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Simon Singh

The Code Book: The Evolution of Secrecy from Mary, Queen of Scots to Quantum Cryptography.

New York: Doubleday, 1999.

A history of codes and ciphers and the role they play in warfare and politics.

Robert W. Stephan

Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945.

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

An examination of Soviet military counterintelligence and deception operations against the Nazis during WWII.

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CIA & OSS History

Christopher Andrew

For the President’s Eyes Only-Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush.

New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995.

Ray Cline

The CIA: Reality vs Myth–The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan,
(Revised edition of The CIA under Reagan, Bush and Casey).

Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1982.

The author, a former top official of the Agency, discusses what clandestine work in an open society is like, why it is needed, and how it can be carried out effectively.

Arthur Darling

The Central Intelligence Agency An Instrument of Government to 1950.

State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990.

A look at the bureaucratic struggles that led to the development of the CIA and the battles that ensued afterward.

Douglas F. Garthoff

Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community — 1946-2005

Washington, DC: Center for The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005.

A comprehensive study of how politics, institutions, and personalities influenced the DCI’s ability to oversee the Intelligence Community.

https://www.cia.gov/library/intelligence-literature/index.html

***

https://www.cia.gov/search?NS-search-page=results

Query 2004

^^^

https://www.cia.gov/search?NS-search-page=results
Query for 1972

***

I come before you speaking as a former member of this committee, and also as a member of the 9/11 Commission, which unanimously supported the creation of the DNI as part of our recommendations to improve the national security of the United States.  The creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence back in 2004 was not without controversy.  Many of you were skeptical of the institution from the beginning; others may have grown so over time.  But I ask you to keep in mind that the DNI remains a work in progress and that on balance, I believe the organization has thus far been a net benefit for the intelligence community and the country.

That is not to say that it doesn’t still have many challenges to overcome. However, I feel that most of those challenges can be associated with the growing pains of a new institution.  I am honored to provide you with my thoughts today on how we can best address those challenges to ensure that the DNI in practice represents what it was envisioned to be in theory.

First, I’d like to give you some history about the inception of the DNI leading up to the 2004 legislation. Then I’d like to give a short analysis of where I think the DNI is succeeding today, and where it is falling short.  Those two pieces together will provide an analytic framework for you to use going forward as you exercise your Constitutional responsibility of Congressional oversight.

Pre-9/11

The history of the Director of National Intelligence does not begin in 2004 with the 9/11 Commission’s report, as is often assumed.  In fact, the idea of a Director of National Intelligence dates back to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the inherent institutional insufficiencies of the Director of Central Intelligence.

http://www.cnponline.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/2418

***

My Note –

Why does this matter when we are in the midst of an economic crisis? It matters because it shows how politically based appointments throughout many agencies of our government including this one, have changed the basics of understanding within those agencies – (among other things.)

It is also true that budgets cannot always rule the day, profits and profitability cannot always be the decision-maker and structures of power have to be considered in light of accountability.

Not only does every agency of our government and business communities have far reaching impacts, but they also have wielded far-reaching power with extensive and massive ripples of unintended consequences from policies, policy applications and choices made for whatever reasons.

As I searched for the significant players, decision-makers and those whose choices were the basis for policy and policy applications, I found many times that the course of leads came back to the intelligence community, finance businesses, investment banks and their officers, government players in elected and appointed positions operating as if their choices and decisions affecting everyone thereafter were no one’s business but their own. That, I would say, is the dominant and over-riding theme that moved like a thread among all of them. And, I asked myself, when did they start thinking about it in this way. And, now I’m asking why they started thinking about it this way and whose ideology it was.

– cricketdiane09, 03-11-09

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