    o     Specialized technical and resource support to the
    Iraq Task Force and the United Nations (UN) Special
    Commission for UN Security Council Resolution 687.

    Significant Counterintelligence accomplishments include:

    o     Conduct of analysis for identification of
    specific espionage threats to DOE personnel
    and activities (i.e., most active foreign
    intelligence services).

    Deleted

    o    Conduct of counterintelligence awareness training for
    DOE and contractor employees.

    o     Cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI)

    Deleted

    o    Support to the FBI at the Nevada Test Site on
    activities associated with implementation of the
    Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

    Significant Threat Assessment accomplishments include:

    o    Completion of comprehensive study updating the
    terrorist threat to DOE facilities.

    Deleted

    o     Conduct of special exhibition., at Sandia National
    Laboratories, of DOE technologies which could
    potentially be of use to other U.S. Government
    agencies in their counterterrorism and counternarcotic
    activities.

    PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE

    The Office of Intelligence will continue to strengthen its role
    in Intelligence Community assessments

    Deleted

    The Energy Security Program of the office of
    Intelligence will focus on assessing the stability of world
    and regional economies; potential foreign markets for U.S.
    energy technologies, equipment, fuels, and other products and
    services; and               Deleted

    The Counterintelligence program will
    continue to be a top priority and Threat Assessment support to
    the safeguard and security of DOE facilities will be maintained.

    FY 1993 FUNDING REQUEST

    Deleted

    FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

    The increased funding request    Deleted    covers inflation and
    supports additional foreign intelligence activities at the
    national laboratories in the Proliferation Intelligence Program
    and the Energy Security Program.

    As a result of recent revelations concerning the Iraqi nuclear
    program, the scope of activities concerning the assessment of
    capabilities and intentions of proliferant or possible proliferant
    nations has been expanded to place greater emphasis on: (1)
    integrated country assessments of emerging proliferant nations;
    (2) the role of nuclear supplier nations; and (3) global technology
    development initiatives.

    Deleted

    In addition, finished intelligence products will support the
    policy initiatives of the Department’s newly established
    Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Technology Support.

    Deleted

    COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

    The increased funding request    Deleted   covers inflation and
    provides for the continued strengthening of the counterintelligence
    program.

    Deleted

    THREAT ASSESSMENT

    The increased funding request    Deleted    will cover inflation for
    continued threat assessment activities carried out in support of the
    Department’s operational security efforts in the field and Headquarters.

    TECHNICAL SUPPORT

    The increased funding request    Deleted    will allow the Office of
    Intelligence to fully correct identified material weaknesses associated
    with findings stemming from the inspection and evaluation of its Sensitive
    Compartmented Information Facility by the Office of Security Evaluations.
    Approximately $800,000 is required in operating funds to maintain the
    classified document control and accountability system.

    The increased funding will also cover administrative support requirements
    based on revised DOE policy on FTE-dependent costs for space, supplies,
    and telecommunications. While these funds are contained in the Office of
    Intelligence request, the funds will be transferred to the Departmental
    Administration account during the execution year.

    PROGRAM DIRECTION

    Deleted

    CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

    Capital Equipment funding will remain at the FY 1992 level and
    will provide for Headquarters and laboratory Deleted communications
    and classified information control requirements.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_hr/h920311q.htm

    ****

    The Corporation
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search
    This article is about the documentary film. For other uses, see The Corporation (disambiguation).
    The Corporation

    Promotional poster for The Corporation
    Directed by     Mark Achbar
    Jennifer Abbott
    Produced by     Mark Achbar
    Bart Simpson
    Written by     Joel Bakan
    Harold Crooks
    Mark Achbar
    Narrated by     Mikela J. Mikael
    Music by     Leonard J. Paul
    Cinematography     Mark Achbar
    Rolf Cutts
    Jeff Koffman
    Kirk Tougas
    Editing by     Jennifer Abbott
    Distributed by     Big Picture Media Corporation
    Release date(s)     Flag of Canada September 9, 2003
    Flag of the United States June 4, 2004
    Running time     145 min.
    Country     Canada
    Language     English
    Official website • IMDb • Allmovie

    The Corporation is a 2003 Canadian documentary film critical of the modern-day corporation, considering it as a class of person and evaluating its behaviour towards society and the world at large as a psychologist might evaluate an ordinary person. This is explored through specific examples.
    Contents
    [hide]

    * 1 The cineastes
    * 2 Synopsis
    * 3 Topics addressed
    * 4 Starring
    * 5 Interviews
    * 6 Reception
    * 7 Topically related films
    * 8 Books mentioned in the film
    * 9 References
    * 10 External links
    o 10.1 Downloads

    [edit] The cineastes

    The documentary was written by Joel Bakan, and directed by Mark Achbar and Jennifer Abbott. The Corporation has been displayed worldwide, on television, and via DVD. Bakan wrote the book, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (ISBN 0-74324-744-2), during the filming of the documentary.

    [edit] Synopsis

    The documentary shows the development of the contemporary business corporation, from a legal entity that originated as a government-chartered institution meant to effect specific public functions, to the rise of the modern commercial institution entitled to most of the legal rights of a person. One theme is its assessment as a “personality”, as a result of an 1886 case in the United States Supreme Court which ruled that corporations are “persons” having the same rights as human beings, based on the 14th Amendment to the US constitution. The film’s assessment is effected via the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV; Robert Hare, a University of British Columbia psychology professor and a consultant to the FBI, compares the profile of the contemporary profitable business corporation to that of a clinically-diagnosed psychopath. The documentary concentrates mostly upon North American corporations, especially those of the United States.

    The film is in vignettes examining and criticising corporate business practices, to establish parallels, between corporate legal misbehaviour (malfeasance) and the DSM-IV’s symptoms of psychopathy, i.e. callous disregard for the feelings of other people, the incapacity to maintain human relationships, reckless disregard for the safety of others, deceitfulness (continual lying to deceive for profit), the incapacity to experience guilt, and the failure to conform to social norms and respect for the law.

    [edit] Topics addressed

    Topics addressed include the Business Plot, where in 1933, the popular General Smedley Butler exposed a corporate plot against then U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt; the tragedy of the commons; Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning people to beware of the rising military-industrial complex; economic externalities; suppression of an investigative news story about Bovine Growth Hormone on a Fox News Channel affiliate television station; the invention of Fanta due to the trade embargo on Nazi Germany; the alleged role of IBM in the Nazi holocaust (see IBM and the Holocaust); the Cochabamba protests of 2000 brought on by the privatization of Bolivia’s municipal water supply by the Bechtel Corporation; and in general themes of corporate social responsibility, the notion of limited liability, the corporation as a psychopath, and the corporation as a person

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Corporation

    My note –
    If the Republicans that are supposed to be representing the American people aren’t finding some way to censor something available to us – they are using their position, power and efforts to create some way undermine our civil rights, liberties, opportunities and funding some ridiculously pervasive and invasive domestic spying operation. And, doing this after running their campaign promises on the principles of protecting the rights of citizens, promoting the values of the US Constitution and preserving the freedoms of the American people.

    It used to be a common joke to say, “how do you know a politician is lying? Their mouth is moving.” Which is a joke only when we are not having to endure the abuse of power or live in misery under the results of those lies.

    ***
    Excerpts from:

    updated 11:32 a.m. EDT, Wed March 11, 2009

    California lawmaker wants to blur Google Earth
    By Charles Cooper
    CNET.com

    (CNET) — OK, it’s California. So we are quite used to the rest of the country rolling their eyes in knowing exasperation at our fads. But often, they turn out to be harbingers of national trends. And so the question: Will AB-255 (a bill that would “censor” some aspects of Google Earth) number among them as well?

    A California bill would blur images of schools and government buildings on Google Earth

    Last month California Assemblyman Joel Anderson, a Republican from the San Diego area, introduced a bill to limit the amount of detail someone could see on screen using online mapping tools. It also calls for fines of up to $250,000 per day for violating what Anderson describes “as the same level of protections that foreign governments extend to their own citizens.”

    Here are the clauses from AB-255 –

    — “An operator of a commercial Internet Web site or online service that makes a virtual globe browser available to members of the public shall not provide aerial or satellite photographs or imagery of a building or facility in this state that is identified on the Internet Web site by the operator as a school or place of worship, or a government or medical building or facility, unless those photographs or images have been blurred.

    — “An operator of a commercial Internet Web site or online service that makes a virtual globe browser available to members of the public shall not provide street view photographs or images of the buildings and facilities described in subdivision (a).”

    Anderson: The bill is fraught with undefined items and it has to be honed down and clarified. What you’re looking at is not the finished product. But the concept of the bill will remain. After the Mumbai attacks, the Indian government found that the lone surviving terrorist used Google’s online maps and the level of detail it offered made them effective. What’s interesting is that what they’re doing in India now is exactly what I’m suggesting we do. If you go throughout the world, many countries are trying to shut down Google mapping–it’s not just Google. My bill would address all online mapping.

    Q: Isn’t the real threat here the motivation of people who look to commit heinous acts, rather than the technology they use?

    Anderson: I’m not against the technology; it’s fantastic. But we’re in an evolving world and we have to change our course as it changes. I’m all for online mapping, but knowing where the air ducts are in an air shaft is not necessary for me to navigate in the city. Who wants to know that level of detail? Bad people do.

    Q: But could not a terrorist just as easily plan out their attacks by using a map of a city like Mumbai? They don’t need to go up online to locate their targets.

    Anderson: The level of detail is not on the maps. With a map, you cant count the number of bricks in a building, or see the elevator shafts. With this level of detail (afforded by online maps,) you can. I hear the argument that, “Yeah, I want to also ban cars because cars are used in robberies.” Look, cars have other commercial uses. There are no other uses for knowing on a map where there are air shafts. These are all red herring arguments. The fact is that I would be remiss in my job if I didn’t take this seriously. I’m not interested in censoring Google or the others, but now that we know there’s a threat, how could we not address this?

    Q: But that’s where it becomes more complicated. A colleague here at CNET pointed out that the way the bill is worded, government agencies that use Google Earth, for instance, to help the public find their buildings could conceivably be in violation as well.

    Anderson: The wording of the law would change. But companies would still back off the level of detail. The only concern people have had that’s been put to me is whether they’ll still be able to use the online maps and my answer is that, absolutely, they will. I’m not against technology.

    Q: Do you believe you have the votes to pass your proposal?

    Anderson: I’m working on that. And I believe that other people from other states will follow suit and do something similar.

    Q: If AB-255 (the censorship bill) does pass, why do you believe it would stand up to a court challenge?

    Anderson: That’s their option. They can take it to court. But since when do you have a First Amendment right to yell fire? This falls under the same category.

    Q: So have you been in touch with software companies to talk about your bill?

    Anderson: Microsoft spent two hours with me last week. I want to hone it down and work out something that works for them as well as for me. I also spoke with the lobbyist from Google. My door is open. I do want to work with them in good faith. The bill will be cleaned up and I have a pretty good idea of where it should go, but as we got through the vetting process, I’m open to what my colleagues have to say or what Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and Mapquest have to say. But the concept of the bill will stay intact. This is the trend that’s going around the world. let’s not wait until an American has to die in order to do the right thing.

    © 2009 CBS Interactive Inc. All rights reserved. CNET, CNET.com and the CNET logo are registered trademarks of CBS Interactive Inc. Used by permission.

    http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/03/11/google.earth.censor.california/index.html

    ***

    Perception management is a term originated by the U. S. military. The U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) gives this definition:

    Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.[1]

    The phrase  perception management  has often functioned as a  euphemism  for  an aspect of information warfare.  A scholar in the field notes a distinction between  perception management  and public diplomacy, which  does not, as a rule, involve falsehood and deception, whereas these are important ingredients of perception management; the purpose is to get the other side to believe what one wishes it to believe, whatever the truth may be. [2]

    Contents

    * 1 Perception Management and the U.S. Department of Defense
    * 2 Perception Management by the U.S. government
    * 3 Perception Management in Business, Marketing and Advertising
    * 4 Perception Management in Fashion
    * 5 Perception Management and Celebrity
    * 6 Perception Management and Universities
    * 7 Perception Management and Terrorism
    * 8 Perception Management in Politics
    * 9 Perception Management in Media
    * 10 Perception Management and Cognition
    * 11 Perception Management in Athletics
    * 12 See also
    * 13 References
    * 14 Further reading –

    * The Corporation – a book and film which looks at how corporations operate, each of which includes a chapter titled “Perception Management” as it is practiced by corporations.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Corporation

    * 15 External links

    Although perception management operations are typically carried out within the international arena between governments, and between governments and citizens, use of perception management techniques have become part of mainstream information management systems in many ways that do not concern military campaigns or government relations with citizenry. Businesses may even contract with other businesses to conduct perception management for them, or they may conduct it in-house with their public relations staff.
    As Stan Moore has written,  Just because truth has been omitted, does not mean that truth is not true. Just because reality has not been perceived, does not mean that it is not real.  [3]

    Perception management includes all actions used to influence the attitudes and objective reasoning of foreign audiences and consists of Public Diplomacy, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Public Information, Deception and Covert Action.[9] The Department of Defense describes  perception management  as a type of psychological operation. It is supposed to be directed at foreign audiences, and involves providing or discarding information to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in a way that is favorable to the originator of the information. The main goal is to influence friends and enemies, provoking them to engage in the behavior that you want. DOD sums it up: “Perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.” [10]

    More recently, the DOD has continued to pursue actively a course of perception management about the Iraq War.  The Department of Defense is conscious that there is an increasingly widespread public perception that the U.S. military is becoming brutalized by the campaign in Iraq. Recognizing its vulnerability to information and media flows, the DoD has identified the information domain as its new  asymmetric flank.   [12]

    Perception Management by the U.S. government

    The U.S. government already has checks in place to dissuade perception management conducted by the state towards domestic populations, such as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which  forbids the domestic dissemination of U.S Government authored or developed propaganda…deliberately designed to influence public opinion or policy.  [13]

    Perception management can be used as a propaganda strategy for controlling how people view political events. This practice was refined by U.S. intelligence services as they tried to manipulate foreign populations, but it eventually made its way into domestic U.S. politics as a tool to manipulate post-Vietnam-War-era public opinion.

    Beginning in the 1950s, more than 800 news and public information organizations and individuals carried out assignments to manage the public’s perception for the CIA, according to the New York Times. By the mid-80s, CIA Director William Casey had taken the practice to the next level: an organized, covert “public diplomacy” apparatus designed to sell a “new product” — Central America — while stoking fear of communism, the Sandinistas, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, and anyone else considered an adversary during the Ronald Reagan presidential administration. Sometimes it involved so-called “white propaganda,” stories and op-eds secretly financed by the government. But they also went “black,” pushing false story lines, such as how the Sandinistas were actually anti-Semitic drug dealers. That campaign included altered photos and blatant disinformation dispersed by public officials as high as the president himself. [10]

    The term  perception management  is not new to the lexicon of government language. For years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has listed foreign perception management as one of eight “key issue threats” to national security, including it with terrorism, attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure, and weapons proliferation among others. The FBI clearly recognizes perception management as a threat when it is directed at the U.S. by foreign governments.[15]

    Perception Management in Business, Marketing and Advertising

    Businesses shape the perceptions of the public in order to get the desired behaviour and purchase patterns from consumers. The best medium for businesses to affect the perceptions of the public is through marketing.

    Marketers understand this very well. To get people to buy products, marketers must create a need and manage the perception of the public so that they feel the product will fulfill that need. This is not the same thing as manipulation, where businesses create something people don’t need, and marketers convince them that they do need it. Good perception management is to the benefit of the consumer, as it fulfills more of their needs, and to the benefit of the business, as it increases their revenue.[16] The decision making process in relation to the future is an element of business that has a great effect on the company’s future. If the company is too risky, this leads to underperformance, and a missed opportunity. If the company takes to many risks, it is likely that there will be a large amount of losses. Ultimately if this amount of risk taking leads the perception of the company to exceed the boundaries of logic and fact, the company will most likely fail based on their poor perception.[17]

    Public relation firms are now offering services to celebrity clients in perception management or reputation repair. It is a new tool for public firms.

    Perception Management in Politics

    “Perception management” – also known as “public diplomacy” – is a propaganda strategy for controlling how a target population views political events. For example, George W. Bush has misled the public about a policy in order to  protect  the American public.

    In the years of the Regan/Bush administration the government saw a lot of reluctance to commit military forces abroad. They used many tactics to change the outlook of peoples thoughts about oversea issues. Warfare experts from the CIA and the Army Special Forces were included in this plan. They accomplished this by pushing issues about the events in South America and Leftist right issues in Nicaragua and Afghanistan [26]

    John Rendon and his Rendon Group, the leader in strategic field of perception management, was awarded 16 million contract from the Pentagon  to target Iraq and other adversaries with propaganda.[27]

    The Chinese government had been controlling media to exercise  mind control  and manipulate public opinion on its citizens. All Chinese media, including newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, TV stations, broadcasting, the movie industry and art performances, are categorized and managed as “mouthpieces” of the ruling Communist Party. [28]

    [some of the references found here – ]

    13. ^  Pentagon Sued for Records on Propaganda, PSY-OPS and ‘Perception Management’ Targeting U.S. Civilians.  (2005, March 4) Judicial Watch, Inc: Washington D.C.
    14. ^ Parry, Robert. “Bush’s Perception Management Plan”. November 18, 2004., Global Exchange
    15. ^ Martemucci, Matteo G.  Regaining the High Ground: The Challenges of Perception Management in National Strategy and Military Operations . 17 June 2007.
    16. ^ Smith, B. (1994)  Perception Management,  The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 1994-1995: http://www.empireclubfoundation.com/details.asp?FT=yes&SpeechID=1270
    17. ^ Vance, Beaumont.  Perception and meltdowns.(RISK MANAGEMENT).  Risk & Insurance 18.12 (Oct 1, 2007): 20(1).

    24. ^ Gressang, D. S. , 2004-03-17  Perception Management and Counter-terrorism: Leveraging the Communicative Dynamic  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online <.PDF>. 2008-10-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73614_index.html
    25. ^ Robert Parry. November 18,2004. Bush’s  Perception Management  Plan. consortiumnews.com. Last accessed November 20,2008.
    26. ^ http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/unitedstates/democracy/2731.html
    27. ^ Time Leslie (2005. The U.S. Military and the Age of ‘Perception Management’. CommonDreams.org News Center

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perception_management

    ***

    Opposition research
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Opposition research (often referred to as oppo) is:

    1. The term used to classify and describe efforts of supporters or paid consultants of a political candidate to legally investigate the biographical, legal or criminal, medical, educational, financial, public and private administrative and or voting records of the opposing candidate, as well as prior media coverage. The research is usually conducted in the time period between announcement of intent to run and the actual election; however political parties maintain long-term databases that can cover several decades. The practice is both a tactical maneuver and a cost-saving measure.[1]
    2. Opposition research may also refer to illegal or unethical means of gathering potentially damaging information on candidates, such as accessing credit reports, wiretapping, theft of files, hacking computer files, and interviewing ex-spouses.
    3.  Vulnerability studies  occur in the ‘prebuttal’ phase of campaign development, when a candidate’s political consultants will amass files of potentially damaging information on their own clients, to prepare pre-emptive strategies for rebuttal at a later date.
    4. Research conducted, at the request of an incumbent office-holder, often by the same staff who conducted campaign research, against political opponents or dissenters. The Hatch Act of 1939 prohibits the use of public office for partisan political advocacy, but often the same staff who once researched private information about opponents are placed in positions of proximity to confidential government files.
    5. Research on the activities of opponents conducted on behalf of advocacy groups, political action committees, churches, labor unions, management of corporations, or sports teams, [2]as well as private individuals. Opposition researchers may work exclusively for one candidate or many, one group, or many groups that share ideologies and financial interests, or the highest bidder. Opposition research has also played a role in confirmation of nominees to the Supreme Court, and other presidential appointments.
    6. Demographic research into the habits, behavior, and histories of voters likely to cast ballots for opponents, as a tool for voter suppression.[3]

    Methods in the United States

    Opposition research differs immensely depending on the size and funding of a campaign, the ethics of the candidate, and the era in which it is conducted. Information gathering can be classified into three main categories: open-source research enabled by the Freedom of Information Act, covert operations or  tradecraft,   and maintenance of human systems of informants. Increasingly, data-mining of electronic records is used. Information is then stored for future use, and disseminated in a variety of ways.[8] A local election sometimes has a staff member dedicated to reading through all of the opponents’ public statements and their voting records; others initiate whisper campaigns that employ techniques of disinformation or  black ops  to deliberately mislead the public by advancing a pre-determined  narrative  that will present the opponent in a negative light. Another technique is to infiltrate the opposition’s operations and position a paid informant there.  Gray propaganda  techniques are often used to release damaging information to news media outlets without its source being identified properly, a technique inherited from disinformation tactics employed by intelligence agencies such as the OSS during World War II.[9] Yet another technique is to position information or personnel within media outlets. Often the information is video footage gathered in campaign-funded  tracker programs  wherein videographers use candidates’ itineraries to track them and record as many remarks as possible, since anything they say can and will be used against them, as was the cased in former Senator George Allen’s  macaca moment. [10]  Far from being detached observers, reporters constantly call oppo staffs looking for tidbits and sometimes trading information,  wrote three reporters, Matthew Cooper, Gloria Borger, and Michael Barone, for U.S. News & World Report in 1992.[11]

    File-sharing between operatives of political parties is quite common. In the 2008 presidential election, a dossier of opposition research against Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Sarah Palin was posted in its entirety on a political blog site, Politico.com. The file was compiled by the staff of her opponent in the 2006 Alaska gubernatorial race, Tony Knowles.[12]

    Oppo dumps  are used by political campaigns to systemtatically supply files of damaging information to press outlets, including matters of the public record, video footage from party archives and private collections, as well as private intelligence gathered by operatives. Many prime time television and radio news commentaries rely on this supply of party-generated material because it is free, and therefore more cost-effective than paying investigative reporters.[13]

    Congressional and presidential opposition research is often conducted by or funded by a political party, lobbying group, political action committee (PAC), or a 527 group that coalesces around a certain issue. In the U.S., both the Republican and Democratic parties employ full-time  Directors of Research  and maintain databases on opponents. In recent years the task of opposition research has been privatized in many areas. Full time companies with permanent staff specializing in media productions or  grassroots  operations have replaced volunteers and campaign officials. Political media consultants may also opt for astroturfing techniques, which simulate wide popular appeal for a candidate’s platform.

    Candidates and incumbents who benefit from opposition research often choose to remain uninformed about their campaign’s operations and tactics, to insure plausible deniability should criminal charges be brought against researchers.

    * Nixon Administration: During the Richard Nixon administration, White House staffers compiled lists of names of political opponents, journalists who had criticized Nixon, and artists and actors (such as Jane Fonda and Paul Newman) who had dissented with Nixon policy, especially on the subject of Vietnam, with the intent of prompting Internal Revenue Service investigations. The full extent of Nixon’s surveillance of private citizens solely on the basis of their dissent was not known until years after Nixon was forced to resign, as former staff members such as Charles Colson and John Dean began to disclose details.[citation needed] Nixon’s Enemies List is the informal name of what started as a list of President Richard Nixon’s major political opponents compiled by Charles Colson, written by George T. Bell [1] (assistant to Colson, special counsel to the White House) and sent in memorandum form to John Dean on September 9, 1971. The list was part of a campaign officially known as “Opponents List” and “Political Enemies Project.” The official purpose, as described by the White House Counsel’s Office, was to “screw” Nixon’s political enemies, by means of tax audits from the IRS, and by manipulating “grant availability, federal contracts, litigation, prosecution, etc.”[31]

    * Ford Administration: During the Gerald Ford presidency, Deputy Assistant Dick Cheney suggested in a now infamous memo to Donald Rumsfeld that the White House use the United States Justice Department to conduct opposition research and retaliate against political opponents and critical journalists such as Seymour Hersh and the New York Times, arguing that the executive branch had the power to prosecute journalists as they saw fit, under the provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917.[32]

    * Reagan Administration: In 1984, during the Ronald Reagan presidency, the Republican National Committee formed The Opposition Research Group, with its own budget of $1.1 million. These staff amassed information on eight Democratic presidential candidates based on data from voting records, Congressional Record speeches, media clippings and transcripts, campaign materials, all of which was stored on a computer for easy access. In this way Reagan was able to track inconsistencies and attack them. This original data base evolved into a network that linked information gleaned by Republicans in all 50 states, creating a master data base accessible to high-ranking Republican staff, even aboard Air Force One.[33]

    * George W. Bush Administration: Two former opposition researchers for the RNC appointed to Justice Department posts, Timothy Griffin and Monica Goodling, were implicated in efforts to use data collected on Democratic-appointed federal attorneys as ground for dismissal. See Dismissal of U.S. attorneys controversy. See also Karl Rove. Also during this administration, CIFA (Counterintelligence Field Activity) , an intelligence gathering arm of the Pentagon was disbanded in 2008, after investigations into the bribery activities directed at Duke Cunningham revealed that the U.S. government kept a sizeable database of information about 126 domestic peace activist groups, including Quakers, about 1,500  suspicious incidents  including peace demonstrations outside armed forces recruiter offices, even though the groups posed no specified threat to national security. The program was known as Talon. About two years elapsed between the program’s disbanding and the Post report. The Washington Post quoted an unnamed  official  as saying, On the surface, it looks like things in the database that were etermined not to be viable threats were never deleted but should have been,  the official said.  You can also make the argument that these things should never have been put in the database in the first place until they were confirmed as threats. [35]
    Opposition Research and Mass media ethics

    * In 1992, Floyd Brown headed up the Presidential Victory Committee, which backed the candidacy of George H. W. Bush. CBS Evening News reported that Floyd Brown was observed to be in the company of NBC news producer Ira Silverman as they stalked the family of Susan Coleman, a former law student of Bush’s opponent Bill Clinton. Coleman had committed suicide, and Brown was attempting to disseminate a rumor that she had had an affair with Clinton. Brown and associate David Bossie reportedly stalked the family of a suicide victim. In April 1992, 30 news organizations received  an anonymous and untraceable letter  by fax  claiming Clinton had had an affair with a former law student who committed suicide 15 years ago.  Floyd Brown attempted to link Clinton to the 1977 suicide of this,  emotionally distraught young woman, seven-months pregnant,  Susan Coleman.[42] The Bush-Quayle campaign eventually filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission against Brown, seeking to distance itself from his tactics.[43][44] The group had filed its intent to air the ad with the Republican Party, and Bush’s campaign director James A. Baker III, who waited 25 days before responding to the letter, after the ad had been airing continuously. Brown has said of the incident,  If they were really interested in stopping this, do you think they would have waited that long to send us a letter? [45] The practice of using tips from sources such as Brown was examined in 1994 by Howard Kurtz, media analyst for the Washington Post. Kurtz surveyed the major networks, Newsweek, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and other influential media outlets, and found varying levels of  use  of Brown’s  information  on David Hale as a witness in the Whitewater controversy. At this time, Brown confirmed that he had been the source of four mainstream media  stories  that had received attention from the Columbia Journalism Review because they bore striking resemblance to the opposition research being disseminated by Citizens United.[46] In 2008, Floyd unveiled a new attack ad against Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, on the Fox News network, while also appearing as a  real estate investor  commenting on the mortgage fraud crisis.[47]

    Opposition research and public opinion in the United States

    The Atwater-Rove style drew sharp scrutiny and criticism, and opened a new venue for study of executive management style, as scholars sought to examine to what extent incumbent politicians who used  black ops  to gain power would also deploy the same staff and techniques to maintain power and control once they are elected. The public now weighs a candidate or organization’s viability by how they conduct their campaigns, and to many voters, a negative campaign means that if elected, that candidate will possibly transfer  oppo  research into retaliatory operations against dissenters.

    Political infighting and Opposition Research

    * In the spring of 2007, Roger Stone, a political consultant in the employ of New York state senator Joseph Bruno, was forced to resign after leaving threatening phone messages on the answering machine of the 85-year-old father of New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, alleging that Spitzer’s campaign finances were conducted improperly.[51] In November of that same year, Stone sent a letter to the FBI detailing Spitzer’s sexual preferences with prostitutes and sexual props, right down to his black calf-length socks.[52] Stone was considered to be an authoritative source because he frequented the same prostitutes as a client himself. A subsequent Justice Department investigation produced evidence that ultimately led to Spitzer’s resignation as governor. Joseph Bruno, Stone’s client, has been a longtime political enemy of Eliot Spitzer.

    Opposition Research and Activism

    * Opposition research is a necessary component of  grassroots  activist groups. Research on corporate or poltiical opponents may enable activist groups to target neighborhoods from which to increase their numbers, to refine their focus or  target,  to pinpoint the target’s vulnerabilities, to reveal hidden sources of funding or little-known connections, to investigate scare tactics, and to augment a legislative initiative.[53]

    Quotes

    *  When they do surveys on the most reviled professions, lawyers, HMO managers, advertisers, members of Congress, used car salesmen and Barry Bonds’ nutritionist top the list. It’s always been my opinion, though, that the only reason opposition researchers aren’t on that list is that few people know we exist.  Jason Stanford, December 4, 2007[54]

    *  Opposition research, if it’s true, is probably 5 or 10 times more effective than paid media.  James Pinkerton quoted in Center for Public Integrity’s  Dirty Politics,

    *  Research is a fundamental point. We think of ourselves as the creators of the ammunition in a war. Research digs up the ammunition. We make the bullets… It’s an amazing thing when you have topline producers and reporters calling you and saying ‘we trust you…we need your stuff.’  (Tim Griffin, in Digging the Dirt, BBC documentary on opposition research, 2000.)

    *  What’s garbage today is gold years later… the trick is to catalog it, retrieve it, and connect the dots.  (Director of Intelligence Project, Southern Poverty Law Center, U.S. News & World Report, September 6, 1999.)

    *  Candidates will be in a fund raising frenzy to try and raise enough cash to cover the television outlets in multiple population centers of all those states. They will be spending a great deal of time in studios preparing positive life story spots with appeal to each such population center. They will be spending more time in studios with attack ads on the other candidates based on the findings of continuing  opposition research.  Who got drunk? Who used drugs? Who had an affair? Who has been married multiple times and what do their exes have to say about them? Who has made a bunch of money in some quick turnaround deal that can be made to look fishy? Who has had an illegal alien mow their lawn or watch their kids, or clean their house, etc. No candidate will have enough time to present themselves to those population centers as a  real  human being with  real  ideas and a  real  set of core beliefs and principles that resonate with those voters. Some, probably most, will come across as opportunistic attack dogs who simply want the power of the presidency by persuading voters to simply deny the prize to everyone else.  Jerry Fox,  The Primary Symptom is Insanity,  Townhall.com, February 14, 2007.

    *  [Y]ou have to plant a lot of seeds in the spring and the summer so you can capitalize on it. If you have a story that’s going to hit in the middle of September, middle of October, what you really want to do is build several things that come off of the story so that it’s not just a one-day hit. If the story runs on the front page of a major paper, you also want to set it up so that it hits some of the television morning shows, and from there you want to have surrogates out the next day, so that you get a second hit. On the third day, ideally, you have some additional information you’ve been holding back that you can feed into it, another round of stories. On the fourth or fifth day you try to hold your candidate back from saying anything, so that eventually, when he does say something about the issue, you get another round of stories. If you do it all effectively, you can basically wipe out a guy’s entire week. He’ll spend the entire week responding to a story that showed up on a Monday.  Chris Lehane, quoted in Atlantic Monthly, June 2004.

    References

    1. ^ Stephanie Mencimer,  Dirty Politics,  Center for Public Integrity, May 30, 2008.
    2. ^ Lee Staples, Roots to Power: A Manual for Grassroots Organizing, 2nd ed. (Westbury, CT: Praeger, 2003).
    3. ^ Avni Patel,  ‘Tis the Season of Election Dirty Tricks: Scaring Student Voters,  ABC News, Oct. 6, 2008.
    4. ^ Victor Kamber, Poison Politics, New York: Insight Books, 1997, p.9.
    5. ^ Kamber, p.11.
    6. ^ James M. Naughton,  A Republican Spy in Muskie’s Ranks Is Unmasked and Sent Out into the Cold, New York Times, December 17, 1971, p. 26.
    7. ^ Stephanie Mencimer,  Dirty Politics,  Center for Public Integrity, May 30, 2008.

    [and other references]

    * A protege of Atwater’s, Karl Rove, is considered to be the  architect  of George W. Bush’s election to the governor’s office in Texas, and to the presidency in 2000 and 2004. In the 2000 race, Rove is credited with masterminding the push poll that initiated the  John McCain has a black love child  whisper campaign in South Carolina.[26] Anonymous telephone pollsters, upon determining that a voter was pro-McCain, asked the question,  Would you be more or less likely to vote for John McCain if you knew he had fathered a black child out of wedlock?  The question was not overt slander, but it prompted the president of Bob Jones University to launch his own internet campaign against McCain, and succeeded in crippling the trust of voters McCain had attracted. The Bush camp knew, as the general public did not, that in reality, John McCain is the adoptive father of a dark-skinned Bangladeshi refugee who was rescued by his wife Cindi.[27]

    * In preparation for Ronald Reagan’s debate with President Jimmy Carter in the presidential race 1980, Reagan’s campaign staff acquired under mysterious circumstances a 200-page briefing book, including information on Carter’s strategy, which staffers David Stockman and David Gergen had used to prepare Reagan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department investigated to see how the information had been obtained by the Reagan camp. Two law professors filed suit in federal district court in Washington to request a special investigation, based on the 1978 Ethics in Government Act.[16] Carter’s staff believed the book to have been stolen from the White House, but the inquiry did not uncover any credible evidence that any law had been violated. The House of Representatives conducted its own investigation, and concluded in a 2,314 page report that the Reagan staff had two copies of the book, one from Reagan’s campaign director William J. Casey, future head of the Central Intelligence Agency.[17] James A. Baker III attributed the acquisition of the documents to Casey, who claimed to know nothing about them, and an analysis of Carter campaign documents found in the “Afghanistan” files of Reagan aide David Gergen indicated they came from three White House offices: the National Security Council, Vice President Walter Mondale and Domestic Adviser Stuart Eizenstat.[18] Many years afterward, Carter himself stated in a PBS interview that the book had been taken by columnist George Will, but Will denied it, calling Carter  a recidivist liar. [19]

    * Lee Atwater is considered to be the  father  of modern aggressive  oppo  techniques. Atwater, who honed his style working for the South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, worked for the Republican National Committee in the 1988 presidential campaign, for which dozens of volunteers staffed three shifts around the clock to feed the then-burgeoning 24-hour news cycle. On Atwater’s watch, the now-infamous “Willie Horton” ads crafted by Floyd Brown turned voters away from Michael Dukakis and towards George H. W. Bush, although Atwater and Bush were protected by plausible deniability in the incident. Academic research into the Bush archives decades later revealed that a Bush staffer, Candice Strother, had released a dossier of information on Willie Horton to Elizabeth Fediay, of the non-profit group that contracted for the ad.[20] Willie Horton was an African-American convicted murderer released on a weekend furlough during Governor Dukakis’s tenure, who escaped and committed a brutal rape in Maryland, also stabbing his victim’s husband.[21] Atwater is also credited with originating  push polls  and  whisper campaigns  that use disinformation strategies to alienate voters from opponents. A biography of Atwater, quotes him as saying in an interview toward the end of his life that he regretted some of his less ethical techniques[22]

    * In the 1992 presidential campaign, Republicans reported that they spent $6 million on a  state of the art (opposition research) war machine  to investigate Bill Clinton, who was running against George H. W. Bush.

    * In the 2000 presidential election, longtime opposition researcher and Nixon loyalist Roger Stone was recruited by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III to oversee the recount of the disputed Presidential election in Miami-Dade County in 2000. Stone is credited with organizing the street demonstrations and eventual shut-down of the recount in that pivotal county.[24]

    31. ^  List of White House ‘Enemies’ and Memo Submitted by Dean to the Ervin Committee,  Facts on File, Watergate and the White House, vol. 1, pages 96-97.
    32. ^ ref>http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/preview/documents.html
    33. ^ J.M Bayer & J. Rodota,  Computerized Opposition Research,  Campaigns & Elections, 6, p. 26-27.
    See also

    * American Association of Political Consultants
    * COINTELPRO
    * disinformation
    * due diligence
    * 527 group

    External links

    * The Atlantic- Playing Dirty
    * [1]Sample candidate dossier A
    * [2]Sample candidate dossier B
    * [3]Sample candidate dossier (self-conducted)
    * [4]Digging the Dirt, BBC documentary about 2000 presidential race and Hillary Clinton senatorial race
    * [5]Do-It-Yourself site for Opposition Research
    * [6]American Association of Political Consultants Code of Ethics
    * [7]Campaigns & Elections, political research journal
    * [8] opposition researcher’s blog that discusses Sun Tzu’s Art of War
    * [9] Youtube footage of Karl Rove and the  state of the art  opposition research data storage system in the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign
    * [10] sample of opposition research released by the Obama 2008 campaign
    * [11] Willie Horton ad, 1988.
    * [12]opposition researcher’s professional blog
    * [13]  Dirty Politics,  a 4-part series originally podcast by Center for Public Integrity; includes profile of an opposition research operative

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_research
    Categories: Election campaigning

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_research

    ***
    TALON (database)
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice), is a database maintained by the Air Force after the September 11th terrorist attacks. It was authorised for creation in 2002 by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, in order to collect and evaluate information about possible threats to U.S. servicemembers and civilian workers in the US and at overseas military installations. [1]The database included lists of anti-war groups and people who have attended anti-war rallies.[2] TALON reports are collected by various US Defense Department agencies including law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and are analyzed by a Pentagon agency, the Counterintelligence Field Activity. CIFA has existed since 2004, and its size and budget are secret. [3]

    On August 21, 2007, the US Defense Department announced that it would shut down the database, as the database had been criticized for gathering information on peace activists and other political activists who posed no credible threat, but who had been one topic of this database due to their political views. [4] The department is working on a new system which would replace TALON, but for the time being, information on force protection threats will be handled by the FBI’s Guardian reporting system. [1]

    See also

    * Surveillance
    * ADVISE
    * Fusion center
    * War on Terror
    * Patriot Act
    * Civil Liberties

    References

    1. ^ a b Defense Department to Close TALON System, by Sergeant Sara Wood, US Army, American Forces Press Service, 8/21/07.
    2. ^ Pentagon to Shutter Anti-Terrorism Database, npr.org
    3. ^ Pentagon to suspend anti-terror database, by Robert Burns, Associated Press, 8/21/07.
    4. ^ Criticized database to be shuttered, by Jim Mannion, Agence France Presse, 8/21/07.

    External links

    * US Dept of Defense

    United States Air Force stub     This United States Air Force article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.
    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TALON_(database)
    Categories: United States Air Force stubs | National Security Agency | Government databases in the United States | Espionage | Data collection | Privacy of telecommunications | National security institutions | Surveillance scandals

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TALON_(database)

    ***

    ADVISE
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement) is a research and development program within the United States Department of Homeland Security Threat and Vulnerability Testing and Assessment (TVTA) portfolio. It is reported to be a massive data mining system [1] with the ability to store one quadrillion data entities. The data can be everything from financial records, phone records, emails, blog entries, website searches, and any other electronic information that can be put into a computer system. This information then would be connected to any given American citizen and assess the probability that he or she is a terrorist.

    The exact scope and degree of completion of the program is unclear. ADVISE is in the 2004-2006 Federal DHS Budget as a component of the $47 million TVTA program.

    The program was officially scrapped in September 2007 after the agency’s internal Inspector General found that pilot testing of the system had been performed using data on real people without required privacy safeguards in place.

    See also

    * Information Awareness Office
    * ECHELON
    * NSA warrantless surveillance controversy
    * Data warehouse
    * Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
    * TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice)

    External links

    * SourceWatch article on ADVISE
    * US plans massive data sweep, February 9, 2006 article by Mark Clayton in the Christian Science Monitor
    * Data Sciences Technology for Homeland Security Information Management and Knowledge Discovery, report of the Department of Homeland Security Workshop on Data Sciences conducted September 22-23, 2004, released in January 2005 by Sandia National Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. See pages 7-8.
    * Information to Insight in a Counterterrorism Context, report on ADVISE prepared for the US Department of Energy by Robert Burleson of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at the University of California
    * Threat & Vulnerability, Testing & Assessment – $47M, page 23 of Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Brief for the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directory, by Parney Albright, March 1, 2005

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADVISE
    Categories: United States Department of Homeland Security

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADVISE

    ***
    ECHELON
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    This article is about the Signals Intelligence capability. For other uses, see Echelon.
    A radome at RAF Menwith Hill, a site with satellite downlink capabilities believed to be used by ECHELON.
    RAF Menwith Hill

    ECHELON is a name used in global media and in popular culture to describe a signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and analysis network operated on behalf of the five signatory states to the UK-USA Security Agreement (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUSCANZUKUS).[1] It has also been described only as the software system which controls the download and dissemination of the intercept of commercial satellite trunk communications.[2]
    The system has been reported in a number of public sources.[3] Its capabilities and political implications were investigated by a committee of the European Parliament during 2000 and 2001 with a report published in 2001,[4] and by author James Bamford in his books on the National Security Agency of the United States.[2]

    In its report, the European Parliament states that the term ECHELON is used in a number of contexts, but that the evidence presented indicates that it was the name for a signals intelligence collection system. The report concludes that, on the basis of information presented, ECHELON was capable of interception and content inspection of telephone calls, fax, e-mail and other data traffic globally through the interception of communication bearers including satellite transmission, public switched telephone networks (which carries most Internet traffic) and microwave links. The committee further concluded that  the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed .[4]

    Bamford describes the system as the software controlling the collection and distribution of civilian telecommunications traffic conveyed using communication satellites, with the collection being undertaken by groundstations located in the footprint of the downlink leg.

    The UKUSA intelligence community is assessed by the European Parliament to include the signals intelligence agencies of each of the member states – the National Security Agency of the United States, the Government Communications Headquarters of Britain, the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, the Defence Signals Directorate of Australia, and the Government Communications Security Bureau of New Zealand. The EP report concludes that it seems likely that ECHELON is a method of sorting captured signal traffic, rather than a comprehensive analysis tool.[4]

    Capabilities

    The ability to intercept communications depends on the medium used, be it radio, satellite, microwave, cellular or fiber-optic.[4] During World War II and through the 1950s, high frequency ( short wave ) radio was widely used for military and diplomatic communication[5], and could be intercepted at great distances.[4] The rise of geostationary communications satellites in the 1960s presented new possibilities for intercepting international communications. The report to the European Parliament of 2001 states:  If UKUSA states operate listening stations in the relevant regions of the earth, in principle they can intercept all telephone, fax and data traffic transmitted via such satellites. [4]

    The role of satellites in point-to-point voice and data communications has largely been supplanted by fiber optics. As of 2006, 99 percent of the world’s long-distance voice and data traffic is carried over optical-fiber.[6] The proportion of international communications accounted for by satellite links is said to have decreased substantially over the past few years in Central Europe to amount to between 0.4 and 5%.[4] Even in less developed parts of the world, communications satellites are used largely for point-to-multipoint applications, such as video.[7] Thus the majority of communications cannot be intercepted by earth stations, but only by tapping cables and intercepting line of sight microwave signals, which is possible only to a limited extent.[4]

    One approach is to place intercept equipment at locations where fiber optic communications are switched. For the Internet, much of the switching occurs at a relatively small number of sites. There have been reports of one such intercept site, Room 641A, in the United States. In the past, much Internet traffic was routed through the U.S. and the UK; this is less true today, with, for example, 95 percent of intra-German Internet communications being routed via the DE-CIX Internet exchange point in Frankfurt in 2000.[4] Thus for a worldwide surveillance network to be comprehensive, either illegal intercept sites would be required on the territory of friendly nations or cooperation of local authorities would be needed. The report to the European Parliament points out that interception of private communications by foreign intelligence services is not necessarily limited to the American or British foreign intelligence services.[4]

    Reportedly created to monitor the military and diplomatic communications of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies during the Cold War in the early sixties, today ECHELON is believed to search also for hints of terrorist plots, drug dealers’ plans, and political and diplomatic intelligence. But some critics claim the system is also being used for large-scale commercial theft, international economic espionage and invasion of privacy.

    British journalist Duncan Campbell and New Zealand journalist Nicky Hager asserted in the 1990s that the United States was exploiting ECHELON traffic for industrial espionage, rather than military and diplomatic purposes.[9] Examples alleged by the journalists include the gear-less wind turbine technology designed by the German firm Enercon[10][11] and the speech technology developed by the Belgian firm Lernout & Hauspie.[12] An article in the Baltimore Sun reported in 1995 that French aerospace company Airbus lost a $6 billion contract with Saudi Arabia in 1994 after the NSA reported that Airbus officials had been bribing Saudi officials to secure the contract.[13][14]

    In 2001, the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System recommended to the European Parliament that citizens of member states routinely use cryptography in their communications to protect their privacy.[4]

    Bamford provides an alternate view, highlighting that legislation prohibits the use of intercepted communications for commercial purposes, although does elaborate on how intercepted communications are used as part of an all-source intelligence process.

    Hardware

    According to its website, the National Security Agency is  a high technology organization… on the frontiers of communications and data processing . In 1999 the Australian Senate Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was told by Professor Desmond Ball that the Pine Gap facility was used as a ground station for a satellite based interception network. The satellites are claimed to be large radio dishes between 20 and 100 meters across, parked in geostationary orbits. The original purpose of the network was to monitor the telemetry from 1970s Soviet weapons, air defense radar, communications satellites and ground based microwave communications.[15]

    Name

    The European Parliament’s Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System stated:  It seems likely, in view of the evidence and the consistent pattern of statements from a very wide range of individuals and organisations, including American sources, that its name is in fact ECHELON, although this is a relatively minor detail. [4] The U.S. intelligence community uses many code names (see, for example, CIA cryptonym).

    Margaret Newsham claims that she worked on the configuration and installation of some of the software that makes up the ECHELON system while employed at Lockheed Martin, for whom she worked from 1974 to 1984 in Sunnyvale, California, USA and in Menwith Hill, England, UK.[16] At that time, according to Newsham, the code name ECHELON was NSA’s term for the computer network itself. Lockheed called it P415. The software programs were called SILKWORTH and SIRE. A satellite named VORTEX would intercept communications. An image available on the internet of a fragment apparently torn from a job description shows Echelon listed along with several other code names.[17]

    Ground stations

    The 2001 European Parliamentary (EP) report[4] lists several ground stations as possibly belonging to or participating in the ECHELON network. These include:

    Likely satellite intercept stations

    The following stations are listed in the EP report (p.54 ff) as likely to have a role in intercepting transmissions from telecommunications satellites:

    * Hong Kong (since closed)
    * Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station (Geraldton, Western Australia)
    * Menwith Hill (Yorkshire, UK) Map
    * Misawa Air Base (Japan)
    * GCHQ Bude, formerly known as GCHQ CSO Morwenstow, (Cornwall, UK) Map
    * Pine Gap (Northern Territory, Australia – close to Alice Springs) Map
    * Sugar Grove (West Virginia, US) Map
    * Yakima Training Center (Washington, US) Map
    * GCSB Waihopai (New Zealand)

    Other potentially related stations

    The following stations are listed in the EP report (p.57 ff) as ones whose roles  cannot be clearly established :

    * Ayios Nikolaos (Cyprus – UK)
    * Bad Aibling Station (Bad Aibling, Germany – US) – moved to Griesheim in 2004[18]
    * Buckley Air Force Base (Denver, Colorado, US)
    * Fort Gordon (Georgia, US)
    * Guam (Pacific Ocean, US)
    * Kunia (Hawaii, US)
    * Leitrim (south of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada)
    * Lackland Air Force Base, Medina Annex (San Antonio, Texas, US)

    See also
    Sister project     Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Echelon

    * ANCHORY SIGINT intercept database
    * Frenchelon
    * Onyx (interception system), the Swiss  Echelon  equivalent
    * Mass surveillance

    Further reading
    * Bamford, James; The Puzzle Palace, Penguin, ISBN 0-14-006748-5; 1983
    * Hager, Nicky; Secret Power, New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network; Craig Potton Publishing, Nelson, NZ; ISBN 0-908802-35-8; 1996
    * Bamford, James; Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency , Anchor, ISBN 0385499086; 2002
    * Keefe, Patrick Radden Chatter: dispatches from the secret world of global eavesdropping; Random House Publishing, New York, NY; ISBN 1-4000-6034-6; 2005
    * Bamford, James; The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America, Doubleday, ISBN 0385521324; 2008

    Notes

    1. ^  AUSCANNZUKUS Information Portal . auscannzukus.org.. http://auscannzukus.org/intro.asp. Retrieved on 2008-03-27.
    2. ^ a b Bamford, James; Body of Secrets, Anchor, ISBN 0-385-49908-6; 2002
    3. ^ One of the earliest was a New Statesman article entitled Someone’s Listening in 1988
    4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Schmid, Gerhard (2001-07-11).  On the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system), (2001/2098(INI))  (pdf – 194 pages). European Parliament: Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. Retrieved on 2008-03-27.

    8. ^ For example:  Nicky Hager Appearance before the European Parliament ECHELON Committee . April 2001. http://cryptome.org/echelon-nh.htm. Retrieved on 2006-07-02.
    9. ^  Nicky Hager Appearance before the European Parliament ECHELON Committee . April 2001. http://cryptome.org/echelon-nh.htm. Retrieved on 2006-07-02.
    10. ^ Die Zeit: 40/1999  Verrat unter Freunden  ( Treachery among friends , German), available at archiv.zeit.de
    11. ^ Report A5-0264/2001 of the European Parliament (English), available at European Parliament website
    12. ^  Amerikanen maakten met Echelon L&H kapot . [1]. 2002-03-30. http://www.daanspeak.com/Hypocratie09.html. Retrieved on 2008-03-28.  (Google’s translation of the article into English).
    13. ^  BBC News . http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/820758.stm. Retrieved on 2006-08-27.
    14. ^  Interception capabilities 2000 . http://www.cyber-rights.org/interception/stoa/ic2kreport.htm#Report. Retrieved on 2006-08-27.
    15. ^ Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard (9 August 1999). JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON TREATIES, Reference: Pine Gap.
    16. ^ Elkjær, Bo; Kenan Seeberg (1999-11-17).  ECHELON Was My Baby . Ekstra Bladet. http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm. Retrieved on 2006-05-17. “Unfortunately, I can’t tell you all my duties. I am still bound by professional secrecy, and I would hate to go to prison or get involved in any trouble, if you know what I mean. In general, I can tell you that I was responsible for compiling the various systems and programs, configuring the whole thing and making it operational on main frames ;  Margaret Newsham worked for the NSA through her employment at Ford and Lockheed from 1974 to 1984. In 1977 and 1978, Newsham was stationed at the largest listening post in the world at Menwith Hill, England…Ekstra Bladet has Margaret Newsham’s stationing orders from the US Department of Defense. She possessed the high security classification TOP SECRET CRYPTO.
    17. ^  Names of ECHELON associated projects – image without any context . http://www.ladlass.com/intel/archives/images/menwith.jpg.  in  Interception Capabilities 2000 – PART 1 . 2003-12-18. http://www.ladlass.com/intel/archives/006457.html. Retrieved on 2006-08-27.
    18. ^ According to a statement by Terence Dudlee, the speaker of the US Navy in London in an interview to the German HR
    US-Armee lauscht von Darmstadt aus (German), hr online, 1 Oct 2004

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON
    Categories: National Security Agency | Government databases in the United States | Espionage | Data collection | Mass surveillance | Privacy of telecommunications | Lockheed Martin | Surveillance

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON

    ***
    Information Awareness Office
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Information Awareness Office seal

    The Information Awareness Office (IAO) was established by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in January 2002 to bring together several DARPA projects focused on applying information technology to counter asymmetric threats to national security. The IAO mission was to  imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition information technologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, information systems that will counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness .

    Following public criticism that the development and deployment of these technologies could potentially lead to a mass surveillance system, the IAO was defunded by Congress in 2003, although several of the projects run under IAO have continued under different funding.[1][2]

    History
    Diagram of Total Information Awareness system, taken from official (decommissioned) Information Awareness Office website (click to enlarge)

    The IAO was established after Admiral John Poindexter, former United States National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan and SAIC executive Brian Hicks approached the US Department of Defense with the idea for an information awareness program after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[2]

    Poindexter and Hicks had previously worked together on intelligence-technology programs for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DARPA agreed to host the program and appointed Poindexter to run it in 2002

    The IAO began funding research and development of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program in February 2003 but renamed the program the Terrorism Information Awareness Program in May that year after an adverse media reaction to the program’s implications for public surveillance. Although TIA was only one of several IAO projects, many critics and news reports conflated TIA with other related research projects of the IAO, with the result that TIA came in popular usage to stand for an entire subset of IAO programs.
    The TIA program itself was the  systems-level  program of the IAO that intended to integrate information technologies into a prototype system to provide tools to better detect, classify, and identify potential foreign terrorists with the goal to increase the probability that authorized agencies of the United States could preempt adverse actions. As a systems-level program of programs, TIA’s goal was the creation of a  counterterrorism information architecture  that integrated technologies from other IAO programs (and elsewhere, as appropriate). The TIA program was researching, developing, and integrating technologies to virtually aggregate data, to follow subject-oriented link analysis, to develop descriptive and predictive models through data mining or human hypothesis, and to apply such models to additional datasets to identify terrorists and terrorist groups.

    Among the other IAO programs that were intended to provide TIA with component data aggregation and automated analysis technologies were the Genisys, Genisys Privacy Protection, Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery, and Scalable Social Network Analysis programs.

    On August 2, 2002, Dr. Poindexter gave a speech at DARPAtech 2002 entitled  Overview of the Information Awareness Office [3] in which he described the TIA program.

    In addition to the program itself, the involvement of Poindexter as director of the IAO also raised concerns among some, since he had been earlier convicted of lying to Congress and altering and destroying documents pertaining to the Iran-Contra Affair, although those convictions were later overturned on the grounds that the testimony used against him was protected.

    On January 16, 2003, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation to suspend the activity of the IAO and the Total Information Awareness program pending a Congressional review of privacy issues involved.[4] A similar measure introduced by Senator Ron Wyden would have prohibited the IAO from operating within the United States unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress, and would have shut the IAO down entirely 60 days after passage unless either the Pentagon prepared a report to Congress assessing the impact of IAO activities on individual privacy and civil liberties or the President certified the program’s research as vital to national security interests. In February 2003, Congress passed legislation suspending activities of the IAO pending a Congressional report of the office’s activities (Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, No.108–7, Division M, §111(b) [signed Feb. 20, 2003]).

    In response to this legislation, DARPA provided Congress on May 20, 2003 with a report on its activities.[5] In this report, IAO changed the name of the program to the Terrorism Information Awareness Program and emphasized that the program was not designed to compile dossiers on US citizens, but rather to research and develop the tools that would allow authorized agencies to gather information on terrorist networks. Despite the name change and these assurances, the critics continued to see the system as prone to potential misuse or abuse.

    As a result House and Senate negotiators moved to prohibit further funding for the TIA program by adding provisions to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004[6] (signed into law by President Bush on October 1, 2003). Further, the Joint Explanatory Statement included in the conference committee report specifically directed that the IAO as program manager for TIA be terminated immediately.[7]

    IAO research

    IAO research was conducted along five major investigative paths: secure collaboration problem solving; structured discovery; link and group understanding; context aware visualization; and decision making with corporate memory.

    Among the IAO projects were:

    Genisys

    Genisys aimed at developing technologies which would enable  ultra-large, all-source information repositories .[8]

    Vast amounts of information were going to be collected and analyzed, and the available database technology at the time was insufficient for storing and organizing such vast quantities of data. So they developed techniques for virtual data aggregation in order to support effective analysis across heterogeneous databases, as well as unstructured public data sources, such as the World Wide Web.  Effective analysis across heterogenous databases  means the ability to take things from databases which are designed to store different types of data — such as a a database containing criminal records, a phone call database and a foreign intelligence database. The World Wide Web is considered an  unstructured public data source  because it is publicly accessible and contains many different types of data — such as blogs, emails, records of visits to web sites, etc — all of which need to be analyzed and stored efficiently.[8]

    Another goal was to develop  a large, distributed system architecture for managing the huge volume of raw data input, analysis results, and feedback, that will result in a simpler, more flexible data store that performs well and allows us to retain important data indefinitely.  [8]

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery

    Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery (EELD) development of technologies and tools for automated discovery, extraction and linking of sparse evidence contained in large amounts of classified and unclassified data sources (such as phone call records from the NSA call database or bank records).[9]

    EELD was designed to design systems with the ability to extract data from multiple sources (e.g., text messages, social networking sites, financial records, and web pages. It was to develop the ability to detect patterns comprising multiple types of links between data items or people communicating (e.g., financial transactions, communications, travel, etc.).[9]

    It is designed to link items relating potential  terrorist  groups and scenarios, and to learn patterns of different groups or scenarios to identify new organizations and emerging threats.[9]

    Scalable Social Network Analysis

    Scalable Social Network Analysis (SSNA) aimed at developing techniques based on social network analysis for modeling the key characteristics of terrorist groups and discriminating these groups from other types of societal groups.[10]

    Jason Ethier, of Northeastern University said the following in his study of SSNA:

    The purpose of the SSNA algorithms program is to extend techniques of social network analysis to assist with distinguishing potential terrorist cells from legitimate groups of people … In order to be successful SSNA will require information on the social interactions of the majority of people around the globe. Since the Defense Department cannot easily distinguish between peaceful citizens and terrorists, it will be necessary for them to gather data on innocent civilians as well as on potential terrorists.
    —Jason Ethier[10]

    Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID)
    Diagram (from official IAO site) describing capabilities of the  Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID)  project[11]

    The Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) project developed automated biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great distances for  force protection , crime prevention, and  homeland security/defense  purposes.[11]

    It’s goals included programs to:[11]

    * Develop algorithms for locating and acquiring subjects out to 150 meters (500 ft) in range.
    * Fuse face and gait recognition into a 24/7 human identification system.
    * Develop and demonstrate a human identification system that operates out to 150 meters (500 ft.) using visible imagery.
    * Develop a low power millimeter wave radar system for wide field of view detection and narrow field of view gait classification.
    * Characterize gait performance from video for human identification at a distance.
    * Develop a multi-spectral infrared and visible face recognition system.

    Effective Affordable Reusable Speech-to-text (EARS)

    Effective Affordable Reusable Speech-to-text (EARS) to develop automatic speech-to-text transcription technology whose output is substantially richer and much more accurate than previously possible. EARS was to focus on everyday human-to-human speech from broadcasts and telephone conversations in multiple languages. [12] It is expected to increase the speed with which speech can be processed by computers by 100 times or more.[13]

    The intent is to create a core enabling technology (technology that is used as a component for future technologies) suitable for a wide range of future surveillance applications.[12]
    Bio-Surveillance

    Bio-Surveillance to develop the necessary information technologies and resulting prototype capable of detecting the covert release of a biological pathogen automatically, and significantly earlier than traditional approaches.[14]

    Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE)

    Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE) focused on developing automated technology capable of identifying predictive indicators of terrorist activity or impending attacks by examining individual and group behavior in broad environmental context and examining the motivation of specific terrorists.[15]

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP)

    Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) was intended to harness collective intelligence by researching market-based techniques for avoiding surprise and predicting future events. The intent was to explore the feasibility of market-based trading mechanisms to predict political instability, threats to national security, and other major events in the near future.[16]

    Babylon

    Babylon to develop rapid, two-way, natural language speech translation interfaces and platforms for the warfighter for use in field environments for force protection, refugee processing, and medical triage.[17]

    Genoa / Genoa II

    Genoa and Genoa II focused on providing advanced decision-support and collaboration tools to rapidly deal with and adjust to dynamic crisis management and allow for inter-agency collaboration in real-time.[18][19] Another function was to be able to intelligently make estimates of possible future scenarios to assist intelligence officials what to do[13], in a manner similar to the DARPA’s Deep Green program which is designed to assist Army commanders in making battlefield decisions.

    TIDES

    Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (TIDES) developing advanced language processing technology to enable English speakers to find and interpret critical information in multiple languages without requiring knowledge of those languages.[20]

    Outside groups (such as universities, corporations, etc) were invited to participate in the annual information retrieval, topic detection and tracking, automatic content extraction, and machine translation evaluations run by NIST.[20]

    Communicator
    Diagram (from official IAO site) describing capabilities of the  Communicator  project

    Communicator was to develop  dialogue interaction  technology that enables warfighters to talk with computers, such that information will be accessible on the battlefield or in command centers without ever having to touch a keyboard. The Communicator Platform was to be both wireless and mobile, and to be designed to function in a networked environment.[21]

    The dialogue interaction software was to interpret the context of the dialogue in order to improve performance, and to be capable of automatically adapting to new topics (because situations quickly change in war) so conversation is natural and efficient. The Communicator program emphasized task knowledge to compensate for natural language effects and noisy environments. Unlike automated translation of natural language speech, which is much more complex due to an essentially unlimited vocabulary and grammar, the Communicator program is directed task specific issues so that there are constrained vocabularies (the system only needs to be able to understand language related to war). Research was also started to focus on foreign language computer interaction for use in supporting coalition operations.[21]

    Live exercises were conducted involving small unit logistics operations involving the United States Marines to test the technology in extreme environments. [21]

    Components of TIA projects that continue to be developed

    Despite the withdrawal of funding for the TIA and the closing of the IAO, the core of the project survived.[22] Legislators included a classified annex to the Defense Appropriations Act that preserved funding for TIA’s component technologies, if they were transferred to other government agencies. TIA projects continued to be funded under classified annexes to Defense and Intelligence appropriation bills. However, the act also stipulated that the technologies only be used for military or foreign intelligence purposes against foreigners.[23]

    TIA’s two core projects are now operated by Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) located among the 60-odd buildings of  Crypto City  at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, MD. ARDA itself has been shifted from the NSA to the Disruptive Technology Office (run by to the Director of National Intelligence). They are funded by National Foreign Intelligence Program for foreign counterterrorism intelligence purposes.

    One technology, now codenamed  Baseball  is the Information Awareness Prototype System, the core architecture to integrated all the TIA’s information extraction, analysis, and dissemination tools. Work on this project is conducted by SAIC through its Hicks & Associates, consulting arm that is run by former Defense and military officials and which had originally been awarded US$19 million IAO contract to build the prototype system in late 2002.[24]

    The other project has been re-designated  TopSail  (formerly Genoa II) and would provide IT tools to help anticipate and preempt terrorist attacks. SAIC has also been contracted to work on Topsail, including a US$3.7 million contract in 2005.
    Media Coverage

    The first mention of the IAO in the mainstream media came from New York Times reporter John Markoff on February 13, 2002.[25] Initial reports contained few details about the program. In the following months, as more information emerged about the scope of the TIA project, civil libertarians became concerned over what they saw as the potential for the development of an Orwellian mass surveillance system.

    On November 14, 2002 the New York Times published a column by William Safire in which he claimed  [TIA] has been given a $200 million budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans. [26] Safire has been  credited  with triggering the anti-TIA movement.[27]

    Concerns and criticism

    Extensive criticism of the IAO has come from across the political spectrum, from neo-luddite anarchists to right-wing constitutionalists.

    Critics believe that massive information aggregation and analysis technologies are a grave threat to privacy and civil liberties. Many fear that allowing a government to monitor all communications, and map social networks will give them the ability to target dissenters or political threats. Critics claim that this concern is not unfounded, citing COINTELPRO and other government programs that targeted peaceful political activists in the U.S. Programs such as those the IAO funded would greatly enhance their ability to identify, track, infiltrate, and target such groups. Such a system of surveillance is a necessary component of a strong totalitarian state.

    Proponents believe that development of these technologies is inevitable and that designing systems and policies to control their use is a more effective strategy than opposition.

    See also

    * Mass surveillance
    * ADVISE
    * Combat Zones That See, or CTS, a project to link up all security cameras citywide and  track everything that moves .
    * ECHELON, NSA worldwide digital interception program
    * Carnivore, FBI US digital interception program
    * Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act
    * Intellipedia, a collection of wikis used by the U.S. intelligence community to  connect the dots  between pieces of intelligence
    * Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange
    * TALON
    * Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulations
    * Information Processing Technology Office

    References
    1. ^  Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly Dead?  (in English). Electronic Frontier Foundation (official website). 2003. http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    2. ^ a b Harris, Shane (Feb. 23, 2006).  TIA Lives On  (in English). National Journal. http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-16.
    3. ^ Overview of the Information Awareness Office
    4. ^ Search Results – THOMAS (Library of Congress)
    5. ^ http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/tia-exec-summ_20may2003.pdf
    6. ^ Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–87, § 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003)
    7. ^ 149 Cong. Rec. H8755—H8771 (24 September, 2003)
    8. ^ a b c  Genisys  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Genisys.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    9. ^ a b c  Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/EELD.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    10. ^ a b Ethier, Jason.  Current Research in Social Network Theory  (in English). Northeastern University College of Computer and Infomation Science. http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/perrolle/archive/Ethier-SocialNetworks.html. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    11. ^ a b c  Human Identification at a distance  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    12. ^ a b  EARS  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/EARS.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    13. ^ a b Belasco, Amy (January 21, 2003).  EFF: Memorandum Regarding TIA Funding  (in English). Electronic Frontier Foundation. http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/belasco-memo.php. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    14. ^ BSS
    15. ^ WAE
    16. ^ FutureMap
    17. ^ Babylon
    18. ^  Genoa  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Genoa.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    19. ^  Genoa II  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/GenoaII.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    20. ^ a b  TIDES  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website — mirror). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/TIDES.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    21. ^ a b c  Communicator  (in English). Information Awareness Office (official website). http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/Communicator.htm. Retrieved on 2009-03-15.
    22. ^ Wanted: Competent Big Brothers, Newsweek, 8 February 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    23. ^ The Total Information Awareness Project Lives On, Technology Review, 26 April 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    24. ^ TIA Lives On, National Journal, 23 February 2006, retrieved 27 July 2007
    25. ^ Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S. – New York Times
    26. ^ You Are a Suspect
    27. ^ Big Brother …

    Further reading

    * Copies of the original IAO web pages formerly available at http://www.darpa.mil/iao/ (June 12, 2002–June 3, 2003) can be found at Archive.org, Internet Archive

    * John Poindexter, Overview of the Information Awareness Office (Remarks as prepared for delivery by Dr. John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office, at the DARPATech 2002 Conference) (August 2, 2002).

    External links

    Information Awareness Office

    Media coverage

    * Harris, Shane (February 26, 2006).  TIA Lives On . The National Journal. http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm.
    *  Pentagon Defends Surveillance Program . The Washington Post. May 20, 2003.
    * Webb, Cynthia L. (May 21, 2003).  The Pentagon’s PR Play . The Washington Post.
    * Bray, Hiawatha (April 4, 2003).  Mining Data to Fight Terror Stirs Privacy Fears . The Boston Globe. pp. C2.
    * McCullagh, Declan (January 15, 2003). News.com.com  Pentagon database plan hits snag on Hill . CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1023-980889.html News.com.com.
    * Markoff, John (February 13, 2002).  Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S. . The New York Times. pp. (first mainstream media mention of IAO). http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20A11F734580C708DDDAB0894DA404482#.

    Academic articles

    * K. A. Taipale (2003).  Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data . Columbia Sci. & Tech. Law Review 5 (2): 1–83 (TIA discussed 39–50). http://ssrn.com/abstract=546782.

    * Robert Popp and John Poindexter (november/december 2006).  Countering Terrorism through Information and Privacy Protection Technologies  (PDF). IEEE Security & Privacy: 18 –26. http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/2006.data-surveillance.pdf.

    Critical views (established sources)

    *  TIA: Total Information Awareness . American Civil Liberties Union. January 16, 2004. http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/14956res20040116.html.
    * Charles V. Peña (November 22, 2002).  TIA: Information Awareness Office Makes Us a Nation of Suspects . Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/research/articles/pena-021122.html.
    *  Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly Dead? EFF: It’s Too Early to Tell . Electronic Frontier Foundation. http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php.
    * Epic.org  Total  Terrorism  Information Awareness (TIA): Latest News . Electronic Privacy Information Center. http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/ Epic.org.
    * SPTimes.com  A Times Editorial: Unfocused data-mining . St. Petersburg Times. January 24, 2003. http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/24/Opinion/Unfocused_data_mining.shtml SPTimes.com.

    Critical views (less well recognized)

    * Russ Kick.  Information Awareness Office Website Deletes Its Logo . The Memory Hole. http://www.thememoryhole.org/policestate/iao-logo.htm.

    Proponent views

    * Mac Donald, Heather (January 27, 2003).  Total Misrepresentation . The Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/137dvufs.asp.
    * Levin, Jonathan (February 13, 2003).  Total Preparedness: The case for the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness project . National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levin021303.asp.
    * Taylor, Jr., Stuart (December 10, 2002).  Big Brother and Another Overblown Privacy Scare . The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2002-12-10.htm.

    Accord:

    * Shane Ham & Robert D. Atkinson (2002).  Using Technology to Detect and Prevent Terrorism  (PDF). Progressive Policy Institute. http://www.ppionline.org/douments/IT_terrorism.pdf.
    *  Safegaurding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism  (PDF). DOD Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC). March 2004. http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.

    Also:

    * Ignatius, David (August 1, 2003).  Back in the Safe Zone . The Washington Post. pp. A19 (discussing opposition to the IAO FutureMap project). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10955-2003Jul31.html.

    Retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office
    Categories: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | Government databases in the United States | Mass surveillance

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