Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Clinton radioactive source theft, 2007
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 17 October 2007

Date: 1 August 2007

Location: Clinton, Michigan, United States

Type of event: exposure related to theft of radioactive sources

Description:

David Hahn was arrested 1 August 2007 for stealing smoke detectors, apparently to collect radioactive sources from them. He was specifically charged with stealing at least 13 smoke detectors (containing americium-241) from several buildings in his apartment complex. At the time his face was covered with open sores reported related to exposure to radioactive materials. On 27 August he plead guilty. On 2 October he was sentenced to a 90-day jail term to be served in six months after he is assessed and treated by doctors at a Veterans Administration Hospital.

Hahn had, around 1993 at age 17, accumulated large amounts of commercial radioactive sources including americium, thorium, radium, and tritium, in an effort to build a homemade breeder reactor. The effort was accidentally discovered by local authorities; the radioactive materials were eventually disposed of by federal authorities.
Consequences: 1 injury?

References:

* AP, 27 Aug. 2007, Man dubbed ‘radioactive boy scout’ pleads guilty, Detroit Free Press, on line [http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070827/BUSINESS05/70827091].
* AP, 4 Aug. 2007, ‘Radioactive boy scout’ charged in smoke detector theft, Fox News, on line [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,292111,00.html].
* Cardenas, Edward L., and Charles E. Ramirez, 14 Aug. 2007, Former Scout is held in thefts, Detroit News, on line [http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070814/METRO03/708140362/1014].
* ClickOnDetroit, 4 Oct. 2007, ‘Radioactive Boy Scout’ sentenced, ClickOnDetroit, on line [http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/14269131/detail.html].
* Silverstein, Ken, 2004, The Radioactive Boy Scout: The Frightening True Story of a Whiz Kid and His Homemade Nuclear Reactor, Villard.
* WNN, 2 Aug. 2007, ‘Radioactive boy scout’ arrested, World Nuclear News, on line [http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/regulationSafety/Former_Radioactive_Boy_Scout_arrested_for_stealing_smoke_detectors-030807.shtml].

2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 17 October 2007.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/2007USA1.html

***

My Note -

There was a report that maybe 12% of Americans think that there is a problem with nuclear materials not being secured which might fall into the hands of terrorists or others willing to use them for harming the public. Where are people living that they wouldn’t know?

Somewhere I saw a photo of a smuggled set of uranium rods – spent fuel rods probably and they were in the back of a car trunk wrapped in newspaper when they were caught. Most of these materials don’t do any favors to anyone that comes near them. There are so many places using them – security is critical and it is great that it is being taken more seriously today than before this.

As President Obama meets with the 47 World Leaders, UN, EU and IAEA Leadership – it is something they can effectively use their influence, power and position to do for a positive outcome – together. I saw Queen Noor of Jordan on an earlier news broadcast today – CNN John King Show with Wendy Sherman, ambassador – it was good to see the efforts they are making. Jill Dougherty of CNN on World Report just a little while ago on their broadcast was showing the testing for nuclear weapons at Lawrence Livermore with reliability and integrity testing being done in all sorts of new high-tech ways that are safer than blowing up a nuclear weapon to see if it works. Really amazing – now if the rest of it could be made secured in all the places where nuclear materials are stored, used, experimentation done, etc., etc., etc. – it would be a better world by at least a bit.

- cricketdiane

Tonight at 8 pm on Campbell Brown, CNN – they are advertising a story about a nuclear waste site in the US which continues to indicate the ongoing problems with leaks and disposal of nuclear materials. (04-13-10)

Nuclear Power in Ukraine

Ukraine is heavily dependent on nuclear energy – it has 15 reactors generating about half of … In connection with the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, …
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf46.html – Cached – Similar
Ukraine agrees to abandon nuclear weapons in first victory for …

Apr 13, 2010 … Ukraine has also agreed to convert its civil nuclear research … Mexico. Federal police officers stand next to suspects Jesus Garcia, …
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us…/article7095755.ece – 5 hours ago

Mexico to slash weapons-grade uranium‎ – 25 minutes ago

WASHINGTON, April 13 (UPI) — Mexico and Ukraine have pledged to eliminate their weapons-grade uranium as 47 nations gathered at a nuclear security summit …

UPI.com

Obama hosts leaders at nuclear summit
By the CNN Wire Staff
April 12, 2010 — Updated 2119 GMT (0519 HKT)

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/12/nuclear.security.summit/index.html?hpt=Sbin

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs announced last week that nations participating in the summit would be Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Vietnam.

In addition, the United Nations, the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency will be represented, Gibbs said.

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/12/nuclear.security.summit/index.html?hpt=Sbin

***

List of nuclear reactors – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

66 Ukraine. 66.1 Power station reactors; 66.2 Research reactors ….. Mexico City – TRIGA Mark III, National Institute for Nuclear Research; Mexico City …
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_reactors

***

Gilani Says He Opposes Afghan Talks With Taliban (Update1)

By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan

April 13 (Bloomberg) — Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said he opposes the Afghan government’s efforts to engage Taliban leaders in talks to promote national reconciliation.

“Militants just want to destabilize the system,” Gilani told reporters at a lunch in Washington yesterday.

(etc.)

Nuclear Summit

Gilani is attending President Barack Obama’s two-day nuclear security summit that brought leaders and senior representatives from 47 nations to Washington.

The prime minister said he told Obama April 11 that Pakistan wants access to U.S. technology for nuclear power generation, in a deal similar to the 2008 agreement that allowed for U.S.-India civil-nuclear cooperation. Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, making them subject to U.S. sanctions that were lifted by President George W. Bush’s administration in 2001.

Gilani said he is confident his country has adequate safeguards to prevent atomic material from being trafficked or falling into the hands of terrorists. He said Pakistan is following all United Nations regulations and that its continued enrichment of uranium to weapons grade is necessary to maintain “minimum deterrence” against India.

Energy Crisis

Pakistan is a “responsible nuclear state” that is suffering its “worst-ever energy crisis with serious implications for our national economy,” he said. “Civil nuclear power generation, hence, is an essential requirement of our national energy strategy.”

In India, Asia’s third-biggest economy, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, a subsidiary of Fairfield, Connecticut-based General Electric Co., and Monroeville, Pennsylvania-based Westinghouse Electric Co., a subsidiary of Tokyo’s Toshiba Corp., would be among the companies bidding for nuclear energy contracts worth at least $10 billion. More than 30 U.S. nuclear-industry suppliers have expressed interest.

( . . . )

Khan Network

The U.S. State Department blames an illicit nuclear technology network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who takes credit for building his country’s nuclear program, for having “lasting implications for international security.”

Khan admitted responsibility for selling nuclear bomb technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, among other countries, after the International Atomic Energy Agency presented evidence of the sales in 2004. Then-President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan pardoned Khan and placed him under house arrest. His house arrest was lifted by a Pakistani court last year.

U.S. investigators have long sought access to Khan, a former head of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. Asked why his government wasn’t making Khan available, Gilani said “that chapter is closed,” and insisted Khan “is being regulated.”

The Pakistani leader said he told Obama that the “biggest mistake of the U.S.” after its military campaign that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in 2001 was to leave “a vacuum” that allowed militants to return.

To contact the reporter on this story: Indira Lakshmanan in Washington at ilakshmanan@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: April 13, 2010 01:51 EDT

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a4e7sFDYKz4k&pos=9

***

Global Increase

Globally, a total of 52 nuclear reactors were under construction as of Jan. 1, according to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Inc. Last year was the first time in the history of commercial nuclear power that no new reactors came into operation, according to International Atomic Energy Agency figures. Some 33 new plants came online in 1984 and that number has declined almost every year since.

Japan Steel Works is spending 80 billion yen ($864 million) at its Muroran plant in the country’s northern island of Hokkaido by March 2012 to increase capacity to make parts for 12 nuclear reactors a year, compared with 5.5 units now, the president said.

The investment will increase annual sales from Japan Steel Works’ cast and forged steel for electric and nuclear power to 70 billion yen from the year starting April 2012, up from 45.5 billion yen expected for the current year, Sato said.

To contact the reporters on this story: Masumi Suga in Tokyo at msuga@bloomberg.net; Shunichi Ozasa in Tokyo at sozasa@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: September 7, 2009 08:39 EDT

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2lUkzmYNGWI

In the end, this
issue was resolved through US-brokered concession trading in conjunction
with the P-5 negotiations on Russia’s proposal for identical transparency at
the test sites. In return for two seismic stations being moved closer to the
US and Chinese test sites, Russia abandoned the proposal for aircraft and
agreed to the network of monitors outlined in Ramaker’s draft treaty text.
HEARING UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS
From the beginning there was agreement that there should be a hydroacoustic
network for detecting explosions conducted underwater or underground
in marine environments, such as the French test sites at Moruroa and
Fangataufa. Such explosions generate soundwaves that can be detected
by sensors thousands of kilometres away.24 Negotiations focused on the
number and location of hydroacoustic stations deemed necessary and most
cost effective. Initially there was enthusiasm for 16 stations: four each to
cover the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, plus a station south of Africa
to cover both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and three auxiliary stations to
aid location identification and to cover in the event of failure of one of the
primary stations. Because of the high expense, this system was modified by
agreement to a total of 11 stations, comprising six fixed cable hydrophone
stations and five T-phase stations near coasts or on islands.25
PICKING UP SHOCKWAVES
A further technology, infrasound, was advocated by the majority of
delegations to provide enhanced detection and location capabilities for
nuclear explosions conducted in the atmosphere. Infrasound technology
detects the shockwaves produced by nuclear explosions once they have
decayed into low-frequency sound waves. For maximum effectiveness, the
network was designed with microphones and microbarographs, organized
in arrays of three or more sensors. Apart from China and Pakistan, which
argued that satellite and electromagnetic pulse detection would be more
effective and would obviate the necessity for infrasound coverage, there was
an early majority for including an infrasound network of around 60 sensors
in the IMS. When Beijing finally accepted that satellite monitoring would
not be included in the IMS, both China and Pakistan also withdrew their
objections to incorporating an infrasound network into the treaty.
SATELLITES AND ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE MONITORING
China’s proposal for the IMS to include a CTBT-specific network of
internationally funded satellites and electromagnetic pulse monitors proved
very controversial. Arguing that both these technologies were essential for
detecting and identifying nuclear explosions at high altitude or in space,
as well as being useful to monitor potential sites on the ground, China had
proposed that a network of around 60 electromagnetic pulse sensors could
be established at relatively low cost and would provide “high sensitivity,
precise location and prompt response” for detecting nuclear explosions
conducted in the upper atmosphere.26 Viewing a CTBT-specific satellite
system as prohibitively expensive, most delegations considered that the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) would be
able to get such information as necessary from national and commercial
satellites in any case.27 By contrast with its position on satellites, which was
shared only by Pakistan, there was wider interest in China’s proposal for a
ground-based system to enhance the location and identification capability
for atmospheric and high-altitude tests. Concerns were raised about a high
false-alarm rate due to lightning, however. China proposed that analytical
software could be designed to discriminate between the EMP produced
by lightning and by nuclear explosions, but other experts were sceptical
that this would be possible. In the end, it was decided to leave satellites
and electromagnetic pulse monitoring out of the IMS, though use could be
made of such data provided from national or civilian capabilities.28

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf

Mafia Solves Nuclear Waste Problem

Posted by feww on September 16, 2009
Nuclear Waste Disposal Doesn’t Have to Be So Expensive: Mafia

The enterprising corporate arm of Mafia has found an answer ( ) to the age old problem of energy growth: Go Nuclear

And don’t worry about the astronomical cost of “disposing” of the permanent waste. They will dump it in the ocean for you at premium prices.

Italian authorities have located the wreck of a vessel with 180 barrels of toxic waste on board, which they say was sunk by the mafia, off the south coast of Italy. The sunken ship is reported to be one of more than 30 scuttled by Cosa Nostra.

ansa photo
Photo: ANSA.it. Image may be subject to copyright.

Italian officials say the 110-meter long sunken vessel, which lay in 500 meters of water in the Tyrrhenian sea, may contain radioactive waste, a report said.

The ship’s location was revealed by Francesco Fonti, an ex-member of Calabria’s feared ‘Ndrangheta crime group, who confessed to using explosives to sink this vessel and two others.

The ship lay less than 28 km off the coast of Calabria in southwestern Italy, and was filmed by a remote-controlled submarine. A short video is available at: toxic dump.

Video images show an empty barrel lay on the seabed, which appears to have fallen out of a gaping hole in the sunken vessel’s damaged hull.

“There could be problems of toxins and heavy metals … this is an issue for the whole international community,” Silvestro Greco, head of Calabria’s environment agency, was reported as saying..

Greco said investigators believed there were 32 ships carrying toxic waste sunk by the mafia since the introduction of tighter environmental legislation in the 1980s made illegal waste disposal a lucrative business for crime groups.

“The Mediterranean is 0.7 percent of the world’s seas. If in this tiny portion there are more than 30 (toxic waste) shipwrecks, imagine what there could be elsewhere,” he said.

See also

* Operation CHASE

References

1. ^ a b c d Brankowitz, William R. Summary of Some Chemical Munitions Sea Dumps by the United States , Meeting notes, 30 January 1989, p. 38, accessed 7 January 2009.
2. ^ a b c d e Vilensky, Joel A. Dew of Death: The Story of Lewisite, America’s World War I Weapon of Mass Destruction. (Google Books), Indiana University Press, 2005, p. 109, (ISBN 0253346126).
3. ^ a b c d e f g h Brankowitz, William R. Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation , p. 9 (p. 13 in PDF), Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Munitions (Demilitarization and Binary) (Provisional), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 27 April 1987, accessed 7 January 2009.

v • d • e
United States chemical weapons program
Agents and chemicals
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) A Chlorine A Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) A Phosgene A QL A Sarin (GB) A Sulfur mustard (HD) A VX
Weapons
Bigeye bomb A M1 chemical mine A M104 155mm Cartridge A M110 155mm Cartridge A M121/A1 155mm Cartridge A M125 bomblet A M134 bomblet A M138 bomblet A M139 bomblet A M2 mortar A M23 chemical mine A M34 cluster bomb A M360 105mm Cartridge A M426 8-inch shell A M43 BZ cluster bomb A M44 generator cluster A M55 rocket A M60 105mm Cartridge A M687 155mm Cartridge A XM-736 8-inch projectile A MC-1 bomb A M47 bomb A Weteye bomb
Operations and testing
Dugway sheep incident A Edgewood Arsenal experiments A MKULTRA A Operation CHASE A Operation Geranium A Operation LAC A Operation Red Hat A Operation Steel Box A Operation Ranch Hand A Operation Top Hat A Project 112 A Project SHAD
Facilities
Anniston Army Depot A Anniston Chemical Activity A Blue Grass Army Depot A Deseret Chemical Depot A Edgewood Chemical Activity A Hawthorne Army Depot A Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System A Newport Chemical Depot A Pine Bluff Chemical Activity A Pueblo Chemical Depot A Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility A Umatilla Chemical Depot
Units and formations
1st Gas Regiment A U.S. Army Chemical Corps A Chemical mortar battalion
Equipment
Chemical Agent Identification Set A M93 Fox A MOPP A People sniffer
Related topics
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory A Chlorine bombings in Iraq A Herbicidal warfare A List of topics A Poison gas in World War I A Tyler poison gas plot

External links

* Map of significant U.S. chemical agent dumps (Operation Geranium marked at F1)

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Geranium
Categories: Chemical weapons demilitarization | Non-combat military operations involving the United States | Ocean pollution

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Geranium

***

The Plutonium Files
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Plutonium Files: America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War is a 1999 book by Eileen Welsome. It is a history of U.S. government-engineered radiation experiments on unwitting Americans, based on the Pulitzer Prize–winning series Welsome wrote for the Albuquerque Tribune.[1][2]

The purpose of the experiments was to assess the effect of radioactivity on the human body. For example, between April 1945 and July 1947, 18 people were injected with plutonium by doctors associated with the Manhattan Project. None of these men, women, and children were told what was being done, and none gave informed consent. Most of the subjects, Welsome writes, were the poor, the powerless, and the sick — the very people who count most on the government to protect them .[3]

These medical experiments were covered up for 40 years. When they became public, the government apologized but not a single doctor or hospital was publicly blamed.[3]

One reviewer stated that the Welsome’s book is a powerful indictment of an important part of the Manhattan Project and a warning of the evil that supposedly high-minded people can do when convinced of their own superiority and devoted to a goal that blinds them to simple humanity .[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Plutonium_Files

***

Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Increasing, Agency Warns

Wednesday, October 03, 2001

More than 20 attempts at smuggling nuclear materials have been confirmed this year, according to Jane’s Information Group Foreign Report. The incidents this year, in addition to more than 370 which have occurred in the last seven years — including 15 incidents involving plutonium or weapon-grade uranium — have prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency to step up its programs to improve the physical security of nuclear materials.

A collaborative law enforcement program under IAEA leadership was started earlier this year to help with the smuggling problem. In conjunction with the World Customs Organization, Interpol and the FBI, the IAEA program will seek better information exchanges between law enforcement agencies as well as training programs for police and customs organizations (Foreign Report, Oct. 4).

Even more IAEA action is needed to prevent nuclear materials from falling into terrorist hands, according to two nonproliferation specialists writing in Arms Control Today. George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler write that adoption of stronger physical protection standards against these threats is essential, and the sooner the better.

The two supported a recent decision by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to convene a meeting of experts to draft a new amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which currently only applies to nuclear materials in transit.
The new amendment should add some sort of verification or reporting requirement, Bunn and Steinhausler said, adding that the convention should apply to domestic facilities and include measures on preventing sabotage (Bunn/Steinhausler, Arms Control Today, Oct. 2001).

http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20011003/19010_story.asp

***

NUCLEAR SMUGGLING CASE DEEPENS GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN TENSIONS
By Richard Weitz (04/05/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Revelations in January 2007 about the details of a recent smuggling incident in the Republic of Georgia have intensified concerns about the security of nuclear materials in the South Caucasus. Although the initial effect of the case has been to sharpen tensions between Russia and Georgia, over the long-term it could result in enhanced nonproliferation cooperation in the region. Indeed, the only two seizures of Highly Enriched Uranium in recent years have taken place in Georgia, indicating the need for greater involvement by the international community in countering WMD smuggling in the South Caucasus.

BACKGROUND: On January 25, 2007, a Georgian court sentenced a citizen of the Russian region of North Ossetia to eight years in prison for attempting to sell 100 grams of weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for $1 million on the black market. The authorities had detained Oleg Khintsagov for almost a year following his arrest in February 1, 2006, in a complex multinational sting operation that eventually involved the CIA, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Energy. The Georgian government provided details about the case only after the court reached its verdict.

Although the court also sentenced three Georgian citizens to between four and six years in prison, the immediate effect of the new revelations surrounding the case was to worsen the already problematic relationship between Russia and Georgia. The Russian Ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, had only just returned to Tbilisi after having been absent for four months following revelations about alleged Russian espionage activity in Georgia. The two countries have also experienced acute bilateral disputes over Georgian efforts to join NATO, Russian economic sanctions on Georgia, and Russian support for the two remaining separatist governmentsâ ”in Abkhazia and South Ossetiaâ ”on Georgian territory.
The Georgian authorities have offered different reasons why they delayed providing details about the case until now. Some Georgian officials said they needed time to investigate the incident thoroughly. At least one Georgian legislator said the United States had requested a temporary media blackout. At a press conference announcing the verdict, however, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili implied that his government had decided to publicize the case because it had lost patience waiting for greater Russian cooperation in investigating the incident.
Russian officials insisted they have cooperated fully with the investigation. Some attributed the delay to a Georgian attempt, supported by some U.S. officials, to release the information at the most opportune time for embarrassing the Russian government. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, â œI hope very much that this is not an attempted political provocation.â Lavrov asserted that experts from Russiaâ ™s Federal Security Service (FSB) and Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) had interrogated Khintsagov, but he â œcould say nothing coherent.â

A representative of the Office of the Russian Prosecutor General told the ITAR-TASS news agency that the Georgian Prosecutor Generalâ ™s Office had asked for legal assistance in investigating Khintsagov. He claimed, however, that the Georgian authorities had failed to respond to the Russian governmentâ ™s request for copies of the materials Russia needed to launch an investigation. Under Russian law, it is illegal for unauthorized personnel to acquire, store, or sell radioactive materials.

Several influential Russians speculated that Georgian and American officials had colluded to exploit the incident to damage Russiaâ ™s reputation as a responsible steward of sensitive nuclear materials. Konstantin Zatulin, director of the Institute of CIS Countries and a deputy in the Duma, noted the resemblance between the Khintsagov incident and the case of former Russian security agent Alexander Litvinenko, killed with radioactive polonium also widely thought to have originated in Russia: â œI see only one reason to again return to the theme of mysterious Russian spies who are transporting uranium and plutonium and other such substances all over the world.â

Andrei Cherkasenko, chairman of the board of AtomPromResursy, a Russian manufacturer of nuclear power equipment, explicitly accused Georgian and American officials of deliberately timing the release of the information about the Khintsagov case to coincide with Russian President Vladimir Putinâ ™s visit to India, where he signed a memorandum of intent to construct four additional Russian nuclear power plants. Russian, American, and other foreign companies are expected to compete vigorously to sell nuclear equipment to India if the Nuclear Suppliers Group authorizes such sales, a decision expected to occur sometime this year.

Whatever the reason for the timing, the Georgian government did cite the smuggling incident to reaffirm its call for the deployment of international observer missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including along the Georgian-Russian border, to supplement or replace the Russian peacekeeping forces there. After meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili on February 26, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said EU governments might deploy peacekeepers in Georgia provided the mission had a clear and achievable objective. Publicizing the arrest of uranium smugglers operating in the breakaway regions supports the Georgian argument that neither the local authorities nor Russian peacekeepers have proven able to secure the territories from serious nonproliferation threats and dangerous criminal networks.

In the past, Russian officials as well as both regionsâ ™ unrecognized separatist governments have rejected proposals for deploying permanent observer missions from non-CIS countries on their territories. Murat Dzhoyev, the South Ossetian de facto governmentâ ™s designated foreign minister, dismissed claims that his autonomous region had become a transit zone for nuclear trafficking as â œlaughable.â His office issued a formal statement accusing Georgia of engineering the scandal to discredit the South Ossetian government. The separatist authorities in Abkhazia also denounced the timing of the Georgian announcement, hinting that Tbilisi sought to influence UN Security Council deliberations by spreading alarm about the security situation in Georgiaâ ™s separatist regions. In mid-February 2006, the â œforeign ministersâ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia conferred in Moscow with their counterpart from the separatist region of Transnistria on how to strengthen their autonomous positions.

Representatives of the Russian Federal Customs Service also expressed skepticism that the material in Khintsagovâ ™s possession came from Russia. They insist that the Russian government has installed very effective Russian-made â œYantarâ radiation monitoring equipment along its southern borders and other trafficking routes that would have detected any smuggled radioactive materials. Georgian officials subsequently revealed that Khintsagov smuggled the uranium across a border checkpoint near Kazbegi, a remote town in eastern Georgia where radiation detection devices might have been less advanced than those deployed at more heavily used transit points.

IMPLICATIONS: The Khintsagov incident underscores the potential nonproliferation threats associated with the anarchic conditions existing in the breakaway regions in the South Caucasus and the other â œfrozen conflictâ regions of the former Soviet Union. The weak law enforcement and porous borders in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which permit easy transit with neighboring Russian regions as well as into Georgia) facilitate trafficking in nuclear materials as well as more conventional forms of contraband (e.g., narcotics, counterfeit currency, persons).

Although the Georgian government has made a number of efforts to enhance the safety and security of the nuclear materials under its control, especially after Georgia joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February 1997, the country remains especially vulnerable to nuclear trafficking through its territory. Besides the lack of effective political authority in the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia., foreign governments and nonproliferation experts have expressed concern about the level of corruption in Georgian law enforcement agencies, the growing strength of transnational criminal organizations in the South Caucasus, and the republicâ ™s pivotal location at the crossroads between Europe, Russia, Asia, and the Middle East.
In June 2003, Georgian authorities apprehended Garik Dadayan, an Armenian national, in the border town of Sadakhlo for attempting to smuggle 170 grams of weapons-grade HEU across Georgiaâ ™s borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Smuggling had become rampant in the region after relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated following their war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Dadayan told investigators that he had acquired the material from intermediaries of Russian and other nationalities in Vladikavkaz, the same North Ossetian city where Khintsagov resided. Georgian authorities concluded that the HEU originated in Novosibirsk. According to the media, however, the FSB sent a confidential letter in May 2006 to the Georgian authorities asserting that Russian experts had concluded that the uranium smuggled by Dadayan and Khintsagov were produced at separate times and seriously differ in composition.

CONCLUSIONS: The two cases demonstrate the vulnerability of the South Caucasus, especially Georgia, to the smuggling of nuclear materials. According to IAEA, of the 481 occurrences of nuclear smuggling reported between May 2002 and early 2006, only the Dadayan incident involved weapons-grade nuclear material. The Khintsagov case now falls into that category. The international community clearly needs to adopt urgent measures to shore up its nonproliferation defenses in the region. Priorities include improving WMD detection capabilities, extending best practices into private industry, and strengthening the rule of law throughout Georgian territory.

AUTHORâ ™S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director for Project Management at the Hudson Institute.
» printer friendly version
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4583

***

Nuclear Terrorism Incidents

compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last updated 28 September 2003

Nuclear terrorism–acts of violence (political and non-political) involving radioactive materials, assaults on nuclear facilities, and thefts of nuclear warheads

* 3 Jan 1961: United States–criticality accident at SL-1 test reactor kills 3; according to reports, the excursion was a murder-suicide by the worker who extracted a control rod.
* 1966-1977: Europe–10 terrorist incidents against European nuclear installations.2
* before 1974: Austria–Radioisotope indium-113 applied to a railroad car.3
* 1974-1986: United States–32 acts of intentional damage or suspected sabotage at domestic nuclear facilities.4
* 1974-1985: Total of nearly 100 instances that involved response by NEST.5
* 1974-1980: United States–total of about 80 instances of nuclear threats deemed credible; only two prompted NEST deployment.6
* 15 Aug 1975: France–Two bombs exploded at Mt. d’Arree NPS in Brittany: one at far end of canal between plant and cooling lake, the other damaging a air chimney for plant buildings in the compound. The reactor was shut down temporarily for inspection.7
* 12 May 1976: Maine–Two bombs exploded in the headquarters of the Central Maine Power Company in Augusta; a Fred Hampton Unit of the People’s Forces claimed responsibility and demanded end to expansion of nuclear powerplants.8
* 10 Oct 1977: Oregon–Bomb exploded next to visitor center at Trojan NPS, with Environmental Assault Unit of the New World Liberation Front claiming responsibility.9
* 18 Dec 1977: Spain–4 ETA terrorists attack guard post at Lemoniz NPS, with one terrorist killed; ETA later claimed to have planned to blow up the reactors.10
* 17 Mar 1978: Spain–Bomb exploded in steam generator of Lemoniz NPS killing 2 construction workers and injuring 14, ten minutes after ETA phone call warned of bomb; damage amounted to $6,000,000.11
* 1979: France–Environmental terrorists cause $20 million in damages at a nuclear plant.12
* 1979: Virginia–2 plant operator trainees entered fuel storage building at Surry NPS and damaged four new fuel assemblies by pouring sodium hydroxide on them.13
* Jan 1979: North Carolina–An employee of a GE subcontractor sent extortion letter with sample of uranium dioxide to general manager of GE nuclear faility in Wilmington. Individual had stolen two 5-gallon containers of uranium dioxide and threatened to disperse them in unnamed U.S. city unless he received $100,000 ransom. He was arrested and sentenced to 15 years.14
* 13 Jun 1979: Spain–Two ETA guerrillas planted bomb in turbine room of Lemoniz NPS which was later detonated 25 minutes after a warning call. One worker who did not evacuate was killed; a tank containing 5,000 liters of oil was ignited and turbine components were moderately damaged. The ETA claimed responsibility on 16 June.15
* 11 Nov 1979: Spain–5 ETA guerrillas entered Equipos Nucleares (Nuclear Instruments) factory in Maliano, planted explosives and kidnapped the 10 guards on duty; guards were released near Santander-Vizcaya border. Charges exploded after midnight, causing $6,000,000 in damage mostly to one end of main factory building. ETA claimed responsibility on 13 November.16
* before 1980: France–Radioactive graphite fuel element plugs placed under driver’s seat of a car; victim sustained 25-30 rad dose to his spinal bone marrow and 400-500 rads to his testes. Perpetrator was tried and convicted of poisoning by radiation, fined $1,000, and served 9 months in prison.17
* 1981: New York–fuel oil filter drains were closed on backup diesel power generators at Nine Mile Point Unit 1, apparently intentionally, preventing their startup.18
* 1981: Ohio–water valve was found shut, apparently intentionally, at Beaver Valley NPS, leaving high-pressure portion of emergency cooling system disabled.19
* 1982: France–Five rockets fired into Creys-Malville nuclear facility, causing minor damage.20
* Aug 1982: New Jersey–values were found closed on backup diesel generator at Salem Unit II NPS, apparently intentionally, which would prevent generator start-up.21
* 1983: West Germany–Four West Germans gain forced entry to a Pershing missile site and attempt to destroy a missile with crowbars.22
* 12 Nov 1984: Missouri–Four Catholic peace activists of the Silo Pruning Hooks entered Minuteman ICBM site near Higginsville and did over $10,000 worth of damage to equipment with a jack hammer; all were arrested and charged with destruction of federal property.23
* Apr 1985: New York–Credible claim emerged that New York City’s water reservoirs had been contaminated with plutonium; testing detected femtocurie levels of plutonium in the water.24
* Jun 1985: Arizona–Report of intentional tampering with water valves at Palo Verde NPS.25
* after 1987: Pennsylvania–Mentally ill man drives his station wagon through the fence at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and wanders on foot for a period of time before being captured.26
* 28 Nov 1987: California–Bomb exploded at 1:30 A.M. in parking lot of Sandia National Laboratories (next to LLNL); 32 hours later a caller claimed responsibility for the Nuclear Liberation Front, although link was unconfirmed.27
* Feb 1990: Azerbaijan–Azerbeijani rebels unsuccessfully attacked a Soviet military depot near Baku where nuclear weapons are stored; Soviet troops were sent to secure the base.28
* Jan 1992: Iran–Egyptian newspaper claimed Iran had bought three Soviet nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan for $150 million; Kazakhstan denied the report. In April Russian intelligence reported Iran had obtained at least two warheads from Kazakhstan; in July a Kazakh official said the three reportedly missing warheads were in test shafts at the Kazakh test site; in September a U.S. congressional task force alleged Iran had obtained 4 Soviet warheads (including 2 operational): two 40 kt SRBM warheads, one 50 kt NGB, and one 0.1 kt AFAP. By 1994 Russia said the warheads were accounted for; Israeli officials suggest the warheads were borrowed for disassembly and reverse engineering.29
* Mar 1992: Commonwealth of Independent States–Reportedly, box of radioactive material stolen from Pridniestroviye, Transdnestr; thieves threatened to blow up the material if fighting in Moldova was not stopped.30
* 1993: Russia–A radioactive substance was planted in the chair of Vladimir Kaplun, director of a Russian packing company; over several weeks Kaplun contracted radiation sickness and died.31
* Nov 1993: Russia–Two nuclear warheads reportedly stolen by two employees of the Zlatoust-36 Instrument Building Plant near Chelyabinsk, a weapons assembly facility; weapons recovered in a nearby residential garage and the employees arrested shortly afterwards.32
* Mar 1994: Russia–At SS-25 ICBM site at Barnaul in Siberia, a Russian soldier opens fire with sub-machine gun and kills commander and two other soldiers; other soldiers could not return fire because they would have had to fire towards the SS-25; the soldier was persuaded to surrender after three hours, having taking refuge in an armoured vehicle.33
* 23 Nov 1995: Russia–Shamil Basayev, Chechen rebel commander, directs television news crew to a parcel of cesium-137 buried in Izmailovsky Park, eastern Moscow; parcel reportedly posed no threat and was removed. Parcel weighed 32 kg, contained 10-50 mCi, and was part of a hospital x-ray machine taken in a prior raid.34
* Dec 1995: France–Saboteurs put salt into a cooling contour of one of the Blayais nuclear power reactors.35
* 9 Jan 1996: Russia–Chechen fighters attack a Russian military airfield at Kizlyar unsucessfully, then temporarily take about 2,000 civilian hostages.36
* Jun 1996: New York–several individuals arrested in plot to kill Republican officials; seized weapons included radioactive materials.37
* after 1996: Russia–Gunman barracades himself in a nuclear submarine and holds police at bay for several hours.38
* May 1997: Russia–Aleksandr Lebed claims privately and later publicly that a number of Soviet ADMs disguised as suitcases are missing; his claims are affirmed by some but no concrete evidence emerges.39
* Nov 1997: Russia–Several threats to sabotage submarine nuclear reactors are made by one or more Murmansk shipyard workers in demanding back pay they are owed.40
* 19 Aug 1999: United States–Andris Blakis spread phosphorous-32 on the chair of a co-worker in Los Angeles, CA, causing a dose to the co-worker of a few tenths of a rem; Blakis was arrested and charged.41
* 6-8 Jun 2000: Japan–Tsugio Uchinishi sent letters laced with monazite (a thorium-containing mineral) to 10 government offices in Tokyo in protest of illegal uranium exports to North Korea.42
* 20 Dec 2000: Japan–A man scattered a small amount of iodine-125 at a subway ticket gate in Osaka; the man was arrested, and no injuries resulted.43
* 2001: worldwide–6 incidents involving terrorism with nuclear or radiological materials.44

NOTES:

2. Denton, p. 152.
3. Mullen, pp. 242, 246.
4. Denton, p. 152.
5. ITFPNT, p. 17.
6. Gates, p. 402.
7. Kellen, pp. 123-124.
8. Kellen, p. 124.
9. Kellen, p. 124.
10. Kellen, p. 124.
11. Kellen, p. 125.
12. Denton, p. 152.
13. Hirsch, p. 212.
14. Hirsch, p. 212.
15. Kellen, p. 126.
16. Kellen, pp. 126-127.
17. Mullen, pp. 242, 246.
18. Hirsch, p. 211.
19. Hirsch, p. 211.
20. Denton, p. 152.
21. Hirsch, p. 212.
22. Denton, p. 153.
23. Missile Protesters, p. 4.
24. Mullen, p. 243; Spector, 1985, p. 5.
25. The Washington Post, p. A5a.
26.
27. Hoffman, p. 1.
28. High Frontier, April 1990, p. 2, and July 1991, p. 5.
29. Potter, pp. 125-148; Hedges, p. A10.
30. Potter, p. 135.
31. Lee, p.
32. Lee, p. 124.
33. Jane’s, p. 15.
34. Lee, pp. 135-136; FAS, 27 March 1996.
35. Bukharin, p. 8.
36. Bukharin, p. 10; Lieven, pp. 137-138.
37.
38.
39. Parrish.
40. Bellona, 9 Nov. 1997.
41. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on line.
42. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on line.
43. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on line.
44. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on line.

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Bellona, 3.8 Kilograms Stolen Uranium Seized in Caucasus, 21 Sept. 1997, Bellona, on line [http://www.bellona.no].
Bellona, Kola Shipyard Workers: ‘We Will Arrange Another Chernobyl’ , 9 Nov. 1997, Bellona, on line [http://www.bellona.no].
Bellona, The Orgin of the Uranium Has Not Been Identified, 19 Feb. 1998, Bellona, on line [http://www.bellona.no].
Belyaninov, A., Nuclear Nonsense, Black-Market Bombs, and Fissile Flim-Flam , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Mar./Apr. 1994, pp. 44-50.
Bukharin, Oleg, Problems of Nuclear Terrorism, The Monitor, Spring 1997, pp. 8-10.
Burrows, William E., and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World, 1994, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Cockburn, Andrew, and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe, 1997, New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell.
Cordesman, Anthony H., Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 22 October 1996, CSIS, on line [http://www.csis.org/]
Denton, Jeremiah, International Terrorism–The Nuclear Dimension, in Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1986, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, pp. 150-157.
Federation of American Scientists, Appendix A: Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents, 27 March 1996, Federation of American Scientists, on line [http://www.fas.org/ irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html]
Gates, Mahlon E., The Nuclear Emergency Search Team , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 397-402.
Gordon, Michael, Stolen Uranium Intercepted Near Border of Georgia and Turkey, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 25 Sept. 1999.
Hedges, Chris, Iran May Be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 Years, U.S. and Israeli Officials Fear , The New York Times, 5 January 1995, p. A10.
Hersh, Seymour M., The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, 1991, New York, NY: Random House.
Hibbs, Mark, Plutonium, Politics, and Panic , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov./Dec. 1994, pp. 24-31.
High Frontier, In the News , High Frontier Newswatch, Arlington, VA: High Frontier: April 1990, p. 2; Sept. 1990, p. 3; May 1991, p. 3; July 1991, p. 5; Sept. 1992, p. 2.
Hirsch, Daniel, The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 207-222.
Hoffman, Bruce, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States, May 1988, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Hughes, David, Uranium Seizures Heighten Terrorism Concerns , Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 April 1995, pp. 63-64.
International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Task Force Report , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 7-49.
Jane’s, Silo Shooting a Cause for Concern , Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 April 1994, p. 15.
Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, 1996, New York, NY: Crown Publ.
Kellen, Konrad, The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism: A Discussion , with Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political Terrorists , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 104-122 ( The Potential … ) and pp. 123-133 ( Appendix ).
Kupperman, Robert, and Jeff Kamen, Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism, 1989, New York, NY: Doubleday.
Leader, Stefan, Osama Bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1999, pp. 34-37.
Lee, Rensselaer W. III, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe, 1998, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, 2nd ed., 1999, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Mann, Paul, Mass Weapons Threat Deepens Worldwide, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 June 1996, pp. 58-60.
Mastrangelo, Eugene, Terrorist Activities by Region , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexande r, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 134-145.
Mazur, Allan, Research Note: Bomb Threats Against American Nuclear-Energy Facilities , Journal of Military and Political Sociology, Spring 1983, pp. 109-121.
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Mullen, Robert K., Nuclear Violence , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 231-247.
Nuclear Smuggling Incidents , 1994, on line [http://www.infomanage.com/timeline.html].
Parrish, Scott, Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy, 1997, on line.
Phillips, John Aristotle, and David Michaelis, Mushroom: The True Story of the A-Bomb Kid, 1978, New York, NY: Pocket Books.
The Plutonium Racket , Economist, 20 Aug. 1994, pp. 39-40.
Potter, William C., Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States, Arms Control Today, Oct. 1995, pp. 9-16.
Potter, William C., Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States, 1993, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Robitaille, A., and R. Purver, Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials, May 1995, on line, Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Rossnagel, Alexander, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials in the Federal Republic of Germany , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 223-230.
Spector, Leonard S., Clandestine Nuclear Trade and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism , in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, 1987, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 78-87.
Spector, Leonard S., Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987, 1987, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publ. Co. for Carnegie Endowment.
Spector, Leonard S., The New Nuclear Nations: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1985, 1985, New York, NY: Random House.
Spector, Leonard S., Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1984, 1984, New York, NY: Random House.
Spector, Leonard S., The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988, 1988, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publ. Co. for the Carnegie Endowment.
Valente, Judith, Checking the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism , The News-Sun (Lake County, IL), 13/14 Aug. 1983, p. 5B.
The Washington Post, 12 July 1985, p. A5a.

(excerpt from Nuclear Terrorism and Related Incidents, version 5)
2000-2002, 2003 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 28 September 2003.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html

***

Russia: Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy

Scott Parrish and John Lepingwell
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
November 1997

General Aleksandr Lebed’s recent allegation that some former Soviet suitcase size nuclear weapons may be missing has generated a storm of negative media commentary in Moscow and concern and unease in Washington. Even though many contradictory reports have been published, some patterns are discernable that provide important clues to unraveling the story of the suitcase nukes.

In a meeting with a US Congressional delegation in May 1997, and again in an interview broadcast on 60 Minutes on 7 September 1997, Lebed claimed that the Soviet Union created perhaps one hundred atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), or atomic land mines. These low-yield (circa 1 kiloton) devices were to be used by special forces for wartime sabotage and thus were small, portable, and not equipped with standard safety devices to prevent unauthorized detonation. According to Lebed, some of the ADMs were deployed in the former Soviet republics, and might not have been returned to Russia after the Soviet Union’s collapse. During his short tenure as Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Lebed started an investigation into the whereabouts of these weapons, but was fired by President Yeltsin before the investigation was completed.

Lebed’s statements are not the first indication that the Soviet Union built ADMs, or that some might have gone astray. In January 1996, the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies received information from a Russian presidential advisor that an unspecified number of ADMs had been manufactured in the 1970s for the KGB. Indeed, in the wake of Lebed’s charges, former Russian presidential advisor Aleksey Yablokov told a US Congressional subcommittee on 2 October 1997 that he was absolutely sure that ADMs had been built in the 1970s for the KGB’s special forces, and that these weapons were not included in the Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear weapons inventory nor covered by its accounting and control systems. Even earlier, in the summer of 1995, the Russian press published several articles claiming that Chechen separatists had either obtained, or tried to obtain, small nuclear weapons. Lebed’s claims are thus not completely new, but they are noteworthy because he was in a position to gain access to information on such weapons.

Official Russian reactions to Lebed’s statements were negative and derisory. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin termed Lebed’s allegations absolute absurdity, while a presidential spokesman said such superfantasies can only be the product of a diseased imagination. But as the official denials continued, they became increasingly self-contradictory and less credible. Some Russian military and atomic energy officials denied that the Soviet Union had ever created ADMs, and even stated that such weapons were either technically impossible, or prohibitively expensive. Others admitted that such weapons might have existed, but that they were all accounted for and under strict control. All agreed, however, that Lebed’s claims were motivated by his desire to regain the political limelight and prepare for a future presidential campaign.
The official denials may well have been orchestrated and coordinated to impugn Lebed’s reputation and reliability. If so, they were poorly conceived and raised more questions than they answered. Seemingly authoritative statements by Russian officials that portable ADMs are technically infeasible are belied by the fact that the United States built hundreds of them during the 1960s. The Soviet Union certainly had the technical capability to create portable ADMs, and may well have had military requirements to do so. Soviet strategy included diversionary actions and special force operations behind enemy lines, and ADMs might well have been stockpiled for use in a nuclear war. Certainly, if the United States developed and deployed ADMs it would be unusual for the Soviet Union not to follow suit. Thus, the claims that the Soviet Union did not produce ADMs are not convincing.

The claim that all nuclear weapons are accounted for is perhaps more credible, but is impossible to confirm. The misleading statements on the technical feasibility of ADMs do not bolster confidence in the claims that all Russian nuclear weapons are securely stored. However, most reports of the loss or theft of nuclear weapons have turned out to be based on weak evidence. The articles on nuclear theft that appeared in the Russian press in mid-1995 were apparently partly based on a report in the extreme right-wing Russian newspaper Zavtra (which in turn evidently was inspired by an article in the Russian-language edition of Soldier of Fortune, which claimed that suitcase nukes were smuggled through Lithuania to Iraq and possibly other countries). Zavtra’s correspondent claimed to have met with a former Chechen agent who participated in the diversion of two suitcase-size nuclear weapons to Chechnya in 1992. To bolster its claim, Zavtra published the technical details of the devices. However, the technical details appear to be inaccurate, and weaken, rather than strengthen, the report’s credibility. After publishing the article, the Zavtra correspondent was abducted, beaten, and threatened with death if he pursued the story. But after reporting the abduction, Zavtra retracted the original article, claiming that the meeting with the agent, and the subsequent beating, had been perpetrated by Chechen agents who hoped that rumors of nuclear weapons in Chechnya would strengthen Chechnya’s hand in negotiations with Moscow. Nevertheless, the original article triggered a string of media reports and speculation concerning nuclear weapons in Chechnya, eventually prompting an explicit denial of the story by Chechen military leader Shamil Basayev. Thus, while there have been a number of reports of the smuggling of portable nuclear weapons, the most publicized reports do not seem to be based on firm evidence, and have been propounded by sources of dubious reliability.

Lebed’s charges have therefore not been adequately dismissed by his critics, nor fully substantiated by his supporters. The claims that the Soviet Union never built ADMs ring hollow, but neither is there any solid evidence indicating the loss or diversion of such weapons. This does not mean that the threat of diversion does not exist, though. The social, political, and economic stresses that wrack Russia provide strong incentives for military insiders to steal nuclear weapons. While organizing such a theft would be extremely difficult, the consequences of a successful theft would be disastrous. Increasing security at nuclear weapons facilities, and especially at civilian nuclear facilities with weapons-grade fissile material, must therefore be at the forefront of the US-Russian security agenda. Increased work in this regard may help to ensure that stories of weapons or fissile material diversion remain fiction, and do not become fact.

Dr. Scott Parrish is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Dr. John Lepingwell is Senior Scholar in Residence and Manager of the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

A longer version of this article, with full citations, is also available. An article on Less Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet Union, written in August 1997, by CNS Director William Potter is also available in the database. Many of the reports referred to in the longer article are also abstracted in the CNS Illicit Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials from the Former Soviet Union database, available on the CNS Web Site or via CD-ROM. For more information on the CNS Databases and subscriptions, please contact CNS Database Marketing Manager Gary Ackerman at (831) 647-6545 or by email at Gary.Ackerman@miis.edu.

Comments or questions? E-mail Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. 2002 by MIIS.

http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/lebedst.htm

***

Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Radiation accidents and other events causing radiation casualties–tabulated data
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last updated 29 January 2009

This is a listing (incomplete) of radiation accidents and other events (e.g. intentional acts) that resulted in acute radiation exposures to humans sufficient to cause casualties. For sources and for details on specific events see individual pages at Database of Radiological Incidents and Related Events or follow links in table.

Notes and codes:

* code: coding for type of accident. Codes:
o A — radiation accident (unspecified or other)
o A-R — accident involving nuclear reactor
o A-NR — accident involving naval reactor
o A-PR — accident involving power reactor
o AC — criticality accident
o AC-RR — criticality accident involving research reactor
o A-a — accelerator accident
o A-d — accidental dispersal of radioactive material
o A-i — accidental internal exposure to radioisotope
o A-ir — irradiator accident
o A-mr — medical radiotherapy accident
o A-mx — medical x-ray accident
o A-os — orphaned source accident
o A-osd — accidental dispersal of orphaned source
o A-rg — radiography accident
o A-s — accidental exposure to source
o A-x — x-ray accident
o I-a — intentional exposure of individual (assault)
o I-c — criminal act (unspecified)
o I-s — intentional self-exposure
o I-t — exposures resulting from theft of source
o NT — nuclear weapon test
o NW — combat use of nuclear weapon
* highest dose: highest dose to any individual; in cases of more than one casualty, most doses were significantly lower. Codes:
o L — casualties involving localized exposures
o N — the individual(s) receiving the highest dose died from effects other than ionizing radiation
* deaths: figures are for ionizing radiation-induced deaths only; parenthetical figures include those from other effects (e.g. thermal and mechanical results of explosions). Code:
o F — indicates fetal deaths.
* public: codes indicating case involved known exposure to the public (i.e. non-employees). Codes:
o c — criminal acts in which only perpetrators were injured
o m — medical, exposure of patients
o x — exposures among public
* source: radioisotope involved, if known. Codes:
o * NW — nuclear detonations
o * — criticality accidents
* release: radioactive release into the environment, if any; for point events (e.g. criticality accidents or nuclear detonations), activity is for 1 hour after event.

date   location/link to entry   type of accident/event   code   highest dose (rem)   deaths   injuries   public   source   release
~ 1896   Chicago, Illinois, USA   radiography overexposure   A-mx   L   0   1   m
~ 1905   Washington, District of Columbia, USA   radiography overexposure   A-mx   L   0   1   m
1920 – 1926   United States   ingestion of radioisotope, chronic injury   A-i      9   70      Ra-226
06 Aug 1945   Hiroshima, Japan   combat use of nuclear weapon   NW   (~80,000–N)   45,000 (130,000)   60,000? (86,000)   x   * NW
09 Aug 1945   Nagasaki, Japan   combat use of nuclear weapon   NW   (~200,000–N)   20,000 (65,000)   50,000? (75,000)   x   * NW
21 Aug 1945   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   criticality accident with plutonium assembly   AC   510   1   1      * Pu
21 May 1946   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   criticality accident with plutonium assembly   AC   2,100   1   1      * Pu
05 Jul 1950   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   5
19 Aug 1950   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
13 Sep 1950   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
20 Sep 1950   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
28 Sep 1950   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   1
Jan 1951   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   1
Jul 1951   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
01 Oct 1951   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   1   3
02 Dec 1951   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   3
15 Dec 1951   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   2
04 Mar 1952   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   1
02 Jun 1952   Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, USA   criticality accident with uranium   AC   136   0   2      * U
04 Jul 1952   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   2
20 Sep 1952   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
1952   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   3
04 Jan 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accidental internal exposure to radioisotope   A-i   ?   2   0      H-3
15 Mar 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with plutonium solution   AC   1,000   0   3      * Pu
09 Sep 1953   Moscow, Russia, USSR   criticality accident   AC   ?   0   4
18 Sep 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   2
13 Oct 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   5
28 Dec 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   11
1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accidental internal exposure to radioisotope   A-i   ?   0   2
01 Mar 1954   Bikini Atoll, Pacific Ocean   fallout from atmospheric nuclear test   NT   300   1   93+      * NW
11 Mar 1954   Obninsk, Russia, USSR   criticality accident   AC   ?   0   1
28 Jun 1954   Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   1   1      Po-210
14 Sep 1954   Totsk range, Russia, USSR   nuclear test   NT   ?   0   ?      * NW
06 Nov 1954   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
24 Jan 1955   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Sb-124
03 Jun 1955   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   4
27 Jul 1955   Idaho RTA, Idaho Falls, Idaho, USA   accidental exposure to source   A-s   L   0   1
22 Dec 1955   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   accident at radiochemical plant   A   ?   0   1
21 Apr 1957   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium solution   AC   3,000   1   10      * U
Jun 1957   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
29 Sep 1957   Chelyabinsk, Russia, USSR   chemical explosion in stored nuclear wastes   A-d   150   0   0
02 Jan 1958   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium solution   AC   6,000   3   1      * U
16 Jun 1958   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   criticality accident with uranium solution   AC   460   0   5      * U
15 Oct 1958   Vinca, Yugoslavia   criticality accident at research reactor   AC-RR   430   1   5      * U
30 Dec 1958   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   criticality accident with plutonium solution   AC   12,000   1   0      * Pu
08 Mar 1960   Lockport, New York, USA   x-ray accident   A-x   1000   0   2
08 Jun 1960   Moscow, Russia, USSR   intentional overexposure   I-s   1,750   1   0   c   Cs-137
13 Oct 1960   K-8 submarine, Barents Sea   reactor leak   A-NR   200   0   3
1960   USSR   ingestion of radioactive material   A-i   L   1   0      Ra
1960   Kazakhstan, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
03 Jan 1961   SL-1 reactor, Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   criticality excursion with uranium research reactor   AC-RR   (~350–N)   3   0      * U
20 Mar 1961   Moscow, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1      Co-60
26 Jun 1961   Moscow, Russia, USSR   criticality accident   AC   ?   0   4
04 Jul 1961   K-19 submarine, North Atlantic   reactor accident   A-NR   6,000   8   31
14 Jul 1961   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium   AC   200   0   1      * U
30 Sep 1961   Moscow, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
1961   Switzerland   accidental exposure to radioisotope   A   300   1   2      H-3
1961   Plymouth, United Kingdom   x-ray accident   A-mx   L   0   11?   m
06 Feb 1962   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
21 Mar 1962 – Aug 1962   Mexico City, Mexico   lost radiography source   A-os   5,200   4   1   x   Co-60
07 Apr 1962   Hanford, Washington, USA   criticality accident with plutonium solution   AC   110   0   2      * Pu
10 Apr 1962   Moscow, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
02 Nov 1962   Obninsk, Russia, USSR   criticality accident   AC   ?   0   2
11 Jan 1963   Sanlian, PRC   lost source   A-os   8,000   2   4      Co-60
11 Mar 1963   Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with plutonium assembly   AC   550   0   2      * Pu
28 Jun 1963   Sverdlovsk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   3
26 Jul 1963   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
1963   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   1
1963   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
24 Jul 1964   Wood River, Rhode Island, USA   criticality accident with uranium solution   AC   10,000   1   1      * U
1964   FR Germany   accidental exposure to radioisotope   A   1,000   1   3      H-3
12 Feb 1965   K-11 submarine, Severodvinsk, USSR   accident during refueling of naval reactor   A-NR   ?   0   7         ?
29 May 1965   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
30 Dec 1965   Mol, Belgium   criticality accident with uranium in water   AC   500   0   1      * U
1965   Illinois, USA   irradiator accident   A-ir   L   0   1
20 May 1966   Moscow, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
11 Jun 1966   Kaluga, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
1966   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
15 Apr 1967   Frunze, Kirgyzstan, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
24 May 1967   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
May 1967   New Delhi, India   accidental exposure to source   A-s   L   0   1      Co-60
04 Oct 1967   Harmarville, Pennsylvania, USA   irradiator accident   A-ir   600   0   3
09 Dec 1967   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
22 Dec 1967   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Sc-46
~ 1965 – 1968   Pennsylvania, USA   attempt to self-induce abortion using x-ray machine   I-s   ?   0   1   c
05 Apr 1968   Chelyabinsk-70, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium in assembly   AC   3,000   2   0      * U
May 1968   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
03 May 1968 – Jun 1968   La Plata, Argentina   lost source   A-os   L   0   1      Cs-137
24 May 1968   K-27 submarine, Barents Sea   naval reactor accident   A-NR   ?   9   83
27 Jun 1968   Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia, USSR   accidental internal exposure to radioisotope   A-i   ?   0   2      Po-210
01 Aug 1968   Wisconsin, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   ~450   1   0   m   Au-198
18 Sep 1968   FR Germany   accidental exposure to source   A-s   100   0   1
07 Dec 1968   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
10 Dec 1968   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with plutonium solution   AC   2,450   1   1      * Pu
02 Jan 1969   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
20 Jan 1969   Obninsk, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   2
11 Feb 1969   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
11 Mar 1969   Melekes, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1      Co-60
22 Apr 1969   Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   2
07 May 1969   Voronezh, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   2
20 Sep 1969   Scotland, United Kingdom   accidental exposure to radiography source   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
24 Sep 1969   Tomsk-7, Seversk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
13 Oct 1969   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
13 Oct 1969   Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
14 Oct 1969   Novaya Zemlya, Russia, USSR   venting from underground nuclear test   NT   80   0   ?      * NW
24 Nov 1969   Novomoskovsk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   3      Cs-137
20 Dec 1969   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
1969   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
1969   USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
1969   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
18 Jan 1970   Sormovo, Russia, USSR   construction accident on submarine nuclear reactor   A-NR   ?   3   2
04 Feb 1970   Kiev, Ukraine, USSR   possible criticality accident   AC   ?   0   1
13 Feb 1970   Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1      Co-60
15 Apr 1970   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
23 Jun 1970 – 25 Jun 1970   Australia   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   2
Sep 1970   Chelyabinsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Cs-137
04 Feb 1971   United States   irradiator accident   A-ir   ~260   0   1      Co-60
15 Feb 1971   Kurtchatov, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium   AC   330   0   3      * U
Mar 1971   Tula, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Cs-137
26 May 1971   Kurtchatov, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with uranium in water   AC   6,000   2   2      * U
Sep 1971   Voronezh, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
05 Dec 1971   Arkhangelsk region, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   3      Cs-137
1971   Chiba, Japan   lost source   A-os   130   0   3      Ir-192
1971   Ufa, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Cs-137
29 Feb 1972   Sichuan, PRC   irradiator accident   A-ir   147   0   1      Co-60
31 Mar 1972   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
8 Apr 1972 – Oct 1972   Harris county, Texas, USA   intentional exposure to individual   I-a   L   0   1   x   Cs-137
Jun 1972   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
Jul 1972   India   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
04 Oct 1972   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
09 Oct 1972   Primorsky region, Russia, USSR   criminal act using radioactive source   I-c   ?   0   1   x   Ir-192
22 Dec 1972   Irkutsk, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
Dec 1972   Wuhan, PRC   medical radiation accident   A-s   245   0   1+   m   Co-60
1972   Bulgaria   self-inflicted radiation exposure   I-s   L   1   0   c   Cs-137
11 Jan 1973   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Co-60
17 Mar 1973   Odessa, Ukraine, USSR   criminal act using radioactive source   I-c   ?   0   1   x   Co-60
Mar 1973   Kaliningrad, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
Apr 1973   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
26 Jul 1973   Elektrogorsk, Moscow region, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1      Co-60
05 Sep 1973   Khokhol, Vladimir region, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   4      Cs-137
Dec 1973   Donetsk, Ukraine, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Cs-137
09 Jan 1974   Novosibirsk, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
24 May 1974   Tomsk-7, Seversk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Rh-106
31 May 1974   Semipalatinsk test site, Kazakhstan, USSR   venting from underground nuclear test   NT   150   0   100   x?   * NW
Jun 1974   Parsippany, New Jersey, USA   irradiator accident   A-ir   400   0   1      Co-60
09 Aug 1974   India   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
24 Oct 1974   Perm’, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Co-60
15 Dec 1974   Lipetsk, Russia, USSR   criminal act using radioactive source   I-c   ?   0   2   x   Cs-137
1974   Sverdlovsk, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
1974 – 1976   Columbus, Ohio, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   10   88   m   Co-60
20 Jun 1975   Kazan’, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   2      Co-60
11 Jul 1975   Sverdlovsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   1   2      Co-60
1975   Tucuman, Argentina   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   2   m   Co-60
1975   Rossendorf, GDR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   L   0   1
1975   Halle, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1975   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   ~100   0   1
1975   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1975   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1975   Iraq   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
13 May 1975   Brescia, Lombardia, Italy   food irradiator accident   A-ir   1,200   1   0      Co-60
Mar 1976   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
12 Jul 1976   Moscow, Russia, USSR   irradiator accident   A-ir   400   0   1      Co-60
22 Jul 1976   Melekes, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
12 Nov 1976   Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1976   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   100   0   1
1976   Hanford, Washington, USA   accidental intake of radioisotope   A-i   L   0   1
? 1976   United States   fluoroscopy accidents   A-mx   L   0   2   m
08 Jan 1977   Sasolburg, Transvaal, South Africa   radiography accident   A-rg   116   0   1      Ir-192
01 Mar 1977   Obninsk, Russia, USSR   possible criticality accident   AC   ?   0   1
05 Mar 1977   Kiev, Ukraine, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   L   0   1
02 Apr 1977   Atucha, Argentina   accidental intake of radioisotope through wound   A-i   L   0   1
Sep 1977   Rockaway, New Jersey, USA   irradiator accident   A-ir   200   0   1      Co-60
1977   La Plata, Argentina   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1977   Pardubice, Czechoslovakia   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1977   FR Germany   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1977   Gyor, Hungary   accidental exposure to industrial source   A-rg   120   0   1
1977   Zona del Oleoducto, Peru   accidental exposure to source   A-s   200   0   3      Ir-192
1977   United Kingdom   accidental exposure to radioisotope   A   64   0   2      H-3
1977   United Kingdom   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
07 Mar 1978   Primorsky region, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
04 Apr 1978   Primorsky region, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
05 May 1978   Setif, Algeria   lost radiography source   A-os   140   1 (+1 F)   6   x   Ir-192
03 Jun 1978   Protvino, Kaluga region, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
17 Jul 1978   West Monroe, Louisiana, USA   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
21 Sep 1978   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   L   0   1
17 Oct 1978   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accident at nuclear reactor site   A   ?   0   1
25 Nov 1978   Udmurtia, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
13 Dec 1978   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   criticality accident with plutonium assembly   AC   250   0   1      * Pu
28 Dec 1978   K-171 submarine, Pacific Ocean   submarine reactor accident   A-NR   ?   3
1978   Buenos Aries, Argentina   accidental exposure to industrial source   A-s   L   0   1      Ir-192
1978   Nancy, France   accidental x-ray exposure   A-x   L   0   1
1978   Nykoping, Sweden   accidental exposure at research reactor   A   L   0   1
1978   United Kingdom   intentional self-exposure to radiography source   I-s   152   0   1   c   Ir-192
1978   United States   accelerator accident   A-a   L   0   1
08 May 1979   Sverdlovsk, Russia, USSR   accident involving nuclear reactor   A-R   ?   0   1
11 May 1979   La Hague, France   radiological assault   I-a   L   0   1   x
05 Jun 1979   Los Angeles, California, USA   lost source   A-os   L   0   5      Ir-192
20 Jul 1979   Leningrad, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   2
20 Sep 1979   Frunze, Kirgyzstan, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
01 Dec 1979   Semipalatinsk, Kazahkstan, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1      Co-60
1979   Parana, Argentina   x-ray accident   A-x   94   0   1
1979   Sokolov, Czechoslovakia   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1979   Montpelier, France   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1979   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1979   Freiberg, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1979   USSR nuclear submarine, unknown location   submarine reactor accident   A-NR   ?   0   4
23 May 1980   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
01 Sep 1980   Leningrad, Russia, USSR   irradiator accident   A-ir   ?   1   0      Co-60
19 Sep 1980   Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   1   0      Ir-192
Sep 1980   Shanghai, PRC   irradiator accident   A-ir   500   0   1      Co-60
03 Dec 1980   Vladivostok, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1980   FR Germany   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   2
1980   Bohlen, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1980   Rossendorf, GDR   accidental exposure to radioisotope   A   L   0   1      P-32
1980   Houston, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L?   7   ?   m   Y-90
02 Apr 1981   Saintes, France   accidental exposure to medical source   A-s   L   0   3      Co-60
29 Jul 1981   Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA   intentional self-exposure to industrial radiography source   I-s   ?   1   0   c   Ir-192
1981   Buenos Aires, Argentina   accidental exposure to industrial source   A-s   L   0   2      Ir-192
1981   FR Germany   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1981   Berlin, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
09 Jan 1982   Kramatorsk, Ukraine, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   2   0      Cs-137
15 Mar 1982   Krasnodar, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
19 May 1982   Smolensk, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
14 Jun 1982   Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, USSR   criminal act using radioactive source   I-c   ?   0   7   x   Co-60
02 Sep 1982   Kjeller, Norway   accident at industrial irradiator   A-ir   2,200   1   0      Co-60
05 Oct 1982   Baku, Azerbaidjan, USSR   lost source   A-os   ?   5   13      Cs-137
18 Dec 1982   Uregoy, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   2      Ir-192
1982   La Plata, Argentina   accident with radiotherapy unit   A-x   L   0   1
1982   Prague, Czechoslovakia   accidental exposure to radiography source   A-os   L   0   1   x   Ir-192
1982   Berlin, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1982   Vikhroli, Bombay, India   lost source   A-os   L   0   1   x   Ir-192
1982   Badak, East Borneo, Indonesia   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
27 Jan 1983   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
28 Apr 1983   Kharkov, Ukraine, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   2      Cs-137
17 May 1983   Volgograd, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
11 Jun 1983   Ufa, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Cs-137
23 Sep 1983   Constituyentes, Argentina   criticality accident with uranium in water   AC   3,700   1   0      * U
07 Dec 1983   Ufa, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1983   Buenos Aires, Argentina   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   2   m   Co-60
1983   FR Germany   accidental x-ray exposure   A-x   L   0   1
1983   Schwarze Pumpe, GDR   accidental exposure to industrial source   A-s   L   0   1      Ir-192
1983   Mulund, Bombay, India   accidental exposure to source   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
6 Dec 1983 – Feb 1984   Ciudad Juarez, Mexico   dispersal of lost radiography source   A-osd   450   1   4   x   Co-60   400 Ci
07 Feb 1984   Perm’, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   5      Ir-192
19 Mar 1984   Casablanca, Morocco   lost radiography source   A-os   ?   8   3   x   Ir-192
21 Apr 1984   Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
12 Jun 1984   Ufa, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
15 Jun 1984   Gorky, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   8      Ir-192
24 Oct 1984   Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Sb-124
1984   Mendoza, Argentina   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1984   Tiszafured, Hungary   accidental exposure to radiography source   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1984   Lima, Peru   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   6
03 Mar 1985   Norilsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   3      Cs-137
03 Jun 1985   Marietta, Georgia, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m
26 Jul 1985   Hamilton, Ontario, Canada   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m
10 Aug 1985   K-431 submarine, Chazhma Bay, Vladivostok, Russia, USSR   reactor accident during refueling   A-NR   220   0 (10)   49         ~1 kCi
26 Sep 1985   Ignalinskaya, Lithuania, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
Sep 1985   Shanghai, PR China   accelerator accident   A-a   L   0   2
16 Oct 1985   Podolsk, Moscow region, Russia, USSR   radiation accident   A   ?   0   1
1985   PR China   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   1   m   Au-197
1985   PR China   radiation accident   A   L?   0   3      Cs-137
1985   Petrvald, Czechoslovakia   accidental intake of radioisotope   A-i   L   0   1      Am-241
1985   Visakhapatnam, India   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Co-60
1985   Yamuananager, India   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   2      Ir-192
1985   Odessa, Texas, USA   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1
1985   United Kingdom   accidental ingestion of radioisotope   A-i   L   0   1      I-125
Sep 1985 – 06 Jan 1986   Yakima, Washington, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m
Mar 1986   Beijing, PRC   accidental exposure to irradiator source   A-ir   80   0   2      Co-60
21 Mar 1986 – 11 Apr 1986   Tyler, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   2   0   m
26 Apr 1986 – 06 May 1986   Chernobyl, Ukraine, USSR   steam explosion and fire in graphite-moderated power reactor   A-PR   1,600   28 (31)   238+   x      52 MCi
May 1986   Kaifeng City, PRC   accidental exposure to irradiator source   A-ir   350   0   2      Co-60
11 Jun 1986   Obninsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Co-60
05 Aug 1986   Kalinin, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1986   United Kingdom   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   Co-60
17 Jan 1987   Yakima, Washington, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   0   m
19 Feb 1987   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
Jul 1987 – Sep 1987   Koko, Nigeria   radiological exposure to low-level waste   A   ?   0   26
12 Sep 1987 – 29 Sep 1987   Goiania, Goias, Brazil   accidental dispersal of lost radiography source   A-osd   700   5   20   x   Cs-137   1375 Ci
1987   Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1
1987   Zhengzhou City, PRC   irradiator accident   A-ir   135   0   1      Co-60
22 Mar 1988   Sverdlovsk, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   3      Sr-90, Y-90
05 Apr 1988   Tashkent, Uzbekistan, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   2      Ir-192
02 Jul 1988   Sao Paulo, Brazil   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   3      Ir-192
18 Aug 1988   Riga, Latvia, USSR   criminal act using radioactive source   I-c   ?   0   1   x   Cf-252
1988   Zhao Xian, PRC   irradiator accident   A-ir   520   0   1      Co-60
1988   Jena, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
1988   Trustetal, GDR   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   2
1988   Rotterdam, Netherlands   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m
1988   Exeter, United Kingdom   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   ?   0   1+?   m
05 Feb 1989   San Salvador, El Salvador   irradiator accident   A-ir   800   1   2      Co-60
20 Mar 1989   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
04 Aug 1989   Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
14 Aug 1989   Zagorsk, Sergiev Posad, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
30 Oct 1989   Moscow, Russia, USSR   x-ray accident   A-x   ?   0   1
1989   Bangladesh   accident with industrial source   A-s   230   0   1      Ir-192
1989   Beijing, PRC   accidental exposure to source   A-s   89   0   2      Co-60
1989   PR China   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1989   Paks, Hungary   accidental exposure to source   A-s   L   0   1
1989   Hazira, Gujarat, India   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1989   Witbank, Transvaal, South Africa   radiography accident   A-rg   225   0   1      Ir-192
27 Feb 1990   Kalinin, Russia, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
13 Mar 1990   Moscow, Russia, USSR   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
29 Mar 1990   United States   fluoroscopy accident   A-mx   L   0   1   m
19 Jun 1990   Honolulu, Hawaii, USA   ingestion of radioisotope   A-i   L   0   1   x   I-131
21 Jun 1990   Soreq, Israel   accident at commerical irradiation facility   A-ir   1,500   1   0      Co-60
25 Jun 1990   Shanghai, PRC   irradiator accident   A-ir   1,200   2   5      Co-60
13 Sep 1990   Kharkov, Ukraine, USSR   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
01 Nov 1990   Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Russia, USSR   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
10 Dec 1990 – 20 Dec 1990   Zarragosa, Spain   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   18   9   m
1990   Sasolburg, Transvaal South Africa   orphaned source   A-os   L   0   4   x   Co-60
24 Aug 1991   Bratsk, Irkutsk, Russia, USSR   attempted homicide using radioactive source   I-a   ?   0   1   x   Cs-137
13 Aug 1991   Forbach, France   irradiator accident   A-ir   L   0   3
26 Oct 1991   Nesvizh, Belarus   irradiator accident   A-ir   1,250   1   0      Co-60
11 Dec 1991   Maryland, USA   irradiator accident   A-ir   L   0   1
? 1977 – 1991   United Kingdom   radiography accident   A-rg   L   1   0      Ir-192
09 Jan 1992   Riazan’, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   2      Ir-192
25 May 1992   Axay, Kazakhstan   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
16 Nov 1992 – 21 Nov 1992   Indiana (city), Pennsylvania, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   0   m   Ir-192
19 Nov 1992   Jilin, Xinzhou, PRC   lost industrial source   A-os   800   3   5   x   Co-60
17 Nov 1992   Hanoi, Vietnam   irradiation accident   A-ir   L   0   1
Nov 1992   Wuhan, PR China   irradiator accident   A-ir   ?   0   4
1992   Switzerland   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1992   San Antonio, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131
14 Apr 1993   Moscow, Russia   homicide using radioactive source   I-a   ?   1   0   x   Cs-137?
12 Jul 1993   Vologda, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
07 Aug 1993   Dimitrovograd, Russia   accident at nuclear reactor site   A      0   1
09 Nov 1993   Tula region, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1993   United Kingdom   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1
28 Apr 1994   Tokyo, Japan   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   1
21 Oct 1994 – 18 Nov 1994   Tammiku, Estonia   exposure to stolen source   I-t   400   1   4   x   Cs-137
28 Nov 1994   Voronezh, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1994   Texas City, Texas, USA   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1
~ Feb 1995 – 07 Jul 1995   Zheleznodorozhny, Moscow region, Russia   criminal act using radioactive source   I-a   800   1   0   x   Cs-137
18 Mar 1995   Pervouralsk, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
23 May 1995   Smolensk, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
11 Sep 1995   Moscow, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Cs-137
03 Oct 1995   Nizhny Novgorod, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1995   France   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
1995   France   orphaned source   A-os   L   0   1   x   Cs-137
1995   Tyler, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131
01 Oct 1994 – 15 Feb 1996   Republic of China (Taiwan)   intentional poisoning using radioactive material   I-a   ?   0   1   x   P-32
05 Jan 1996   Jilin, Xinzhou, PRC   exposure to lost source   A-os   290   0   1      Ir-192
23 Feb 1996   Moscow, Russia   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
27 Feb 1996 – 05 Mar 1996   Houston, Texas, USA   exposure to stolen source   I-t   L   0   1   x   Co-60
08 Jun 1996   Nizhny Novgorod, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
Jun 1996 – 09 Oct 1997   Lilo Training Center, Tbilisi, Georgia   lost sources   A-os   590   0   11      Ra-226, ?
24 Jul 1996   Gilan, Iran   lost industrial radiography source   A-os   450   0   1      Ir-192
22 Aug 1996 – 27 Sep 1996   San Jose, Costa Rica   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   7   81   m   Co-60
17 Jun 1997   Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia   criticality accident with uranium assembly   AC   4,850   1   0      * U
29 Nov 1997   Grozny, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   3      Co-60
02 Dec 1997   Volgograd, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Ir-192
1997   Georgia   lost source   A-os   ?   1   ?   x   Co-60
18 Mar 1998   Moscow, Russia   accidental exposure to source   A-s   ?   0   1      Co-60
06 Oct 1998   Kansas City, Missouri, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0 (+2 F)   0   m   I-131
31 Dec 1998   Aransas Pass, Texas, USA   radiography accident   A-rg   L   0   1      Ir-192
10 Dec 1998 – 08 Jan 1999   Istanbul, Turkey   lost radiograpy sources   A-os   310   0   10   x   Co-60   636 Ci
20 Feb 1999   Yanango, Peru   lost source   A-os   150   0   1      Ir-192
26 Apr 1999 – 28 Apr 1999   Henan, PRC   lost source   A-os   610   0   3   x   Co-60
04 Aug 1999   Houston, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131
13 Sep 1999   Grozny, Russia   attempted theft of sources   I-t   high   3   3   c   Co-60
30 Sep 1999 – 01 Oct 1999   Toki-mura, Ibarakin, Japan   criticality accident with uranium solution   AC   1,800   2   1      * U
1999   Kingisepp, Russia   exposure to stolen source   I-t   ?   3   0   c
24 Jan 2000 – 20 Feb 2000   Samut Prakarn, Thailand   lost radiography source   A-os   200   3   7   x   Co-60
05 Jun 2000 – 03 Jul 2000   Meet Halfa, Qaluobiya, Egypt   lost radiography source   A-os   750   2   5   x   Ir-192
16 Aug 2000   Samara, Russia   lost radiography source   A-os   275   0   3      Ir-192
13 Oct 2000   Dubna, Russia   accelerator accident   A-a   ?   0   1
Aug 2000 – 24 Mar 2001   Panama City, Panama   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   17   11   m
06 Feb 2001   Nizhny Novgorod, Russia   x-ray accident   A-x   L   0   4
27 Feb 2001   Bialystok, Poland   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   5   m
24 Jun 2001   Stavropolskij Kraj, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
01 Aug 2001   Salavat, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   2      Ir-192
summer 2001   Kandalaksha, Russia   exposure to stolen source   I-t   ?   0   4   c
early Dec 2001 – Feb 2002   Liya, Georgia   exposure to stolen source   I-t   ?   0   3   c   Sr-90
May 2002   Guangzhou, PRC   intentional exposure using radioactive sources   I-a   ?   0   75   x   Ir-192
01 Sep 2002   Nizhny Novgorod, Russia   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   1      Ir-192
09 Jun 2003 – 11 Jun 2003   Houston, Texas, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m
08 Aug 2003   Anderson, Indiana, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131
2003 – 13 Nov 2003   Kola Harbor, Russia   exposure to stolen sources   I-t   ?   ?   1+?   c   Sr-90
26 Jan 2004 – 22 Mar 2004   South Bend, Indiana, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   3   m   Cs-137
~03 Sep 2004 – 24 Sep 2004   St. Petersburg, Russia   intentional poisoning using radioactive substance   I-a   ?   1   0   x
02 Nov 2004 – 16 Nov 2004   Columbus, Ohio, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131, I-123
Nov 2004   Lyon, France   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   0   m
May 2004 – May 2005   Epinal, France   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   13   m
14 Dec 2005 – 15 Dec 2005   Ranquil, Chile   lost radiography source   A-os   ?   0   4      Ir-192
05 Jan 2006 – 01 Feb 2006   Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   1   0   m
11 Mar 2006   Fleurus, Belgium   irradiator accident   A-ir   460   0   1      Co-60
26 May 2006   Florence, South Carolina, USA   radiotherapy accident   A-mr   L   0   1   m   I-131, Tc-99m
~ Aug 2006   Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast   radiography accident   A-rg   ?   0   4      Ir-192
01 Nov 2006   London, United Kingdom   intentional poisoning using radioactive substance   I-a   ?   1   2   x   Po-210
Aug 2007   Clinton, Michigan, USA   theft of sources   I-t   L?   0   1?   c

© 2004-2008, 2009 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 29 January 2009.
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Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Clinton radioactive source theft, 2007
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 17 October 2007

Date: 1 August 2007

Location: Clinton, Michigan, United States

Type of event: exposure related to theft of radioactive sources

Description:

References:

2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 17 October 2007.
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Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

London radiological homicide, 2006
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 7 July 2008

Date: ~1 November 2006

Location: London, United Kingdom

Type of event: assasination by poisoning using ingested radioactive substance

Description:

Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB agent and recent critic of Russia’s Putin administration, fell ill in London and eventually died of poisoning. Litvinenko had been granted asylum in the United Kingdom in 2000 following persecution in Russia. Recently he had been investigating the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist critical of the Putin administration. On 1 November he met with two Russians, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun, at Pine Bar in London’s Millennium Hotel, then met with Italian Mario Scaramella at a London sushi bar. A few hours later he fell ill and was admitted to a London hospital. Doctors came to suspect poisoning, with poisoning by a radioactive substance suggested on 21 November. Litvinenko died on 23 November, and on 24 November his death was linked to a major dose of radioactive polonium-210. Polonium-210 is an alpha emitter with a half-life of 138 days and is a fairly volatile metal; the ingested maximum permissible body burden is 0.03 microcuries, or about 7 nanograms. Reportedly Litvinenko’s symptoms and time from exposure to death are consistent with the ingestion of about 5 microcuries of polonium-210 (about 1 microgram, equivalent to a sphere 0.6 millimeters in diameter).

Litvinenko’s wife was found to be contaminated with polonium-210 but did not suffer injury. On 24 November unusually high levels of polonium-210 were found at the sushi restaurant visited by Litvinenko as well as Litvinenko’s home and a portion of the hospital where Litvinenko was treated; these sites were closed off for decontamination. Trace levels of polonium-210 contamination were reported on 27 November at two other central London locations, on 29 November on two British Airways 767s that served the London-Moscow route, and on 30 November at a total of 12 London locations, including a soccer stadium visited by Lugovi and Kovtun on 1 November. Checks at additional locations proved negative, including some of 30 locations identified as actually or potentially contaminated as of 20 December. As of 5 December 3,233 people had called the British health service regarding possible exposures. Of these, 244 were identified for followup and 28 had been referred for assessment of possible radiation exposure. (These figures were up from 1,325 callers, 68 identified for checking, and 21 referred, through 29 November). In addition, 238 workers at the two hospitals where Litvinenko was treated were investigated for possible exposure and 71 were referred for testing. No additional positive exposures were identified through 6 December; this includes negative results on workers at the hospitals where Litvinenko was treated, all staff at the sushi bar, and 3 individuals referred after reporting possible radiation exposure. However, on 7 December it was announced that 7 bar staff of the Millenium Hotel’s Pine Bar were found contaminated with polonium-210. Following an interview of Lugovoi by British investigators at the British embassy in Moscow on 4 December, trace amounts of radioactive contamination were found there. Radioactive material has been ruled out in the poisoning of former Russian prime minister Yegor Gaidar in Dublin, Ireland, on 24 November.

On 6 December UK authorities officially announced Litvinenko’s death was being investigated as a homicide. On 7 December Russian authorities announced they were opening a criminal case, additionally stating that Kovtun had fallen ill. Disputed reports state that Kovtun is in critical condition and in a coma. On 8 December Lugovoi was reported ill as well. The use of polonium-210 in a poisoning would require access to the product from a nuclear research-type reactor and/or sophistication laboratory separation techniques. The Russian government has denied any involvement in the poisoning. On 28 May 2007 UK authorities formally requested extradition of Lugovoi from Russia under charges for Litvinenko’s murder. Russia formally refused the request on 5 July, asserting that the Russian constitution did not permit extradition of citizens. The United Kingdom and Russia expelled four of each other’s diplomats in the rift that followed. In July 2008 it was reported that British officials had concluded there were strong indications that the murder was backed by the Russian government.

In 2007 UK authorities reported results of tests on a total of 735 people for Po-210 contamination: 596 were not contaminated; 120 showed probable contact with Po-210 but with levels indicating no health risk; and 17 people (one relative of Litvinenko, probably his wife, and 16 motel staff) with Po-210 levels not significant enough to cause any illness in the short term and any increased risk in the long term is likely to be very small.

Consequences: 1 death, 2 injuries.

References:

* AP, 7 Dec. 2006, Criminal case opened in ex-spy’s death, Yahoo News, on line [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061207/ap_on_re_eu/poisoned_spy].
* BBC, 7 Dec. 2006, Funeral service for murdered spy, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6216202.stm].
* BBC, 24 Nov. 2006, ‘No radiation risk’ public told, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6181190.stm].
* BBC, 6 Dec. 2006, Radiation find in British embassy, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6215168.stm].
* BBC, 24 Nov. 2006, Radiation tests after spy death, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6180682.stm].
* BBC, 19 July 2007, Russia expels four embassy staff, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6906481.stm].
* BBC, 7 Dec. 2006, Russian ex-PM blames ‘poisoners’, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6216842.stm].
* BBC, 24 Nov. 2006, Spy’s death-bed Putin accusation, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6180068.stm].
* BBC, 8 Dec. 2006, Tests for spy murder bar visitors, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6220026.stm].
* BBC, 8 Dec. 2006, Timeline: Former Russian spy case, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6179074.stm].
* BBC, 27 July 2007, Timeline: Litvinenko death case, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6179074.stm].
* BBC, 7 July 2008, Russia ‘backed Litvinenko murder’, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7494142.stm].
* Harrison, John, Rich Leggett, David Lloyd, Alan Phipps, and Bobby Scott, 2007, Polonium-210 as a poison, Journal of Radiological Protectin, 27:17-40.
* Health Protection Agency, 19 Sept. 2007, Public health response to the polonium-210 incident, Health Protection Agency, on line [http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2007/070919_polonium.htm].
* Health Protection Agency, 29 Nov. 2006, Updated on public health issues related to Polonium-210 investigation, Health Protection Agency, on line [http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2006/291106_pol210.htm].
* Health Protection Agency, 3 Dec. 2006, Updated on public health issues related to Polonium-210 investigation, Health Protection Agency, on line [http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2006/031206_pol210.htm].
* Health Protection Agency, 6 Dec. 2006, Updated on public health issues related to Polonium-210 investigation, Health Protection Agency, on line [http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2006/061206_pol210.htm].
* Health Protection Agency, 15 March 2007, Updated on public health issues related to Polonium-210 investigation, Health Protection Agency, on line [http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2007/070315_polonium-210.htm].
* Ionactive, 2007, Polonium-210 poisoning, Ionactive Consulting, on line [http://www.ionactive.co.uk/news_article.html?n=42].
* London Resilience Partnership, 20 Dec. 2006, Agencies announce progress on the Litvinenko remediation process, London Resilience, on line [http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk//statements/statement-20061220.jsp].
* Los Alamos National Laboratories Chemistry Division, 12 Dec. 2003, Polonium, LANL, on line [http://periodic.lanl.gov/elements/84.html].
* Reuters, 7 Dec. 2006, Litvinenko contact Kovtun critically ill: Ifax, Yahoo News, on line [http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20061207/ts_nm/britain_poisoning_kovtun_dc].
* Ricon, Paul, 28 Nov. 2006, Sophistication behind spy’s poisoning, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6190144.stm].

2006-2007, 2008 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 7 July 2008.
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Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Florence radiotherapy accident, 2006
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 1 November 2007

Date: 26 May 2006

Location: McLeod Regional Medical Center, Florence, South Carolina, United States

Type of event: accidental radiotherapy exposure to fetus

Description:

A pregnant woman was administered a thyroid ablation treatment involving 15 mCi of metastable technetium-99 (Tc-99m) and 14 uCi of iodine-131. The woman signed a statement that she was not pregnant and persuaded the administering technician that she was not pregnant; the technician failed to perform a pregnancy test as required by procedure. The woman was 17 weeks’ pregnant at the time, however. Her obstetrician reported the issue to the nuclear medicine licensee on 3 October 2006, who estimated the dose to the fetus as 5.17 rad whole body and 13,920 rad to the thyroid. The child was born November 2006 with underactive thyroid gland but no other apparent health problems. The child is receiving thyroid supplement.

Consequences: 1 injury

References:

* Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007, Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences, Fiscal Year 2006, NUREG-0090 Vol. 29, NRC, on line [http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2007/secy2007-0037/2007-0037scy-attachment1.pdf].

2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 1 November 2007.
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Dakar radiography accident, 2006
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 24 September 2007
Date: ~August 2006

Location: Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast

Type of event: accidental exposure to radiography source

Description:

Following use of an iridium-192 source in radiography equipment in Dakar, Senegal, the source failed to retract into the shielded storage container. Users were not aware that the source was not secure, and the equipment was stored under a staircase for several weeks and later moved to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, for use there. Operators discovered the source was not secure when preparing to use it again. Between the two locations, four employees suffered sufficient exposure to warrant transfer to Paris, France, for medical treatment: all with localized radiation injuries and one additionally reportedly in particularly serious condition. Other employees at both sites are being tested for exposure.

Consequences: 4 injuries.

References:

* Bureau Veritas, 1 Sept. 2006, Accidental exposure to ionising radiation in Senegal and the Ivory Coast: four people receive treatment in France, Bureau Veritas, on line [http://www.bureauveritas.com/webapp/servlet/RequestHandler?mode=displayArchiveDetail&contentID=63992&nextpage=ViewArticle.jsp].
* IRSN, 31 Aug. 2006, Accident de gammagraphie en Afrique: l’IRSN apporte son assistance et mobilise ses experts dans le domaine de l’irradiation accidentelle, IRSN, on line [http://www.irsn.fr/].
* IRSN, 15 Feb. 2007, Les accidents dus aux rayonnements ionisants: le bilan sur un demi-siecle, IRSN, on line [http://www.irsn.org/document/site_1/fckfiles/File/Internet/documents_doctrines_et_syntheses/les_accidents_dus_aux_rayonnements_ionisants.pdf].

© 2006, 2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 24 September 2007.
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Fleurus irradiator accident, 2006
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 24 September 2007

Date: 11 March 2006

Location: Fleurus, Belgium

Type of event: accident with industrial irradiator

Description:

A worker received an accidental radiation exposure at a facility for irradiation of medical devices. The facility uses a cobalt-60 source in an exposure cell but stowed in a pool when personnel are present, using a safety interlock system. On 11 March the employee noticed a radiation monitor alarm was activated with no irradiation in progress and the cell door open. He reset the alarm and entered the cell for 20 seconds to close the cell door. The worker was not carrying a Geiger counter as required by company procedures. He suffered nausea and vomiting soon afterward but made no connection to the irradiator. Several weeks later he suffered massive hair loss and went to a doctor, when it was determined he suffered an exposure of 420 rem; this estimate was subsequently revised to 440-480 rem. The individual was admitted to a French hospital for treatment of radiation sickness on 31 March. Primary cause of the accident has been suggested to be a failure of the hydraulic control system that raises and lowers the source from safe storage in its pool.

Consequences: 1 injury.
References:
* FANC, 12 April 2006, Information file: Sterigenics, FANC, on line [http://fanc.fgov.be/FANC/en/sterigenics_2006_04_11_dossier1.htm].
* Ionactive Consulting, 2006, Overexposure–irradiation facility, Ionactive Consulting, on line [http://www.ionactive.co.uk/news_article.html?n=37].
* Ionactive Consulting, Jan. 2007, Overexposure–irradiation facility, Ionactive Consulting Newsletter, 1:16, on line at Ionactive Consulting, on line [http://www.radprocalculator.com/Files/Ionactive_Radiation_Protection_newsletter_January_2007.pdf].
* NucNet, 2006, Belgium overexposure incident provisionally rated INES level 4, NucNet, on line [http://www.csvts.cz/cns/news06/060407n.htm].
* VRT FlandersNews, 6 April 2006, Man critical after accident, VRT FlandersNews, on line [http://www.vrtnieuws.be/nieuwsnet_master/versie2/english/details/060406_nuclear/index.shtml].

2006, 2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 24 September 2007.
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St. Petersburg radiological homicide, 2004
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 24 September 2007

Date: ~3-24 September 2004

Location: St. Petersburg, Russia

Type of event: homicide possibly using radioactive material

Description:

Roman Tsepov died 24 September 2004 of poisoning with unknown material. He fell ill shortly after a business trip to Moscow, and in less than three weeks later died. A post mortem analysis reportedly suggested that radioactive material was used in the murder, with contamination of an unspecified radioactive element found at one million times background levels. Other reports suggest the poison was a medicine used to treat leukemia. Tsepov’s symptoms prior to death have been described as severe radiation sickness. Tsepov was general director of the Baltik-Escort private security company, whose clients had included Vladimir Putin when Putin was deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. Both Tsepov and Alexander Litvinenko had connections to a scandal involving the Russian oil company Yukos.

Consequences: 1 fatality.
References:

* Calvert, Jonathan, and Pazit Ravina, 31 Dec. 2006, Litvinenko murder may be linked to mystery Russian poisonings, TimesOnLine, on line [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/newspapers/sunday_times/britain/article1265372.ece].
* Krasov, Petr, 22 Nov. 2006, Famous poisonings, Kommersant, on line [http://www.kommersant.com/p723709/Alexander_Livinenko_assassination_poisoning/].
* O’Halloran, Julian, 6 Feb. 2007, Russia’s poisoning ‘without a poison’, BBC News, on line [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/6324241.stm].
* Yasmann, Victor, 20 Dec. 2006, Russia: The KGB’s post-Soviet ‘commercialization’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, on line [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2006/12/888236cc-139d-4212-a28d-88451fdaccab.html].
* Zaitseva, Lyudmila, Aug. 2007, Organized crime, terrorism and nuclear trafficking, Strategic Insights, 6(5), on line at Center for Contemporary Conflict [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.asp].

2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 24 September 2007.
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Kola Harbor orphaned sources, 2003
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 8 April 2005

Date: 2003-13 November 2003

Location: Kola Harbor, near Polyarny, Russia

Type of event: orphaned sources

Description:

On 12 November 2003, inspectors found the radiothermal generator at navigation lighthouse 414.1 in Olenya Bay, Kola Harbor, had been dismantled. Most of the shielding had been stolen, including the depleted uranium radiation shield. One radioisotope heat source was found nearby in the water 2-3 meters deep. The following day inspectors found a similar situation at lighthouse 437 on Yuzhny Goryachinsky Island, Kola Harbor. Again, the shielding had been stolen, including the depleted uranium shielding, and one source was recovered near the island’s north shore. Both RTGs were BETA-M RTGs, each containing 35,000-curie strontium-90 sources (5 kg each). Without the shielding, the dose rate is 800-1000 roentgens/hour at a distance of 2-5 cm from the sources; the sources generate 230 W of heat. Both cases appear to have involved individuals seeking to steal metal to sell as scrap. It is probable that the perpetrators incurred radiation injury or even a fatal dose; no success was reported in attempts to track down the perpetrators.

Consequences: At least 1 injury presumed.

References:

* Alimov, Rashid, 2 April 2005, Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, on line, Bellona [http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/37598.html].
* Kudrik, Igor, Rashid Alimov, and Charles Digges, 17 Nov. 2003, Two strontium powered lighthouses vandalised on the Kola Peninsula, on line, Bellona [http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/31767.html].

2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 8 April 2005.
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Liya orphaned sources, 2001-2002
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 23 November 2005

Date: early December 2001-February 2002

Location: Liya, Tsalenjikha district, Republic of Georgia

Type of event: orphaned radiothermal generators

Description:

Three men found two radiothermal generators in the woods 27 km from Liya, western Georgia. They removed the shielding, apparently to recover the material as scrap metal. In early December 2001 they removed both strontium-90 sources, each one 35,000 curies, and took them back to their campsite where they used them as heat sources. All three became sick from radiation exposure within hours. After they sought medical treatment, Georgian authorities contacted the IAEA on 24 December for assistance in securing the sources. A team attempted to reach the sources in January 2002 but was unable to due to heavy snow and rugged terrain. A team successfully reached the sources on 4 February 2002 after which they were secured. Subsequently investigators concluded that the men had been using and selling lead from the RTG shields for a period of months; 20 kg of contaminated lead was recovered in a Liya house. One report claims the men were offered $10,000 to transport the sources to Turkey.

Consequences: 3 injuries.
References:

* IAEA, 2003, Safety related events and issues worldwide during 2002: A report supporting the nuclear safety review for the year 2002, on line, IAEA [http://www.iaea.org/ns/CoordiNet/documents/nsr2002_events.pdf].
* Kudrik, Igor, Rashid Alimov, and Charles Digges, 17 Nov. 2003, Two strontium powered lighthouses vandalised on the Kola Peninsula, on line, Bellona [http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/31767.html].
* Parrish, Scott, ed., 1 May 2002, Radiothermal generators containing strontium-90 discovered in Liya, Georgia, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, on line at Nuclear Threat Institute [http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2002/20020030.htm].
* Standring, W. J. F., O. G. Selanaes, M. Sneve, I. E. Finne, A. Hosseini, I. Amundsen, and P. Strand, 2005, Assessment of environmental, health and safety consequences of decommissioning radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) in Northwest Russia, StralevernRapport 2005:4, on line at Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority [http://www.nrpa.no/dokumentarkiv/StralevernRapport4_05.pdf].

2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 23 November 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

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***

Guangzhou radiological assault, 2002
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 18 September 2007

Date: May 2002

Location: Guangzhou, P.R. China

Type of event: use of radioactive material in intentional assault on an individual

Description:

A Chinese nuclear scientist, Gu Jiming, used radioactive iridium-192 pellets in an attack on a business rival. Gu used forged papers to obtain an industrial machine containing the iridium-192, then placed them above the ceiling panels in the hospital office of the rival. The victim soon reported symptoms including memory loss, fatigue, appetite loss, headaches, vomiting, and bleeding gums. Another 74 staff members of the hospital, including one pregnant woman, also had symptoms. Gu was convicted 29 September 2003, given a suspended death sentence (life in prison), and an assistant was sentenced to a 15-year prison term.

Consequences: 75 injuries.

References:

* Mohtadi, Hamid, and Antu Murshid, 7 July 2006, A global chronology of incidents of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear attacks: 1950-2005, on line, National Center for Food Protection and Defense [http://www.ncfpd.umn.edu/docs/GlobalChron.pdf].
* Nature, 9 Oct. 2003, Researcher faces life in prison for revenge radiation poisoning, Nature, 425:552.

2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 18 September 2007.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/2002PRC1.html

***
Kandalaksha orphaned source, 2001
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 28 February 2008

Date: May-June 2001

Location: Kandalaksha Nature Preserve, Murmansk region, Russia

Type of event: orphaned source

Description:
In May four individuals partially dismantled a radiothermal generator shielding at a lighthouse near Kandalaksha, seeking to steal metal to sell as scrap; they removed three radioisotope power sources. All four were hospitalized with radiation injuries. The sources were recovered in June 2001. The recovery operation was supported by the government of Finnmark, a province of Norway.

Consequences: 4 injuries.

References:

* Alimov, Rashid, April 2005, Radioisotope thermoelectric generators, Bellona, on line [http://www.bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/37598].
* Standring, W. J. F., M. Dowdall, M. Sneve, O. G. Selnaes, and I. Amundsen, 2007, Environmental, health and safety assessment of decommisioning radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in northwest Russia, Journal of Radiological Protection, 27:321-331.
* Standring, W. J. F., O. G. Selanaes, M. Sneve, I. E. Finne, A. Hosseini, I. Amundsen, and P. Strand, 2005, Assessment of environmental, health and safety consequences of decommissioning radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) in Northwest Russia, StralevernRapport 2005:4, on line at Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority [http://www.nrpa.no/dokumentarkiv/StralevernRapport4_05.pdf].

2005-2007, 2008 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 28 February 2008.
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***

doe1x.jpg

Johnston’s Archive

Nuclear Weapons

North Korea’s first nuclear test

on weapons effects:

* The Effects of a Nuclear Attack on the Rio Grande Valley

* The Effects of a Global Thermonuclear War, 4th ed.

* Nuclear weapons effects–an overview
* Nuclear weapons effects: Some data

* High-altitude nuclear explosions

* Graphs of weapons effects

* Your annual radiation dose

on weapons design:

* Simplified schematic of a nuclear fission implosion weapon (typical atomic bomb, diagram)
* Simplified schematic of a multistage thermonuclear weapon (typical hydrogen bomb, diagram)

* Nuclear weapon yields vs. weight (graph)

on programs, weapons, and deployments:

* Strategic and theater nuclear forces:
o Part 1: Introduction and sources
o Part 2: United States
o Part 3: Russia
o Part 4: United Kingdom, France, and P.R. China
o Part 5: Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran
o Part 6: Summary data

* U.S. and Soviet/Russian strategic warheads, 1984-1994 (graph)

Nuclear stockpiles, cumulative estimates and graphs
o including Cumulative estimates, introduction

* Listings of nuclear warhead types:
o Introduction
o United States
o Soviet Union/Russia
o United Kingdom
o France
o People’s Republic of China
o Other countries

* Multimegaton weapons: the largest nuclear weapons

* Nuclear weapons and fissile material in Israel

* Iran: WMD-related facilities

* Listings of strategic missile submarines:
o United States
o Soviet Union/Russia
o United Kingdom
o France
o People’s Republic of China
o Israel

* Missile designations:
o Missile designations, introduction
o Soviet/Russian missile designations
o PR Chinese missile designations

* Listing of Soviet/Russian naval vessels:
o Introduction
o Listing of Soviet/Russian naval vessels
on strategic defense:

* Ballistic Missile Defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative
* U.S. should have missile defense system
o see also at The Brownsville Herald.

* President George W. Bush’s Speech on National Missile Defense, 1 May 2001.

on nuclear testing:

Nuclear tests–databases and other material

general material:

* Nuclear weapon milestones
o Part 1
o Part 1-B
o Part 2

other material:

*
Database of Radiological Incidents and Related Events
o including List of radiation accidents and other events causing radiation casualties
o Statistical summary of radiation accidents and other events causing radiation casualties
o List of criticality accidents
o and pages on individual incidents

* Nuclear terrorism:
o Nuclear terrorism incidents
o Osama bin Laden and nuclear weapons
o Dirty bombs and other radiological weapons

* Nuclear Weapons in Film

NUCLEAR WEAPONS–INFORMATION LINKS

* United States government sources:
o U.S. Department of Defense.
o DOE Nevada Operations Office.

* foreign government sources:
o CEA (French atomic energy agency) (English).

* organizations and sources in the United States:
o Arms Control Association.
o Brookings Institution.
o Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
o Center for Defense Information.
o Center for Nonproliferation Studies–at the Monterrey Institute for International Studies.
o Center for Strategic and International Studies.
o Federation of American Scientists.
o GlobalSecurity.org.
o Heritage Foundation.
o High Energy Weapons Archive–in depth information, including some of the most detailed information on the Internet regarding nuclear weapon physics.
o High Frontier.
o Institute for Science and International Security.
o National Institute for Public Policy.
o Nautilus.
o Natural Resources Defense Council.
o Submarine World Network.
o Trinity Atomic Web Site.

* organizations outside the United States:
o Bellona Foundation–foundation in Norway.
o Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies–at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.
o Centre for Defense and International Security Studies (CDISS)–in the United Kingdom.
o Jane’s Information Group–publisher in the United Kingdom.
o British American Security Information Council (BASIC).

Some recommended nuclear weapon documents

Banner image: Plumbbob Stokes, a 19 kt airburst test of the XW-30 conducted 7 August 1957 (credit: U.S. Department of Energy photograph).

Comments? Questions? Corrections? Contact me.

Copyright © 2001-2006, 2008 by Wm. Robert Johnston. All rights reserved.
Last modified 13 May 2008.
Return to Home. Go to What’s New. Go to FAQ on use of material from this site.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/index.html

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html
Nuclear terrorism incidents

SL-1 reactor excursion, 1961
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 17 October 2007

Date: 3 January 1961

Location: SL-1 reactor, National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, USA

Type of event: criticality excursion in research reactor

Description:

The SL-1 reactor was a prototype of a reactor intended for easy assembly at remote facilities such as DEW line stations in the Arctic. It used 15 kg of uranium fuel (enriched to 91% U-235), was water moderated, and had a thermal power capacity of 3 MWt. Five aluminum-clad cadmium control rods provided reactor control. The SL-1 had operated 2 years, with an 11-day shutdown for maintenance being completed at the time of the incident.

Three workers were reassembling the control rod drives on 3 January in preparation for startup the following day. At about 9:01 PM the three workers were on top of the reactor when one manually removed the center control rod as rapidly as possible, over a 0.5-second period. The reactor became supercritical, with a total energy release of 1.3 x 108 joules (comparable to 30 kg of TNT), producing a steam explosion. The worker who extracted the rod was killed instantly, impaled on the building’s ceiling by a control rod. The other two men were burned and thrown by the steam explosion, one dying instantly from impact with a shielding block and the other sustaining head injuries of which he died 2 hours later (maximum dose sustained was possibly 350 rad). The release of radioactive material was largely contained to the building.

Emergency responders were alerted by an automated alarm and arrived at the site at 9:10 PM. High radiation readings were measured in the reactor building, delaying entry. At 10:50 PM several responders and contractor personnel removed one man alive, who died shortly afterwards. One body was removed from the reactor building on 4 January and the other on 9 January. Of personnel/responders involved, 22 received doses of 3-27 rads from entering the building and/or handling the casualties.

The reason that the control rod was withdrawn is unknown, since none of the workers survived and the facility did not have appropriate data recording systems. The control rods in SL-1 had some tendency to stick, sometimes causing difficulty during manual extraction. One hypothesis is that the worker accidentally withdrew the control rod too far in an effort to overcome a stuck condition. The amount of withdrawal involved was about 50 cm, possibly difficult to achieve accidentally, and the particular control rod involved had not been sticking for the past six months. Another hypothesis is that the rod was intentionally withdrawn in an act of murder-suicide; this was the conclusion of the investigation of the incident.

Consequences: 3 fatalities, all from mechanical/thermal effects of the explosion.

References:

* Combustion Engineering, 15 May 1961, SL-1 Reactor Accident on January 3, 1961: Interim Report, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, on line at Idaho Operations Office [http://www.id.doe.gov/foia/IDO-19300a.pdf].
* Flight Propulsion Laboratory Department, General Electric Company, 21 Nov. 1962, Additional Analysis of the SL-1 Excursion: Final Report of Progress July through October 1962, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, on line at Idaho Operations Office [http://www.id.doe.gov/foia/IDO-19313.pdf].
* Horan, J. R., 1968, Major health physics experiences during 15 years of reactor testing, in Radiation Protection, Part 1, ed. by W. S. Snyder, H. H. Abee, L. K. Burton, R. Maushart, A. Benco, F. Duhamel, and B. M. Wheatley, Pergamon Press (New York, NY), pp. 541-546.
* McKeown, William, 2003, Idaho Falls: The Untold Story of America’s First Nuclear Accident, ECW Press.
* McLaughlin, Thomas P., Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, and Victor I. Sviridov, May 2000, A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), on line at CSRIC [http://www.csirc.net/docs/reports/la-13638.pdf].
* RNSI, June 2002, The International Accident Dosimetry Comparison Programme 10-21 June 2002 , on line at IRSN [http://www.irsn.fr/va/04_act/04_act_2/04_act_21dossiers_irsn/pdf/va_dp_intercomp.pdf].
* SL-1 Report Task Force, Jan. 1962, IDO Report on the Nuclear Incident at the SL-1 Reactor on January 3, 1961 at the National Reactor Testing Station, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, on line at Idaho Operations Office [http://www.id.doe.gov/foia/IDO-19302.pdf].
* Stacy, Susan M., 2000, Proving the Principle: A History of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, 1949-1999, U.S. DOE, on line at Idaho National Laboratory [http://www.inl.gov/proving-the-principle/].

2004-2006, 2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 17 October 2007.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

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***

Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Wood River criticality accident, 1964
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 14 September 2005

Date: 24 July 1964

Location: Wood River, Rhode Island, USA

Type of event: criticality accident with uranium solution
Description:

The accident occurred at a facility which reprocessed for recovery highly enriched uranium in scrap material from fuel element production. A tank containing uranium (93% U-235) in sodium carbonate solution was being agitated by a stirrer. A worker, intending to add a bottle of trichloroethane to remove organics, erroneously added a bottle of uranium solution to the tank, producing a criticality excursion accompanied by a flash of light and the splashing of about 20% of the tank’s contents (about 10 liters out of 40-50 liters, including the bottle contents) out of the tank. The worker fled to the site’s emergency building. Two plant administrators returned to the building; one turned off the agitator, producing a lesser criticality excursion that was not recognized until their dosimeters were examined. The administrators incurred doses of 100 rads and 60 rads. The worker absorbed about 10,000 rads and died 49 hours after the accident.

Consequences: 1 fatality (10,000 rem), 1 injury.

References:

2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 14 September 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/1964USA1.html

***

List of Criticality Accidents
last updated 20 September 2007

date   location   type of accident   deaths   injuries   highest dose (rem)   activity release   fissions (x1015)
11 Feb 1945   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium in styrex   0   0   0       6
6 Jun 1945   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium in water   0   0   66       40
21 Aug 1945   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   plutonium assembly   1   1   510       10
21 May 1946   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   plutonium assembly   1   4   2100       3
? Dec 1949   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   2.5       35
~1950?   Chalk River, Ontario, Canada   uranium in water   0   0   >5?       ?
1 Feb 1951   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium in water   0   0   ~0       100
16 Nov 1951   Hanford Works, Washington, USA   plutonium in solution   0   0   low       80
18 Apr 1952   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       15
2 Jun 1952   Argonne, Illinois, USA   uranium in water   0   2   140       122
12 Dec 1952   Chalk River, Ontario, Canada   uranium in water   0   0   low       120000
9 Apr 1953   Sarov, Russia, USSR   plutonium assembly   0   0   1.6       11
15 Mar 1953   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   plutonium in solution   1   1   1000       200
3 Feb 1954   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       56
26 May 1954   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   0.9       100
22 Jul 1954   Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   uranium in water   0   0   ~0       4680
29 Nov 1955   Argonne, Illinois, USA   uranium   0   0   ~0       470
1 Feb 1956   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   0.6       160
3 Jul 1956   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium   0   0   0       32
12 Feb 1957   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       120
21 Apr 1957   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   uranium in solution   1   5   3000       100
2 Jan 1958   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   uranium in solution   3   1   6000       230
16 Jun 1958   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   uranium in solution   0   5   460       1300
15 Oct 1958   Vinca, Yugoslavia   uranium in water   1   5   430       2600
18 Nov 1958   Reactor Testing Area, Idaho, USA   uranium   0   0   ~0       25000
30 Dec 1958   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   plutonium in solution   1   0   12000       150
16 Oct 1959   Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   50   some   40000
15 Mar 1960   Saclay, France   uranium in water   0   0   ~0       3000
17 Jun 1960   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       60
5 Dec 1960   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   plutonium in solution   0   0   2       250
3 Jan 1961   Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   uranium in water   3   0   fatal*       4400
25 Jan 1961   Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   <0.06       600
14 Jul 1961   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   uranium   0   1   200       12
10 Nov 1961   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       10
7 Apr 1962   Hanford, Washington, USA   plutonium in solution   0   3   110       800
7 Sep 1962   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   plutonium in solution   0   0   low       200
5 Nov 1962   Idaho RTA, Idaho, USA   uranium in water   0   0   ~0       1000
11 Dec 1962   Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA   uranium   0   0   ~0       30
30 Jan 1963   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   uranium in solution   0   0   17       790
11 Mar 1963   Sarov, Russia, USSR   plutonium assembly   0   2   550       5
26 Mar 1963   Livermore, California, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   0.12       376
2 Dec 1963   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   uranium in solution   0   0   <5       60
24 Jul 1964   Wood River, Rhode Island, USA   uranium in solution   1   1   10000       130
28 May 1965   White Sands, New Mexico, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0       150
30 Dec 1965   Mol, Belgium   uranium in water   0   1   500       430
3 Nov 1965   Electrostal Plant, Russia, USSR   uranium oxide slurry   0   0   3       8
16 Dec 1965   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   uranium in solution   0   0   0.27       550
30 Jan 1968   Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   low       11
5 Apr 1968   Chelyabinsk-70, Russia, USSR   uranium assembly   2   0   3000       60
6 Sep 1968   Aberdeen, Maryland, USA   uranium assembly   0   0   ~0   0   609
10 Dec 1968   Mayak Enterprise, Russia, USSR   plutonium in solution   1   1   2450       130
24 Aug 1970   Windscale Works, England, United Kingdom   plutonium in solution   0   0   2       1
15 Feb 1971   Kurtchatov, Russia, USSR   uranium   0   2   ?       20000
26 May 1971   Kurtchatov, Russia, USSR   uranium in water   2   2   6000       2000
17 Oct 1978   Idaho CPP, Idaho, USA   uranium in solution   0   0   low       2700
13 Dec 1978   Siberian Chemical Combine, Russia, USSR   plutonium assembly   0   1   250       3
23 Sep 1983   Constituyentes, Argentina   uranium in water   1   0   3700       400
10 Aug 1985   Chazhma Bay, Vladivostock, Russia, USSR   uranium reactor   10   49   220   ~7 MCi   5000
15-16 May 1997   Novosibirsk Plant, Russia   uranium in solution   0   0   <0.4       5.5
17 Jun 1997   Arzamas-16, Russia   uranium assembly   1   0   4800       10000
30 Sep 1999   Toki-mura, Japan   uranium in solution   2   1   1800       2500

2002, 2007 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 20 September 2007.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radcrit.html

***

Kurtchatov SF-3 criticality accident, 1971
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 14 September 2005

Date: 26 May 1971

Location: Kurtchatov, Russia, USSR

Type of event: criticality accident with uranium in water

Description:

Experiments were being conducted to determine the number of uranium fuel rods (90% U-235) required to produce a critical configuration. Rods were placed in various geometries within a Plexiglas tank which was filled with water, with additional rods added a few at a time. Insufficient calculations had been performed regarding such an apparatus. At the completion of one experiment, the water was being rapidly drained, causing the rods to slump into a supercritical configuration. The excursion ejected water and fuel rod fragments from the tank. One technician received about 6,000 rem and died 5 days later; a supervisor received 2,000 rem and died 15 days later. Two others in the room received doses of 700-800 rem and suffered acute radiation sickness; they survived with long term health effects.
Consequences: 2 fatalities (6,000 and 2,000 rem), 2 injuries (700-800 rem).

References:

2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 14 September 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

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***
Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Toki-mura criticality accident, 1999
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 11 June 2006

Date: 30 September-1 October 1999

Location: JCO Fuel Fabrication Plant, Toki-mura, Ibarakin, Japan

Type of event: criticality accident at fuel fabrication plant

Description:

Three operators were engaged in processes combining uranium oxide with nitric acid to produce a uranium-containing solution for shipment. The uranium involved was 18.8% U-235. The procedure used deviated from that licensed to the facility. In particular the uranium solution was being placed in a precipitation tank for dispensing into shipment containers, not the more narrow vessel (geometrically favorable to minimizing criticality risks) prescribed by license. At about 10:35 AM, while two workers were adding a seventh batch of uranium solution to the tank, a criticality excursion occurred. The two workers, along with a third worker nearby, observed a blue flash and fled the location; simultaneously, gamma-radiation detectors went off in the building and two adjacent buildings, prompting all workers to evacuate to a muster area. Workers were relocated following higher than background radiation readings. The two workers who had been pouring both began vomiting during transport to the hospital. The excursion continued for 20 hours (the facility did not have a procedure for dealing with criticality events) until outside experts were brought in to drain the tank, shortly after midnight. At 3:18 PM an evacuation of residents within 350 meters of the site had been ordered due to 5 rad/hr readings at the facility boundary; at 10:30 PM an advisory was issued to residents within a radius of 10 km to stay indoors. Of the three workers involved in the accident, the one pouring the solution received 600-1,000 rem and died 210 days later; the one holding the funnel received 1,600-2,000 rem and died 82 days later; and the one at a nearby desk received 100-450 rem and was hospitalized for three months. Both workers who died had received transplants of blood stem cells. The highest doses to neighboring residents were between 5 and 25 rem in the case of about 20 residents.

Consequences: 2 fatalities (1,700 and 800 rem), 1 injury (300 rem).

References:

* Fujimoto, Kenzo, Dec. 1999, Nuclear accident in Tokai, Japan, Journal of Radiological Protection, 19:377-380.
* McLaughlin, Thomas P., Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, and Victor I. Sviridov, May 2000, A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), on line at CSRIC [http://www.csirc.net/docs/reports/la-13638.pdf].
* UNSCEAR, 2000, Annex E: Occupational radiation exposures, in Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly, with Scientific Annexes, Volume I: Sources, UNSCEAR, on line at UNSCEAR [http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/annexe.pdf].

2004, 2005, 2006 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 11 June 2006.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/1999JAP1.html

***

Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Arzamas-16 criticality accident, 1997
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 14 September 2005

Date: 17 June 1997

Location: Russian Federal Nuclear Center (Arzamas-16), Sarov, Russia
Type of event: criticality accident with uranium metal assembly

Description:

A criticality accident occurred at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, formerly Arzamas-16. An experimenter was attempting to replicate a successful 1972 experiment involving a sphere of highly enriched uranium (90%) surrounded by a spherical copper reflector. However, he had incorrectly recorded the outside reflector dimensions and as a result used a much larger reflector; further, he had failed to complete appropriate paperwork on the experiment and was working alone. He had assembled the uranium sphere within a hemisphere of the copper reflector in an experimental cell. While adding the first layer of the second copper hemisphere, it dropped onto the assembly and produced a supercritical assembly at 10:40 AM. A flash of light resulted, after which the experimenter left the cell. The uranium core reached a calculated peak temperature of 865E C before power output declined to a steady 480 W. The assembly remained in this state until 12:45 AM on 24 June 1997 when it was remotely disassembled. The experimenter received a dose of 4850 rem, from which he died the morning of 20 June, 66 hours after the accident.

Consequences: 1 fatality (4850 rem).

References:

* IAEA, 2001, The Criticality Accident at Sarov, IAEA (Vienna, Austria), on line at IAEA [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1106_scr.pdf].
* McLaughlin, Thomas P., Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, and Victor I. Sviridov, May 2000, A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), on line at CSRIC [http://www.csirc.net/docs/reports/la-13638.pdf].

2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 14 September 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/1997RUS1.html

***

Database of radiological incidents and related events–Johnston’s Archive

Constituyentes research reactor accident, 1983
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 14 September 2005

Date: 23 September 1983

Location: RA-2 Facility, Constituyentes, Argentina

Type of event: criticality accident in research reactor

Description:

An accident occurred during operation of the RA-2 research reactor. Two fuel elements had been placed outside the graphite reflector surrounding the reactor but had not been removed from the tank. A technician was changing the fuel configuration from the control room while moderating water was in the reactor, a procedural violation. A criticality excursion occurred, exposing the operator to a 3,700-rad dose (2000 rad gamma and 1700 rad neutron), with the upper right side of the body exposed the worst. The operator died 2 days later. Two others in the control room received doses of 35 rad each.

Consequences: 1 fatality.

References:

* McLaughlin, Thomas P., Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, and Victor I. Sviridov, May 2000, A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), on line at CSRIC [http://www.csirc.net/docs/reports/la-13638.pdf].
© 2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 14 September 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/1983ARG1.html

****

Vinca reactor accident, 1958
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 14 September 2005

Date: 15 October 1958

Location: Boris Kidrich Institute, Vinca, Yugoslavia

Type of event: criticality accident at research reactor

Description:

The accident involved a research reactor using 3,995 kg of aluminum-clad natural uranium fuel in a tank filled with heavy water for moderator. A subcritical foil counting experiment was being performed when an experimenter noticed the smell of ozone and realized a criticality excursion was occurring. The power buildup had gone undetected as the water level was raised due to saturation of both detecting chambers. The total energy release was about 80 million joules (about 2 kg of TNT equivalent). The six individuals in the room received doses of 433, 422, 415, 410, 320, and 205 rem. All developed severe radiation sickness and one died. The five survivors all received experimental bone marrow transplants, which were rejected in all patients, although before rejection the transplants probably contributed to survival.

Consequences: 1 fatality (433 rem?), 5 injuries (422, 415, 410, 320, 205 rem).
References:

* Cosset, Jean Marc, 2002, ESTRO Breur Gold Medal Award Lecture 2001: Irradiation accidents–lessons for oncology?, Radiotherapy and Oncology, 63:1-10.
* McLaughlin, Thomas P., Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, and Victor I. Sviridov, May 2000, A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), on line at CSRIC [http://www.csirc.net/docs/reports/la-13638.pdf].

2004, 2005 by Wm. Robert Johnston.
Last modified 14 September 2005.
Return to Home. Return to Nuclear Weapons Resources. Return to Database of radiological incidents and related events.
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/1958YUG1.html

***

Threat of nuclear terrorism

Posted: 06:30 PM ET

Campbell Brown Blog – Staff
Filed under: Domestic • terrorism

Video of “How Likely is a Nuke Attack?”

with NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly and nuclear expert, Michael Levi

http://campbellbrown.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/09/threat-of-nuclear-terrorism/

From among the comments on a Campbell Brown / CNN blog post about the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists or others intent on doing harm -


Peter Houston		April 9th, 2010 9:30 pm ET I believe that the talk about a dirty bomb attack on America is absolute nonsense. I hope that some war mongers are not scaring us again into supporting another senseless war. If these materials are as toxic and deadly as we are told, the terrorists would be dead before they even use it. The materials are so toxic and well protected that falling into the hands of terrorists is completely impossible. Please stop the silly talk of a dirty bomb attack on America. Talk about creating more jobs in America.

***
1993 shootings at CIA Headquarters
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

CIA.svg

An attack took place on January 25, 1993 near the entrance of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia where two CIA employees were killed and three others wounded. The perpetrator, Mir Aimal Kasi, shot CIA employees in their cars as they were waiting at a stoplight.

Kasi fled the country and was placed on the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list, sparking a four year international manhunt. He was captured by FBI agents in Pakistan in 1997 and rendered back to the United States to stand trial. He admitted that he shot the victims of the attack, and was subsequently found guilty of capital and first-degree murder, and was executed by lethal injection in 2002.

Contents

* 1 Background
* 2 Shootings
* 3 Investigation
* 4 Capture and rendition
* 5 Trial and execution
* 6 Possible vendetta
* 7 Execution
* 8 Victims
* 9 Memorials
o 9.1 Central Intelligence Agency memorial wall
o 9.2 Route 123 Memorial
o 9.3 Lansing Bennett Forest
* 10 References
* 11 See also
* 12 External links

Background
Mir Aimal Kasi, shortly after his capture in 1997
Kasi (Arabic: ??? ????? ??????) was a Pakistani national, born in Quetta, Balochistan[1] on February 10, 1964,[2] and belonging to the Pashtun tribe of Kasi[1]. He went to the US in 1991, taking a substantial sum of cash he had inherited on the death of his father in 1989[1]. He travelled on forged papers he had purchased in Karachi, altering his name to Kansi , and later bought a fake green card in Miami[3]. He stayed with a Kashmiri friend, Zahed Mir[4], in his Reston, Virginia apartment, and invested in a courier firm[1] for which he also worked as a driver[5]. This work would be decisive in his choice of target: I used to pass this area almost every day and knew these two left-turning lanes [were] mostly people who work for CIA. [3]

According to Kasi, his first thoughts of an attack came after the purchase of an AK-47 from a Chantilly gun store. The plan soon became more important than any other thing to [him]. [3]

Shootings

At around 8 a.m. on January 25, 1993, Kasi stopped his brown station wagon behind a number of vehicles waiting at a red traffic light on the eastbound side of Route 123, Fairfax County.[6] The vehicles were waiting to make a left turn into the main entrance of CIA headquarters. Kasi emerged from his vehicle with an AK-47 and proceeded to move among the lines of vehicles, firing into them. Within seconds, he had killed Lansing H. Bennett MD, 66, and Frank Darling, 28. Three others were left with gunshot wounds.[5] Darling was shot first and later received additional gunshot wounds to the head after Kasi shot the other victims.

During his later confession, Kasi said that he’d only stopped firing because there wasn’t anybody else left to shoot , and that he only shot male passengers because it would be against [his] religion to shoot females .[5]

He was also surprised at the lack of an armed response: I thought I will be arrested, or maybe killed in a shootout with CIA guards or police. [3]

Kasi climbed back into his vehicle and drove to a nearby park. After 90 minutes of waiting, it became clear that he was not being actively sought and so he drove back to his Reston apartment[5]. He hid the assault rifle in a green plastic bag under a sofa, went to a McDonald’s for something to eat, and booked himself into a Days Inn for the night. The CNN news reports he watched made it clear that police had misidentified his vehicle and did not have his license plate number.[4] The next morning, he took a flight to Quetta, Pakistan.[1] According to Kasi, he killed American CIA people because, I was real angry with the policy of the U.S. government in the Middle East, particularly toward the Palestinian people, Kasi said in a prison interview with CNN affiliate WTTG.[7]

Investigation

An investigative task force (named Langmur for Langley murders ) was drawn together from both the FBI and local Fairfax County police. They began sifting through recent AK-47 purchases in Maryland and Virginia—there had been at least 1,600 over the previous year alone. Mir Aimal Kasi’s name was on the sales slip from a gun store in Chantilly, where he had exchanged another gun for the AK-47[4] just three days before the shootings.[5]
This information provided the first solid lead in the investigation when Kasi’s roommate, Zahed Mir, reported him missing two days after the shootings.[5] He also told police how Kasi would get angry watching CNN reports of attacks on Muslims[4] — in particular, Kasi would later cite the US attacks on Iraq, Israeli killings of Palestinians, and CIA involvement in Muslim countries.[3][5] Although Mir didn’t think much of it at the time, Kasi had said he wanted to do something big , with possible targets of the White House, the Israeli Embassy and the CIA.[4]

A police search of Kasi’s apartment turned up the hidden AK-47 under the couch. Ballistics tests confirmed it was the weapon used in the shootings, and Kasi became the chief suspect of the investigation.[4]

Kasi was listed as one of the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives.[8] The search was focused on Pakistan, and agents spent the next four years following hundreds of leads, taking them as far afield as Thailand, but to no avail.[4] Kasi would later reveal he had spent this time being sheltered by fellow Pashtun tribesmen, in the border regions of Afghanistan, making only brief visits to Pakistan.[3][5]

Capture and rendition

In May 1997, an informant walked into the US consulate in Karachi and claimed he could help lead them to Kasi. As proof, he showed a copy of a driver license application made by Kasi under a false name but bearing his photograph. Apparently, the Pashtun tribals who had been sheltering Kasi were now prepared to accept the multi-million dollar reward offer for his capture.[9] Other sources claim they were pressured by the Pakistani government.[1]

Kasi was in the Afghan border regions, so the informant was told to lure Kasi into Pakistan where he could be more easily apprehended. Kasi was tempted with a lucrative business offer—smuggling Russian electronic goods into Pakistan—which brought him to Dera Ghazi Khan, in the Punjab province of Pakistan, where he checked into a room at Shalimar Hotel.[9]

At 4 a.m. on the morning of June 15, 1997, an armed team of FBI agents, working with the Pakistani ISI, raided Kasi’s hotel room. His fingerprints were taken on the scene, confirming his identity.

There is some dispute over where Kasi was taken next—US authorities claim it was a holding facility run by Pakistani authorities[5], while Pakistani sources claim it was the US embassy in Islamabad[9] — before being flown to the US on June 17 in a C-141 transport.[5][10]

During the flight, Kasi made a full oral and written confession to the FBI.[5]

Kasi’s extrajudicial rendition was controversial in Pakistan—no formal request for his extradition was made, and no extradition proceedings were initiated.[10] US authorities would later assert the rendition was legal under an extradition treaty signed with the UK, before Partition when India was under colonial rule.[5] Kasi argued against his rendition in court but his assertions were found to have no basis in law. The Court wrote:

…the treaty between the United States and Pakistan contains no provision that bars forcible abductions, nor does it otherwise ‘purport to specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of a national of the other country for the purposes of prosecution.’ Id. at 664 (emphasis added). Nor does the treaty provide that, once a request for extradition is made, the procedures outlined in the treaty become the sole means of transferring custody of a suspected criminal from one country to the other. Finally, because Kasi was not returned to the United States via extradition proceedings initiated under the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Pakistan, Kasi’s reliance upon United States v. Rauscher does not avail him.[11]

Trial and execution

On February 16, 1993, Kasi, then a fugitive, had been charged in absentia. The charges involved capital murder of Darling, murder of Bennett, and three counts of malicious wounding for the other victims, along with related firearms charges.

Kasi was tried by a Virginia state court jury over a period of ten days in November 1997, on a plea of not guilty to all charges. The jury found him guilty, and fixed punishment for the capital murder charge at death.[5] On February 4, 1998, Kasi was sentenced to death for the capital murder of Darling, who was shot at the beginning of the attack and again after the other victims had been shot. Among his other punishments were a life sentence for the first-degree murder of Bennett, multiple 20-year sentences for the malicious woundings, and fines totalling $600,000.[5]

Possible vendetta

Two days before Kasi’s execution on November 12, 2002, four US oil executives and their Pakistani taxi driver were shot dead in Karachi, in what was has been described as a deliberate response to Kasi’s guilty verdict.[12]
[edit] Execution

Kasi was executed by lethal injection on November 14, 2002, at Greensville Correctional Center in Jarratt, Virginia.[13] Kasi’s body was repatriated to Pakistan, his funeral was attended by the entire civil hierarchy of Baluchistan, the local Pakistan Army Corps Commander and the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Ashraf Jahangir Qazi.[14]

Victims

The two fatalities of Kasi’s attack were Lansing H. Bennett M.D., 66, and Frank Darling, 28, both CIA employees. Bennett, with experience as a physician, was working as an intelligence analyst assessing the health of foreign leaders.[15] Darling worked in covert operations.[4]
The three people wounded in the attack were Calvin Morgan, 61, an engineer; Nicholas Starr, 60, a CIA analyst; and Stephen E. Williams, 48, an AT&T employee.[4]

Memorials
Central Intelligence Agency memorial wall

The CIA Memorial Wall at their Langley headquarters, on which Bennett and Darling are memorialized

Bennett and Darling were memorialized as the 69th and 70th entries on the CIA’s memorial wall of stars in the foyer of the Langley headquarters building,[16] although President Clinton, in an address to the CIA, attributed the two individuals as the 55th and 56th stars.[17]

Route 123 Memorial

The Route 123 Memorial, consisting of a granite wall and two benches facing each other near the site of the shooting, is dedicated to Bennett and Darling.[18] This memorial is illumnated at night. The memorial is not at the exact location of the shooting due to traffic reasons.

An inscription reads:

In Remembrance of Ultimate Dedication to Mission Shown by Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency Whose Lives Have Been Taken or Forever Changed by Events at Home and Abroad.

Dedicato Par Aevum
(Dedicated to Service)
May 2002

The memorial was dedicated May 24, 2002.[18]

Lansing Bennett Forest

A forest was renamed in Bennett’s honor—the Lansing Bennett Forest in Duxbury, Massachusetts, where he was formerly chair of the Duxbury Conservation Commission.[1]

Bennett is buried in the Dennis Village Cemetery, Route 6A, north of Bourne, Massachusetts.

References

1. ^ a b c d e f Baluch, S. Kasi’s funeral: mourners come in their thousands , DAWN, November 25, 2002.
2. ^ Mir Aimal Kasi. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney. Retrieved on 2007-11-19.
3. ^ a b c d e f Stein, J. Convicted assassin: ‘I wanted to shoot the CIA director’ , Salon.com, January 22, 1998.
4. ^ a b c d e f g h i Davis, P. & Glod, M. CIA Shooter Kasi, Harbinger of Terror, Set to Die Tonight , Washington Post, November 14, 2002.
5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Justice A. Christian Compton, Virginia Supreme Court Opinion on Mir Aimal Kasi, November 6, 1998.
6. ^ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars , New York: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 246-247
7. ^ ARCHIVES CNN http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/14/cia.killings.execution/
8. ^ FBI-Ten Most Wanted Fugitive-Mir Aimal Kansi
9. ^ a b c Hasan, K. How Aimal Kasi was betrayed , Daily Times (Pakistan), June 23, 2004.
10. ^ a b Khan, R. In search of truth , DAWN, November 24, 2002.
11. ^ FindLaw for Legal Professionals – Case Law, Federal and State Resources, Forms, and Code
12. ^ Knowlton, B. Americans Abroad Face a Rising Risk of Terrorism , International Herald and Tribune, November 21, 1997.
13. ^ Glod, M. & Weiss, E. Kasi Executed For CIA Slayings, Washington Post, November 15, 2002.
14. ^ Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Predicaments Post 9/11 , South Asia Analyst Group, Paper No. 564, December 12, 2002
15. ^ Lansing Bennett, Physician Slain Outside CIA , Washington Post, January 27, 1993.
16. ^ http://gutenberg.com/eBooks/Government_Documents/CIA_Factbook_on_Intelligence_2002/memorial_stars.html
17. ^ Remarks from President to CIA employees
18. ^ a b CIA virtual tour

See also

* 1993 World Trade Center bombing

External links

* Article about Princeton alumnus, Lansing Bennett, M.D., detailing his medical career, State Department work, CIA work. [2]
* Princeton thesis written by Bennett [3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_shootings_at_CIA_Headquarters

***

Posted on Tue, Oct. 6, 2009
Bomb kills 5 U.N. aides; Taliban group suspected

By Chris Brummitt

Associated Press
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – A suicide bomber who killed five staffers at the U.N. food agency’s headquarters in Pakistan yesterday was dressed as a security officer and allowed to enter the heavily guarded building after he asked to use the bathroom.
The United Nations announced it was temporarily closing all its offices in Pakistan after the noontime bombing, which blew out windows and left victims lying in pools of blood in the lobby of the three-story World Food Program compound.

This is a heinous crime committed against those who have been working tirelessly to assist the poor and vulnerable on the front lines of hunger and other human suffering in Pakistan, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in Geneva, Switzerland.

Despite the office closures, the U.N. said its Pakistani partner organizations would continue distributing food, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance.

Pakistani authorities launched an investigation into the major security lapse, saying they would question guards who failed to stop the bomber from carrying out the first suicide attack in Islamabad in four months.

The attack came a day after the new Pakistani Taliban leader met reporters close to the Afghan border, vowing more attacks in response to U.S. missile strikes on militant targets in Pakistan. Ending speculation he had been killed, Hakimullah Mehsud denied government claims the militants were in disarray and said his fighters would repel any offensive on their stronghold in South Waziristan.

Authorities blamed Islamic militants for the bombing but did not single out the Taliban. It was unclear whether militants targeted the World Food Program because of its work in Pakistan or were simply looking to kill foreigners or those working with them. The dead were four Pakistanis and an Iraqi.

Extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq seeking to attack high-profile Western targets have shown no hesitation in striking foreign humanitarian agencies, including the U.N., regardless of the work they are doing in relieving the suffering in the countries. A blast in June on a luxury hotel housing many foreign aid workers in Peshawar killed two U.N. staffers.

Sometimes the very nature of their work invites attack. In yesterday’s bombing, insurgents may have believed that by feeding refugees from the fighting in the Swat valley, the WFP is propping up a Pakistani government they see as a U.S. puppet.

The U.N. and various humanitarian agencies, including those funded by the U.S., expanded in Pakistan over the last year to help support its elected government.
The U.N. considers itself a major target in Pakistan. Many of its offices are surrounded by 12-foot-high blast walls. Its staff members are driven in bulletproof cars and not allowed to bring their families with them on assignment in the country.

This was one of the best-protected U.N. centers in all of Pakistan, said U.N. spokeswoman Michele Montas.

Taliban and allied militants have carried out scores of suicide attacks in Pakistan over the last 21/2 years. Under U.S. pressure, Pakistani security forces have had some success combatting the extremists. Hakimullah’s predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in August.

Yesterday’s bombing was one of at least four major strikes in the last three weeks appear to show Pakistani militants are regrouping and have the capacity to carry out attacks. It took place in a well guarded, upscale residential area close to where President Asif Ali Zardari has a home.

Hassan Abbas, a former official in the Bhutto and Musharraf governments, said the attack is significant because it shows militants can still breach high security zones.

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20091006_Bomb_kills_5_U_N__aides__Taliban_gro

***

FAS | Nuke | Guide | Pakistan |||| Search | Join FAS
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
A Brief History of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.

India’s 1974 testing of a nuclear device gave Pakistan’s nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan’s program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan’s direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.

In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
# Pakistan Nuclear Weapons – A Chronology
Nuclear Tests

On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.

On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.

Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.

DEVICE    DATE    YIELD
[announced]    YIELD
[estimated]
[boosted device?]    28 May 1998    25-36 kiloton    total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device    28 May 1998    12 kiloton
Low-yield device    28 May 1998    sub-kiloton    –
Low-yield device    28 May 1998    sub-kiloton    –
Low-yield device    28 May 1998    sub-kiloton    –
Fission device    30 May 1998    12 kiloton    4-6 kiloton
Fission device    not detonated    12 kiloton    –
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.

According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.

These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.

Pakistan’s nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
#

Satellite Imagery of Pakistan’s May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites
Nuclear Infrastructure

Pakistan’s nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab’s plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.

Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form and that Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly. However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan’s assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan’s reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan’s military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Foreign Assistance

In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan’s production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan’s efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.

According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.

China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan’s failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.

According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
Intermittent US Sanctions

On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important frontline state, such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Several sources, such as Jane’s Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan’s motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan’s best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India’s decision.

Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf’s statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would respond with full might. These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.
Sources and Resources

* UN Nuclear Chief Warns of Global Black Market Mohammed ElBaradei commenting on questions raised by the Khan confession, February 6, 2004.
* Abdul Qadeer Khan Apologizes for Transferring Nuclear Secrets Abroad, broadcast on Pakistani television, February 4, 2004.

* Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries? By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, February 4, 2004

Deadly Arsenals, chapter on Paksitan – by Joseph Cirincione, John B.Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar (Carnegie, June 2002). The chapter discusses Pakistan’s WMD, missile and aircraft capabilities. It also presents the strategic context of the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, touching on foreign assistance from China and on-and-off US economic assistance.
*

Proliferation: Threat and Response, Jan. 2001 – A Defense Department report on the status of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It includes a brief historical background on the conflict between India and Pakistan as well as an assessment of their nuclear capabilities, chem/bio programs, ballistic missile programs and other means of delivery.
*

ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUGGLE: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation – by Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002. This working paper explores possible cooperative programs that could enhance the security of Pakistan and India’s nuclear arsenals, in order to prevent the diversion of dangerous materials into the hands of terrorists or rogue state leaders.
*

Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2001 from NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Jan/Feb 2002. A Two-page update on the state of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. It makes rough estimates of the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of fissile material in Pakistan’s possession and touches on fissile material production capabilities. Also included is a brief discussion of delivery mechanisms such as aircraft and missiles.
*

Monterey Institute Resource Page on India and Pakistan – last updated July 7, 2000. This page has many useful links to relevant maps, news articles and analytical pieces on India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs.
*

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Pakistan resources
*

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons – A Chronology – a timeline of the Pakistan’s Nuclear Development program since 1965.
*

The Threat of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons – a CSIS report by Anthony H. Cordesman (Last updated Nov. 2001). – This report tells the history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and discusses China role in its development. It also lists recent US intelligence reports on Pakistan’s activities.
*

From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan – Gregory S. Jones. (Rand, 2000). This issue paper describes the requirements for a nuclear deterrent force in general terms, discusses how the Indian-Pakistani nuclear relationship is affected by China, and then considers the specific decisions that still must be made in India and Pakistan.
*

Pakistan Nuclear Update, 2001 – Wisconsin Project. This three-page document provides a brief summary of Pakistan’s main nuclear sites and an update on developments in Pakistan’s nuclear program.
*

Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance – by David Albright, Kevin O’Neill and Corey Hinderstein, Oct. 4, 2001. An ISIS issue brief on the potential threats to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
*

The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests – by Terry C. Wallace, Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory (SASO), 1998. This technical paper provides a seismic analysis of India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. It concludes that Pakistan’s May 28 tests had a seismic yield of 9-12 kt, and the May 30 test had a yield of 4-6 kt. An updated web page on this report can be found here
*

Satellite Imagery of Pakistan’s May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites, hosted on the Center for Monitoring Research Commercial Satellite Imagery Page
*

Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma – September 23 2001, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Transcripts from a Carnegie panel on developments in Pakistan in the aftermath of the Septempber 11th attacks. The panel included three speakers — Shirin Tahir-Kheli, George Perkovich and Rose Gottemoeller– and was moderated by Joseph Cirincione.
*

Chapter on Pakistan, from Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, July 1998). This chapter documents the history of Pakistan’s nuclear program and tracks the development of its nuclear infrastructure. It also covers in detail the sanctions the US imposed on Pakistan in light of these developments, as well Pakistan’s missile program.
*
U.S. Appears to be Losing Track of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and U.S. Now Believes Pakistan to use Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program By Mark Hibbs July, 1998. Two brief articles written in the aftermath of Paksistan’s 1998 nuclear tests — they discuss Pakistan’s weapons grade uranium and plutonium production capacities and the implications for its nuclear arsenal.
*
U.S. Labs at Odds on Whether Pakistani Blast Used Plutonium, by Dana Priest Washington Post Sunday, January 17, 1999; Page A02. This article discusses the controversy over the preliminary analysis carried out by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which found that plutonium traces had been released into the atomosphere during Pakistan’s May 30th underground nuclear test. Scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Labs contested the accuracy of this finding and alleged that Los Alamos had contaminated and then lost the air sample. At the time, Los Alamos’ findings were highly controversial because they implied that Pakistan had obtained plutonium either though imports or indigenous production, and there was uncertainty about Pakistan’s plutonium production capabilities. It is now public knowledge that Pakistan can produce and isolate plutonium at its Khusbab reactor and at the New Labs and Chasma separation facilities.
*

NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS Munir Ahmed Khan REGIONAL STUDIES Autumn 1998

FAS | Nuke | Guide | Pakistan |||| Search | Join FAS

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Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pakistan
Location of Pakistan
Nuclear program start date    1 January 1972
First nuclear weapon test    28 May 1998
Last nuclear test    30 May 1998
Largest yield test    25-36 kT (PAEC claim) [1]
Total tests    6 detonations
Peak stockpile    70-90 warheads
(2009 estimate) [2][3]
Current stockpile    70-90 warheads
(2009 estimate) [2][3]
Maximum missile range    2,500 km (Shaheen-II) [4]
NPT signatory    No

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Pakistan began focusing on nuclear development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This program, known as Project-706, would reach fruition under President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program was in response to neighboring India’s development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan. It was here that Bhutto rallied Pakistan’s scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed Pakistani nuclear scientist, Munir Ahmad Khan (a U.S. trained scientist), as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who till then had been working as Director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria. This marked the beginning of Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear capability. Following India’s surprise nuclear test, codenamed Smiling Buddha in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.[citation needed]

Consequently, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgical engineer, working at the Dutch research firm URENCO, also joined Pakistan’s nuclear weapons-grade Uranium enrichment program. The uranium enrichment program had been launched in 1974 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan as Project-706. A.Q. Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and was made Project-Director in July 1976 after taking over from another nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. In 1983, Khan was convicted by a Dutch court in absentia for stealing the blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.[5]

Through the late 1970s, Pakistan’s program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan’s direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.[3]

On 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India’s second nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills in the Chaghai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan, the base having been long-constructed by provincial martial law administrator Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. Pakistan’s fissile material production takes place at Kahuta and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by the scientists.[6]

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program was established in 1974 when the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up in PAEC by chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.Munir Ahmad Khan was credited as the one of the pioneers of Pakistan’s atomic bomb by a recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London’s dossier on Pakistan’s nuclear program. DTD was assigned the task of developing the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high-speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components, high explosive lenses for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The DTD had come up with its first implosion design of a nuclear weapon by 1978 which was then improved and later tested on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan’s first successful cold test of a nuclear device.

Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also developed a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force fighter aircraft.[7]
Contents

* 1 Nuclear weapons
o 1.1 Origins
o 1.2 Initial refusal to start a nuclear programme
o 1.3 The Civilian Nuclear Programme
o 1.4 Policy
o 1.5 Protection
o 1.6 Modernisation and Expansion
* 2 Infrastructure
o 2.1 Uranium Infrastructure
o 2.2 Plutonium Infrastructure
o 2.3 Arsenal
o 2.4 Second strike capability
o 2.5 Foreign assistance
o 2.6 Doctrine
o 2.7 U.S. aid in guarding the nuclear weapons
o 2.8 National Security Council
* 3 Weapons development agencies
o 3.1 National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)
o 3.2 Ministry of Defense Production
o 3.3 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
o 3.4 Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)
o 3.5 Precision Engineering Complex (PEC)
o 3.6 Ministry of Industries & Production
* 4 Delivery systems
o 4.1 Missiles
o 4.2 Aircraft
* 5 Notes
* 6 See also
* 7 External links

Nuclear weapons
See also: Project-706

Origins

In February 1948, the founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah announced:
“ The weak and the defenseless in this world invite aggression from others. The best way we can serve peace is by removing the temptation from the path of those who think we are weak and, for that reason, they can bully or attack us. That temptation can only be removed if we make ourselves so strong that nobody dare entertain any aggressive designs against us. Pakistan has come to stay and no power on earth can destroy it.[8][9] ”

In 1972, in response to India’s Smiling Buddha nuclear tests, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto announced:
“ If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians have the bomb, the Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus and the Sikhs have the bomb. Why not the Muslims too have the bomb?[10][11] ”

Initial refusal to start a nuclear programme

Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme started in 1956 under the Government of Prime Minister of Pakistan, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. When President Ayub Khan imposed martial law in Pakistan, the Pakistani civilian nuclear programme was frozen until 1972. On December 11 1965, President Ayub Khan had a brief meeting with Pakistani nuclear engineer Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan (late) at the Dorchester Hotel in London. The meeting was arranged by the then foreign minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During the meeting, Munir Ahmad Khan told President Ayub Khan that Pakistan must acquire the necessary facilities that would give the country a nuclear deterrent capability, which were available free of safeguards and at an affordable cost. Munir Ahmad Khan also told President Ayub Khan that there were no restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely available, and that India and Israel were moving forward in deploying it.
Munir Ahmad Khan estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less expensive, the then costs were not more than $150 million. President Ayub Khan listened to him very patiently, but at the end of the meeting, Ayub Khan remained unconvinced. Ayub Khan clearly refused Munir Ahmad Khan’s offer and said that Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money. Moreover, President Ayub Khan mentioned that if Pakistan ever needed the bomb, Pakistan could somehow acquire it off the shelf.[12]

The Civilian Nuclear Programme
Main article: Nuclear power in Pakistan

Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme started in 1956 when the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established, with the initial target of capitalizing on the U.S-Pakistan’s quest for acquiring the sensitive nuclear technology. U.S President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Programme , and its first chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad[13]. In 1961, PAEC set up a Mineral Centre at Lahore and a similar multidisciplinary Centre was set up in Dhaka, in the then East Pakistan. With these two centers, the basic research work started[13].

The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for Uranium. This continued for about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in the Dera Ghazi Khan district and the first-ever national award was given to the PAEC. Mining of Uranium began in the same year. Dr. Abdus Salam and Dr. I. H. Usmani also sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the field of Nuclear Technology and nuclear reactor technology. In December 1965, then-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where he met with known Pakistani nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan. At a Vienna meeting on december, Munir A. Khan informed Bhutto about the statue of Indian nuclear programme[13].

The next landmark under Dr. I. H. Usmani, was the establishment of PINSTECH – Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, at Nilore near Islamabad. The principal facility there was a 5 MW research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and consisting of the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-1), which was upgraded to 10 MW under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990. A second Atomic Research Reactor, PARR-2, was a Pool-type, light-water, 27-30 kW, training reactor that went critical in 1989 under Munir Ahmad Khan. Both reactors were provide by the United States[13]. Canada build Pakistan’s first civil-purpose nuclear power plant[13].

The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at Dera Ghazi Khan for the concentration of uranium ores. The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day[14].

Dr. I. H. Usmani’s contribution to the nuclear programme is fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into Pakistan’s premier nuclear research institution. In addition to sending hundreds of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim world’s first nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972. Thus, Usmani laid solid groundwork for the civilian nuclear programme[15]

On September 3, 2004, Pakistan signed an agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to the media sources in Pakistan, IAEA has mandated Pakistan to extensively use and establish more nuclear power plants to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes in agriculture, industrial, health, education, environment, energy and power sectors [16].

Policy

Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April 1960, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 28 October 1997.In 1999 Pakistan signed the Lahore Accords with India, agreeing on a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. However, Pakistan, like India and Israel, is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions.

Protection

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed that Pakistan has dispersed its nuclear weapons throughout the country, increasing the security so that they could not fall into terrorist hands. Her comments came as new satellite images released by the ISIS suggested Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, a fuel for atomic bombs. The institute has also claimed that Pakistan has built two more nuclear reactors at Khoshab increasing the number of plutonium producing reactors to three.[17]

In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear security is the strongest in the world.[18] According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s nuclear safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons[19].
Modernisation and Expansion

Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported.[20] Estimated Pakistani nuclear weapons is probably in the neighborhood of more than 200 by the end of 2009. “The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.”[21]. Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is “likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall”.[22]

Infrastructure
Uranium Infrastructure

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program is based, primarily, on highly-enriched uranium (HEU))[1], which is produced at the Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, a Zippe centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in use since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan has continued its pursuit of expanded uranium-enrichment capabilities.

Plutonium Infrastructure

In the mid 1980s, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab Research Reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industries contributed in 82% of the reactor’s construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the U.S. Government officials, this heavy-water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities,[23] sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.[24] The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use 6Li directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab’s Plutonium production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the ballistic missiles.[citation needed]

Plutonium separation takes place at the New Labs Reprocessing Plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Television screenshot of the first known Pakistani Nuclear Test, 28 May 1998.

In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as many as 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year. [25][26][27] The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan’s third plutonium reactor[28], signaling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation’s existing HEU stream to atomic warheads.

Arsenal

Pakistani IRBMs on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.
A truck-mounted launch system (TEL) armed with 4 Babur cruise missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.
Truck-mounted IRBMs on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.

The U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated that Pakistan had built 24–48 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads.[29][30] In 2003, the U.S. Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimated that Pakistan possessed between 35 and 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.[31]

The NRDC’s and the Carnegie Foundation’s estimates of approximately 50 weapons are from 2002–03 estimations. In 2000, U.S. Military intelligence estimated that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.[32] The actual size is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. In recent developments, retired Brig. General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans’ Military told a Pakistani newspaper the nation has about 80 to 120 genuine warheads, and also revealed that Pakistan has decoy or dummy warheads to complicate any designs by aggressors.[33][34]

Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test of 30 May 1998 at Kharan. In this test the most compact and sophisticated design, made to be carried by small delivery vehicles such as MIRV and cruise missiles, was tested. Compactness can also be an issue when small aircraft such as fighter-bombers are being used as delivery vehicles, unless the platform happens to be a dedicated strategic bomber.

The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 8–10 kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 15–25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. Add about 50 or so chemical high-explosive lenses, triggering circuits, and outer aluminium casing, all this adds to the overall weight of the device. Therefore if a bomb has to use only U-235, that will impose serious restrictions on the amount of U-235 that can be used, and the size of the bomb itself, thus restricting its explosive yield. True PAEC did develop bomb designs that could be carried by all PAF aircraft, but after years of effort and R&D, and then too, there were serious limitations on the further extent of miniaturization of the bombs. If uranium is used as bomb fuel, it cannot be miniaturized beyond a certain point.

However, only 2–4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20–25 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four. “The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.”[21]

A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational deterrent capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.

As for Pakistan’s plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1980s onwards. There were only two problems. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and so did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. So PAEC built its own plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources.

Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide UO2 (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride UF4 and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6).

The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb.

It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000-20,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75–100 kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need 20 kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005.

Pakistan’s first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12kt, 30 to 35kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25kt and 150kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300–500kt [35] large-size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on fighter-bombers such as the Dassault Mirage III and fitted to Pakistan’s short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the Shaheen series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.[35]

Second strike capability

According to a US congressional report, Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been dealing with efforts to develop new weapons and at the same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war. Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.[36]

It was confirmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles, state-of-the-art air defences around strategic sites, and other concealment measures. Pakistan has also built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in case of a nuclear war. In 1998, Pakistan had ‘at least six secret locations’ and since then it is believed Pakistan may have many more such secret sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not know where all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are located. Pakistani defence officials have continued to rebuff and deflect American requests for more details about the location and security of the country’s nuclear sites.[37]

Foreign assistance

Historically, China is alleged to have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development infrastructure, especially, when increasingly stringent export controls in the western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire nuclear materials and technology from elsewhere. Additionally, Pakistani officials have supposedly been present to observe at least one Chinese nuclear test. In a recent revelation by a high-ranking former U.S. official, it was disclosed that China had allegedly transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan and conducting Proxy Test for it in 1980.[38] According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.[39]

In 1986, Pakistan and China signed a civilian nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civil-purpose nuclear technology. A grand ceremony was held in Beijing where Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presence of Munir Ahmad Khan and Chinese Prime Minister. Therefore, in 1989, Pakistan reached agreement with China for the supply of a 300MW CHASHNUPP-1 nuclear power plant.

In February, 1990, President François Mitterrand of France visited Pakistan and announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe nuclear power reactor to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (late) was dimissed in August, 1990, the French nuclear power plant deal went into cold storage and the agreement could not be implemented due to financial constraints and the Pakistani government’s apathy. Also in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P. Yakunin, says that the USSR is considering a request from Pakistan for the supply of a nuclear power plant. The soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was on its way during 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed U.S. displeasure at the recent agreement made between France and Pakistan for the sale of a nuclear power plant[40]. After the U.S. concerns the civilian-nuclear technology agreements were cancelled by France and Soviet Union.

Doctrine

Pakistan’s motive, as stated by its former President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1985, for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India.[3]

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the U.S. Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan’s best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India’s decision.

The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan’s nuclear posturing is the NCA. Here is a link showing NCA of Pakistan. [1] It was established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise the present President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex.

It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press namely Jang that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly one of the greatest achievement to date for Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen-II and Ghauri II missiles.

U.S. aid in guarding the nuclear weapons

From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[41]

Pakistan turned down the offer of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a sophisticated weapon release program which initiates use via specific checks and balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of dead switches . But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of PAL and U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry to be well secured.[42][43][44]

National Security Council

* National Command Authority
* Ministry of Defence
* Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC)
* Strategic Planning Directorate (SPD – ex CDD)

Weapons development agencies
National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)

* National Development Complex (NDC), Islamabad
* Pakistan Missile Organization (PMO), Khanpur
* Air Weapon Complex (AWC), Hasanabdal
* Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi

Ministry of Defense Production

* Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Wah
* Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra
* Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), Chattar

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

* Directorate of Technical Development
* Directorate of Technical Equipment
* Directorate of Technical Procurement
* Directorate of Science & Engineering Services
* Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad
* Pakistan Institute of Science & Technology (PINSTECH)
* New Laboratories, Rawalpindi
* Pilot Reprocessing Plant
* PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors
* Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad
* Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad
* Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center)
* Khushab Reactor, Khushab
* Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore
* Hard Rock Division, Peshawar
* Mineral Sands Program, Karachi
* Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur
* Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan
* Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mianwali
* Multan Heavy Water Production Facility, Multan, Punjab
* Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad
* Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra
* Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala
* Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad
* New Labs Nilore,Islamabad

Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)

* Aerospace Institute, Islamabad.
* Computer Center, Karachi.
* Control System Laboratories.
* Sonmian Satellite Launch Center, Sonmiani Beach.
* Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi.
* Material Research Division.
* Quality Control and Assurance Unit.
* Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit.
* Solid Composite Propellant Unit.
* Liquid Composite Propellant Unit
* Space and Atmospheric Research Center (space Center), Karachi
* Static Test Unit, Karachi
* Tilla Satellite Launch Center, Tilla, Punjab

Precision Engineering Complex (PEC)
Ministry of Industries & Production
* State Engineering Corporation (SEC)
* Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC)
* Peoples Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.

Delivery systems
Missiles

Below is a list of all known missiles, either in development or operational with Pakistan’s armed forces, that are believed to be capable of carrying a non-conventional (nuclear) payload.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Capable Missiles Name/Designation    Class    Range
(varies with payload weight)    Payload    Status
Hatf-I    SRBM    100 km    500 kg    Operational
Abdali    SRBM    180 km    500 kg    Operational
Ghaznavi    SRBM    290 km    500 kg    Operational
M-11    SRBM    300 km    500 kg    Operational
Shaheen-I    SRBM    750 km    850 kg    Operational
Ghauri-I    MRBM    1,500 km    750 kg    Operational
Ghauri-II    MRBM    2,300 km    750-1,200 kg    Operational
Shaheen-II    IRBM    2,500 km    700 kg    Operational [4]
Ghauri-III    IRBM    3,500+ km    1,200+ kg    Under Development
Shaheen-III    IRBM    4,500+ km    1,200+ kg    Under Development
Babur (Hatf 7)    Cruise Missile    700 km    500 kg    Operational
Ra’ad (Hatf 8)    Air Launched Cruise Missile    350 km    500 kg    Operational

Aircraft

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practised toss-bombing in the 1990s, a method of launching weapons from fighter-bombers which can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads. The PAF has two units (No. 16 Sqn and No. 26 Sqn) operating around 50 of the Chinese-built Nanchang A-5C, believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons due to its long range. The others are various variants of the Dassault Mirage III and Dassault Mirage 5, of which around 156 are currently operated by the Pakistan Air Force. The PAF also operates some 46 F-16 fighters, the first 32 of which were delivered in the 1980s and believed by some to have been modified for nuclear weapons delivery.

It has also been reported that an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with a range of 350 km has been developed by Pakistan, designated Hatf 8 and named Ra’ad ALCM, which may theoretically be armed with a nuclear warhead. It was reported to have been test-fired by a Dassault Mirage III fighter and, according to one Western official, is believed to be capable of penetrating some air defence/missile defence systems.[45]

Notes

1. ^ a b http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html
2. ^ a b http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f828323447768858/fulltext.pdf
3. ^ a b c d http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/pakistan2009.php
4. ^ a b http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.54/missile_detail.asp
5. ^ A.Q. Khan . www.globalsecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm. Retrieved 2009-04-10.
6. ^ Pakistan Nuclear Weapons . http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html. Retrieved 2007-02-22.
7. ^ http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm
8. ^ http://groups.google.com.pk/group/paknationalists/web/jinnah-pakistans-grey-wolf
9. ^ http://www.quaid.gov.pk/speech25.htm
10. ^ http://www.weeklyblitz.net/index.php?id=295
11. ^ http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-152972617.html
12. ^ http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/speech_munirahmed.html
13. ^ a b c d e http://pakdef.info/forum/archive/index.php?t-8346.html
14. ^ http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1989/890516-cr.htm
15. ^ Pakistan’s Nuke History: Part1 From A PAEC Perspective
16. ^ http://www.pakissan.com/english/news/newsDetail.php?newsid=6791
17. ^ http://www.apakistannews.com/pakistan-builds-2-more-reactors-isis-117565
18. ^ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=20095\29\story_29-5-2009_pg7_1
19. ^ http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=180186
20. ^ http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nucwatch/nucwatch071798.html
21. ^ a b http://www.1913intel.com/2008/12/27/the-dangers-of-india-pakistan-war/
22. ^ http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Pakistan+building+third+nuclear+reactor+at+Khushab&artid=pQqZ2l/ffuU=&SectionID=oHSKVfNWYm0=&MainSectionID=oHSKVfNWYm0=&SectionName=VfE7I/Vl8os=&SEO=
23. ^ Uranium Institute News Briefing 00.25 14 – 22 June 2000 . Uranium Institute. 2000. http://www.world-nuclear.org/nb/nb00/nb0025.htm. Retrieved 2006-05-07.
24. ^ Key Issues: Nuclear Energy: Issues: IAEA: World Plutonium Inventories
25. ^ BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan nuclear report disputed
26. ^ Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program – washingtonpost.com
27. ^ BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan ‘building new reactor’
28. ^ U.S. Group Says Pakistan Is Building New Reactor – New York Times
29. ^ Federation of American Scientists
30. ^ Center for Defense Information
31. ^ US Navy Strategic Insights. Feb 2003 . US Navy. 2003. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp. Retrieved 2006-10-28.
32. ^ Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal Underestimated, Reports Say
33. ^ Impact of US wargames on Pakistan N-arms ‘negative’ -DAWN – Top Stories; 3 December 2007
34. ^ Calculating the Risks in Pakistan – washingtonpost.com
35. ^ a b http://defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_pakistan_240409.html
36. ^ http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability–us-report–il–12
37. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04nuke.html?_r=1&hp
38. ^ China tested N-weapons for Pak: US insider The Times of India 6 September 2008
39. ^ http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200110-eng.asp
40. ^ http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_1990.html
41. ^ U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms . The New York Times. 2007-11-18. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html?ref=us. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
42. ^ New York Times/18 November 2007
43. ^ http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/
44. ^ http://forums.csis.org/poni/?p=34
45. ^ http://powerpolitics.org/?p=161

4 Responses to Nuclear materials – enriched uranium – plutonium – radioactive materials – accidents – security of nuclear materials – President Obama and 50 World Leaders meet in Washington to better secure nuclear materials for a good reason – in fact, for a bunch of good reasons –

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April 15, 2010 at 12:25 pm

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