US infrastructure crumbling while money continues to flow into the Middle East and around the world to build infrastructure for our enemies – air quality, pollution, global warming, US infrastructure, Afghanistan and Iraq –

Posted by cricketdiane on September 29, 2009

The economic well-being of the United States is dependent on the reliability, safety, and security of its physical infrastructure. The nation’s infrastructure is vast and affects the daily lives of virtually all Americans. In total, there are about 4 million miles of roads, 117,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, 79,000 dams, 26,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways, 11,000 miles of transit lines, 500 train stations, 300 ports, 19,000 airports,5 55,000 community drinking water systems, and 30,000 wastewater treatment and collection facilities. Collectively, this infrastructure connects communities, facilitates trade, provides clean drinking water, and protects public health, among other things.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08763t.pdf

my note -

It is missing the natural gas, petroleum facilities and pipelines, the electricity generating facilities – hydroelectric, coal-fired and nuclear / atomic plants, and national parks, preserves and lands

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http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/eiinformation.html

EPA – US Emission Inventory System

http://www.epa.gov/ttn/airs/airsaqs/aqslinks.htm

Assessment of Gas Hydrate Resources on the North Slope, Alaska, 2008

Thumbnail of and link to report PDF (6 MB)

<!– Thumbnail Image should be the front cover page, about the size of 324.height and 250.width with small shadow/shading around the border. If the publication is just a map, try to keep the thumbnail of the map The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) recently completed the first assessment of the undiscovered technically recoverable gas-hydrate resources on the North Slope of Alaska. Using a geology-based assessment methodology, the USGS estimates that there are about 85 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of undiscovered, technically recoverable gas resources within gas hydrates in northern Alaska.

Version 1.1

Posted October 2008

Fact Sheet PDF (6 MB)

For further information:
This factsheet and assessment results are available at the USGS Energy Program website, http://energy.usgs.gov

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format (PDF); the latest version of Adobe Reader or similar software is required to view it. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge.

Suggested citation:

Accessibility FOIA Privacy Policies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Geological Survey
URL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3073/index.html
Page Contact Information: USGS Publications Team
Page Last Modified: Thursday, October 30 2008, 02:52:42 PM

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3073/

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Fed’s Strategy Reduces U.S. Bailout to $11.6 Trillion (Update2)

By Mark Pittman and Bob Ivry

Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) — The Federal Reserve decided to keep pumping $1.25 trillion of new money into the mortgage market to focus on rescuing the U.S. economy as the financial system revives and banks ask for less help.

The Fed is allowing some of the 10 support programs it created or expanded after the credit crisis began in August 2007 to expire or shrink. That caused the first decline in the amount of money the U.S. has committed on behalf of taxpayers to end the recession, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The central bank has purchased $694 billion of mortgage- backed securities since January and plans to spend $556 billion more by April 2010 to keep interest rates down. The debt-buying is the biggest program in the Fed’s arsenal.

“The first thing the Fed had to do was stop the bleeding in the banking system,” said Richard Yamarone, director of economic research at Argus Research Corp. in New York. “Now that that seems to have been accomplished, they’re focusing on the economy by buying mortgage-backed securities.”

The purchases were scheduled to stop at the end of December. The Federal Open Market Committee decided on Sept. 23 to continue the program through the first quarter of next year and slow the pace of buying to “promote a smooth transition in markets,” the committee said in a statement. It also said the economy has “picked up.”

9.4 Percent Decline

The debt-buying pushed the average 30-year mortgage interest rate this week to 5.04 percent, its lowest since May, according to McLean, Virginia-based Freddie Mac. The debt is guaranteed by Freddie Mac and the other government-sponsored home-loan financiers, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, both based in Washington.

The U.S. has lent, spent or guaranteed $11.6 trillion to bolster banks and fight the longest recession in 70 years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

That’s a 9.4 percent decline since March 31, when Bloomberg last calculated the total at $12.8 trillion.

The tally “ignores the fact that virtually all commitments are backed by assets,” Andrew S. Williams, a Treasury Department spokesman who had the same role at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York until earlier this year, said in an e- mail. “The Federal Reserve’s current ‘outlays’ are largely in the form of secured loans. The aggregate value of the collateral backing those loans exceeds the loan value. These are not ‘outlays.’”

Refused to Identify

Spokesmen Calvin A. Mitchell of the New York Fed and David Skidmore of the Fed in Washington declined to comment.

The Fed has refused to identify the collateral backing its loans. Bloomberg News parent Bloomberg LP, the New York-based company majority-owned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, sued the central bank in November to force it to provide the information. U.S. District Judge Loretta A. Preska gave the Fed until Sept. 30 to appeal her decision requiring more disclosure about the financial institutions that have benefited.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Financials Index has risen 140 percent since its low on March 6, including a 174 percent increase in share price for JPMorgan Chase & Co. to $43.65 and a 137 percent jump for Goldman Sachs Group Inc. to $179.50.

Among the U.S. programs that have expired is the Treasury guarantee of money market mutual fund deposits, instituted a year ago to stem an investor run the week after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s collapse. The department said it collected $1.2 billion in fees from funds before the effort concluded on Sept. 18 and never paid out a claim.

Gas Guzzlers
The $3 billion “cash for clunkers,” which gave people rebates for trading in gas-guzzling vehicles, ended in August after 700,000 vehicles were sold, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.

The Fed’s Money Market Investor Funding Facility, or MMIFF, is slated to be closed on Oct. 30, and four other Fed programs with a total limit of $2.5 trillion are scheduled to expire in February. Others have been cut back.

The central bank said Sept. 24 it will reduce the Term Securities Lending Facility to $50 billion from $75 billion and the Term Auction Facility, once $900 billion, will shrink to $50 billion. Support for commercial paper, short-term loans that corporations and banks use to pay everyday expenses, has fallen to $1.2 trillion as the market fell from a one-year peak of $1.8 trillion in January.

64 Percent Higher

Banks have repaid about $70.6 billion of the $204.6 billion in direct aid extended through the Capital Purchase Program of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. Congress created the $700 billion fund last October.

The $70.6 billion includes $25 billion from New York-based JPMorgan Chase, one of the biggest recipients, and $28 million from Novato, California-based Bank of Marin Bancorp, one of the smallest, according to the Treasury and regulatory filings.

“Because financial conditions have started to improve, Treasury has already begun the process of exiting from some emergency programs,” the TARP administrator, Herb Allison, told the Senate Banking Committee Sept. 24. “It will, however, be some time before all CPP participants have fully extinguished their obligations to the taxpayers.”

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program has generated more than $9 billion in fees.

The combined commitments of the Fed and government agencies are 57 percent higher than on Nov. 24, when Bloomberg’s first tally was $7.4 trillion.

“We’re not self-sustaining yet,” William O’Donnell, head of Treasury strategy for RBS Securities Inc. in Stamford, Connecticut, said in an interview.

===========================================================
— Amounts (Billions)—
Limit         Current
===========================================================
Total                            $11,563.65     $3,025.27
———————————————————–
Federal Reserve Total            $5,870.65     $1,590.11
Primary Credit Discount           $110.74        $28.51
Secondary Credit                    $1.00         $0.58
Primary dealer and others         $147.00         $0.00
ABCP Liquidity                    $145.89         $0.08
AIG Credit                         $60.00        $38.81
Commercial Paper program        $1,200.00        $42.44
Maiden Lane (Bear Stearns assets) $29.50        $26.19
Maiden Lane II (AIG assets)       $22.50        $14.66
Maiden Lane III (AIG assets)       $30.00        $20.55
Term Securities Lending            $75.00         $0.00
Term Auction Facility             $375.00       $196.02
Securities lending overnight       $10.42         $9.25
Term Asset-Backed Loans (TALF) $1,000.00        $41.88
Currency Swaps/Other Assets       $606.00        $59.12
GSE Debt Purchases                $200.00       $129.21
GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities $1,250.00       $693.60
Citigroup Bailout Fed Portion     $220.40         $0.00
Bank of America Bailout            $87.20         $0.00
Commitment to Buy Treasuries      $300.00       $289.22
———————————————————–
Treasury Total                    $2,909.50     $1,075.91
TARP                              $700.00       $372.43
Tax Break for Banks                $29.00        $29.00
Stimulus Package (Bush)           $168.00       $168.00
Stimulus II (Obama)               $787.00       $303.60
Treasury Exchange Stabilization    $50.00         $0.00
Student Loan Purchases             $60.00         $0.00
Citigroup Bailout Treasury          $5.00         $0.00
Bank of America Bailout Treasury    $7.50         $0.00
Support for Fannie/Freddie        $400.00       $200.00
Line of Credit for FDIC           $500.00         $0.00
Treasury Commitment to TALF       $100.00         $0.00
Treasury Commitment to PPIP       $100.00         $0.00
Cash for Clunkers                   $3.00         $2.88
———————————————————–
FDIC Total                        $2,477.50       $356.00
Public-Private Investment (PPIP)$1,000.00          0.00
Temporary Liquidity Guarantees* $1,400.00       $301.00
Guaranteeing GE Debt               $65.00        $55.00
Citigroup Bailout, FDIC Share      $10.00         $0.00
Bank of America Bailout, FDIC Share $2.50         $0.00
———————————————————–
HUD Total                           $306.00         $3.25
Hope for Homeowners (FHA)         $300.00         $3.20
Neighborhood Stabilization (FHA)    $6.00         $0.05
———————————————————–
* The program has generated $9.3 billion in income,
according to the agency.

Glossary: ABCP — Asset-backed commercial paper AIG — American International Group Inc. FDIC — Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. FHA — Federal Housing Administration, a division of HUD GE — General Electric Co. GSE — Government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) HUD — U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development TARP — Troubled Asset Relief Program

Breakout of TARP funds:
===========================================================
— Amounts (Billions)—
Outlay      Returned
===========================================================
Total                              $447.76        $75.33
———————————————————–
Capital Purchase Program           $204.55        $70.56
General Motors, Chrysler            $79.97         $2.14
American International Group        $69.84         $0.00
Making Home Affordable Program      $23.40         $1.13
Targeted Investment Bank of America $20.00         $0.00
Targeted Investment Citigroup       $20.00         $0.00
Term Asset-Backed Loan (TALF)       $20.00         $0.00
Citigroup Bailout                    $5.00         $0.00
Auto Suppliers                       $5.00         $1.50

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: September 25, 2009 16:39 EDT

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=ahys015DzWXc

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Dam Safety Research, Publications & Resources
Home » Publications & Resources » Dam Safety Research, Publications & Resources

Your Information Source for Dam Safety Research & Publications

Click the tabs at left for listings of recently published books and papers from a variety of sources. (Previously listed references are archived in the ASDSO Bibliography.)
For more information on items listed in these pages, contact Sarah McCubbin-Cain.

ASDSO members may borrow selected items from the ASDSO Library.

These pages updated 9/1/09

* ASDSO Bibliographic Database
* ASDSO Bookstore
* Training Materials
* The Journal of Dam Safety
* ASDSO Speakers Bureau
* Dam Safety Research, Publications & Resources
o Recent Journal & Magazine Articles (August ’09)
o Books & Presentations, August 2009
* ASDSO Peer Review Program
* Download Documents
* Picture Gallery
* ASDSO Information Services
* Links to Other Resources

http://www.damsafety.org/resources/?p=94218cc1-29fa-4df8-9586-0650bcd9d1af

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Dam Safety Research, Publications & Resources
Home » Publications & Resources » Dam Safety Research, Publications & Resources » Recent Journal & Magazine Articles (August ’09)
ASDSO Resource Center – August 2009

Advances in Water Resources – 08/2009 V. 32 (8)

H. A. Gallegos, J. E. Schubert and B. F. Sanders. Two-dimensional, high-resolution modeling of urban dam-break flooding: A case study of Baldwin Hills, California

Canadian Mining Journal – 05/2009 V. 130 (4)

Tough diggin’

Description of challenges faced by contractor in blasting a 2.9-km transfer tunnel for Hydro-Quebec in Northern Quebec. The transfer tunnel was part of a $5 billion hydroelectric project that involved construction of four dams, a spillway, 74 dikes, two diversion bays, and the transfer tunnel.

CDA/ACB Bulletin – Summer 2009 V. 20 (3)

Annual CDA Conference Overview

Keynotes: Psychology of Safety (Dr. Jacob Groeneweb, Leiden University, Netherlands); Application of Safety-by-Design Principles in Hazardous Industries (Michael A. Prince, BMT Isis Ltd, UK); Adapting to Climate Change (Dr. Stewart j. Cohen, Environment Canada, Vancouver BC).
Technical sessions: Mining dams, Dam safety reviews, Public safety, Incident investigation & analysis, Reliability-centered maintenance, Flow discharge gate reliability, and Identification, monitoring and repair of piping damage to till core dams.

Anon. A unified river ice breakup model

Progress report, May 2009, for the NSERC strategic grant project prepared in response to Hydro Quebec’s need to simulate the propagation of the dambreak flood wave under winter conditions and its desire to optimize hydroelectric peaking without causing the downstream ice cover to break up.

T. Bennett. A change to make history

The History and Archives Committee of the Engineering Institute of Canada is interested in receiving submissions of papers and archival materials on the history of dams in Canada. For more information, contact Tony Bennett (tony.bennett[at]opg.com).

Civil Engineering – 08/2009

J. Landers. Climate change is decreasing flows in major rivers, study finds

NSF-sponsored study examined flow in major rivers around the world between 1948-2004.

Engineering News-Record – 08/03/2009 V. 263 (4)

Oroville Dam bulkhead fails

CA DWR investigating failure of a steel bulkhead during routine hydraulic tests on July 22. Five workers were injured when a 6′ x 10′ steel wall collapsed in a diversion tunnel.

P. R. Russell. Studies dispute ash spill’s engineering analysis

Reviews of TVA ash spill come to different conclusions.

Engineering News-Record – 08/17/2009 V. 263 (6)

TVA opts for dry storage after catastrophic coal-ash spill

United Convey Corp to convert Kingston’s ash-handling from wet to dry under a $50- to $70-million contract.

EWRI Currents – Summer 2009

Anon. Pathfinder Dam Centennial Celebration

Pathfinder Dam Centennial celebration held July 15, 2009. The dam is a 214′-high cyclopean masonry thick-arch dam and was the first big dam built by the U.S. Reclamation Service (now Bureau of Reclamation). The arch dam design for Pathfinder Dam was based on the results of analyses performed and reported by consulting engineers George Y. Wisner and Edgar T. Wheeler; that 1905 analysis methodology evolved and became known as the Trial Load Method of analysis that is still used by the Bureau of Reclamation and others worldwide. Pathfinder Dam was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1971, was designated a Wyoming Historic Civil Engineering Landmark in 1975, and is in the process of being re-nominated by ASCE’s Wyoming Section to become a National Historic Civil Engineering Landmark.

Anon. Engineering Societies Agree on Climate Change Action

As leaders of the civil engineering profession gathered in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador to discuss the challenges and risks faced by coastal communities worldwide at the 2009 Triennial Conference, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the Canadian Society for Civil Engineering (CSCE) and the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) jointly signed an agreement on Civil Engineering and Climate Change.

Geosynthetics – 08-09/2009 V. 27 (4)

J. Chi. History, development, and future prospects for geosynthetics industries in China

Article describes development of China’s geosynthetics production, applications, testing, and research, and discusses the market supply and demand as well as development trends. Dam applications cited. Part 1 of 2 parts.

D. Leshchinsky. Research and innovation: seismic performance of various geocell earth-retention systems

Overview of research on use of geocells as earth-retention structures.

International Journal of Engineering, Transactions B: Applications – 10/2008 V. 21 (3)

H. Afshin, B. Firoozabadi and M. Rad. Hydrodynamics analysis of Density currents

Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering – V. 135 (8)

M.-W. Seo, I. S. Ha, Y.-S. Kim and S. M. Olson. Behavior of concrete-faced rockfill dams during initial impoundment

USSD Newsletter – 07/2009 V. (No. 148)

Anon. Levees workshop to be held in Sacramento

Technical, policy and management issues relating to levees will be the focus of a USSD workshop to be held Oct. 13-15 in Sacramento.

Anon. Cybersecurity issues addressed

Brief overview of a Dams Sector Cybersecurity Summit recently held in Chicago.

D. H. Babbitt and R. G. Charlwood. Wenchuan Quake Report

Report on an International Seminar on Earthquakes and Dam Safety, conducted March 29-April 3, 2009 by the Chinese Committee on Large Dams, to review the performance of large dams affected by the May 12, 2008 Wnnchuan Earthquake. Dam assessed: Zipingpu, Shapai, Futang, Taipingyi, Yingziuwan, Bikou, Baozhusi, Tanjiashan.

R. Barham, P. Shiers, M. McCaffrey and J. Lyon. Repairing an embankment sinkhole

Case study of repairs at Chilhowee Hydroelectric Project on the Little Tennessee River near Knoxville.

R. Bisnett. Use of loess as an embankment dam core material: an investigation into two forms of collapse

Paper by USSD scholarship winner. Understanding the saturation state and the effect of varying compaction parameters on the one-dimensional consolidation and seismic response of loess is essential to evaluating its use as an engineering material in embankment dams.

P. J. Regan. An examination of dam failures vs. age of dams

Paper addresses 4 questions: (1) How are dam incidents distributed over the life of a dam and what are the implications of longterm satisfactory performance? (2) Is there a difference in longterm performance among different types of dams? (3) Are there particular potential failure modes that contribute significantly to safety inidents over time? (4) Is there a difference in the types of delayed incidents depending on the year the dam was constructed?

D. Shannon. Lake Lenexa Dam and Spillway

J. N. Stateler. Consequence ratings: a streamlined method for developing loss of life estimates

Condensed version of a paper presented at the 2009 USSD Annual Meeting and Conference.

http://www.damsafety.org/resources/?p=8803f043-13e8-492c-bd57-a26867486106

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WASHINGTON, Oct 30, Washington transit agency at risk in AIG fallout:
Reuters
Washington, D.C.’s transit agency won a slight reprieve on Thursday from having to pay millions on a defaulted financing deal, which many fear could escalate and cost U.S. public transportation groups up to $16 billion on exposure to other soured financing.
Read more…
Denver, CO: 09/18/08, A Quiet Crisis Below Ground
,
The Denver Post
The state of Colorado needs to invest at least $2.6 Billion to fix a drinking water system that has been plagued deterioration that has led to parasites, disease, and damages to roadways. Columnist Susan Thornton argues that not nearly enough attention has been given to the issue.
Read more…

http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/index.cfm

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Association of State Dam Safety Officials

http://www.damsafety.org/

DAMS [D]
Background | Conditions | Policy Options | Specific ASCE recommendations | Sources

Since 1998, the number of unsafe dams has risen by 33% to more than 3,500. While federally owned dams are in good condition, and there have been modest gains in repair, the number of dams identified as unsafe is increasing at a faster rate than those being repaired. $10.1 billion is needed over the next 12 years to address all critical non-federal dams–dams which pose a direct risk to human life should they fail.

Background

Dams provide tremendous benefits, including water supply for drinking, irrigation and industrial uses; flood control; hydroelectric power; recreation; and navigation. However, dams also represent one of the greatest risks to public safety, local and regional economies and the environment. Historically, some of the largest disasters in the United States have resulted from dam failures. In 1889, 2,209 lives were lost when the South Fork Dam failed above Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The 1928 St. Francis Dam failure killed 450. During the 1970s, the failures of the Buffalo Creek Dam in West Virginia, Teton Dam in Idaho and the Toccoa Falls Dam in Georgia collectively cost 175 lives and more than $1 billion in losses. Such dam failures as Silver Lake Dam in Michigan in 2003 ($100 million in damages and economic losses of $1 million per day) and the Big Bay Lake Dam in Mississippi in March 2004 (100 homes destroyed) are current reminders of the potential consequences of unsafe dams.

In order to provide safe, continuing service, dams require ongoing maintenance, monitoring, frequent safety inspections and rehabilitation. Aging dams often require major rehabilitation to assure their safety. Downstream development below dams is increasing dramatically, and continuing scientific research of dam failure mechanisms, such as earthquakes and major flood events, frequently demand repairs to dams constructed long before these advances were realized. Many state dam safety programs do not have sufficient funding or qualified staff to effectively regulate dams under their authority. State programs regulate 95% of the 79,000 dams in the United States, while the federal agencies own or regulate only 5% of the nation’s dams.

Conditions
Like all man-made structures, dams deteriorate. Deferred maintenance accelerates deterioration and causes dams to be more susceptible to failure. As with other critical infrastructure, a significant investment is essential to maintain the benefits and assure the safety that society demands.

In the past two years, more than 67 dam incidents, including 29 dam failures, were reported to the National Performance of Dams program, which collects and archives information on dam performance as reported by state and federal regulatory agencies and dam owners. Dam incidents are such events as large floods, earthquakes or inspections that alert dam safety engineers to deficiencies that threaten the safety of a dam. Due to limited state staff, many incidents are not reported; therefore, the actual number of incidents is likely to be much greater.

The number of high-hazard potential dams (dams whose failure would cause loss of human life) is increasing dramatically. Since 1998, the number of high-hazard-potential dams has increased from 9,281 to 10,213, with 1,046 in North Carolina alone. As downstream land development increases, so will the number of high-hazard potential dams. As these dams often require major repair to accommodate more stringent inspection, maintenance and design standards, financial support for state dam safety programs must keep pace.

Even more alarming, states presently report more than 3,500 unsafe dams, which have deficiencies that leave them more susceptible to failure. Many states have large numbers of unsafe dams, including Pennsylvania (725), New Jersey (583), and New Hampshire (357). Many state agencies do not report statistics on unsafe dams; therefore the actual number is potentially much higher.

The combined effect of rapid downstream development, aging/non-compliant structures and inadequate past design practices, coupled with a predicted increase in extreme events, demands fully funded and staffed state dam safety programs, as well as substantial and proactive funding for dam repairs.

Some progress is being made through the repair of small watershed dams constructed with assistance from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), beginning in 1948. This is only a small portion of the total number of non-federal dams. On the federal side, federally owned and federally regulated hydropower dams are in good condition; however, continuing budget restrictions and increased attention to security are placing pressure on and limiting many agency dam safety programs.

While the recent passage of the National Dam Safety and Security Act of 2002 (Public Law No: 107-310), which provides funding through grants, has improved state dam safety programs, it does not provide funding for needed repairs. It is estimated that $10.1 billion is needed over the next 12 years to address all critical non-federal dams–dams that pose a direct risk to human life should they fail. In the meantime, the 79,000 dams in the U.S. National Inventory of Dams continue to age and deteriorate, yet there is no national funding program to fund the repair of unsafe dams.
Since the last ASCE Report Card, the National Dam Safety Act of 1996 was reauthorized in 2002, increasing the authorization to $8.0 million. To date, however, funding has remained at pre-reauthorization levels of $5.5 million. Under this program, state dam safety agencies have received grants totaling nearly $22 million to assist with improving dam safety regulatory programs by procuring equipment, implementing new technology, and enabling more-frequent inspections. The program also provided opportunities for continuing education to dam safety engineers, and funding for research to advance the technology of investigations, construction, and rehabilitation of dams, but no funding to repair unsafe dams.

According to results of a study by the Association of State Dam Safety Officials, the total investment to bring U.S. dams into safety compliance or to remove obsolete dams tops $30 billion. Except for a handful of state programs offering low-interest loans to dam owners, there are no funding sources for dam rehabilitation or repair. Private owners have the greatest need for funding. The Small Watershed Rehabilitation Act addresses less than 10% of the nation’s dams–the remaining 90% demand similar attention.

Representative Sue Kelly introduced HR 5190, the Dam Repair and Rehabilitation Act, in the 108th Congress. The bill would provide $350 million over 4 years for the repair, rehabilitation or removal of non-federal, high-hazard, publicly owned dams. The bill will be re-introduced early in the 109th Congress.

Four years ago, few state dam safety programs were adequately funded or staffed. Today, that situation remains the same. On average nationwide, there are 268 state-regulated dams per full-time equivalent (FTE) staff. In 13 states, this number exceeds 500, and four report more than 1200 dams per FTE staff. In 1998, a Texas House Committee recommended adding 15 staff members to that state’s six-member dam safety team; today, there are still only six staff members responsible for inspecting nearly 7500 dams. One Texas official commented that, because of inadequate staffing, some dams would not be examined for three centuries.

Since the last Report Card, Delaware has created a dam safety program, leaving Alabama as the last remaining state that has not passed dam safety legislation. As a result, an estimated 2,100 dam structures–perhaps more–are unregulated. At last count, 171 of these structures were classified as high-hazard.

Policy Options

There is still an alarming lack of public support and education about the need for proper maintenance and repair of dams. Unless a dam fails, dam safety is not usually in the public view, although it is an issue that affects the safety of millions of people who could be living and working in the path of a sudden, deadly dam failure.

Specific recommendations supported by ASCE:
* Establishment of comprehensive and fully funded dam safety programs in all 50 states, especially Alabama, the only state without an authorized dam-safety program
* Introduction and passage of legislation to create a loan fund for the repair, rehabilitation and removal of non-federal dams would provide seed money to advance the process of rehabilitating the most critical dams
* Full funding and expansion of the Small Watershed Rehabilitation Act
* Development of a comprehensive, Internet-based information resources system to support the maintenance and improvement of dam safety in the United States
* Reauthorization of the National Dam Safety Program Act in 2006
* Funding program in each state to assist with loans and matching grants

Sources

Association of State Dam Safety Officials, 2003 National Dam Safety Program Successes and Challenge
Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Dams: An Important Part of the U.S. Infrastructure

Federal Emergency Management Administration, Annual Report to Congress, 2003

Association of State Dam Safety Officials, The Cost of Rehabilitating Our Nation’s Dams, 2002

Natural Resource Conservation Service, Aging Watershed Projects: A Growing National Concern, 1998

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, National Inventory of Dams, 1998

World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making, 2000

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, National Inventory of Dams, 2000

World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making, 2000

Easterling, D.R., et al. Observed Variability and Trends in Extreme Climate Events: A Brief Review, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 81, March 2000

Haurwitz, Ralph, Dam Inspections Are Years Behind, The Austin American-Statesman, February 21, 1998

Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water Control Infrastructure, National Inventory of Dams, Vol.II, 1992

ASCE Policy Statement 280 Dam Safety, 2003

ASCE Policy Statement 470 Dam Repair and Rehabilitation, 2003

http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id=23

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Home » State Map » Georgia

Georgia Dam Safety Program

Contact:
Tom Woosley
Program Manager
GA Department of Natural Resources
Safe Dams Program
4244 International Parkway, Ste. 110
Atlanta, GA 30354
Tel: 404/362-2678
Fax: 04/362-2598
tom_woosley@dnr.state.ga.us
Web:
Dept. of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Div.

http://www.gaepd.org/

2007 National Inventory of Dams – Georgia Dam Statistics

2006 Statistics:Total Number of state-regulated dams: 3874
Number state-regulated high hazard potential dams: 450
Number state-regulated significant hazard potential dams: 0
Number state-regulated low hazard potential dams: 3424
Total Number of dam safety FTE’s: 11
Total Budget: 727,009

2005 Statistics:
Total Number of state-regulated dams: 3861
Number state-regulated high hazard potential dams: 437
Number state-regulated significant hazard potential dams: 0
Number state-regulated low hazard potential dams: 3424
Total Number of dam safety FTE’s: 9

2003 Statistics:
Number of state-regulated dams: 3,412
Number of dams in National Inventory of Dams: 4,977
Number of dam safety FTEs: 10

View Georgia’s report in Successes and Challenges – 2002 National Dam Safety Program (Association of State Dam Safety Officials, 2002)

View a summary of Georgia’s dam safety laws and regulations – from Summary of State Laws and Regulations on Dam Safety (Association of State Dam Safety Officials, July 2000)

http://www.damsafety.org/map/state.aspx?s=10

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wwv_flow_file_mgr.get_file.jpg
Dams in Georgia

total number of dams – 4814
high hazard dams -

https://rsgis.crrel.usace.army.mil/apex/f?p=397:3:775767146432274::NO::P3_STATES:GA

The 1928 St. Francis Dam failure killed 450. During the 1970s, the failures of the Buffalo Creek Dam in West Virginia, Teton Dam in Idaho and the Toccoa Falls Dam in Georgia collectively cost 175 lives and more than $1 billion in losses. Such dam failures as Silver Lake Dam in Michigan in 2003 ($100 million in damages and economic losses of $1 million per day) and the Big Bay Lake Dam in Mississippi in March 2004 (100 homes destroyed) are current reminders of the potential consequences of unsafe dams.

http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id=23

***
Our nation’s dam infrastructure is an important component of the nation’s water control infrastructure, supplying such benefits as water for drinking, irrigation, and industrial uses; flood control; hydroelectric power; recreation; and navigation.14 However, as evidenced by the events of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the failure of dam infrastructure, which includes levees, also represents a risk to public safety, local and regional economies, and the environment. In particular, the aging of dam infrastructure in the United States continues to be a critical issue for dam safety because the age of dams is a leading indicator of potential dam failure.15 According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, the number of unsafe dams has risen by more than 33 percent since 1998, to more than 3,500 in 2005.16 In addition, the number of dams identified as unsafe is increasing faster than the number of dams that are being repaired.
To address the challenges facing our nation’s dams, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Dam Safety Review Board identified both short- and long-term goals and priorities for the National Dam Safety Program17 over the next 5 to 10 years. They include identifying and remedying deficient dams, increasing dam inspections, increasing the number of and updating of Emergency Action Plans,

Aging Dam Infrastructure Raises Safety and Funding Challenges
14The term “dam” includes conventional dams, navigation locks, levees, canals (excluding channels), or other similar types of water retention structures.
15A number of factors, including age, construction deficiencies, inadequate maintenance, and seismic or weather events contribute to the likelihood of dam failure.
16American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, March 2005.
17The National Dam Safety Program, which is administered by FEMA, is a partnership of the states, federal agencies, and other stakeholders to encourage individual and community responsibility for dam safety.

Page 12 GAO-08-763T Physical Infrastructure

***

Diesel Particulate Matter:

Diesel Particulate Matter (PM) is a mixture of particles that is a component of diesel exhaust. EPA lists diesel exhaust as a mobile source air toxic due to the cancer and noncancer health effects associated with exposure to whole diesel exhaust. EPA believes that exposure to whole diesel exhaust is best described, as many researchers have done over the years, by diesel particulate concentrations.

Note that in this assessment, the potential carcinogenic risk from diesel PM is not addressed because there currently is no unit risk estimate available. There are noncancer results. Learn more about EPA’s qualitative assessment of diesel PM.

Given its broad scope, this risk characterization is subject to a number of limitations due to gaps in data or in the state of the science for assessing risk. For example, the current assessment does not yet include results for dioxins, compounds that may contribute substantially to risks. In addition, the EPA is reassessing the health effects of many pollutants considered in this study. A status report for all EPA health effect assessments is available at cfpub.epa.gov/iristrac/index.cfm. For more details about the limitations in the risk characterization, refer to the limitations section on the Web site.

The 2002 national-scale risk assessment is based on a 2002 inventory of air toxics emissions (the most complete and up-to-date available). It then assumes individuals spend their entire lifetimes exposed to these air toxics. Therefore, it does not account for the reductions in emissions that have occurred since 2002 or those that will happen in the near future due to regulations for mobile and industrial sources (see further details in the Air Toxics Reduction section of the Web site). This risk assessment represents an update and enhancement to EPA’s 1999 national-scale assessment. The next assessment will focus on emissions for the year 2005. It will be released in late 2009 or early 2010.

http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2002/risksum.html

***

Between fiscal years 2002 and 2009, the United States provided
approximately $38.6 billion to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction goals,
which can often be characterized as construction (see table 1). Table 1
does not include funding provided for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.4 According to DOD, $22 billion of the $38.6 billion has been
disbursed.

Afghanistan.4 According to DOD, $22 billion of the $38.6 billion has been
disbursed.
Table 1: U.S. Government Funding Provided in Support of Afghan Security, Stabilization, and Development, Fiscal Years
2002-2009
Fiscal Years
Dollars in millions 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009a Total
Security $147 $388 $949 $2,307 $1,989 $7,431 $2,763 $5,606 $21,580
— Afghan National Army 86 361 719 1,633 736 4,872 1,778 4,043 14,228
— Afghan National Police 24 0 160 624 1,217 2,523 964 1,512 7,024
— Other security 37 27 70 50 36 36 21 51 328
Governance, rule of law, human rights 110 97 262 244 110 286 517 824 2,450
— Democracy/Governance 103 89 233 223 80 221 391 614 1,954
— Rule of law 7 8 29 21 30 65 126 210 496
Economic and social development 650 498 1,153 1,570 1,007 1,591 2,100 2,448 11,017
— Reconstruction 124 295 855 1,240 706 1,191 1,494 1,871 7,776
— Humanitarian/Other 526 203 298 330 301 400 606 577 3,241
Counternarcotics 40 3 126 775 420 737 617 802 3,520
— Eradication 39 0 50 257 138 177 183 202 1,046
— Interdiction 1 3 76 338 137 323 248 366 1,492
— Alternative development 0 0 0 175 140 229 181 225 950
— Other counternarcotics 0 0 0 5 5 8 5 9 32
Total $947 $986 $2,490 $4,896 $3,526 $10,045 $5,997 $9,680 $38,567
Source: Departments of Defense and State.
Note: Funding provided includes assistance for Afghanistan from a variety of budget accounts, such
as Afghan Security Forces Funding, Economic Support Funds, and Commander’s Emergency
Response Funds, among others; State/USAID operations funding; and use of drawdown authority
contained in legislation such as the Afghan Freedom Support Act. Relevant transfers and
reprogramming also are included.
aAccording to State, fiscal year 2009 numbers include preliminary allocations of funding received in
the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, as well as preliminary funding allocations from the
fiscal year 2009 supplemental request.
4Specific funding figures for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan do not exist because
funding provided to DOD for military operations in support of the GWOT, which includes
Afghanistan, is not appropriated by country or specific contingency operation. Funding for
military operations covers expenses such as personnel costs of mobilized reservists; costs
for housing, food, and fuel; and costs to repair and replace equipment.
Page 4 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09473sp.pdf

In 2006, the government of Afghanistan, along with the international partners,
adopted the Afghanistan Compact, a political agreement outlining the
international community’s commitment to provide resources and support to
achieve Afghanistan’s security, governance, and reconstruction goals as set out
in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Subsequently, more
than 70 nations pledged over $57 billion in aid toward the achievement of these
goals. The United States alone provided $32 billion. United States efforts to
work with NATO partners and other contributing countries present unique
opportunities in Afghanistan, but also pose some challenges. In March 2009, the
President announced a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

***

The security situation in Afghanistan, though cyclical in nature, has
deteriorated since 2005. Attacks on civilians as well as Afghan and
coalition forces have increased year after year. Attacks increased from
2,388 in 2005 to 5,087 in 2006, 7,058 in 2007, and 10,889 in 2008. The
majority of the violence is concentrated in the eastern and southern parts
of Afghanistan where the Taliban receives funding from the opium trade
and where U.S. forces operate. In 2008, insurgent activity increased
dramatically, including an increase in improvised explosive device attacks,
as well as attacks focused on infrastructure, development, and
construction projects.

d09473sp.pdf

***

The increase in insurgent attacks, especially in the east and the south, has
impeded security and reconstruction efforts in those regions.
• State officials reported that the development of the Afghan National
Security Forces has been impeded by the security situation. For example,
despite the fact that the Afghan National Army is directly charged with
defeating the insurgency and terrorism, the Afghan National Police are
often reassigned from their training to provide immediate help with the
counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of their training.
• According to USAID, programs ranging from road reconstruction to power
generation, face significant cost increases and were delayed or abandoned
due to a lack of security.

***

Rebuilding Iraq -

Economic Reform and Reconstruction
Building a sustainable market economy in Iraq will likely be a long-term effort. Iraq’s centralized economic and political structure will require fundamental changes similar to those that are taking place in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The most immediate concern is Iraq’s physical reconstruction, including building roads, schools, and power plants. Another immediate concern is Iraq’s external debt and its war reparations resulting from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—estimated to be as much as $400 billion. Additional concerns are the U.N. sanctions against Iraq and the related oil for food program, which still has more than $3 billion in escrow. Potential issues include oversight of the efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction; the role and contributions of allies, the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; the pros and cons of forgiving Iraq’s external debt; and resolution of the oil for food program.

[etc.]

The fiscal year 2003 emergency supplemental
authorized about $2.5 billion for relief and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, available through fiscal
year 2004. As of April 24, 2003, the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) estimated that they would
provide about $596.5 million in assistance to Iraq in
fiscal year 2003. This amount does not reflect all
estimated assistance to Iraq for fiscal year 2003.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03792r.pdf

***

My Note -

Do you have any idea what I could do with a billion dollars? For one thing, I would design a gizmo that would melt IED ignition / detonation systems within a hundred yards of any of our troops. But, then – that is not the most important thing compared to giving bankers the money to back their bad bets and poor choices or funding the destruction of and then rebuilding of countries who basically hate us. (and always will.)

- cricketdiane

***

Russian tanks and rocket systems to boost Latin America’s military potential

14 September, 2009, 18:12

Russia will lend $2.2 billion to Venezuela, says President Hugo Chavez after his visit to Moscow. The money will help Venezuela’s military potential, which Chavez deems crucial as US influence grows in the region.

President Hugo Chavez says his country is buying nearly 100 T-72 tanks and an S-300 air-defense system, using a more than $2 billion loan it got from Russia.

The announcement was made just days after President Chavez’s two-day visit to Moscow, during which he recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“We have good relations with Venezuela both military, economic and cultural. There is no embargo on the selling of arms to this country so if it wants to buy our military hardware, we are ready to supply it,” explains Vladimir Travkin, editor-in-chief of the, Latin America magazine.

It comes as Colombia is planning to allow the United States access to seven military bases in the country, officially to help it in the war against drugs and left-wing guerillas.

But Venezuela says it’s a threat to its national security as it holds some of the largest oil reserves in the world.

President Chavez stresses the new measures are strictly for protection from the Empire – a term the President often uses when referring to the United States.

“It’s doubtful the US will engage in a war with Venezuela. American soldiers are already fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan. But any leader with some self-respect has to think about how to protect his country from potential threats,” says Viktor Litovkin, an analyst from Independent Military Review newspaper.

The S-300 is planned to be the foundation of Venezuela’s air-defense shield.

Developed in the USSR and produced in Russia, it’s designed to knockout planes and ballistic missiles. Its radars can simultaneously track up to one hundred targets while engaging up to twelve.

Chavez says he also plans to buy other air-defense systems from Russia with Venezuela’s military already being the most powerful in Latin America.

http://russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-09-14/russian-tanks-latin-america.html

***

Afghanistan – here $38 Billion – there $38 Billion – everywhere another $38 Billion – except to repair America’s infrastructure – well, unless you’re a wealthy banker, then the USA can freely give you Hundreds of BILLIONS of dollars to back your bad bets and stock market gambling

Posted by cricketdiane on September 27, 2009

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09473sp.pdf

Table 1: U.S. Government Funding Provided in Support of Afghan Security, Stabilization, and Development, Fiscal Years
2002-2009
Fiscal Years
Dollars in millions 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009a Total
Security $147 $388 $949 $2,307 $1,989 $7,431 $2,763 $5,606 $21,580
— Afghan National Army 86 361 719 1,633 736 4,872 1,778 4,043 14,228
— Afghan National Police 24 0 160 624 1,217 2,523 964 1,512 7,024
— Other security 37 27 70 50 36 36 21 51 328
Governance, rule of law, human rights 110 97 262 244 110 286 517 824 2,450
— Democracy/Governance 103 89 233 223 80 221 391 614 1,954
— Rule of law 7 8 29 21 30 65 126 210 496
Economic and social development 650 498 1,153 1,570 1,007 1,591 2,100 2,448 11,017
— Reconstruction 124 295 855 1,240 706 1,191 1,494 1,871 7,776
— Humanitarian/Other 526 203 298 330 301 400 606 577 3,241
Counternarcotics 40 3 126 775 420 737 617 802 3,520
— Eradication 39 0 50 257 138 177 183 202 1,046
— Interdiction 1 3 76 338 137 323 248 366 1,492
— Alternative development 0 0 0 175 140 229 181 225 950
— Other counternarcotics 0 0 0 5 5 8 5 9 32
Total $947 $986 $2,490 $4,896 $3,526 $10,045 $5,997 $9,680 $38,567

Source: Departments of Defense and State.
Note: Funding provided includes assistance for Afghanistan from a variety of budget accounts, such as Afghan Security Forces Funding, Economic Support Funds, and Commander’s Emergency Response Funds, among others; State/USAID operations funding; and use of drawdown authority
contained in legislation such as the Afghan Freedom Support Act. Relevant transfers and reprogramming also are included.
a According to State, fiscal year 2009 numbers include preliminary allocations of funding received in the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, as well as preliminary funding allocations from the
fiscal year 2009 supplemental request.
4 Specific funding figures for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan do not exist because funding provided to DOD for military operations in support of the GWOT, which includes Afghanistan, is not appropriated by country or specific contingency operation. Funding for military operations covers expenses such as personnel costs of mobilized reservists; costs for housing, food, and fuel; and costs to repair and replace equipment.

[etc.]

***

In 2006, the government of Afghanistan, along with the international partners, adopted the Afghanistan Compact, a political agreement outlining the international community’s commitment to provide resources and support to achieve Afghanistan’s security, governance, and reconstruction goals as set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Subsequently, more than 70 nations pledged over $57 billion in aid toward the achievement of these goals. The United States alone provided $32 billion. United States efforts to work with NATO partners and other contributing countries present unique opportunities in Afghanistan, but also pose some challenges. In March 2009, the President announced a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

[ . . . ]

As part of a UN mandate, the United States established Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 2002, which were transferred to ISAF
authority in 2003. PRTs consist of military officers, diplomats, and
reconstruction subject matter experts working to support reconstruction efforts. The PRTs’ mission is to assist the government of Afghanistan in extending its authority; facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment; and, through military presence, enable security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts. The United States leads 12 of 26 PRTs (see fig 3).

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09473sp.pdf

***

In early 2006, there were over 36,000 U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan.
As of February 2009, there are over 65,000 troops with over 35,000 U.S. troops and over 30,000 other troops from more than 40 different countries in Afghanistan. The new administration has indicated that it intends to send up to approximately 21,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan in 2009.
The increase in insurgent attacks, especially in the east and the south, has
impeded security and reconstruction efforts in those regions.
• State officials reported that the development of the Afghan National
Security Forces has been impeded by the security situation. For example,
despite the fact that the Afghan National Army is directly charged with
defeating the insurgency and terrorism, the Afghan National Police are
often reassigned from their training to provide immediate help with the
counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of their training.
• According to USAID, programs ranging from road reconstruction to power
generation, face significant cost increases and were delayed or abandoned
due to a lack of security.

(from the same document – April 2009)

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09473sp.pdf

***

My Note – but after spending hundreds of billions in private contracts for Iraq’s infrastructure and now in Afghanistan – plus in Chile and no telling where all else, this little note from the GAO describes what the people of the United States get -

Why GAO Did This Study
Highlights
Accountability Integrity Reliability
May 8, 2008
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Challenges and Investment Options for the Nation’s Infrastructure
Highlights of GAO-08-763T, a testimony before the Committee on the Budget and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives
Physical infrastructure is critical to the nation’s economy and affects the daily life of virtually all Americans—from facilitating the movement of goods and people within and beyond U.S. borders to providing clean drinking water. However, this infrastructure—including aviation, highway, transit, rail, water, and dam infrastructure—is under strain. Estimates to repair, replace, or upgrade aging infrastructure as well as expand capacity to meet increased demand top hundreds of billions of dollars. Calls for increased investment in infrastructure come at a time when traditional funding for infrastructure projects is increasingly strained, and the federal government’s fiscal outlook is worse than many may understand.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08763t.pdf

***

US Corps of Engineers is busy spending their time and money in Iraq and Afghanistan – that’s why they can’t get anything done right in the United States as it crumbles around us and becomes ever more dangerous to US citizens who have paid for every cent, dime, and dollar by the hundreds of billions of dollars in taxes and use fees, registrations, fines and matching state tax funds that the Corps of Engineers and their civilian contractors are blatantly misusing, diverting to foreign enterprises and treasonously mismanaging

Posted by cricketdiane on September 27, 2009

US Army Corps of Engineers – (USACE)

USACE directly supports the military at the front, making expertise available to commanders to help solve and avoid engineering and other problems. Forward Engineer Support Teams may accompany combat engineers to provide immediate support, or to reach back electronically into the rest of the Corps for the necessary expertise. Corps professionals use the knowledge and skills honed on both military and civil projects to support the US and local communities in the areas of real estate, contracting, mapping, construction, logistics, engineering, and management experience. This work currently includes support for rebuilding Iraq, establishing Afghanistan infrastructure, and supporting international and interagency services.

In addition, the work of almost 34,000 civilians on civil works programs throughout USACE provide a training ground for similar capabilities worldwide. USACE civilians volunteer for assignments worldwide. For example, hydropower experts have helped repair, renovate, and run hydropower dams in Iraq in an effort to help get Iraqis to become self-sustaining.[4][5]

* More than 90 percent of the USACE construction contracts have been awarded to Iraqi-owned businesses – offering employment opportunities, boosting the economy, providing jobs, and training, promoting stability and security where before there was none. Consequently, the mission is a central part of the U.S. exit strategy.

* Completed over 4,400 infrastructure projects in Iraq at an estimated cost of $6.5 billion and over 500 projects ($2.6 billion) are ongoing: school projects (324,000 students), crude oil production 3 million barrels per day (480,000 m³/d), potable water projects (3.9 million people (goal 5.2 million)), fire stations, border posts, prison/courthouse improvements, transportation/communication projects, village road/expressways, railroad stations, postal facilities, and aviation projects.

* At work in more than 90 countries (while the US infrastructure kills and maims through their neglect, incompetence, dereliction of duty, and by abuse of the authority, resources and office they’ve been given. – my note)

* Gulf Region Division (Provisional) (GRD) (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), located in Baghdad, Iraq.[5] Its three districts are in North, Central, and South Iraq. There are more than 4,600 projects in the works with more than 4,000 completed through 2007. GRD is staffed primarily by civilian volunteers from throughout USACE.
* Afghanistan Engineer District (Provisional) (AED) (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM), located in Kabul, Afghanistan.[5] The Corps of Engineers built much of the original Ring Road in the early 1960s and returned in 2002 Supports the full spectrum of regional support, including the Afghan National Security Forces, US and Coalition Forces, Counter Narcotics and Border Management, Strategic Reconstruction support to USAID, and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. AED is also primarily staffed by civilian volunteers from throughout USACE.

[from - ]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Corps_of_Engineers

In both its Civil Works mission and Military Construction program, the Corps is responsible for billions of dollars of the nation’s infrastructure. For example, the Corps maintains direct control 609 dams, maintains and/or operates 257 navigation locks, and operates 75 hydroelectric facilities generating 24% of the nation’s hydropower and three percent of its total electricity. USACE inspects over 2,000 Federal and non-Federal levees every two years. (my note- but 90% of the contracts and hundreds of billions of dollars intended for our infrastructure restoration and repair are going to Iraq and Afghanistan.)

Headquarters

The Headquarters group defines policy and guidance and plans direction for the organizations within the Corps. It is made up of an Executive Office and 17 Staff Principals.[1] Located in Washington, DC, the Headquarters creates policy and plans the future direction of all other Corps organizations.

USACE has two directors who head up Military Programs and Civil Works.

* Steve Stockton, Director of Military Programs.
* Joe Tyler, Director of Civil Works

Colonel Debra Lewis, the Gulf Region Division Central District commander with Sheik O’rhaman Hama Raheem, an Iraqi councilman, celebrate the opening of a new women’s center in Assriya Village that the Corps helped construct in 2006.

(while they tell us there is no money for our dams to be repaired, our bridges and water systems to be brought up to a basic standard of safety and entire system is in dangerous disrepair and inadequacy. – my note)

***

“America Betrayed” documentary 2008

About the movie

From 9/11, to the war in Iraq, to the worst disaster in U.S. history, the levee failures in Hurricane Katrina, America Betrayed follows the money, and the path leads straight back to the hallowed halls of Congress… the profits straight into the pockets of those with ties to the Executive Branch.

America Betrayed is the story of waste, fraud, and abuse at the very highest echelons of our federal government. Through interviews with Pulitzer Prize winning journalists from the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and TIME Magazine, to noted scientists from Berkeley and Harvard, to U.S. Senators and Congressman, America Betrayed takes an in-depth look at just how our government’s dirty little secrets have impeded an investigation into 9/11 and nearly ruined a great American city…New Orleans.

The gloves are off, and the inside story is being told, as longtime broadcast journalist and documentary filmmaker Leslie Cardé talks for the first time with insiders who know exactly how the game is played.

From the contractors who built sub-standard structures in New Orleans and were told to “keep quiet”, to the whistleblowers who sacrificed their jobs to come forward and expose the cover-ups, cooked books, and cronyism nationwide within the Army Corps of Engineers, this film digs deep to unearth the truth.

While scientists charged with investigating the Katrina disaster were intentionally led astray, journalists dug their heels in to get to the root of “disaster capitalism”,a process by which government insiders cash in with emergency no-bid contracts, in times of national stress.

America Betrayed clearly exposes our government’s misappropriation of funds in spending its citizens’ hard-earned tax dollars on rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure, while the bridges, dams, levees and highways in this country are crumbling. America Betrayed is a cautionary tale for those who trust their government, and hopefully a wake-up call to change the status quo in Washington.

http://www.americabetrayedmovie.com/

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1268175/

Be prepared to pull your hair out, 2 July 2009

Author: Roland E. Zwick (magneteach@aol.com) from United States

If you’re looking for a movie to really get your blood boiling, search no further than “America Betrayed,” a shocking and revelatory documentary that examines the deplorable condition that much of our nation’s infrastructure is in at the moment.

Writer/director Leslie Carde finds her villain in the US Army Corps of Engineers, an agency whose primary aim is supposed to be that of protecting the nation’s citizenry from potential disasters caused by the structural failure of dams, bridges, levees, buildings etc.

Instead, the Corps, in cahoots with the many politicians and congressmen who work right along with it, has been found, over and over again, to be derelict in its duties – guilty of negligence, of employing harmful cost-cutting measures, of having misplaced priorities, of engaging in outright deception, and of brokering sweetheart deals with pet contractors.

The movie is unsparing in its treatment of the Corps, and Carde clearly views it as her own personal mission to hold that organization accountable for the many acts of criminal malfeasance it has engaged in over the years. I think it speaks volumes that no member of the Corps was willing to be interviewed for this film.

The movie chooses as its focal point the catastrophic failure of the levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in the almost complete annihilation of one of America’s premier cities. Interviewee after interviewee refers to Katrina not as a “natural” disaster but as a man-made one. And given the facts as Carde lays them out for us, the film makes a very convincing case for that argument.

The scenes set in New Orleans – both during the hurricane and in the wake of its aftermath – are heartbreaking in the extreme. But it isn’t just in New Orleans that the problem lies. The movie makes it clear that there are literally hundreds of other potentially dangerous levees and dams scattered throughout the country, most notably in the earthquake-prone Central Valley region of California. And that isn’t even taking into account all the aging, structurally unsound bridges, sewer systems, roadways, etc. that are also threatening to give way at any moment – as exemplified by the Minnesota bridge collapse that resulted in the deaths of thirteen people on August 1, 2007.

Most galling, perhaps, is the fact that so many of the funds that could have been earmarked for retrofitting projects here in the U.S. have been diverted to similar projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Carde’s work extends far beyond the issue of infrastructure; she views this as merely a symbol of the much greater failure of government overall, of our unwillingness as a nation to value the safety of our people over corporate profit and special interest deal-making.

“America Betrayed” is indeed a powerful and important social document – but be prepared to seethe.

***

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Corps_of_Engineers

* Structural Flood Control
o Flood Control Act of 1928 which holds the corps exempt from financial liability should their flood control structures fail

***

(And who paid for this stuff – US taxpayers, our families, our pocketbooks, our sacrifices – )

Construction

Inspection Party, 1952

Congress authorized Buford Dam for construction in 1946 as part of the overall development of the nation’s waterways after the Second World War.

The river and harbor legislation that came out of Congress during this time period was targeted at developing the nation’s rivers systems for national defense, flood control, power production, navigation and water supplies.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was involved in hundreds of projects all over the United States, as the scope of this massive undertaking was unprecedented.

Funding for construction first appeared on the horizon for the project in late 1949 as part of a multi-million dollar public works appropriation for the State of Georgia which saw $750,000.00 go to Buford Dam. This money was used to complete the initial planning and design phases of the project such as the powerhouse design and for the start of construction. The ground breaking was held on the Gwinnett County side of the future dam site on March 1, 1950.

Excavation for Powerhouse, 1951

Hundreds of people from all over North Georgia braved the cold damp weather conditions to make the trek along the water soaked muddy roads to get to the groundbreaking ceremony. The work on the three saddle dikes, main earth dam, powerhouse, as well as bridge & highway relocation and construction would take over seven years. Although the work would be completed by private companies they would have to follow government specifications agreed to at the time the contracts were awarded.

During this time period the government would also have to acquire the rights to over 56,000 acres of land and see to the relocation of over 700 families. This was necessary in order to prepare the land for a 38,000-acre reservoir with over 692 miles of shoreline. The government followed strict guidelines spelled out in the “River and Harbor Act” legislation in acquiring private property for public use. Careful attention was paid in removing homes, barns, wells, fencing, and other physical property to prevent navigation hazards on the lake in the future. This one aspect of the project’s construction had a price tag of over 19 million dollars. Most property was purchased for between $25 and $75 per acre. When complete, the total cost of the project’s construction, including the acquisition of land related items, was nearly 45 million dollars.

Construction of penstocks, 1953

On February 1, 1956 the gates of the intake structure were closed on the lakeside of the dam starting the slow process of creating the reservoir that was eventually named Lake Sidney Lanier after the Georgia born poet and musician who died in the 1880’s. It took over three years for the lake to record its normal elevation of 1070 feet above sea level for the first time on May 25, 1959. The dedication was held on top of the intake structure parking lot on October 9, 1957.

http://lanier.sam.usace.army.mil/history.htm

***

My Note – even the Corps of Engineers admission of this history refers to drinking water / civilian water needs in the purposes of the Lanier reservoir. But, no – not according to a district judge who favored the shellfish over the needs of people and their children.

***

4:47 p.m. Tuesday, September 22, 2009

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Sewage plants swamped in Fulton, Cobb, Gwinnett

By By D.L. Bennett

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

// <![CDATA[
/* //

The record rains of the past few days flooded out sewage treatment plants in Fulton, Cobb and Gwinnett counties, dumping millions of gallons of untreated sewage into local waterways.

Enlarge photo

Rising water from the Chattahoochee River flooded out Atlanta's R.M. Clayton Water Reclamation Center Tueday, causing a massive dump of sewage into the rain-swollen river.

Elissa Eubanks, eeubanks@ajc.com Rising water from the Chattahoochee River flooded out Atlanta's R.M. Clayton Water Reclamation Center Tueday, causing a massive dump of sewage into the rain-swollen river.

Atlanta Flood 2009 »

Santa Susana Field Laboratory

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This article has been nominated to be checked for its neutrality. Discussion of this nomination can be found on the talk page. (July 2009)

SSFL administrative areas and surrounding communities.

1990 Aerial view of the Energy Technology Engineering Center located in Area IV

The Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) is a once prolific rocket and nuclear reactor test facility located 30 miles (48 km) north of downtown Los Angeles, California. SSFL continues to operate today, serving as a research facility for The Boeing Company. The first commercial nuclear-power producing reactor (the Sodium Reactor Experiment) inside the United States was built at SSFL. The SRE came online in April 1957, and began feeding electricity to the grid on July 12, 1957. The reactor powered over 1,100 homes in the Moorpark area of California for a short period of time. Today, all nuclear research and most rocket testing has been halted.

Various research initiatives, such as the development of the Saturn rockets that powered the Apollo missions, the rockets that powered the vast ballistic missile arsenal of the United States during the Cold War years, and even a program to develop nuclear reactors for use in outer space were undertaken at the facility.

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History

Founded in the mid-1940s, SSFL was slated as a United States government facility dedicated to the development and testing of nuclear reactors, powerful rockets like the Delta II, and the systems that powered the Apollo missions. The location of SSFL was chosen for its remoteness in order to conduct work that was considered too dangerous to be performed in more densely populated areas. In subsequent years however, Southern California’s population mushroomed. Today, more than 150,000 people live within 5 miles (8 km) of the facility, and at least half a million people live within 10 miles (16 km). The area is south of Sage Ranch Park.

At a size of 2,850 acres (11 km²), SSFL is situated on top of the Simi Hills, overlooking Simi Valley to the north, Chatsworth, Canoga Park, and the West Hills areas of the San Fernando Valley — a densely populated area on the northernmost border of Los Angeles’ city limits — to the south.

The site is divided into four areas, (area I, II, III, IV). Areas I through III were used for rocket testing, missile testing, and munitions development. Area IV was used primarily for nuclear reactor experimentation and development. Laser research for the Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as “Star Wars”), was also conducted in Area IV.

Rocketry

North American Aviation (NAA) began its development of liquid propellant rocket engines after the end of WWII. The Rocketdyne division of NAA, which came into being under its own name in the mid-1950s, designed and tested several rocket engines at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory located in the mountains northwest of Chatsworth, California. They included engines for the Army’s Redstone (an advanced short-range copy of the German V-2), and the Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) as well as the Air Force’s counterpart IRBM, the Thor. Also included were engines for the Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), as well as the twin combustion chamber alcohol/liquid oxygen booster engine for the NAVAHO, a large, intercontinental cruise missile that never became operational. Later, Rocketdyne designed and tested the huge F-1 engine that was eventually used as one of a cluster of engines powering the Apollo booster, as well as the J-2 liquid oxygen/hydrogen upper stage engine also used on the Project Apollo spacecraft.^[1]

Nuclear facilities and accidents

This worker is John Pace helping align equipment over the SRE reactor core after the meltdown. His hat reads: “Your safety is our business, Atomics International.”

Throughout the years, approximately ten low-power nuclear reactors operated at SSFL, in addition to several “critical facilities”: a sodium burn pit in which sodium-coated objects were burned in an open pit; a plutonium fuel fabrication facility; a uranium carbide fuel fabrication facility; and purportedly the largest “Hot Lab” facility in the United States at the time. (A Hot Lab is a facility used for remotely cutting up irradiated nuclear fuel.) Irradiated nuclear fuel from other Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Department of Energy (DOE) facilities from around the country were shipped to SSFL to be decladded and examined.

The Hot Lab suffered a number of fires involving radioactive materials. For example, in 1957, a fire in the Hot Cell “got out of control and … massive contamination” resulted. (see: NAA-SR-1941, Sodium Graphite Reactor, Quarterly Progress Report, January-March 1957). Another radioactive fire occurred in 1971, involving combustible primary reactor coolant (NaK) contaminated with mixed fission products. (see: Rockwell International, Nuclear Operations at Rockwell’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory — A Factual Perspective, September 6, 1991).

At least four of the ten nuclear reactors suffered accidents. The AE6 reactor experienced a release of fission gases in March 1959, the SRE experienced a power excursion and partial meltdown in July 1959; the SNAP8ER in 1964 experienced damage to 80% of its fuel; and the SNAP8DR in 1969 experienced similar damage to one-third of its fuel. (see “Reactor accident sources” below).

Unfortunately, the reactors located on the grounds of SSFL were considered experimental, and therefore had no containment structures. Reactors and highly radioactive components were housed without the large concrete domes that surround modern power reactors.

Sodium Reactor Experiment

Main article: Sodium Reactor Experiment

The Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) was an experimental nuclear reactor which operated from 1957 to 1964. On July 12, 1957, its electrical generating system produced the first electricity generated from a nuclear power system to supply a commercial power grid by powering homes in the nearby city of Moorpark. In July 1959, internal cooling channels within the reactor became obstructed by a contaminant causing 13 of 43 reactor fuel elements to partially melt.^[2] The reactor was repaired and returned to operation in September, 1960 and completed operations in February 1964.^[3] The reactor and support systems were removed in 1981 and the building torn down in 1999.

The 1959 incident caused the release of radioactive gasses from the fuel elements. Reports and other documentation prepared by the reactor operators (Atomics International) shortly after the incident indicate the gasses were collected, monitored, contained, allowed to decay to acceptable limits then released to the atmosphere over a period of about two months all in compliance with the requirements in effect at the time.^[4] In 2004, an analysis of the 1959 incident was prepared to support a lawsuit against the Boeing Company. The analysis concludes the SRE incident may have released up to 260 times more radioactive iodine-131 than the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. Boeing maintains that only a much smaller amount of only xenon-133 and krypton-85 were released. The contradictory analysis of the 1959 incident has been a source of controversy in the neighboring community, however, environmental contamination resulting from the July 1959 incident has not been yet found.^[5] In April, 2009, The Department of Energy announced the dedication of $41.5 million dollars to provide for additional environmental sampling of the 260-acre Area IV, including the former SRE site.

Advanced Epithermal Thorium Reactor

The Advanced Epithermal Thorium Reactor was housed in Building 4100. It was used to study twenty different nuclear reactor core configurations by using an apparatus which supported a range of geometries.^[6]

Energy Technology Engineering Center

Main article: Energy Technology Engineering Center

The Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC), was a government-owned, contractor-operated complex of industrial facilities located within Area IV of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory. The ETEC specialized in non-nuclear testing of components which were designed to transfer heat from a nuclear reactor using liquid metals instead of water or gas. The center operated from 1966 to 1998. The ETEC site has been closed and is now undergoing building removal and environmental remediation by the U.S. Department of Energy.

Site contamination

The sodium burn pit, an open-air pit for cleaning sodium-contaminated components, was also contaminated when radioactively and chemically-contaminated items were burned in it, in contravention of safety requirements. In an article in the Ventura County Star, James Palmer, a former SSFL worker was interviewed. The article notes that “of the 27 men on Palmer’s crew, 22 died of cancers.” On some nights Palmer returned home from work and kissed “his [wife] hello, only to burn her lips with the chemicals he had breathed at work.” The report also noted that “During their breaks, Palmer’s crew would fish in one of three ponds … The men would use a solution that was 90 percent hydrogen peroxide to neutralize the contamination. Sometimes, the water was so polluted it bubbled. The fish died off.” Palmer’s interview ended on a somber note: “They had seven wells up there, water wells, and every damn one of them was contaminated,” Palmer said, “It was a horror story.” (See: The Cancer Effect, October 30, 2006, The Ventura County Star.)

Other spills and releases occurred over the decades of operation as well. In 1989, a DOE investigation found widespread chemical and radioactive contamination on the property. Widely publicized in the local press, the revelations led to substantial concern among community members and elected officials, resulting in a challenge to and subsequent shutdown of continued nuclear activity at the site, and the filing of lawsuits. Cleanup commenced, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was brought in at the request of local legislators to provide oversight.

A Worker disposes of toxic chemicals by blowing up full barrels with a rifle shot (the reaction to the shot caused an explosion).

On December 11, 2002, a top Department of Energy (DOE) official, Mike Lopez, described typical clean-up procedures executed by Field Lab employees in the past. Workers would dispose of barrels filled with highly toxic waste by shooting the barrels with rifles so that they would explode and release their contents into the air. It is unclear when this process ended, but for certain did end prior to the 1990s. (See: “Rocketdyne, it’s the pits,” Ventura County Reporter, December 12, 2002; also see SB990, a bill before the California legislature relating this almost unbelievable procedure.)

On July 26, 1994, two scientists, Otto K. Heiney, 52, of Chatsworth and Larry A. Pugh, 51, of Thousand Oaks, were killed when the chemicals they were illegally burning in open pits exploded. After a grand jury investigation and FBI raid on the facility, three Rocketdyne officials pleaded guilty in June 2004 to illegally storing explosive materials. The jury deadlocked on the more serious charges related to illegal burning of hazardous waste. (see: “Scientist Fined $100 in Lab Blast That Killed 2,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2003 Thursday; also see “Executive Sentenced in ’94 Blast; A former Rocketdyne official gets probation for violations linked to two scientists’ deaths.” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2003 Tuesday.)

(So apparently a human life to our court judges, when it involves the upper crust as responsible for criminally cutting short that life – is about $50 a piece and probation. They ought to make those executives and their supervising management employees live in the contaminants on that property. – my note)

Toxic substances burn and are released into the air.

At trial, a retired Rocketdyne mechanic testified as to what he witnessed at the time of the explosion:

“I assumed we were burning waste,” Wells testified, comparing the process used on July 21 and 26, 1994, to that once used to legally dispose of leftover chemicals at the company’s old burn pit. As Heiney poured the chemicals for what would have been the third burn of the day, the blast occurred, Wells said. “It was so loud I didn’t hear anything … I felt the blast and I looked down and my shirt was coming apart.”

When he realized what had occurred, Wells said, “I felt to see if I was all there … I knew I was burned but I didn’t know how bad.” (See: “Ex-Rocketdyne Worker Describes Fatal 1994 Blast,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2002 Saturday)

In 2005, wildfires swept through northern Los Angeles County and parts of Ventura County. The fires consumed most of the dry brush throughout the Simi Hills where SSFL is located. The facility received substantial fire damage. Since the fire, allegations have emerged that vast quantities of on-site contamination was burned up, and released into the air. Most recently, Los Angeles County firefighters who were assigned to SSFL during the fire have been sent for medical testing to see if any harmful doses were ingested or inhaled while protecting the facility.

While community members and firefighters have expressed concern about the amount of exposure, Boeing officials stand by their position that no contamination of the air resulted from the fire, and that any contamination that may have been consumed by the fire was negligible.

California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control also claims that no significant contamination occurred as a result of the fire. Although the Field Lab is under current criticism for violating almost 50 discharge permits, State agencies have been silent on the issue. Recently, lawyers disclosed to the California Water Resources Control Board that over 80 exceedances of Boeing’s discharge permits were found in the past year alone. In January 2006, the State Water Resources Control Board finally stepped in, and refused some requests by Boeing for even lighter standards.

Also in October 2005, Plaintiff Margaret-Ann Galasso, in a suit against Boeing criticized her attorneys, who, as she claimed, accepted a $30 million dollar settlement with Boeing without her approval. The attorneys stand to collect $18 million, or 60% of the settlement amount after their costs and fees are subtracted. The Plaintiff who disclosed the allegedly tainted deal is splitting the rest of the settlement with other plaintiffs and will only receive around $30,000, a far cry from the amount she will need for extensive future medical treatments for diseases that were linked to contamination from the SSFL facility.

In October 2006, the Santa Susana Field Laboratory Advisory Panel, made up of independent scientists and researchers from around the United States, concluded that contamination at the facility resulted in between 0 and 1,800 cancer deaths (the average estimate was 300 deaths). The report also concluded that the SRE meltdown caused the release of more than 458 times the amount of radiation released at Three Mile Island.[1]

On October 15, 2007, Boeing announced that “In a landmark agreement between Boeing and California officials, nearly 2,400 acres (10 km²) of land that is currently Boeing’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory will become state parkland. According to the plan jointly announced Friday by California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Boeing and state Sen. Sheila Kuehl, the property will be donated and preserved as a vital undeveloped open-space link in the Santa Susana Mountains above Simi Valley and the San Fernando Valley. The agreement will permanently restrict the land for nonresidential, noncommercial use.”

Conflict over cleanup

At least 4 nuclear accidents and over 30,000 rocket engine tests have occurred at SSFL over the years. Many critics and local residents believe that SSFL remains a highly polluted site to this day. Widespread use of highly toxic chemicals to power the rocket tests and to clean rocket test-stands after the testing as well as contamination that resulted from the considerable nuclear research is at the heart of such claims.

Cleanup Standards

Future use of the land SSFL is located on is also a source of much debate. The site’s current owners, the Boeing Company have issued statements suggesting that the land may be sold for future unrestricted residential development without having cleaned the site up to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cleanup standards. On August 2, 2005, Pratt & Whitney purchased Rocketdyne from Boeing, but refused to acquire SSFL as part of the sale.

However, in March 2003, DOE reversed its position and announced that SSFL would not be cleaned up to EPA Superfund standards. While DOE simultaneously claimed compliance with the 1995 Joint Policy Agreement, the new plan included a cleanup of only 1% of the contaminated soil, and the release of SSFL for unrestricted residential use in as little as ten years. EPA responded to this announcement by claiming that DOE was not subject to EPA regulation due to the fact that DOE existed as a separate entity under the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, and refused take steps to force DOE adherence to the 1995 agreement.

In August 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report on Energy and Water Appropriations, urging DOE to live up to its commitments in the 1995 Joint Policy and clean up SSFL to EPA’s CERCLA standards. Shortly thereafter, DOE responded to the Senate, claiming it was in fact consistent with both the Joint Policy and EPA’s CERCLA standards.

In December 2003, soon after DOE’s announcement that it was consistent with the 1995 agreement, EPA issued its own formal findings. EPA determined that the cleanup was not consistent with its CERCLA standards, and that sufficient contamination would remain at levels that would be dangerously inappropriate for unrestricted residential, and that the only safe use under DOE’s revised cleanup standards would be restricted day hikes with limitations on picnicking.

Critics point out that if the DOE-Boeing cleanup plan was followed through and the site was released for unrestricted residential use, the property would likely become a Superfund site subject to EPA standards. After the sale, the site would no longer be a DOE facility, and thus, the exemption from CERCLA standards would no longer be in effect.

The end result being that the site would only be brought into compliance with CERCLA cleanup standards after Boeing has sold the property, relieving the company of any burden of cleanup costs. The costs would likely be passed on to taxpayers, and not those responsible for the actual contamination. This is merely critical analysis, however, and it remains unclear as to what cleanup standards DOE and Boeing will end up setting for themselves.

In early May 2007, a Federal Court in San Francisco issued a major ruling which concluded that DOE has not been cleaning up the site to proper standards, and that the site would have to be cleaned up to higher standards if DOE ever wanted to release the site to Boeing, which in turn, would most likely release the land for unrestricted residential development.

From the L.A. Times (“Judge assails Rocketdyne cleanup” print edition, California section, May 3, 2007): Judge “Conti’s ruling requires DOE to prepare a more stringent review of the lab, which is on the border of Los Angeles County. Conti wrote that the department’s decision to prepare a less-stringent environmental document prior to cleanup is in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act and noted that the lab ‘is located only miles away from one of the largest population centers in the world.’”

On July 26, 2007, staff at the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board recommended a $471,190 fine against Boeing Co. for 79 violations of the California Water Code during an 18-month period.

From October 2004 to January 2006, wastewater and storm water runoff coming from the lab had increased levels of chromium, dioxin, lead, mercury and other pollutants, the water board said. The contaminated water flowed into Bell Creek and the Los Angeles River in violation of a July 1, 2004, permit that allowed release of wastewater and storm water runoff as long as it didn’t contain high levels of pollutants.

On October 15, 2007, Boeing announced that “In a landmark agreement between Boeing and California officials, nearly 2,400 acres (10 km²) of land that is currently Boeing’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory will become state parkland. According to the plan jointly announced by California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Boeing and state Sen. Sheila Kuehl, the property will be donated and preserved as a vital undeveloped open-space link in the Santa Susana Mountains above Simi Valley and the San Fernando Valley. The agreement will permanently restrict the land for nonresidential, noncommercial use.”

Community Involvement

Every quarter, Simi Valley hosts workgroup meetings regarding the cleanup of SSFL that is open to the public attendance and comment.

The workgroup consists of representatives from the California Department of Toxic Substances Control and the U.S. EPA. Public policy organizations such as Committee to Bridge the Gap also send representatives as part of the work group. The Boeing Company, current owner of the SSFL site is also invited, but has boycotted the meetings for the past few years. The DOE has also been invited, but like Boeing, had boycotted the meetings for the past few years. In August 2007, however, the DOE for the first time in years sent representatives to the quarterly workgroup meeting. Other organizations and private companies also attend as part of the workgroup depending on the topic pending.

The meetings are typically held at The Simi Valley Cultural Arts Center, located at 3050 Los Angeles Avenue, Simi Valley, CA 93065.

References

^ The F-1 engine was so big that it could not be tested at the Rocketdyne Field Laboratory which was too close to populated San Fernando Valley areas, and tests on it were run out in the desert at the Edwards Air Force base. “Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, Chapter 3.2“. NASA. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-350/ch-3-2.html.
^ Ashley, R.L.; et. Al (1961). SRE Fuel Element Damage, Final Report of the Atomics International Ad Hoc Committee. NAA-SR-4488-supl. http://www.etec.energy.gov/Health-and-Safety/Documents/SSFLPanelFiles/NAA-SR-4488-Final.pdf.
^ Rockwell International Corporation, Energy Systems Group. “Sodium Reactor Experiment Decommissioning Final Report“. pp. 4. http://etec.energy.gov/History/Major-Operations/SREDocs/ESG-DOE-13403_SREDecomReport_(4143).pdf. Retrieved April3, 2009.
^ Daniel, John A (May 27, 2005). Investigation of releases from Santa Susana Sodium Reactor Experiment. pp. See appendix C and F for copies of original documents. http://etec.energy.gov/Health-and-Safety/Documents/SSFLPanelFiles/Daniel_Report_on_SRE_Total.
^ “Fact Sheet: EPA Concludes Superfund Evaluation of ETEC Area IV“. December 2003. http://www.etec.energy.gov/Regulation/RegDocs/EPAHRS.pdf. Retrieved April 3, 2009.
^ Advanced Epithermal Thorium Reactor

External links and Sources

“RocketdyneWatch“. A new website dedicated to proper public disclosure of the activities at the SSFL, complete with a historic news archive dating back to the 1980s, a document archive, and other relevant information to this contentious site. http://www.rocketdynewatch.org. Retrieved January 1, 2007.
“U.S. DOE ETEC Closure Project Website“. DOE-sponsored project website provides historical ETEC technology development, site usage and current closure project information. Interactive graphic found in Regulation section explains the various involved regulatory agencies and their roles at the site. Large number of documents located in the Reading Room. http://etec.energy.gov. Retrieved September 12, 2008.
“Santa Susana Field Laboratory Site Investigation and Cleanup website“. Hosted by the California State Department of Toxic Substances Control which oversees the investigation and cleanup of chemicals in the soil and groundwater at the SSFL. Project status documents, reports and public comment materials are available. http://www.dtsc-ssfl.com/. Retrieved September14, 2006.
“About Us – Santa Susana website“. Brief website hosted by The Boeing Company, the largest landowner of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory. This site contains general information and a cleanup completion schedule for the soil and groundwater projects. Surface water discharge-related information for SSFL is posted in the Environmental Programs section. http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/environment/santa_susana/index.html. Retrieved September14, 2008.
“The Rockets’ Red Glare: First Installment“. An upcoming documentary film recounts the horrors and hazards of the work done at Boeing’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory. This first installment focuses on the workers and their every-day exposure to the hazardous environment provided by the owners and operators of this lab.. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPE9BjkMwXg. Retrieved July 27, 2007.
“Santa Susana Field Laboratory“. U.S. DOE Office of Environmental Management. http://web.em.doe.gov/cercla97/susana.html. Retrieved September 30, 2005.
“Environment Site Restoration Summary – Santa Susana Field Laboratory“. U.S. DOE Office of Environmental Management. http://web.em.doe.gov/er/14088.html. Retrieved September 30, 2005.
“Energy Technology Engineering Center, Santa Susana Field Lab“. Center for Land Use Interpretation. http://ludb.clui.org/ex/i/CA4970/. Retrieved September 30, 2005.
“SSFL Ground Water Contamination: Preliminary Analysis” (PDF). http://www.ph.ucla.edu/erg/meeting/Groundwater.pdf. Retrieved September 30, 2005. – PDF of a presentation given on August 19, 2003.
“Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL)“. The Decontamination and Decommissioning Science Consortium. http://www.orau.gov/ddsc/projects/DOE/ssfl.htm. Retrieved September 30, 2005.
“Discussed at FARK: Radioactive emissions from a nuclear meltdown in California 47 years ago are worse than anybody thought. In other news, there was a nuclear meltdown in the US back in 1959“. http://forums.fark.com/cgi/fark/comments.pl?IDLink=2335071. Retrieved October 6, 2006.
The Santa Susana Advisory Panel
History Channel – Roccketdyne at YouTube (Adobe Flash video)

Reactor Accident Sources

“-NAA-SR-MEMO-3757” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAA-SR-MEMO-3757.pdf. Retrieved March 5, 2007. , Release of Fission Gas from the AE-6 Reactor, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-NAA-SR-5898” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAA-SR-5898.pdf. Retrieved March 5, 2007. , Analysis of SRE Power Excursion, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-NAA-SR-4488” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAASR4488.pdf. Retrieved March 14, 2007. , SRE Fuel Element Damage an Interim Report, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-NAA-SR-4488-Suppl” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAASR4488SUP.pdf. Retrieved March 14, 2007. , SRE Fuel Element Damage Final Report, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-NAA-SR-MEMO-12210” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAASRMEMO12210.pdf. Retrieved March 14, 2007. , SNAP8 Experimental Reactor Fuel Element Behavior: Atomics International Task Force Review, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-NAA-SR-12029” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/NAASR12029.pdf. Retrieved March 14, 2007. , Postoperation Evaluation of Fuel Elements from the SNAP8 Experimental Reactor hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org
“-AI-AEC-13003” (PDF). http://www.rocketdynewatch.org/files/pdf/AIAEC13003.pdf. Retrieved March 19, 2007. , Findings of the SNAP 8 Developmental Reactor (S8DR) Post-Test Examination, hosted by RocketdyneWatch.org

Coordinates: 34°13′51″N 118°41′47″W / 34.230822°N 118.696375°W / 34.230822; -118.696375

Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Susana_Field_Laboratory“

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Susana_Field_Laboratory

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Georgia flooding while the Corps of Engineers from hell push water into the swollen rivers – Why do they get paid for being incompetent on a regular basis?

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

From the little extra water we had here in Atlanta -

Lake Lanier and Buford Dam Water Release Answers

Everyone with an interest in Lake Lanier and those affected by flooding around metro Atlanta have been asking the question: why does water continue to flow through Buford Dam despite the huge amounts of rain swelling the Chattahoochee and its creeks and tributaries downstream and the capacity of the lake to hold this precipitation?

Because of the virtual lockdown on communication with the Army Corps of Engineers in Georgia the only semblance of communication comes from the Corps’ Mobile, AL office.

Area fishermen and concerned citizens that have spoken with the people at the Alabama office are in disbelief that the decisions are either influenced by or coming directly from that office when they don’t even seem to understand the severity of the rain event.

The Mobile, AL office of the Corps of Engineers first explained that the two main generators have been shut off and that a smaller units that discharges 600 cubic feet per second was operating to supply power to the Dam and some small electric companies in the area. They quickly backed off that statement and said the small generator was only powering the dam itself.

So now we know that it takes 389 million gallons of water discharged per day (600 cfs) just to power the dam itself. Corps spokespeople don’t even know if it is possible to shut off the discharge completely, which means that through the additional rains expected for this weekend the already stressed creek and tributary system downstream from the dam will likely continue to back up at the Chattahoochee.

http://www.lakelanier.com/200909241260/news/release-answers/

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Atlanta Flooding Sets New Records – USGS
Released: 9/24/2009 4:40:52 PM

Contact Information:
U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey
Office of Communication
119 National Center
Reston, VA 20192

Edward H. Martin

Phone:

770-903-9100

Brian E. McCallum
Phone: 770-903-9127 | FAX:

The flooding around Atlanta this week is one for the record books. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the rivers and streams had magnitudes so great that the odds of it happening were less than 0.2 percent in any given year. In other words, there was less than a 1 in 500 chance that parts of Cobb and Douglas counties were going to be hit with such an event.

“The USGS can reliably say just how bad these floods were. They were epic!” said Brian McCallum, Assistant Director for the USGS Water Science Center in Georgia. “We have all witnessed the devastation caused by these floods, but now we can quantify it.” The data are gathered from the USGS real-time streamgaging network.

On Sept. 22, USGS crews measured the greatest flow ever recorded (28,000 cubic feet per second) on Sweetwater Creek near Austell, Ga.

Elsewhere in the Atlanta area:

The Yellow River streamgages in Gwinnett, DeKalb and Rockdale counties measured flows between the 1 percent chance (100-year) and 0.5 percent chance (200-year) flood magnitude.
Flows caused by the rain at Peachtree Creek in Atlanta were only near the 10 percent chance (10-year) flood magnitude, but the backwater effects from the Chattahoochee River pushed water levels over the 0.2 percent chance (500-year) flood at the gage location.
On the Chattahoochee, USGS measured a 1 percent chance exceedence (100-year) flood at Vinings and Roswell.

“Today, six USGS crews are installing and repairing the 20 gages that were destroyed because of flooding. We expect that all but one gage should be operational by the end of the day,” said McCallum. “During flooding, these gages provide critical information to many users, so fixing the gages is our priority now.”

USGS also has two crews measuring high water marks, and will continue taking these indirect measurements in earnest on Monday. Pictures taken over the past few days by USGS scientists as they work in flooded areas are available online.

In Georgia the USGS maintains a network of more than 300 stream gages that provide data in real time. Data from these gages are used by local, state and federal officials for numerous purposes, including public safety and flood forecasting by the National Weather Service.

A map of these gages and graphs of discharge for the last seven days is available online. The USGS works in cooperation with other Federal, state, and local agencies, throughout Georgia that measure water level (stage), streamflow (discharge), and rainfall.

Users can access current flood and high flow conditions across the country at the USGS WaterWatch Web site.

More information on USGS flood-related activities is available at the USGS Surface Water Information Web site.

USGS provides science for a changing world. For more information, visit www.usgs.gov.

Subscribe to USGS News Releases via our electronic mailing list or RSS feed.

**** www.usgs.gov ****

Links and contacts within this release are valid at the time of publication.

http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2316&from=rss_home

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Posted: Friday, September 25th 2009 at 7:04am

Corps defends flood management operations

By Ken Stanford Editor

<!–

–>

Buford Dam

MOBILE, Ala. – The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is defending its management of Lake Lanier during this week’s floods.

Questions have been raised about continuing to send water through Buford Dam even as flooding was occurring downstream. But spokeswoman Lisa Coghlan says some water has to flow through in order to produce electricity. And, that curtailed releases have kept 37 billion gallons of flood water in Lanier.

And, no, she says, there is no danger of “overfilling” the lake. “We have 14 feet of flood storage capacity at Lake Lanier.”

Last Saturday, the Corps implemented its Flood Control Operations at the dam… reducing the amount of water sent downstream.

The level of Lanier increased another .08 foot in the past 24 hours and was at 1068.03 early Friday… within three feet of full pool since before the start of the prolonged drought that ended earlier this year. Full pool is 1071 and the corps expects continued runoff from this week’s heavy rains to send the level to 1068.5 this weekend.

Even more heavy rains are forecast through Saturday and a Flash Flood Watch has been issued for most of north Georgia. (See separate posting.)

(The Georgia News Network contributed to this story.)

(The Georgia News Network contributed to this story.)

Associated Categories: Homepage, Local/State News

http://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=223514

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Posted: Saturday, September 26th 2009 at 6:39pm

Rain continues to drench Ga.; flood losses now put at $500M

ATLANTA – Heavy rains drenched northwest Georgia Saturday and then moved into metro Atlanta, dumping several inches and causing flooding in some areas, but forecasters said the end of the rain was in sight. And, the state Insurance Commissioner updated the estimated losses from flooding earlier in the week, putting it at half-a-billion dollars.

[ . . . ]

Georgia Insurance Commissioner John Oxendine on Saturday raised the estimated cost of damage caused by heavy flooding in parts of north Georgia to $500 million. The new figure was twice as much as Tuesday’s initial damage estimate of $250 million.

“I think it could quite possibly go up,” Oxendine said, adding that the estimate of half a billion dollars was conservative.

Oxendine said 20,000 homes and other structures suffered major damage, mainly in the area north and west of Atlanta.

A federal disaster declaration has been issued to provide individual assistance for recovery efforts to residents in 14 Georgia counties that were hardest hit. The declaration covers Carroll, Catoosa, Chattooga, Cherokee, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fulton, Gwinnett, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Stephens and Walker counties.

http://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=223447&c=1

***

And where is our Governor with a bunch of Georgia under flood waters?

Thursday, September 24, 2009, 8:47pm EDT

Perdue visits Panama Canal project

Atlanta Business Chronicle – by Dave Williams Staff Writer

Gov. Sonny Perdue got a first-hand look Thursday at the widening of the Panama Canal, a project that is vital to the planned deepening of the harbor at the Port of Savannah.

The Panama Canal Authority took over operation of the canal when the United States turned it over to the Panamanian government at the end of the last decade.

“These people have their act together,” said Perdue, after touring both the construction work and operating locks. “It’s a well-run enterprise.”

The governor and Ken Stewart, commissioner of the Georgia Department of Economic Development, led a state delegation that traveled to Panama this week to check on the $5.2 billion project’s progress.

[ . . . ]

Georgia officials are seeking federal funding for the harbor deepening. But Congress won’t act until the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers signs off on the project.

[etc.]

(we’re paying for him to go see the Panama Canal with his buddies, of course)

http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2009/09/21/daily88.html

***

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Supreme Court won’t hear Georgia water appeal

Jacksonville Business Journal – by Dave Williams Staff Writer

The U.S. Supreme Court Monday declined to hear Georgia’s appeal of a lower court ruling in the long-running tri-state water wars.

The high court denied a request to review a decision handed down nearly a year ago by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington invalidating a 2003 agreement to let metro Atlanta water utilities increase withdrawals from Lake Lanier from about 13 percent of the lake’s capacity to about 22 percent.

The agreement between Georgia and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was challenged by Florida and Alabama, which lie downstream of Lanier in the Chattahoochee River system.

In a prepared statement, Gov. Charlie Crist applauded the decision.

“This action will allow Florida to continue our efforts to help protect the adequate flow of freshwater in the Apalachicola River,” Crist said. “After nearly 20 years of legal discussions, today’s decision should provide the framework needed for resolution of this matter.

In opposing Georgia’s efforts to take more water out of Lake Lanier to meet rapidly growing customer demand in metro Atlanta, Florida and Alabama argued that the reservoir was built in the 1950s primarily to provide hydropower and that water supply was not its authorized purpose.

http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2009/01/12/daily11.html?q=Corps%20of%20Engineers%20Georgia

***

Georgia begins cleaning up $250 million in flood damage

Gov. Sonny Perdue seeks $16.35 million in federal aid to help recover from storms that left nine dead. Crews work on an Atlanta water-treatment plant that added to Chattahoochee River flooding.

Reporting from Atlanta – With floodwaters finally receding, Georgians began the unglamorous task of cleaning up Wednesday, while taking stock of the destruction from an unprecedented autumn deluge that has claimed nine lives and caused an estimated $250 million in damage.

Across the state, roads reopened and residents returned to view the damage to their homes. In the early hours Wednesday, work crews managed to fix much of the damage to a city of Atlanta water-treatment plant that spilled millions of gallons of water into the Chattahoochee River.

[ etc. ]

In Greater Atlanta, the local river system had been a sort of famous afterthought. Atlanta earned its initial fortunes in the 19th century as a railroad hub, and for many Atlantans, the Chattahoochee, which runs southwestward through the metro region, has typically been out of sight — and out of mind.

“People usually see the river from a car window when they’re rushing over a freeway,” said Sally Bethea, head of Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, a nonprofit environmental group. “And usually, [the water] stays in place. So I think it’s pretty stunning for people to see the river widen to a half a mile, and the creeks widen, and all of this raging water.”

Bethea blamed the flooding in part on rampant development and paving that prevent the earth from soaking up rain, instead sending it shooting into river basins.

[ . . . ]

The rains have helped in one respect: by adding water to Lake Lanier, the source of much of the region’s drinking water. During a three-year drought that was declared over in March, lake levels reached record lows. The recent rains added more than 3 feet to the water level of the 38,000-acre lake, said Robert G. Holland, spokesman for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

[ . . . ]

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-atlanta-flooding24-2009sep24,0,7167655.story

(has video clip of first person account, also)

***

Biden to GA Flood Victims: We Don’t Want Another Katrina-like Government Response

September 25, 2009 2:12 PM

ABC News’ Karen Travers and Jordyn Phelps report:

Vice President Biden surveyed flood damage in the Atlanta area this morning and promised an effective and timely government response, in contrast to the Bush Administration’s handling of Hurricane Katrina.

“This is not going to happen overnight. It is not going to happen tomorrow, but it is going to happen,” Biden said.

[etc.]

“Look, we don’t want anything like the past happening again,” Biden said. “This is hands on stuff, but it’s going to take time. We’re going to get other federal agencies in now. We’re are going to get HUD in and others who are going to be able to take care of hopefully your real needs.”

The floods have killed 9 people in Georgia. Eight counties have been declared federal disaster areas and will qualify for federal funding.

The vice president took an aerial tour of the flood damage in a helicopter with FEMA Director Craig Fugate. They were joined in a second helicopter by Georgia Sens. Johnny Isakson and Saxby Chambliss, Rep. David Scott and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano.

Biden stopped by a shelter set up the Cobb County Civic Center to meet with people whose homes were damaged and destroyed in the flooding. The shelter is housing 277 flood victims who will be able to stay there as long as necessary.

[ . . . ]

http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/09/biden-to-ga-flood-victims-we-dont-want-another-katrinalike-government-response.html

Some of the comments on the article above about Lake Lanier and the Corps of Engineers sending the agreed upon water through despite the flooding –

I am disgusted with the US Atmy Corps of Engineers Mobile AL HQ. These bureaucrats during the recent flooding released water (although a mimimum amount)from Lake Lanier into the swollen waters. Lake Lanier was 6+ feet from full lake elevation and 20+ feet from flood level and there was no good reason for releasing any water from Lake Lanier. I am not happy.

Posted by: Robert G Sorbet | Sep 26, 2009 7:07:04 AM

I also feel we need someone to watch the corp of engineers. They have constantaly released more water than they should have over the past two summers and dried up some surrounding lakes which were on some people’s property after saying they would only take some of the water…they left nothing….Who moniters them? I think an investigation should be made as to who is watching and supervising them.

Posted by: talmag | Sep 26, 2009 12:41:44 PM

@Alyson I do not believe that the COE directed water release from Lake Lanier killed anyone or exacerbated the flooding situation to any great extent, what I do know is that there has been hard feelings for many years between Georgians and the Corps, and what prompted my anger was a Press Release issued by the Corps Mobile AL HQ which I can no longer access or it has been taken down for some good or bad reason.

Posted by: Robert G Sorbet | Sep 26, 2009 12:08:42 PM

I do have a problem with the Corps of Engineers releasing water from a flood control lake into swollen waters during a flash flood. My nephew lost a lifelong friend in these floods. I live in Douglas County Georgia and my heart goes out to all of the victims.

***

I’m so very, very sorry for your nephew’s loss, and I hope you and your family and friends are all okay. Please hang in there. I have read that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
is getting a lot of criticism from Georgians right now for mismanagement of the water at Lake Lanier– though I confess I’m a little confused as to what they did, why, and so on.

Posted by: Alyson | Sep 26, 2009 10:22:25 AM

@Alyson You make great sense. I have no problem with FEMA, Obama, or Biden; but I do have a problem with the Corps of Engineers releasing water from a flood control lake into swollen waters during a flash flood. My nephew lost a lifelong friend in these floods. I live in Douglas County Georgia and my heart goes out to all of the victims.

Posted by: Robert G Sorbet | Sep 26, 2009 9:49:31 AM

Just a little context cuz some of these comments seem bizarre to me. First of all, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has said that the floods are a “once in 500 years flood,”… the odds of such a thing happening are less “than 0.2 percent in any given year.” The floods have affected 20 counties, caused the deaths of least nine people, and created about $250 million in damages. Two very conservative Republican senators, Johnny Isakson and Saxby Chambliss, have commended “the White House’s quick response.” Acutally, Chambliss said the admin’s response was “magnificent” and “quick. Isakson said he had spent last night on the phone with local officials, all of whom reported FEMA workers on the ground–yep that FEMA, which three years was described as being in shambles. I’m glad to hear that FEMA is back on track, and was happy to see the VP there.

Posted by: Alyson | Sep 26, 2009 9:25:02 AM

Jason…. I wonder WHO paved “the road to hell” in the prior DECADES….It had to take longer than 9 months to “pave a road to hell”, isn’t that rational?

***

Lake Allatoona Water Levels Soar Past Full Pool

Written by Steve Burge

The deluge of recent rains in North Georgia have sent the Lake Allatoona water levels soaring past full pool. The lake rose rose more than 8 feet in the past 24 hours.

Currently the lake is 11 feet above full pool and still rising. The high water levels have caused Allatoona to spread over its banks into parks, campgrounds and parking lots on shore.

The Corps of Engineers which is in controls the lake, has shut down all boat ramps on the lake except for Stamp Creek and Galts Ferry.

Photos of the Lake Allatoona Flooding

These are photos taken on Tuesday morning of the ramps and roads around Allatoona. Despite the high water, fishermen are still out on the lake between fish from Bartow Carver to the Dam. Thanks to Robert Edison from First Bite Guide Services for these photos.

(lots of great photos of Lake Allatoona – my note)

http://www.lakeallatoona.com/20090922360/news/water-levels/lake-allatoona-water-levels-soar-past-full-pool.htm

***

Recovery Act Funds Will Upgrade Earthquake Monitoring
Released: 9/24/2009 4:19:44 PM

Contact Information:
U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey
Office of Communication
119 National Center
Reston, VA 20192

Dr. William Leith

Phone:

703-648-6786

Clarice Nassif Ransom
Phone: 703-648-4299

USGS will Grant Universities $5 Million to Beef Up Public Safety

Grants totaling $5 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act are being awarded to 13 universities nationwide to upgrade critical earthquake monitoring networks and increase public safety.

“These stimulus grants will save lives as well as create jobs,” Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar said today. “More than 75 million Americans in 39 states face the risk of earthquakes. Through the modernization of seismic networks and data processing centers, scientists will be able to provide emergency responders with more reliable, robust information to save lives and reduce economic losses.”

Grants are awarded by the U.S. Geological Survey, and monitoring is a key component of the USGS Advanced National Seismic System. ANSS is a national network of sophisticating shaking monitors placed both on the ground and in buildings in urban areas. The ANSS “strong motion” instruments give emergency response personnel real-time maps of severe ground shaking and provide engineers with information to create stronger and sounder structures for homes, bridges, buildings, and utility and communication networks.

“These investments under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act will provide jobs for the manufacturers of the equipment, the geophysical contractors who perform installations, and the colleges and universities that run regional earthquake networks and are training the next generation of earthquake scientists in partnership with USGS,” Salazar noted.

In California and other high-hazard regions, some parts of the current system include 40-year-old technology, and even the systems most recently upgraded date back to 1997. Think about what a 12-year-old computer looks like. Stimulus funding will replace old instruments with state-of-the-art, robust systems across the highest earthquake hazard areas in California, the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, the Intermountain West, and the central and eastern United States.

The new monitoring systems will be more energy-efficient than the ones they replace and will make solar power the primary power source in remote locations. Engaging students in the siting and installation will provide a unique educational experience and help to train the next generation of earthquake scientists.

Because the investments will modernize aging equipment at existing stations, they do not represent out-year commitments and the new equipment should lower future maintenance costs. The investments in earthquake monitoring meet the stated Recovery Act criteria of being “temporary, targeted and timely” – spending that will flow directly into the economy.

Universities receiving funding include: Montana Tech of the University of Montana; California Institute of Technology; University of Oregon; University of Utah; University of California, San Diego; University of Washington; Saint Louis University; University of Memphis; Boston College, University of Nevada, Reno; University of California, Berkeley; Columbia University; and the University of Alaska Fairbanks.

For more information, visit the Department of the Interior Recovery Investments Web site.

USGS provides science for a changing world. For more information, visit www.usgs.gov.

[ From - ]

http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2314&from=news_side

***

Thu

Sep

2009

Lake Lanier and Buford Dam Water Release Answers

Because of the virtual lockdown on communication with the Army Corps of Engineers in Georgia the only semblance of communication comes from the Corps’ Mobile, AL office. Area fishermen and concerned citizens that have spoken with the people at the Alabama office are in disbelief that the decisions are either influenced by or coming directly from that office when they don’t even seem to understand the severity of the rain event.

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On September 24, 2009, Chuck said:

Why would the American people want to enlist the federal government to run the health care system in this country when apparently they are not able to even grasp the basic concept that when water is released into a river it contributes to its level. The primary purpose of this and most other Corps lakes is to provide flood control. Where is the common sense leadership in this situation? Why wasn’t our commander in chief of the military ensuring that his military staff at the Corps office in Mobile was doing the right thing during an emergency situation? Obvious incompetence and lack of common sense. My tax dollars at work:

On September 24, 2009, lakeman said:

Concur completely. Unbelievable. I can’t believe there is water still being released.

On September 25, 2009, lakeman said:

Corps says releases equaled 1 inch, 30 miles down stream. Wait a minute. 670 cfs is what flows the hooch thru ATL in the middle of a drought. Big Cover Your Bu t going on!

http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/article/23957/

On September 25, 2009, Jim said:

Last night the corp let out almost 500 MILLION gallons or 668 cubic feet per second from the Buford Dam . Here is the link to their data that shows the release records. http://tinymicros.com/lanier/

During the peak of the flooding they continue to release 600+ cubic feet per second according to these records, and for only 1 day they backed it down to just under 400. The corp did contribute to the flooding and they should be held accountable. Even one drop of water being let out while homes were being destroyed is negligent and illustrates their lack of responsibility inability to manage our resources.

On September 25, 2009, Aaron said:

389 million gallons per day just to power the dam? Who are you kidding here? Those inefficient generators and turbines will get you every time. Also you have to understand the dam was built for flood control. What does that mean? The flood level was not high enough so they opened the dam to make sure more places were flooded there by controlling the flood. Had they closed the dam completely then they would not be in control. This way they are not sitting by and doing nothing. West Point Lake is screaming, with the flood gates wide open and generating full blast so next week they can ask Lanier for more water. But I think I have it figured out now. When water runs into Lake Lanier it becomes “Federalâ€ water. This â€œFederalâ€ water is then released and allowed to mingle with other water down stream making this water become â€œFederalizedâ€ as well and now must be allocated properly. As for the flooding, samples were taken and this is how they are able to tell that their water had no effect what so ever on any flooding taking place down stream, but I guess whatâ€™s a third of a billion gallons or so when your house is already 20 feet under water. Say what you will about inefficiency, but nobody can do it better than our government. Iâ€™m sure glad someone who knows what is going on is in charge.

On September 26, 2009, lakeman said:

Ya’ll will not beleive what I just read in the Times online edition.

http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/article/23957/

This absolute moron “Jeremy” says:

In this case, the dead fish will cause plenty of problems for the humans. But that does require rational thought. I am not a tree hugger in any sense. You DO NOT completely stop the flow of the river, PERIOD. If the dam is damaged because of the lack of flow then you create a big problem. Most of the deaths were from stupidity.

What planet did this guy wiz in on?

On September 26, 2009, lakeman said:

This was sent to 1071 Coalition:

So now that the lake is at a “normal level” for the 1st time in 4 years, the Corps is going to increase withdrawals????

Is 550 cubic feet per second NOT enough for water quality? It always has been in the past. Why is there a need NOW to increase that amount for water quality?

Increases in Hydro power production? Why? Is there some big power demand somewhere? Are the lower lakes not producing enough power? My goodness, I would think the generators on the lower lakes have been red hot for 10 days now. Is Lake Lanier serving as a “profit center” for the Corps to sell power? I understand the :power contracts”, but is this really necessary or is the Corps simply profiting by draining the Lake? To the detriment to all of us?

Are there construction contracts between the Corps and local governments,with which the Corps is obligated to keep the lake BELOW a certain level during a certain time frame? Gwinnett County? Lake Lanier Islands ? Forsyth County? Hall County? The Cities of Cumming and Gainesville? Are there ANY contracts with the Corps requiring a maintained lake elevation? If the public was made aware of these contractual obligations, maybe, just maybe we’d understand why the lake levels must stay down. And guess what? If we all knew ahead of time that Lake Lanier would be held down artificially, for a specified period of time, for a specified reason, we could all plan our business interests with Lake Lanier accordingly!

Case in point: Duke Power on Lake Keowee sends out a yearly lake level outlook and drawdown schedule. Duke explains with its stakeholders, the needs for these drawdowns, the timeframe for these drawdowns, and a list of things the stakeholders can accomplish while the lake is down. Dock and seawall repairs, etc. Duke Power works WITH their stakeholders by being transparent, honest, and up front. Yes, I understand that Duke is a privately held corporation with shareholders etc., but the point is, they care about the folks that care the most for the lake. They work TOGETHER.

I know for a fact that NO ONE is happy to read your email regarding increased discharges. I think your group needs to demand a little (actually a lot) transparency from the Corps regarding these contracts and what EXACTLY is required by the Corps. If these contracts cause harm to the public and un necessary degradation to the lake levels, then something needs to be done about it. When are these contracts up for renewal? Why in the world would we release water simply to produce hydro power? Incredibly inefficient form of power production at the expense of this Lake level. Someone needs to get copies of these contracts and read them, understand them, find out when they are up for renewal, study the demands and requirements, and lastly, find out where these contract obligations need to be corrected.

Lake Lanier has NOT been full 8 out of the last 11 years. 8 out of the last 11 years below full pool. The lake has reached full pool only 3 out of the last 11 years. That’s a 28% score. I don’t know ANY business represented by your group that would be in business if they “got it right” 28% of the time. This is reflective of one main thing: Poor Management. Poor Management at a time when Georgia is facing unprecedented hurdles with this Lake. There is no excuse, drought or otherwise, for this lake to have a 28% record over 11 years. None.

Everyone would like answers to these questions. We are all tired of the “surprises” by the Corps. No one that I know of has a good feeling about the Corps. Why? Because of the surprises and seemingly super inefficient methods of management of this lake. Their methods simply do not make sense. We need honest answers, honest transparency, and honest management of the lake from the Corps. Maybe then we would understand the Corps methodology for the madness that we see. The public is NOT HAPPY; as a matter of fact, everyone I come in contact with, is understandably upset with the Corps’ management of this Lake. Something has got to change. Your group is a group of business interests which in one way or another obviously profits by the existence of Lake Lanier. These businesses would probably see increases in profits with a better, more efficient management of this Lake.

Please demand some changes.

On September 26, 2009, Jim said:

A true TEST of the Corps willingness to show interest in Lake Lanier will be if they allow the lake to have a surplus of 1 to 2 feet like they have proposed in the past to act as a buffer going into the summer months. To my knowledge, this is the first time the lake has been this close to full pool at the end of the summer. Sept and Oct are usually are most driest months.

The lake refills during the winter months. Now would be the time to take action to plan for the future by allowing a small surplus.

On September 26, 2009, SkiOutsideTheWake said:

Hi Jim. Makes complete sense but the Corps has an itchy trigger finger to press that buttom which lets out water…check out the 5 week forecast on the Corps website below. It was just released 4 days ago. Lisa Coghlan of the Corps was all excited about the lakes potential to reach 1068.5 in one article this week but the 5 week forecast shows the Corps letting out most of the gains from this week. I’m sure they are just following their 50 year old Operating Manual and preparing for the winter and spring rains but the Manual never had common sense written in to it. Has anyone ever run a red light when you new the light was broken and skipping your turn or did you sit there waiting for the traffic light repair person to show up and give you a green light? The Corps is going to stick to their 50 year old manual and wait another 1-2 years for their new and improved operating manual. I wonder if the drones down in Mobile will add some common sense language into their Pulitzer document?

http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/acfframe.htm

On September 26, 2009, SkiOutsideTheWake said:

“button”…cant find my reading glasses ;-)

On September 26, 2009, SkiOutsideTheWake said:

Here’s more. Great point by Henry Rowe in this article:

“I think the corps will say that the water was released only to provide power for internal operations. This is unacceptable. In flood conditions, they should pay for power off the grid to operate and not release any water to reduce the flood as much as possible.”

http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/article/23984/

On September 26, 2009, moose said:

Adding to flood conditions by discharges to operate the dam is incomprehensible! Also I read that “minimum” discharges have to be maintained for “the trout in the river”. Trout will find their way without dam water. Who depends on catching these trout for their daily substinence? They need to find a job and go to Publix. What irritates me most is the absolute wall between the COE and the public regarding communications. But they are government aren’t they? I think as a group we need to express our concerns to our 2 local so called advocates. Coalition 1071 and the Lake Lanier Association . Instead of having cocktail meetings at Legacy Lodge with a featured speaker, it needs to turn into something more aggressive. We’ve all seen the effect that constituents have had with the Town Hall meetings regarding health care, etc; this is the kind of local response that is needed here. Polite and organized but firm. The LLA seems to be very quiet as well and needs to pick up the action. All of you can email or write or call both of these groups, let’s start now!

http://www.lakelanier.com/200909241260/news/release-answers/

***

http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/acfframe.htm

Flood Control - when they only use it to insure water for oyster beds in Alabama - why does the corps of engineers support Alabama's wants when Georgian's tax dollars have paid for these projects/ dams / resevoirs / drinking water / facilities / hydropower plants / and upkeep

[ Lanier ] [ West Point ] [ George ] [ Woodruff ] [ Blountstown ]

Click here for lake level forecast in tabular form.

ACF River Level Forecasts

Forecasts for River Basins in Upper Georgia – Forecast of river stages provided by NWS River Forecast Center.

Forecasts for River Basins in Lower Georgia – Forecast of river stages provided by NWS River Forecast Center.

Chattahoochee Hourly Stages – Hourly readings for gages on Chattahoochee for period ending 6 a.m. CT.

Flint River Hourly Stages – Hourly readings for gages on Flint River for period ending 6 a.m. CT.

Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Data

Date: 26-SEP-09

<!–

	Buford	West Point	George	Woodruff
Midnight Pool (ft-msl)	1068.02	637.93	190.65	76.97
6AM Pool (ft-msl)	1068.03	637.26	190.65	76.99
Midnight Tailwater (ft-msl)	NA	574.45	122.54	58.46
6AM Tailwater (ft-msl)	NA	572.64	122.57	58.53
Daily Avg Inflow (cfs)	1784	36388	50026	58593
First 4hr Avg Inflow (cfs)	4027	10054	51984	59357
Daily Avg Outflow (cfs)	667	54981	50707	58203
First 4hr Avg Outflow (cfs)	667	48071	50623	58189
Actual Generation (mwh)	169	2038	2689	430
Estimated Generation (mwh)	168	2040	2640	430
Rainfall (inches)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

–>


	Lake Elevation	Tailwater Elevation	Gate Step	Rainfall
Andrews	103.71	99.31	0	0.00

NOTE: Rainfall totals are 24-hour period ending at 6 a.m.

Elevation Charts for Last 30 Days. Updated Daily

Stream Gages

[ Albany ] [ Big Creek ] [ Blountstown ] [ Chattahoochee ] [ Colloden ] [ Columbus ] [ Cornelia ] [ Dahlonega ] [ Hwy. 280 ] [ Itchawaynochaway ] [ Mile 35 ] [ Montezuma ] [ Newton ] [ Norcross ] [ Roswell ] [ Sope Creek ] [ Spring Creek ] [ Suwanee Creek ] [ Uchee Creek ] [ Vinings ] [ West Point ] [ Wewahitchka ] [ Whitesburg ]

For additional information, contact Water Management at (251) 690-2737
or by email at: water-sam@usace.army.mil

Go to Top of Page | Return to Main Page

http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/acfframe.htm

*****

Fri., September 25, 2009 1:28pm (EDT)

| |

More Rain Puts Georgia At Risk For More Flooding

By Melissa Stiers

Updated: 10 hours ago

More rain expected this evening and this weekend has all of north Georgia including metro Atlanta and Athens under a flash flood watch effective 4 p.m. today until early Sunday morning.

More rain in the forecast for North Georgia. (photo by Judy Baxter)

Meteorologists at the National Weather Service in Peachtree City predict rain and thunderstorms will be moving through the state over night and Saturday, which puts Georgia at risk for more flooding.

“Unfortunately, we’ve had to put north Georgia into flash flood watch because of this potential of one to two inches of rain and could have isolated higher amounts possible,” said Weather Service hydrologist Kent Frantz, “which could cause additional flooding, either in areas that have already had flooding and new areas in the urbanized metro area and up in the north Georgia mountains.”

Frantz says the rain may move through slowly at first, and the greatest chance of heavy rain is Saturday.

Meanwhile, the Army Corps of Engineers has a close watch on Lake Allatoona, just north of metro Atlanta and West Point Lake near Columbus because both lakes are already well above full pool.

http://www.gpb.org/news/2009/09/25/more-rain-puts-georgia-at-risk-for-more-flooding

***

Fri., July 10, 2009 1:10pm (EDT)

80 Georgia Counties “Abnormally Dry” This Week

By Susanna Capelouto

Updated: 2 months ago

Dry conditions returned to some 80 Georgia Counties this week. That’s according to the U.S. Drought Monitor map. The drought map is issued by the National Drought Mitigation Center. The July 7 posting shows that the soil in much of north and east Georgia is “abnormally dry.” That’s the first step on a scale that measures the severity of drought conditions. Kent Frantz is a hydrologist for the National Weather Service in Peachtree City. He says just after state officials declared an end to the three year drought, it got hot and dry in Georgia for 30 days. “The state drought committee, I think, officially declared the drought over on about June 12 and just seems like it shut off the next day,” Frantz says. He adds that since July 7, Georgia has gone back to it’s normal summer pattern of afternoon thunderstorms. Frantz says he expects normal soil conditions to return by fall.

(yeah, right – its fall – it flooded – what is normal about any of it?

- my note)

http://www.gpb.org/news/2009/07/10/80-georgia-counties-abnormally-dry-this-week

***

Georgia State – drought, floods, Lake Lanier, Corps of Engineers from hell, Atlanta drinking water, Georgia dams, climate change, global warming, bizarre weather events

***

Start Your Own Business How – To and Resources

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

***

Women’s Economic Development Agency

http://www.weda-atlanta.org/about.htm

***

Founded in 1996 as a tax-exempt, non-profit corporation, WEDA has provided business development, management training and technical assistance to more than 15,000 Atlanta-area entrepreneurs. Over the last six years, the organization’s programs and services have helped to facilitate the formation of more than 1,300 small businesses that range from home-based endeavors like jewelry making, virtual assisting and home accessories design, to retail and personal services ventures like clothing stores and hair salons, to companies engaged in cutting edge activities like information technology and automotive waste oil recycling.

Also included among our client base are franchisees for Bruster’s Ice Cream, Mathnasium, Smoothie King, System 4 and others, as well as social entrepreneurs who have chosen to pursue non-profit ventures that provide critically needed services like transitional housing, after school programs and eldercare in response to the needs of disadvantaged families and communities.

Combined, these business have accessed more than $8.5 million in commercial financing ( much of it in the form of micro-loans) and have had a significant impact on the area’s economy, including the creation of more than 250 new jobs (not including the business owners)

WEDA’s programs and services are divided into three categories: Business Development and Management, Wealth Building, and Customized Training and Licensing. These categories are designed to meet the learning and cultural needs of its clientele, as well as the objectives of the organizations supporters and community stakeholders.

WEDA is a bi-lingual organization that offers its programs and services in both English and Spanish. Further, WEDA makes every effort to meet the needs of physically challenged clients through the use of handicapped-accessible facilities, as well by providing curriculums on either diskette (for use with JAWS or similar adaptive equipment) or in Braille so that visually impaired clients can fully participate in all training activities. Although WEDA is a women centric organization, it does discriminate and serves an ethnically-and gender -diverse clientele.

Economic Impact

Data for the period January 01, 2002 – September 30, 2008

Client Statistics:

Number of business starts

1,339

Percent that remain in business

beyond 3 years of program completion

88.1%

beyond 5 years of program completion

74.6%

Of those not in business:

Intend to start in the future

78.6%

Changed mind (i.e. decided not to open business

19.0%

Business closed

2.4%

Average annual business revenue

$84,263

Home-based business

68.2%

Number of new jobs created (not including the business owners)

252

Formally organized business structure (corporation, LLC, etc.)

80.6%

For-Profit

90.6%

Low- to moderate- income households at time of initial intake

70.2%

***

Liquidity Event Proceeds Calculator

June 24, 2009 by David Sung

Entrepreneurs, if you sell your company tomorrow, do you know how much you would make? Do you know how much your investors make? How about your employees? Better yet, you’re raising a round of funding and you just received a new term sheet. How does this change everything?

The Liquidity Event Proceeds Calculator (“LEPC”) was developed as a
joint project between the Atlanta Technology Development Center (ATDC)
and Siavage Law Group, LLC with assistance from Atlanta investment
bankers Croft and Bender, LLC. The LEPC provides users with a
comprehensive understanding of the effect of their particular venture
capital deal terms. It allows the user to input valuation, option pool
size, amount of investment, and amount and timing of the liquidity
event in order to customize various scenarios to the company’s unique
financing circumstances. The LEPC projects the proceeds to be derived
by common holders, preferred holders and option holders in liquidity
events at varying valuations and varying time periods. The assumptions
are listed on the first page and the tool proceeds through three
pro-forma rounds of funding, A, B and C. In order to gain a working
understanding of the tool, we recommend that users review the
spreadsheets as written first before they modify the assumptions to
suit their needs. Each of the rounds has a pro-forma liquidity event at
increasing dollar values that can be modified by the user.

Tags: Entrepreneurship, Venture Capital

http://www.slg-lepc.com/lepc/index.php?login=1

[from - ]

http://atdc.org/2009/06/liquidity-event-proceeds-calculator.html

(which came from – )

http://atdc.org/

RESOURCE PROVIDER INFORMATION
RESOURCE NAME
* Resource Provider’s Name:	Advanced Technology Development Center
Secondary Name:
RESOURCE ADDRESS
* Address:	430 Tenth Street Norht West

* City:	Atlanta
* State:	GA
* Zip Code:	30318
Web Site Address:	www.atdc.org
CONTACT INFORMATION
Contact Name:	John Toon
Contact Title:
* Phone Number:	(404)-894-3575
Fax:
* E-Mail Address:	john.toon@atdc.org
RESOURCE PROVIDER TYPE
* Resource Provider Type:	Education
* Type Of Services:	Administrative Management, Administrative Management, Business Plan Development, Financial Packaging, Technology/Electronic Commerce
* Description:	ATDC exists to help technology-based entrepreneurs who reside in Georgia who plan to take an intellectual property position on a technological innovation which can serve as the basis for their enterprise.
Organizational Affiliation:

[from - ]

http://www.mbda.gov/

Resource Locator for Atlanta, GA

Resource and Capital Locator (Guests)

***

SBIR Tutorial

The Department of Defense (DoD) SBIR and STTR programs fund a billion dollars each year in early-stage R&D projects at small technology companies — projects that serve a DoD need and have commercial applications.

(This tutorial explains the process step-by-step).

***

http://www.energy.gov/

[also on this site - ]

http://www.energy.gov/nationalsecurity/index.htm

National Security

The Department has four overriding National Security priorities: insuring the integrity and safety of the country’s nuclear weapons; promoting international nuclear safety; advancing nuclear non-proliferation; and, continuing to provide safe, efficient, and effective nuclear power plants for the United States Navy.

	Cyber Security Protection Cyber Security programs protect the information and systems that the Department depends on as DOE increasingly relies on new technology. The Department works to preserve the integrity, reliability, availability, and confidentiality of important information while maintaining its information systems.
	Managing Operations Security Managing security operations for DOE facilities in the national capitol area, as well as, developing policies designed to protect national security and other critical assets entrusted to the Department is an important responsibility.
	Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction DOE plays an integral part in nuclear nonproliferation, countering terrorism and responding to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. We provide technology, analysis, and expertise to aid the United States government in preventing the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction.

Start Your Own Business Stuff – Tools, Resources, Money, Grants and Mentoring Resources – Applied Solutions and Innovation / Invention

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE	CONTACT OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Thursday, September 24, 2009	202-482-4883

Commerce Secretary Locke Announces New Commerce Initiatives to Foster Innovation and Entrepreneurship

WASHINGTON—U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke announced today his plans to create a new Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship within the Department of Commerce and launch a National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Both substantial new initiatives will help leverage the entire federal government on behalf of promoting entrepreneurship in America. The new office is expected to announce additional initiatives in the coming months.

The new Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, which will answer directly to the secretary, will be geared toward the first step in the business cycle: moving an idea from someone’s imagination, or from a research lab, into a business plan.

“We’re not lacking for groundbreaking ideas in this country; nor are we short on smart entrepreneurs willing to take risks,” Locke said at the Inc. 500/5000 Conference today. “What we need to do is get better at connecting the great ideas to the great company builders. And I think The Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship is a big step in the right direction.”

The National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship will advise the Commerce Department on policy relating to building small businesses and help to keep the department engaged in a regular dialogue with the entrepreneurship and small business communities. The council is expected to be comprised of successful entrepreneurs, innovators, investors, non-profit leaders and other experts.

The Obama Administration is committed to helping America’s entrepreneurs succeed, evidenced by its efforts to free up credit markets, unprecedented investments in America’s physical and intellectual infrastructure, and variety of tax credits and other incentives to help foster promising industries like renewable energy and smart grid technologies.

Working toward the Obama Administration’s vision, the Department of Commerce will lead the effort to encourage high-growth entrepreneurship through these new initiatives, among others.

Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship
The mission of the Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship is to unleash and maximize the economic potential of new ideas by removing barriers to entrepreneurship and the development of high-growth and innovation-based businesses. The office will report directly to Locke and focus specifically on identifying issues and programs most important to entrepreneurs. Working closely with the White House and other federal agencies, this new office will drive policies that help entrepreneurs translate new ideas, products and services into economic growth. The office will focus on the following areas:

Encouraging Entrepreneurs through Education, Training, and Mentoring
Improving Access to Capital
Accelerating Technology Commercialization of Federal R&D
Strengthening Interagency Collaboration and Coordination
Providing Data, Research, and Technical Resources for Entrepreneurs
Exploring Policy Incentives to Support Entrepreneurs and Investors

National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship
The National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship will advise Locke and the administration on key issues relating to innovation and entrepreneurship. The council will include successful entrepreneurs, innovators, angel investors, venture capitalists, non-profit leaders and other experts who will identify and recommend solutions to issues critical to the creation and development of entrepreneurship ecosystems that will generate new businesses and jobs. It will also serve as a vehicle for ongoing dialogue with the entrepreneurship community and other stakeholders.

http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_008444

***

Locke to Lead U.S. Delegation to Chile for the Americas Competitiveness Forum

Washington (Sept. 25)—U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke will travel to Santiago, Chile, September 27-29, to participate in the third Americas Competitiveness Forum (ACF). The ACF brings together representatives from the public and private sectors to discuss ways to spark innovation, create jobs and expand trade among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Department of Commerce hosted the first two ACFs in Atlanta in 2007 and 2008. Secretary Locke will be joined by the Presidents of Chile and Guatemala, as well as ministers of trade and economy from throughout the region and senior representatives from business and academia. (More) (ACF Web site)

***

Grants

Department of Commerce (DOC)

Grants Management

Economic Development Administration (EDA)

Grant Requirements

International Trade Administration (ITA)

Market Development Cooperator Program
Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT). A technical assistance initiative of the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, SABIT offers organizations competitive grants and an opportunity to host industry-specific delegations. SABIT serves as an initial entry point for U.S. businesses seeking funding to establish long-term relationships with potential customers, distributors, or partners in the former Soviet Union. The program trains Eurasian managers and scientists in commonly accepted business practices as a means of facilitating cross border relationships. In turn, these personal relationships serve as a basis for business development and reduce market access barriers for U.S. businesses

National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)

Funding Opportunities

National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA)

Telecommunications Grants

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

[from - ]

http://www.commerce.gov/Grants/index.htm

***

http://www.mbda.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=rls.search

Resource Locator – interactive

Resource and Capital Locator (Guests)

[from - ]

http://www.mbda.gov/

Minority Business Development Agency, Department of Commerce

***

For Atlanta -

Resource Name	City	State	Zip Code	Service Type
[Advanced Technology Development Center]	Atlanta	GA	30318	Multiple Services

[ATDC - Georgia Center for Advanced Telecommunications]	Atlanta	GA	30318	Multiple Services

[Atlanta Business League]	Atlanta	GA	30314	Multiple Services

[Atlanta Metropolitan Black Chamber of Commerce]	Atlanta	GA	30309	All Types of Services

[Atlanta Public Schools Office of Contract Compliance]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Atlanta Regional Electronic Commerce Research Ctr]	Atlanta	GA	30332	Multiple Services

[Atlanta U.S. Export Assistance Center]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Business Information Center (BIC)]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[BusinessNow]	Atlanta	GA	30316	Multiple Services

[Center for International Business Education and Research]	Atlanta	GA	30332	Multiple Services

[Center of International Standards and Quality]	Atlanta	GA	30332	International Trade Services

[Cobb Chamber of Commerce]	Atlanta	GA	30009	Multiple Services

[Consumer Protection Division]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Administrative Management

[Contract Compliance Office]	Atlanta	GA	30307	Multiple Services

[Department of Revenue]	Atlanta	GA	30345	Administrative Management

[Economic Development Center]	Atlanta	GA	30314	All Types of Services

[Enterprise Funding Corporation]	Atlanta	GA	30303	All Types of Services

[First Stop Business Information Center]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Multiple Services

[French- American Chamber of Commerce]	Atlanta	GA	30338	Multiple Services

[Georgia Center for Nonprofits]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Georgia Child Care Council]	Atlanta	GA	30329	Administrative Management

[Georgia Department of Agriculture]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Administrative Management

[Georgia Department of Community Affairs]	Atlanta	GA	30329	All Types of Services

[Georgia Department of Industry Trade and Tourism]	Atlanta	GA	30303	International Trade Services

[Georgia Hispanic Chamber of Commerce]	Atlanta	GA	30329	Multiple Services

[Georgia Manufacturing Extension Partnership]	Atlanta	GA	30332	Multiple Services

[Georgia Micro Enterprise Network]	Atlanta	GA	30331	All Types of Services

[Georgia Minority Supplier Development Council]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Georgia Partnership for Excellence in Education]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Marketing Development

[Georgia Small Business Technical Assistance Program]	Atlanta	GA	30354	All Types of Services

[Georgia State University SBDC]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Georgia Statewide MBEC]	Atlanta	GA	30332	Multiple Services

[Georgia Tech Electronic Commerce Resource Center]	Atlanta	GA	30332	Technology/Electronic Commerce

[MBDA Atlanta Regional Office]	Atlanta	GA	30308	Multiple Services

[NAACP]	Atlanta	GA	30310	Multiple Services

[National 8(a) and Small Disadvantaged Business Association, Inc]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Administrative Management

[National Association of Minority Contractors]	Atlanta	GA	30303	All Types of Services

[Office of Regulatory Services]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Administrative Management

[Office of Small and Minority Business]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Marketing Development

[Quick Start]	Atlanta	GA	30345	Multiple Services

[Secretary of State, Corporations Division]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Administrative Management

[Service Corps of Retired Executives]	Atlanta	GA	30339	All Types of Services

[Service Corps of Retired Executives]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Southern Economic Development Council]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[Southern United States Trade Association]	Atlanta	GA	30334	International Trade Services

[The Alliance for Work-Life Progress]	Atlanta	GA	30328	All Types of Services

[The Business Growth Corporation of Georgia]	Atlanta	GA	30339	Multiple Services

[The Business Growth Corporation of Georgia]	Atlanta	GA	30319	Financial Packaging

[The Georgia Women's Business Council (GWBC)]	Atlanta	GA	30303	Multiple Services

[The Governor's Small Business Center]	Atlanta	GA	30334	All Types of Services

[The Resource Institute]	Atlanta	GA	30329	All Types of Services

[Trademarks Section, Secretary of State]	Atlanta	GA	30334	Administrative Management

[Women's Economic Development Agency]	Atlanta	GA	30308	Multiple Services

[World Trade Center Atlanta]	Atlanta	GA	30308	International Trade Services

[from Resource Locator - Atlanta, GA - 2009 ]

http://www.mbda.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=rls.results&set_v=UmVxdWVzdFRpbWVvdXQ9NTAwJmNpdHk9MTExOCZzdGF0ZT1HQSZzZXJ2aWNlX2NhdF9jb2RlPUFMTCZuZXh0PU5leHQgPiZmcm9tX21vbnRoPTAmZnJvbV95ZWFyPTAmdG9fbW9udGg9MCZ0b195ZWFyPTAmcmVnaW9uY29kZT0wJnZpZXdfbW9kZT0w

***

The DoD SBIR & STTR Programs

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The SBIR Program provides up to $850,000 in early-stage R&D funding directly to small technology companies (or individual entrepreneurs who form a company).
The STTR Program provides up to $850,000 in early-stage R&D funding directly to small companies working cooperatively with researchers at universities and other research institutions.

Small companies retain the intellectual property rights to technologies they develop under these programs.
Funding is awarded competitively, but the process is streamlined and user-friendly.
Learn more by going to Overview and other sections. Also visit our Resource Center at www.dodsbir.net.

August 3 , 2009: DoD SBIR National Beyond Phase II invitation from Undersecretary Carter.

<!–

SBIR 2009.3 Solicitation is in pre-release. The solicitation will be open to proposal submission from August 24, 2009 at 6AM ET through September 23, 2009 6AM ET.

–><!–

STTR 2009.B Solicitation is in pre-release. The solicitation will be open to proposal submission from August 24, 2009 at 6AM ET through September 23, 2009 6AM ET.

–><!–

SBIR 2009.3 Solicitation is open to proposal submission. The solicitation will close to proposal submission on September 23, 2009 at 6AM ET.

–><!–

STTR 2009.B Solicitation is open to proposal submission. The solicitation will close to proposal submission on September 23, 2009 at 6AM EST.

–>

SBIR 2009.3 Solicitation closed to proposal submission on September 23, 2009 at 6AM ET.
STTR 2009.B Solicitation closed to proposal submission on September 23, 2009 at 6AM ET.
P.L. 111-43, SBIR Program extended through September 30, 2009 (link to Public Law not yet available)
News Release – Small Business Director Looks to Speed Innovation to the Warfighter
Abstracts of Phase I proposals selected for award from SBIR solicitations
Abstracts of Phase I proposals selected for award from STTR solicitations
SBIR Tutorial introduces you to the DoD SBIR/STTR programs and shows you step-by-step how to prepare and submit a proposal.

Questions?

Contact the SBIR/STTR Help Desk by telephone 866-SBIRHLP (866-72…) or Email.

Comments/Suggestions:

If you have suggest for improving these programs? Email us.

Join our Listserv:

If you wish to be notified via email of future DoD SBIR/STTR solicitations and events, subscribe to our listserv.

[from -]

http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/

***

New Kauffman Foundation Study Offers Insights Into the Earliest Years of a New Business

<!—->

Contacts:
Barbara Pruitt, 816-932-1288, bpruitt@kauffman.org, Kauffman Foundation
Tom Phillips, 212-935-4655, comptwp@aol.com, Communication Partners

Kauffman Firm Survey findings provide insights for policymakers interested in encouraging new business development and growth

(KANSAS CITY, Mo.) March 12, 2008 — Understanding the characteristics of new business formation and sustainability can help lead to policies that encourage entrepreneurial businesses, which are a major driver of economic growth.

A new report released today by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation fills a gap in the study of entrepreneurship. As the largest longitudinal study of new businesses ever conducted, the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) follows nearly 5,000 businesses founded in 2004 and tracks them over their early years of operation.

“New businesses play an important but not-well-understood role in our dynamic economy,” said Robert Litan, vice president of Research and Policy at the Kauffman Foundation. “These insights into the earliest years of a firm’s existence are essential for creating public and private programs that encourage new business development, innovation and sustainability.”

According to Kauffman researchers, the data provide a unique opportunity to study a panel of new businesses from start-up to sustainability or closure. Data are being collected annually from the same firms, centering on the topics of debt and equity financing, employee benefits, business innovations and outcomes such as sales and profits. In addition, detailed data are collected on the characteristics of business owners.

Following are some of the highlights:

A little more than 2 percent of businesses reported owning patents during their first year of operation, while nearly 9 percent reported having copyrights. The percent of businesses with patents and copyrights was much higher for businesses that were considered to be high tech, at 4 percent and 11 percent, respectively. About the same percentage of businesses had trademarks (13.5 percent), regardless of their tech status.

Nearly 60 percent of the businesses had no employees in their first year. Just under three-quarters of businesses had one employee or less, while about one-quarter of businesses had two or more employees. Very few businesses (less than 4 percent) had more than 10 employees.

More than a third of businesses (37 percent) had no revenue in their first year of operation. About 45 percent of businesses in the KFS experienced a profit during their first year, compared with about 55 percent of businesses that experienced a loss in their first year. About 17 percent of businesses had profits in excess of $100,000.

Nearly 44 percent of new businesses had no debt financing during their first year of operation. Many businesses were started with very little debt financing: 17 percent of businesses started with $5,000 or less; nearly 11 percent started with $100,000 or more.

About 80 percent of businesses had some positive equity investment in their business in the first year. Nearly 10 percent invested $100,000 of equity into their business, while another 33 percent invested between $10,001 and $100,000. About one-quarter of businesses invested some amount less than $5,000.

The vast majority of equity invested came from the business owners themselves. Just 10 percent of the businesses in the KFS used external equity sources in their first year. Parents were the most common source of external equity (3.4 percent), while spouses provided equity to 1.6 percent of businesses. Non-family informal investors and venture capitalists were used very infrequently (2.7 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively).

Nearly 70 percent of businesses in the KFS data were owned by men and just over 30 percent were owned by women. Whites owned more than 81 percent of the businesses, while blacks owned 9 percent, Asians owned 4 percent, and the remaining 5 percent were owned by Native Americans, Pacific Islanders and individuals of other racial groups. About 6.6 percent of the businesses were owned by Hispanics.

Just under 9 percent of firms closed in calendar year 2005, and the survival rates vary by owner demographics. For example, 88 percent of black-owned businesses survived, compared with 92 percent of white-owned businesses and 91 percent of Asian-owned businesses. Women-owned businesses had a survival rate of 89 percent, about three percentage points lower than businesses owned by men.

According to Alicia Robb, principal investigator on the KFS, as additional years are added to the study, the data will allow researchers to investigate ongoing financial infusions, changes in strategy and innovation, and survival and growth. “Many important topics can be investigated, including the determinants of business growth and survival, as well as the roles that financial and human capital play in business outcomes,” said Robb.

[from -]

http://www.kauffman.org/Details.aspx?id=1090

***

Iran nuclear weapons program – clandestine nuclear programs, loosey goosey nuclear / atomic materials security for over 40 years around the world –

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

When I did a Google search for this -

Iran nuclear missiles 1992

It gives a bunch of other very interesting information -

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/lavizan.htm

including this -

Sources and Resources

Iran has up to 4 nuclear bombs By STEVE RODAN Jerusalem Post 09 April 1999 — Iranian Revolutionary Guards official quotes an engineer identified as Turkan as saying that the nuclear warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
IRAN HAS FOUR NUCLEAR BOMBS ICEJ NEWS SERVICE April 9, 1998 — Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them. In 1992 the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
Missile Threat from Iran By Kenneth R. Timmerman Reader’s Digest January 1998
Aerospace Industries Organizations Homepage

(from that site)

***

[And - ]

Iran Missile Facilities

Bandar Abbas

Subordinate to: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy Command.

Other Names: Bendar Abbas

Location: Latitude 27° 11′ North; longitude 56° 16′ East; 1078km southeast of Tehran; province of Hormozgan

Primary Function: Testing, assembly, manufacture, and upgrade of Chinese-built cruise missiles such as the HY-2 Seersucker and C-801 Sardine. Reportedly, it also has built a land-based missile launch site.

Description and Activities:
The city of Bandar Abbas is one of Iran’s major ports. It is located 1078km southeast of Tehran in the province of Hormozgan. Bandar Abbas hosts a missile site overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy Command. The Chinese built this facility in 1987. The facility assembles and extends the range of Silkworm missiles, modifies Seersucker missiles, and manufactures rockets. The Chinese may be assisting the IRGC in extending the range to 400km. Bandar Abbas also is believed to host a launch site with three to six launchers for the land-based Silkworm.

As a port, Bandar Abbas is a major point of delivery for missiles, weapons components, and conventional arms to Iran. In February 1992, North Korea transferred 80 Scud missiles to Iran and an additional 30 to Syria, via Bandar Abbas. US attempts to intercept this missile shipment were unsuccessful. In the spring of 1992, the North Korean ship Dae Hung Ho also delivered missile parts to Bandar Abbas before they were flown to Syria

In 1996, Iran purchased 10 more Houdong fast-attack craft (FAC) from China, some of which are deployed near Bandar Abbas. These craft are equipped to fire Saccade C-802 missiles. The precise number of C-802s purchased by Iran is not known, but sources believe Iran has armed approximately 20 FAC with Saccades. In January 1996, Iran reportedly test fired a Saccade missile, causing the United States to reassess Iran’s potential threat to shipping in the region.

Bandar Abbas also hosts Kilo class submarines delivered by the Russians, reportedly armed with missiles.

Key Sources: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iran’s Missile Development,” in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds. The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier’s Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 66; John Pike, “Bandar Abbas,” <http://www.fas.org>; Anthony Cordesman, Threats and Non-Threats from Iran (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995); “Iranian Commentary Calls US Claims of Missile Test ‘Propaganda’,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 31 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960131000346, 31 January 1996; Reuters, “US sees threat to Gulf shipping from Iran missiles,” Financial Times (London), 31 January 1996, p.8; via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; “Second Sub for Iran,” The Washington Post, 4 August 1993, p.A12; via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Evolving Conventional Military Forces, Working Draft (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 February 1996); Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000); “Navy on Alert Since Arrival of Korean Freighter,” Sawt Al-Kuwayt Al-Duwali (London), 12 March 1992, pp.1, 11; in Proliferation Issues, 26 March 1992, pp.32-33; Melissa Healy, “Suspect Vessel Eludes US Net, Docks in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1992, p.A1, A9; “Rafsanjani’s Bomb,” Mednews, 8 June 1992, pp.1-5.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4099.html

	Abu Musa Island
	Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
	Aliabad
	Arak
	Bakhtaran
	Bandar Abbas
	The Instrumentation Factory Plant or Department 140/16
	Farhin
	Garmsar
	Gostaresh
	HASA
	Isfahan
	Karaj Missile Development Complex
	Khoramabad
	Kuhestak
	Manzariyah
	Mashhad
	Parchin
	Qeshm Island
	Qom
	Sanam College
	Semnan
	Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
	Shahroud
	Shiraz
	Sirjan
	Sirri Island
	Tabas
	Tehran

	Maps
	WMD411: U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
	Issue Brief: IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
	Issue Brief: IAEA Board Deplores Iran’s Failue to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
	Issue Brief: Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
	Issue Brief: The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
	Issue Brief: WMD in the Middle East
	Treaties and Organizations
	NIE: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (2007)
	CRS: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2007)
	In Focus: IAEA and Iran
	FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide
	Survival: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme (2006)
	The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
	Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2004)
	Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: A Profile (1998)
	Iran and CBW (1998)

***

Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development

by Koji OSHIMA

Senior Research Councilor, DRC

Introduction

Since 1987 when a former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu told London’s newspaper Sunday Times that Israel had been producing nuclear warheads, Israel has been recognized as a de facto nuclear state. About 10 years later, in May 1998, India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices, and declared that they became the sixth and seventh nuclear state. What country will be the next nuclear state? Iran would be one of the candidate states. Iranian nuclear weapons development is reviewed and briefly discussed here.

1. Strategic Environment

Iran borders on the west frontier of Iraq, with which Iran competed the hegemony in the West Asia. In the east is Pakistan, which has already tested nuclear devices. In the north is Caspian Sea, the north bank of which is a nuclear state, Russia. In the south is Persian Gulf, where strong U.S. naval fleets are always present. Across the Gulf is Saudi Arabia, where several huge U.S. military bases are located. Furthermore Israel, the common enemy of Arabian countries with nuclear arsenals, is only 1,000 km apart from Iran. The Khomeini Revolution caused U.S. to sever diplomatic relations with Iran, and its international isolation still remains.

Iran joins following international organizations for control of weapons of mass destruction; as a member state of Partial Test Ban Treaty (1964), NPT (1964), and Seabed Treaty (1971). It signed Outer Space Treaty (1967) (not ratified) and Safeguard Agreement with IAEA (1964). But Iran is excluded from Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, NSG, Zangger Committee and Organization of the Islamic Conference.

2. Natural Resources and Industries

(1) Natural Resources

Iran is a major producer of oil. At the end of 1999, 93 billion barrels of reserved oil and 25 trillion m³’s of natural gas were reportedly estimated. 5,000t of reserved uranium ore is also estimated in the dessert of the Iranian Heights. Reserved iron ore is estimated at 1.2 billion tons. Iran abounds relatively in copper, zinc and lead, but thorium, lanthanide elements, lithium and beryllium are not known of their reserved amount.

(2) Basic Industries

Oil is produced 3.79 million barrels per year and refined 1.52 million barrels per year. Oil field survey, oil well drilling and oil-refinery plant building were used to be conducted with economic and technical assistance from foreign countries, but Iran recently conducts them by itself. Natural gas is produced 90 billion m³ per year. Petro-chemical products are produced per year as follows: chlorine 240,000t; Ammonia 1,422,000t; urea 1,758,000t; nitric acid 386,000t; sulfuric acid 960,000t; ammonium nitrate 254,000t; sodium hydroxide 33,000t; and phosphoric acid 240,000t.

Iran has more production capabilities than developing countries in the area of electric and electronic industries.

(3) Nuclear R & D Laboratories

Major R & D laboratories for a nuclear development are the Teheran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).

TNRC is officially assumed as a research facility, but reportedly it also produces nuclear-weapon related materials. TNRC has a 5MWe research reactor, which was provided by U.S., and the reactor is officially reputed to be used for production of radioactive isotopes. The reactor changed its fuel rods to 20% enriched uranium rods made in Argentine. TNRC reportedly has a plutonium extraction plant, but there are some articles, that denied it. TNRC also has a uranium conversion facility, where crude uranium refined at the Sagham Mines Complex or at the Yadz University Nuclear Research Department, is converted into yellow cake. There are sufficient evidences to certify the presence of the facility, but the facility reportedly have not operated for a while. If yellow cake was produced here, it would be sent to the Fasa/Rudan Research Center in order to convert into uranium hexafluoride, and then would be sent to the Mo’allem Kalayeh facility in order to manufacture enriched uranium fuel rods for a reactor.

At the Ibn-e Heysam Laser Technology Center, the subsidiary organization of TNRC, uranium Laser enrichment and the inertia-confinement fusion are studied.

ENTC was established by the Ayatollah Khomeini Regime in 1984, just in the midst of Iran-Iraq war with a strong intension of nuclear development. ENTC is officially assumed as a research center, but it is regarded as the de facto center of the nuclear-weapon development. ENTC has a 27 kW miniature neutron source reactor, two sub-critical reactors, and four research reactors, employing about 3,000 workers. Furthermore, there has been a rumor afloat that ENTC has a 27MW plutonium production reactor, but the rumor may be some confusion as to a 27 kW miniature neutron source reactor. ENTC also has a China-made Calutron, but it is said to have no enrichment capability because of its non-corrosion resistance. But it is evident that it produces isotopes for medical treatment at least. There has also been a rumor of a conversion facility here, where uranium was converted into uranium hexafluoride, but some evidences suggested that the conversion facility was located at the Fasa/Rudan Research Center. ENTC also has a zirconium manufacturing facility, where zirconium cladding tubes for reactor fuels are manufactured.

Other nuclear R&D laboratories are the Laser Research Center, the Theoretical Physics & Mathematics Research Center, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Complex, the Gorgan Al Kabir Nuclear Center, the Tabriz Laboratory, and the Bonaz Atomic Energy Research Center.

At the Laser Research Center an atomic Laser enrichment is presumably studied. At the Theoretical Physics & Mathematics Research Center high energy physics, elementary particle physics, theoretical nuclear physics, and statistical mechanics are presumably studied.

（4） Nuclear Reactors

Since 1967 when Iran introduced a 5MWe research reactor from U.S., Iran has been making steady efforts to construct nuclear power plants for civil use. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was established 1975, and then a nuclear power plant construction was started at Bushehr with the aid of a West German company, Siemens, and a French company. But the Islamic Revolution stopped the construction in 1979, and the plant was severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq war. After the war Iran tried to tap Germany for reconstruction of the plant, but in June 1991 Germany refused it because of possible military use. In January 1995 Russia made a contract of constructing two Russian light water reactors at Bushehr, where the broken plant was constructed. One of them is supposed to start operations in December 2003. Iran reportedly introduced several small research reactors from China. All these were for peaceful use, but the steady introduction of nuclear reactors and introduction of construction/operation technology have caused a suspicion of nuclear-weapons ambition to Western countries, especially U.S.

Iran has five confirmed research reactors, one power reactor under construction, one power reactor planned, and three unconfirmed reactors. All of them were imported and constructed. Table 1 shows Iranian nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, and under contemplation.

Table 1 Iranian nuclear reactors in operation,

under construction, and under contemplation

Location	Type and Performance	Completed	IAEA’s Safeguard
TNRC^*1	LWR, HEU(20%) 5MWe	1967 1980’s modified	Yes
ENTC^*2	MNSR^*3, HEU(900g), 27kW	1969	Yes
ENTC^*2	HWZPR^*4, natural uranium	Operating, Provide by China	No
ENTC^*2	LWSCR^*5, LEU	Operating, Provide by China	No
ENTC^*2	GSCR^*6 natural uranium	Operating, Provide by China	No
BNC^*7,No.1	VVER-1000, LEU 1,000MWe	Scheduled May 2003	Planning
BNC^*7,No.2	VVER-1000, LEU 1,000MWe	Scheduled 2007	Planning
Tabas	Not identified	unconfirmed	―
Nekka	Russian Type, LEU 400MWe, underground	unconfirmed	―
Nekka	Russian Type, LEU 400MWe, underground	unconfirmed	―

*1 Teheran Nuclear Research Center

*2 Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center

*3 miniature neutron source reactor

*4 heavy water zero power reactor

*5 light water sub-critical reactor

*6 gas-cooled sub-critical reactor

*7 Bushehr Nuclear Complex

3. Motivations and Acquisition Processes of Iranian Nuclear Development

Iran may have four motivations of nuclear development: ①to have a deterrent to Iraqi conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction, ②to have a measure of lessening American influences to the West Asia, ③to have a countermeasure against Israeli conventional forces and nuclear forces, and ④to have a symbol of an Asian great power.

Iraq is the sworn foe, to which Iran fought several times for hegemony in the West Asia. Both countries launched chemical weapons each other during the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from September 1980 to July 1988. UNSCOM found out not only chemical programs, but also nuclear and biological programs through its inspection to Iraq after the Gulf War. These facts are supposed to lead Iran into development of surpassing weapons including nuclear weapons as a natural consequence.

The U.S. attacked Afghanistan in retaliation for the multiple terrorism on September 11^th 2001, and by chance the U.S. could establish military bases in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The military presence in the area considerably strengthened U.S. influences on the West Asia. The region leads the world in oil production. A powerful U.S. influence over the region is a major issue for Iran, because petroleum is the primary industry of Iran. The U.S. has implemented economic sanctions against Iran since 1979. Iran must find some ways of dealing with the sanctions. A nuclear weapon is an extremely valuable measure of lessening U.S. influences over the West Asia.

Israel has the strongest conventional forces in the Middle East and it was recognized as a de facto nuclear state, even though the country itself made it ambiguous. The conventional forces and the nuclear weapons seem to back recent Sharon’s bullish behavior against Palestinians ignoring world’s public opinions. It is a common Arabian objective to have nuclear weapons as a countermeasure against Israeli nuclear weapons. Iran naturally hopes to develop nuclear weapons, even if the country is not a member state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

A nuclear weapon is a status symbol of a big power. Iran is isolated from international community in one way or another. Hence it is natural to attmpt nuclear weapons development as a breaking –through measure of the situation.

Iranian acquisition processes of a nuclear weapon are supposed as follows: ①illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union countries, ②indigenous development of nuclear weapons through secret purchase of nuclear materials, ③indigenous development of nuclear weapons supported by Russia and/or China, and ④indigenous development by Iran own.

In 1992 Russia was designated as the successor to the Soviet Union, which was authorized to have nuclear weapons by NTP. On the other hand Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, where nuclear weapons had been deployed, became non-nuclear states. Thus all nuclear weapons out of Russia should have been transferred to Russia and put under the Russian control. But confusion in Russia lasted long time and it made Russian managing ability questionable. Rumors were in the air that some nuclear weapons of former Soviet Union were missing and a part of them passed into Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.

The de facto nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel were said to have developed nuclear weapons using so called “reverse engineering”, which was indigenous engineering simulating purchased materials and equipment. The former Soviet countries are eliminating or cutting down nuclear weapons, thus nuclear materials, equipment, and technicians are in excess. These materials and technicians are said to have turned to the black market. There are many reports on newspapers that such black-market materials are confiscated by the customs in European countries. Therefore, such materials possibly flow into Iran.

Russia and China collaborate on nuclear development for peaceful use with Iran making a nuclear agreement respectively. 1992 Iranian nuclear technicians visited a nuclear-weapon related factory in Kazakhstan. In January 1995 the Russia-Iran nuclear reactor agreement was signed. In January 1999 the Moscow Aerospace Laboratory and two other Russian laboratories were accused of providing Iran nuclear technologies and were boycotted in business by the U.S. government. China used to be the main provider of nuclear technologies since 1985, and made an agreement to provide Iran with two reactors 1992. But China cancelled it 1995 yielding to the U.S. pressure. However, these kinds of collaboration will possibly occur in the future.

4. Indication and Analysis of Iranian Nuclear Program

The Iranian government has repeatedly denied her intention of developing nuclear weapons. But a U.S. agency confirmed that Iranian technicians visited the Ulba Metallurgical Plant at Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan in 1992, where a fast breeder reactor was operating and fuel rods were manufactured and spent fuels were reprocessed. The “Nuclear Fuel” (Dec. 5^th, 1995) reported that the U.S. bought 650kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in 1995 to prevent Iran from obtaining the HEU. The ”Nucleonics Week” (Sep. 22^nd, 1996) also reported that Russia promised Iran to sell 2,000t of natural uranium in accordance with 1995 Russia-Iran nuclear agreement. Therefore, Iran seems to have had no capability of extraction and refinement of uranium at the point of 1996.

Washington Times (Apr. 17^th, 1996) reported that Iran had been constructing a conversion facility at Esfahan with a Chinese assistance since about 1990, where yellow cake was converted into UF₆. Chinese assistances were stopped in March 1997 yielding to the strong U.S. pressure. But possibly Iran had already obtained necessary materials and basic technologies of yellow cake conversion. Iran had reportedly tried purchasing materials necessary for conversion several times.

The “Nuclear Fuel” (Apr. 10^th, 1995) reported that some Iranian subsidiary company sometimes had tried to buy samarium-cobalt magnetic rings for a balancing machine and/or a bearing of a centrifugal separator of a laboratory scale from German and Swiss companies since 1990. The magazine (May 8^th, 1995) also reported that Russia agreed to provide Iran with centrifugal separators in March or April 1995. But Reuter (Feb. 23^rd, 1996) reported that President Yeltsin and President Clinton met May 10^th, 1995, and agreed that Russia would cancel the agreement with Iran and remove the centrifugal separators. Thus, Jane’s estimated that Iran has crude centrifugal technologies, but Iran has little capability to manufacture essential parts of a centrifugal separator such as a UF₆-resistant rotor, header, and scraper, because Iran imported these items. The major research in Iran may be located in some laboratory in the Ghazvin military base.

Little information is available as to Iranian Laser enrichment technologies. Russia agreed to provide the Laser Research Center of the Iranian Atomic Organization with the atomic Laser enrichment method; thus Iran may mainly study the atomic Laser enrichment method. But import of Laser equipment and uranium metal vapor generators are essentially required to complete the method. The atomic Laser enrichment technology may be studied at the Ibn-e Heysam Laser Technology Center and the Laser Research center.

There is unconfirmed information that Iran also studies electro-magnetic enrichment at the Karaj Agricultural & Medical Research Center, using a China-supplied Calutron and a Belgian Ion Beam Application Cyclotron.

Britain disclosed that its customs found a small amount of maraging steel usable for centrifugal separators shipping for Iran, and then stopped the cargo from departing. That made the suspicion of Iranian nuclear development rise to the surface. The CIA director John M. Deutch testified at the congress hearing that “Iran made active efforts to obtain indigenous capabilities of developing nuclear weapons, and the focus was on the production of plutonium and HEU. In order to shorten the development term, Iran also tried to import nuclear materials from former Soviet countries as well.” An American high official told on December 19^th, 1997 that China had intension to stop selling a UF₆ production plant. His words brought to light the Iranian intention of uranium enrichment.

An Israeli newspaper reported in April 1998 that Israel had received an Iranian document that indicated Iranian obtainment of several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet country. The paper also reported that Iran had received four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan, and the warheads had been maintained by Russian nuclear specialists. But just after the report, the DOD spokesman denied them, saying that there was no evidence.

A British newspaper reported on April 24^th, 1998 that Iranians were arrested on the charge of purchasing nuclear-weapon related materials and technologies in Britain. What the nuclear-weapon related materials and technologies meant is not clear.

On January 12^th, 1999 the Presidential Aide Burgher made a speech that three Russian laboratories were accused of collaborating with Iran on development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and they were imposed sanctions of banning trade and assistance. They were the “Electric, Science, Technology and Design Laboratory”, the “Mebdeleev Chemical Technology University”, and the “Moscow Aerospace Laboratory”.

In March 2000 Czech government announced that Czech would not permit a manufacturer the export of ventilators in production for an Iranian nuclear reactor. This means that Czech entertains apprehensions upon Iranian extraction of plutonium from spent fuels.

In June 2001 the Washington Post reported that a Russian metallurgical company had exported high-tensile aluminum alloy to Iran that could be usable for a rotor of a centrifugal separator of uranium enrichment.

Thus, Iran still needs foreign assistance to enrich uranium.

With respect to atomic affairs, Russia and Iran increasingly work in closer cooperation. In April 2000 Ministry of Russian Atomic Energy, Adamov, asserted at the executive council held in Snezhinsk (former Chelyabinsk) that Russia had intention to export Iran three more reactors. President Putin, who served as the chairman of the meeting, acknowledged the Minister’s words. Recently Iranian dependence upon Russia seems to be increasing. But on March 7^th, 2000 the Czech Lower House passed the expert ban of military critical items, thus Czech manufacturer ZVVS could not provide Iran with equipment for the Bushehr nuclear plant. And so, Iranian nuclear development has not being progressing on schedule. Regarding these factors, Iran seems not to possess, not only capability of constructing a nuclear reactor as a whole, but also manufacturing a turbo alternator and other equipment for a nuclear plant.

Taking these facts above into account, the followings could be said.

① Iran explicitly has the intention of nuclear armament.

② Iranian nuclear programs are progressing step by step since the end of Iran-Iraq war in July 1988.

③ Iran has not attained self-sufficiency in its nuclear fuel cycle at the end of July 2002.

④ Iran has to import most of the materials and the technologies for a nuclear weapon from foreign countries such as Russia and China.

From other information sources, the followings are estimated.

① Iranian development & production programs of nuclear weapons are integrated into civilian nuclear development & production, which is conducted under the direction of the Nuclear Power Organization.

② Iranian nuclear programs seem to be mainly conducted by the Nuclear Power Organization under the strong influence of the Revolution Guard Corps (Pasdaran), and agencies of Pasdaran cooperate with subordinates of the Nuclear Power Organization.

③ Most of Iranian nuclear-weapon related companies are national enterprises under the Islamic Foundation.

5. Conclusion

As mentioned above, there are four ways for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons: ①illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons from former Soviet Union countries, ②indigenous development of nuclear weapons through secret purchase of nuclear materials, ③indigenous development of nuclear weapons supported by Russia and/or China, and ④indigenous development by Iran own.

Iran will be a nuclear state, when Iran illegally acquires a nuclear weapon, whether Iran can use it properly or not. But at the end of July 2002 Russia has been more stable than in 1990’s. Furthermore the U.S. gives economic and technical assistance to ensure the control of Russian nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar Act (Public Law 102-228). Therefore the possibility of illegal acquisition of nuclear weapon is quite low.

If Iran secretly obtains nuclear-related materials, it will take 1-3 years to complete manufacturing a nuclear weapon, depending upon kinds and quantity of the materials acquired. But after the Gulf War, the Nuclear Supply Group reviewed the London Guidelines and Warsaw Guidelines in detail, hence, the possibility for Iran to acquire nuclear materials becomes lower.

If Iran develops a nuclear weapon secretly with assistance from foreign countries such as Russia and China, it will take 5-10 years to have an atomic bomb. China seems to retreat its assistance to Iran, but Russia appears to assist Iran aggressively in the area of peaceful nuclear development. Hereafter the relationship between India and Iran in the area of an atomic power should be focused on carefully.

When Iran develops a nuclear weapon by its indigenous technologies, it will take 10 years or more. But since this will be the worst case for Iranian to be a nuclear state, Iran will try to avoid it as much as possible.

Here I conclude that Iran will join a nuclear club within 5-10 years, if the present situation continues. Recognizing Iranian natural resources and industries, it is very hard to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, even if the development of a nuclear weapon could be retarded by export control and/or a public opinion of the world. The only way of prevention is to make an environment, where Iran realizes that its nuclear armament is not the best policy.

○ Biographies of authors

○ Contents

http://www.drc-jpn.org/AR-6E/ohshima-e02.htm

DEFENSE RESEARCH CENTER （DRC)

Japan

***

However by early March 2004, Iran faced criticism for failing to disclose parts of its nuclear programme in a resolution drafted at a meeting of the UN nuclear watchdog. According to the IAEA’s report Tehran failed to reveal sensitive research in a declaration submitted last October. The report singled out Iran’s failure to declare that it was researching advanced centrifuge designs, known as P2, capable of producing highly enriched uranium. In early March, Iran first banned IAEA inspectors after the agency issued a resolution accusing Tehran of secret nuclear activities but later claimed the cancellation of the inspectors visit was due to “technical problems” and agreed to their to return. All this at a time when the United States is keen to accuse Iran of developing a secret weapons programme and wants the IAEA to declare the country in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There is little doubt amongst the scientific community that Iran’s uranium enriching programme and centrifuges buried underground belie the regime’s claims that its nuclear programme is “entirely for peaceful purposes”. When IAEA inspectors first found enriched Uranium in Iran’s nuclear deposits, the government claimed that this was an accident caused by contamination, and even blamed imported equipment for this contamination. However the quantity and quality of enriched uranium found in Iran contradicted these claims. Of course enriched uranium can be used for commercial reactors (as can plutonium). But NPT countries are not supposed to enrich uranium without mandatory IAEA inspections because of its potential for “dual use”.

To make a bomb that will be carried in a missile you need 25kg of highly enriched uranium or 8kg of plutonium. Natural uranium contains less than 0.1% of fissile material. This fraction needs to be increased to 20%-90% to make a weapon. This “enrichment” is what the centrifuges do.

The other route to a nuclear weapon is to create fissile uranium or plutonium in a reactor and use chemical processing to extract it – this is what is done at Sellafield, UK. A number of counties, including France, reuse enriched uranium and plutonium from reprocessed fuel in reactors. The idea is that they are then independent of sources of natural uranium as the “breeder” reactors create more fissile uranium and plutonium than they consume. Iran enriches Uranium above 20 %. This is precisely what can be used for nuclear weapons.

http://www.iran-bulletin.org/IBMEF_1_word%206%20files/atom_rev.htm

(A statement from a person with interesting insight and many good facts.)

***

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg

Map shows Iran as (grey) signifying “suspected clandestine programs” on Nuclear Weapons Status 2005 Map – includes a chart of numbers

Map of Nuclear Weapon States 2005 - includes Iran as suspected of clandestine nuclear weapons programs - Carnegie Endowment

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg

[from -]

Deadly Maps

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/deadlymaps.cfm

Deadly Maps

<!– (view record) –> This site provides images of “the complete collection of maps from Carnegie’s, ‘Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats’. … The first five maps reflect the worldwide proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their missile delivery systems. The country maps show the major nuclear installations, both civilian and military, in each country.” Includes maps of Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, Pakistan, Libya, Israel, and other countries. From the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/deadlymaps.cfm

[from - ]

http://lii.org/pub/subtopic/3584

(and also found on the deadly maps site)

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/iran.jpg

Iran Deadly Arsenals 2005 Map from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

5,000 tons of uranium reserves – Uranium mining – Iran

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Issue: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

Document Eight: Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Livermore, “Summary Report of the NTH Country Experiment,” W. J. Frank, ed., March 1967. Original classification: secret. [extract of heavily excised document]

This report describes an experiment that took place at a time when policymakers wanted to know how difficult it would be for a non-nuclear power to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory paid two newly-minted physicists, with no access to or knowledge of classified information, to “produce a credible nuclear weapons design.” After three “man-years”, the two physicists had a design for an implosion nuclear weapon. The report’s conclusions remain classified, but apparently the experiment was a success: it showed that any capable physicist could design a nuclear weapon.

[Page 1] [Page 2] [Page 3] [Page 4] [Page 5] [Page 6] [Page 7] [Page 8] [Page 9] [Page 10] [Page 11] [Page 12] [Page 13] [Page 14] [Page 15]

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html

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Iran nuclear weapons – missiles – facilities – and enriched uranium – the problem is that nobody has been making sure the nuclear and atomic “stuff” was secured for a long, long time before now

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

Nuclear Sites

Lashkar Ab’ad – Laser enrichment

Lashkar Ab’ad was Iran’s pilot plant for laser isotope separation until 2003. This site contained equipment including copper vapor lasers (CVL) that were designed to produce enrichment levels of 3.5-7%. The IAEA reported that the facility would have been capable of HEU production once all planned equipment was installed. There were several foreign suppliers to the laser enrichment program, including the United States, Germany, and Russia.

Iran took steps to conceal this facility from the IAEA. The IAEA first asked to visit Lashkar Ab’ad in May 2003 after the NCRI identified the site and said it was related to gas centrifuge activities. Iran eventually relented and allowed inspection in August 2003. Iran initially declared that Lashkar Ab’ad was devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, and claimed that its laser program was unrelated to uranium enrichment. Iran also claimed that no nuclear material had been involved in the experiments.

Iran changed its declaration and acknowledged to the IAEA in late-October 2003 that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had been established at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000, after initial development work was conducted at TNRC. Iran also stated that uranium laser enrichment experiments had been conducted in late 2002 and early 2003 using previously undeclared imported natural uranium metal. It was only after this October revelation that the IAEA was allowed to take environmental samples at this site. Some of the material and equipment from Lashkar Ab’ad was moved to Karaj in May 2003 to avoid detection by the IAEA.

In its report of February 2008, IAEA safeguards officials visited Lashkar Abad and reported that the laboratories were currently run by a private company producing and
developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. The report also noted that the former laser equipment has been dismantled with some of it stored at the site. The IAEA added: “The management of the company provided detailed information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work, and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.”

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/lashkar-abad-laser-enrichment/

***

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/esfahan/

In 1991, Iran contracted to purchase a turn-key, industrial scale conversion facility from China. This contract was eventually canceled as a result of US pressure, but Iran retained the design information and built the plant on its own. Construction of the UCF began in the late 1990s.

The UCF consists of several conversion lines, including the line for the conversion of yellowcake to UF6. The annual production capacity of the UCF is 200 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6. The UF6 iis slated for the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. The UCF is also able to convert yellowcake, LEU and depleted uranium into UO2 and depleted uranium metal.

[etc.]

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Pars Trash (Tarash)

Pars Trash, a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric located in Tehran, is another centrifuge site that received equipment from Kalaye Electric in particular for Iran’s P-2/IR-2 centrifuge development effort.

Pars Trash, a small company employing about ten people, is located in Tehran among warehouses and light industrial buildings about a kilometer west of the Kalaye Electric facility. It manufactured the centrifuge’s outer casings. These are the thick aluminum tubes that house the centrifuge rotor assembly and, in the case of an accident, prevent broken pieces of the thin-walled rotor assembly, which can act like shrapnel, from injuring or even killing bystanders. Pars Trash was originally a small private factory involved in making automobile parts. It went bankrupt and was bought by the Kalaye Electric Company, or its subsidiary Farayand, for the three expensive computer-operated machine tools it owned, which could be adapted to the manufacture of centrifuge components.

An engineer married to the plant manager is believed to have been the backbone of the operation. She programmed and set up the machines to make centrifuge components and ensured their quality, before turning the operation over to a technician who subsequently operated the automated machines to produce thousands of components.

The current status of operations at Pars is unknown as IAEA inspectors had access to the site only while Iran was adhering voluntarily to the Additional Protocol.

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/pars-trash-tarash/

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Iran’s Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium URANIUM …
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat – View
Work on Iran’s uranium centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985. ….. From 1981 to 1993 Iran has carried out bench scale preparation of UO2 at ENTC. …
www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Iran_fact_sheet.pdf

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On Nov. 10, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report charging Iran with violating its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In particular, the IAEA said that Tehran had been conducting experiments with imported nuclear material without informing the agency. The report also revealed that Iran had carried out a variety of clandestine nuclear activities for more than two decades. In doing so, it had deceived the agency on numerous occasions by concealing facilities and providing the IAEA with incomplete and false information. A discussion of the IAEA’s revelations follows.

Uranium Enrichment

Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment

Iran’s gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment program dates back to 1985 and currently consists of a small pilot facility at Natanz and a larger commercial facility under construction at the same location. Uranium-enrichment facilities can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, as well as fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors.

Iran had previously claimed its gas-centrifuge program was completely indigenous and had not been used to test nuclear material, but both of these claims were proven false by the IAEA.

The IAEA first visited the Natanz facility in February. Its advanced state of operation led the agency to suspect that Iran had tested the centrifuges with nuclear material without first notifying the agency—a violation of its safeguards agreement. (See ACT, November 2003.) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that IAEA environmental sampling showed that particles of both low-enriched and highly enriched uranium (LEU and HEU) had been present during that time at the Natanz facility, suggesting possible confirmation of the inspectors’ suspicions. Although LEU is used in civilian power plants, HEU can be used to build nuclear weapons. The presence of this material could be evidence that Iran produced weapons-grade uranium at Natanz and has nuclear material that it has not yet declared to the IAEA—each a violation of its safeguards agreement. At the time, however, Iran blamed the material’s presence on contaminated, imported components and continues to do so.

Meanwhile, Iran introduced nuclear material into the Natanz facility’s centrifuges under IAEA safeguards in June, although the IAEA Board of Governors had issued a statement earlier that month encouraging Iran not to do so. Tehran accelerated its tests in August but, in an October deal with European foreign ministers, agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities. At the time, Iran did not say when the suspension would take effect, but the new IAEA report says Iran told the IAEA that it would suspend its enrichment activities effective Nov. 10. (See ACT, November 2003.)

Iran also admitted Oct. 21 to using small amounts of uranium hexafluoride to test centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran between 1999 and 2002, according to the report. Centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas in cylinders to increase the concentration of the relevant isotopes. Iran had previously acknowledged producing centrifuge components there but denied conducting any tests with nuclear material. Iran dismantled “the test facility at the end of 2002,” according to the report.

Activities at the Kalaye facility have been contentious because Iran had hindered IAEA investigations there and prevented agency inspectors from conducting environmental sampling until August. These samples also detected HEU and LEU particles, a finding Iran also attributes to contaminated components. Tehran maintains it only enriched uranium at Kalaye to a degree that is not suitable for weapons.

Iran continued to obstruct the IAEA’s investigation of the Kalaye facility until recently, according to the report. Tehran initially told agency inspectors that the centrifuges had been destroyed but later admitted to their existence and allowed the IAEA to inspect them Oct. 30-31. The components had been stored elsewhere in Iran, but it is unclear how the agency became aware of this fact.

In the Nov. 24 issue of Time magazine, ElBaradei said that five European and Asian countries supplied Iran with the components and that the agency will discuss the matter with those governments.

In a further misstep, Iran tested the centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride imported in 1991. A June agency report pointed out that Iran not only violated its safeguards agreement by failing to report the imported material but also could not account for some of the material, raising suspicions that Iran had conducted illicit enrichment experiments. At the time, Iran said the material had leaked from its containers.

Laser Enrichment

According to the report, Iran told the IAEA Oct. 21 that it had been pursuing a laser-based uranium-enrichment program since 1991. An August IAEA report stated that Iran had previously acknowledged a research and development program involving lasers, but not an enrichment program.

IAEA inspectors visited a site called Lashkar Ab’ad in August. Although they did not find any activities related to uranium enrichment being conducted there, the agency asked Iran to confirm that there had not been any past “activities related to uranium laser enrichment” at any location in the country and to allow environmental sampling at that location. Iran allowed inspectors to conduct sampling on Oct. 6 and told the IAEA Oct. 21 that it conducted laser-enrichment experiments with undeclared imported uranium metal at a site in Tehran until October 2002.

Iran later told the IAEA during an Oct. 27-Nov. 1 visit that it had established “a pilot plant for laser enrichment” at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000 and conducted enrichment experiments there between October 2002 and January 2003. Iran dismantled the equipment in May and presented it to IAEA inspectors on Oct. 28, according to the report.

Other Concerns

Reprocessing

The IAEA found that Iran separated a “small amount” of plutonium from spent fuel produced in a research reactor in Tehran—an action Iran was obligated to report to the IAEA. Reprocessing activities have caused concern because Iran has nearly completed a light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr and has announced plans to build a heavy-water reactor, each of which produce plutonium. LWRs are considered more proliferation resistant. Such reprocessing can also produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Uranium Conversion

Iran announced in March that it had completed a facility located near Isfahan for converting uranium oxide into uranium hexafluoride. Iran first told the IAEA that it had completed the facility without having tested it with nuclear material but later admitted to conducting uranium-conversion experiments in the early 1990s. (See ACT, September 2003.) Iran was required to disclose these experiments to the IAEA.

According to the November report, Iran told the IAEA Oct. 9 that it conducted previously undisclosed uranium-conversion experiments with multiple phases of the conversion process between 1981 and 1993. Iran also admitted that it was planning to produce uranium metal for use in its laser-enrichment program. In June, a Department of State official noted that Iran would most likely use uranium metal in nuclear warheads.

The report also states that Iran failed to provide design information about the facilities where the concealed nuclear activities took place, as is required by its safeguards agreement.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/IAEAreport

***

Esfahan (Isfahan)
Uranium Conversion Facility

In September 1995, China’s ambassador to Iran admited that China was selling uranium enrichment technology to Iran, and in early 1996 China informed the IAEA of the proposed sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. The United States and China reached agreement in October 1997 that China would halt assistance to Iran’s nuclear efforts. China pledged to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion facility (UCF) and to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, but said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran would use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. According to some reports, at that time the UCF plant was close to completion and was anticipated to be operational by 2000. Some reports suggested that by that time Chinese assistance had enabled Iran to complete construction of the UCF plant. In December 1998, US intelligence reports were publicly cited as having revealed that two Russian nuclear research institutes were actively negotiating to sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a uranium-conversion facility.

The UCF was a facility declared to the IAEA in 2000 and subsequently under construction at Esfahan. In February 2003, before the top officials of the Ministry of Science, Iranian President Mohammad Khatanmi reportedly announced a program for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which was to include the UCF in Esfahan. At the UCF Facility in Esfahan, using the yellow cake prepared at Ardekan, a number of by-products including uranium hexofloride (UF₆), metallic uranium, and uranium oxide (UO₂) were produced. These were later used for uranium enrichment.

The IAEA received preliminary design information on the UCF under construction at ENTC in July 2000, and had been carrying out continuous design information verification (DIV) since then. In that design information, the facility was described as being intended for the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF6 for enrichment outside Iran, and for the subsequent conversion (at the UCF) of the enriched UF₆ into low enriched UO₂ enriched uranium metal and depleted uranium metal.

In a letter to the IAEA dated 9 October 2003 from Mr. E. Khalilipour, Vice President of the AEOI, Iran provided information that had not been provided earlier on research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes, including acknowledgement of laboratory and bench scale experiments. Specifically, Iran confirmed that, between 1981 and 1993, it had carried out at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) bench scale preparation of UO₂ and, at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), bench scale preparation of ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC), UO₃, UF₄ and UF₆. In the same letter, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the IAEA. These activities were carried out at TNRC and ENTC.

In addition to the issues associated with the testing of UCF processes, the IAEA had previously raised with Iran questions related to the purpose and use of nuclear material to be produced at UCF, such as uranium metal. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that the uranium metal had been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as previously stated, but also for use in the laser enrichment programme.

In the meetings held between 27 October and 1 November 2003, Iran provided additional information about these experiments. According to Iranian officials, the experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved pressed or sintered UO₂ pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had been irradiated in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation was carried out at TNRC in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment. Iran stated that these experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry.

On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports, and design information for ENTC and JHL, covering these activities.

An IAEA Report dated 10 November 2003 found that Iran had failed to report the production of UO₂ targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at TNRC. It also found that Iran had failed to provide design information for the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of UO₂, UO₃, UF₄, UF₆ and AUC.

The UCF project was not one of the projects Iran agreed to suspend voluntarily. The IAEA was informed in February 2004 that Iran would start the Esfahan ICF project in March 2004. In early 2004 AEOI Director Reza Aqazadeh announced that the Esfahan UCF project was in the experimental stage and that the center would soon begin experimental production. He stated that the Esfahan UCF center would produce all the raw materials needed for fuel cycle activities, including hexafluoride uranium, metal uranium, and uranium oxide.

It was reported by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a anti-government Iranian politial action group linked to organizations on the US terror watch list, on 9 March 2004 that Alireza Jafarzadeh, who disclosed in August 2002 Iran’s facilities at Natanz and Arak, said Iranian leaders decided at a recent meeting to seek an atom bomb “at all costs” and begin enriching uranium at secret plants. “They set a timetable to get a bomb by the end of 2005 at the latest,” the former spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran said. “They will heavily rely on smaller secret enrichment sites at Karaj, Esfahan and at other places.”

On 12 June 2004 Iran rejected European demands that it freeze additional parts of its atomic program, including the heavy-water reactor. “We will not accept any new obligation,” Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said at a news conference. “If anyone asks us to give up Esfahan industries to change yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas or to give up heavy-water facilities in Arak, we cannot accept such an extra demand that is contradictory to our legal rights.”

Iran informed the Agency that it was conducting hot tests at UCF that would generate UF₆ product. One such test, which generated about 30–35 kg of UF₆, was conducted between May and June 2004. In March 2004, Iran began testing the process lines involving the conversion of UOC into UO₂ and UF₄, and UF₄ into UF₆. As of June 2004, 40 to 45 kg of UF₆ had been produced therefrom. A larger test, involving the conversion of 37 tons of yellowcake into UF₄, was initiated in August 2004.

On 18 June 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak and the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.

On 19 September 2004 the IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution Saturday that it was necessary for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities immediately. Iran promised before to comply, but had only partially suspended its uranium enrichment program and never for very long.

On 21 September 2004 Iran informed the IAEA that it had started converting uranium into the gas needed for enrichment purposes, a process that had sparked renewed concerns about a possible bomb program. Reza Aghazadeh, Iran’s Vice-President and energy chief said the Islamic Republic was already converting part a large amount of raw uranium into the gas (hexafluoride) used by nuclear centrifuges to make enriched uranium. This larger test involving 37 tonnes of yellowcake had been planned for August/September 2004. If all 37 tonnes of yellowcake were converted, that would produce enough uranium metal that, when enriched, would yield about 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough to make up to five atomic bombs.

According to Iran’s declaration of 14 October 2004, 22.5 tons of the 37 tons of yellowcake had been fed into the process and that approximately 2 tons of UF₄, and 17.5 tons of uranium as intermediate products and waste, had been produced. There was no indication as of that date of UF₆ having been produced during this later campaign.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/esfahan-ucf.htm

***

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (Persian: غلامرضا آقازاده) (born Khoy, Iran on 15 March 1949) is anIranian Politician. Aghazadeh served as the Vice President for Atomic Energy [1] of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran up until July 2009.

He has a Bachelor of Science in Accounting and Computer Engineering from University of Tehran. He moved to the US for further studies but returned in late 1978 as the revolution against the Shah began to unfold. He was an active member of the opposition, and in 1979 became a director of the ultra-populist IRP newspaper Jomhuri Eslami, run by Mir-Hossein Mousavi. In 1980, Musavi became foreign minister and made Aghazadeh his deputy in charge of economic relations and finance.

Two years later, as Musavi became prime minister, Aghazadeh was made state minister for executive affairs, a post attached to the premier’s office. Later he held the title of deputy PM for executive affairs in charge of Iran’s oil barter deals with foreign states and companies under a countertrade system started in 1982. He co-ordinated policies of various ministries through the PM’s office. His talents earned him the post of Iran’s Minister of Petroleum in October 1985. He held this position until 1997 when he was replaced by Bijan Namdar Zanganeh after the election of then reformist president Mohammad Khatami. He was then promoted to the post of Vice President for Atomic Energy. He held this position from 1997 to 2009.

Aghazadeh is also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.

On July 16, 2009, the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency reported that Gholam Reza Aghazadeh had resigned as Iran’s Nuclear Chief for unspecified reasons, a resignation of intense interest in such a difficult time.^[1]

References

^ Head of Iran Atomic Energy Organization resigns. ISNA. July 16, 2009

External links

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Gholam Reza Aghazadeh

Preceded by Mohammad Gharazi	Petroleum minister of Iran 1985-1997	Succeeded by Bijan Namdar Zangeneh

This article about an Iranian politician is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gholam_Reza_Aghazadeh“

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gholam_Reza_Aghazadeh

***

Article: Ex-Soviet arms may be in Iran // Nuclear warheads missing in Kazakhstan

Article from:: Chicago Sun-Times
Article date:: May 1, 1992
Author:: // Edith M. Lederer

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-4108032.html

LONDON Iran has obtained at least two nuclear warheads that had been reported missing from Kazakhstan, a newspaper said Thursday.

The article, based on a secret report from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency, again raises questions about whether the successors to the Soviet Union will be able to control their weapons.

The newspaper, the European, did not say how it had obtained the intelligence report. It quoted the report as saying several nuclear warheads vanished from the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, which the republic’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, closed in early 1992.

The European said some intelligence sources believe Nazarbayev was behind the secret …

[etc.]

***

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/lavizan.htm

Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Sanam Industrial Group
Sanam Industries Group
Lavizan
35°46’23″N 51°29’52″E
Sultanatabad [Saltanatabad]
35°47’09″N 51°28’40″E

No.28, Shian 5, 
Lavizan, Tehran, 
Tel : +98-21-2949508,9 
      +98-21-2935281 
Fax : +98-21-2948301

Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) is a leading industrial and military subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Armed Forces Logistics. More than 13 large factories with over 10,000 expert personnel are involved in manufacturing a vast variety of military and non-military products, which are partially exported. AIO’s factories are equipped with modern facilities and supported with long experiences, which have led to high quality products according to international standards.

Military products include different types of weapons such as guns, rockets, missiles, mortars, bombs, rocket launchers, field kitchens, gyroscopes, transportation means, police equipment, and helmets. Technical and engineering services include precision machining, metal forming, trading & software services, quality control environmental test, dimensional measurement, heat treatment & coating, C.N.C. machine, and C.M.M. measurement.

Iran’s missile program reportedly includes production plants in Esfahan and Semnan, as well as at design centers in Sultanatabad, Lavizan and Kuh-e Bagh-e-Melli on the outskirts of Teheran. Although the location of the Kuh-e Bagh-e-Melli is uncertain, but the Sultanatabad and Lavizan facilities are apparently located in extremely close proximity.

The Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), also known as the SANAM Industrial Group, is the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) liquid fuel missile design and manufacturing arm, attached to Department 140 of the DIO Missile Industries Group [other reports claim that it is in charge of Iran's solid-fuel missile program]. Sanam Industries Group is said to be the lead organization for the development of the Shahab-3 missile.

It was reported in July 1998 that China Great Wall Industries Corporation had negotiated a contract with the Missiles Industry Group [also said to be known as the Sanam Industries Group or Department 14] to provide telemetry infrastructure for test flights of Iran’s Sahab-3 and Sahab-4 ballistic missiles.

Iran said on 14 April 1999 that it had successfully fired a medium- to long-range anti-aircraft missile dubbed Sayyad-1, which it claimed was developed by the Defense Ministry’s Aerospace Industries Organization. In September 1999 Aerospace Industries Organization unveiled the country’s first indigenously-built jet engine, the Tolu-4. This low-to-medium-thrust turbofan is designed mainly for civil applications. Apparently of Russian origin, it is believed to be the product of local final assembly of components produced in Russia. The Lavizan Technical and Engineering Complex includes faculties of installations industries and metallurgy. Baltic States Technological University in Saint Petersburg has reportedly contracted with the DIO’s Sanam College to help Iran design long-range solid fuel rocket boosters. The organizations jointly created a center known as Persepolis as part of an agreement concluded in 1996. Iranian students from the Sanam Industrial group were expelled on 22 June 1998 from Ustinov Military Mechanics State Technical University as part of Russia’s international obligations to control the spread of missile technology, days after both houses of the US Congress passed sanctions on Moscow. Encouraging the strikes and demonstrations that led to the downfall of the Shah’s regime, Iman Khomeini requested soldiers to abandon their barracks. The revolt spread to the the regime’s most strategic strongholds, including the Shah’s special guards, and several officers of the guard stationed at Lavizan Military Base were killed by revolutionary soldiers on the anniversary of Ashura [the day of mourning and commemoration of the martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammed's grandson Imam Hussein, massacred by the Caliph Umayed Yazid in AD 680].

Like many military organizations, the SANAM Industrial Group subsidiary of AIO produces non-military products to meet domestic and export markets demands. In addition to military products, AIO’s products include: household, automotive parts, stainless steel dishes, and industrial equipment. Non-military products include TVs, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, various types of grinding wheels, stainless steel dishes, industrial fans, motor pumps, automotive parts (axle- cylinder body- propeller shafts- fuel pumps- steering system- electromotor for power window- washer wiper pump- engines). Using Korean SAMSUNG technology, the SANAM Washing Machine is a powerful, economic and durable washing machine with after sale service. The SANAM Washing Machine is a semi-automatic with 3kg capacity equipped with timer drier and two separate motors. SANAM Industrial Group in Parchin is licensed by the Italian company Lombardini to produce internal combustion engines below 50 kW, including a wide range of air and liquid cooled diesel and spark-ignition engines that are used in automotive, agricultural, industrial and marine applications.

In 1992, the US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee said there was a “98 per cent certainty that Iran already had all [or virtually all] of the components required for two to three operational nuclear weapons made with parts purchased in the ex-Soviet Muslim republics.” In April 1998 the Jerusalem Post ran a series of alarmist articles claiming Iran had nuclear weapons, based on claims that a defecting Iranian nuclear scientist had delivered details of Tehran’s weapons program to Israel. The Jerusalem Post reported that Iranian government documents discussed Tehran’s efforts to purchase nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics. According to the documents, “Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them”. In one of the documents, dated December 1991, the deputy head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards tells Atomic Energy Agency chief Rezi Amrullahi that “two war materiel of nuclear nature” had arrived from Russia and were being held by the guards. According to another (in 1992), the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area. A third document (also dated 1992) discusses the production of a solid fuel missile prototype, Zalzal 300, completed in Lavizan which was soon to be ready for launch.

The accuracy of these various claims is uncertain, and it is probable that these claims are in fact incorrect. These reports are almost certainly the product of efforts by the Israeli government to pressure the United States into stronger trade sanctions on Russia.

Sources and Resources

Iran has up to 4 nuclear bombs By STEVE RODAN Jerusalem Post 09 April 1999 — Iranian Revolutionary Guards official quotes an engineer identified as Turkan as saying that the nuclear warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
IRAN HAS FOUR NUCLEAR BOMBS ICEJ NEWS SERVICE April 9, 1998 — Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them. In 1992 the nuclear warheads were being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.
Missile Threat from Iran By Kenneth R. Timmerman Reader’s Digest January 1998
Aerospace Industries Organizations Homepage

FAS | Nuke | Guide | Iran | Facility |||| Index | Search |

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/lavizan.htm

***

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/50432228/Time-Life-Pictures

Title:	Vladimir Dlouhy
Caption:	Czech Industry Min. Vladimir Dlouhy during TIME interview re former E. bloc country’s market economy transition. (Photo by Chris Niedenthal//Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)
Date created:	01 Nov 1993
Editorial image #:	50432228
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Photographer:	Chris Niedenthal/Contributor
Collection:	Time & Life Pictures
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Show keywords and more details

***

Nuclear Chronology
1993
The Czech engineering firm, Skoda, considers selling nuclear technology to Iran; Skoda first attempts to do so in cooperation with Germany’s Siemens. When Siemens refuses, Skoda pursues the matter on its own with the support of Czech industry minister, Vladimir Dlouhy. However, sharp Western protests causes Skoda to abandon the effort. Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda’s nuclear division, says later that Skoda would not sell nuclear technology directly to Iran until adequate nuclear safeguards were in place. Svitak, however, indicates that Czech nuclear technology sold to Russia could end up in Iran.
—”Something Clunky Out East,” Economist (London), 18 February 1995, pp. 68-69.

1993
Iranian arms dealers Mehdi Kashani and Musa Khair Habibollahi purchase the small Hartenholm airport located north of Hamburg in Germany. The Iranians have reportedly been using the airport as a transit point for smuggling weapons-related materials and technology since sometime after 1985, and according to Western intelligence officials, continue to use the airport for smuggling nuclear weapons-related items and other goods under the new management of another Iranian, Nick Ahmed Semnar. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]
—Chris Hedges, “Nuclear Trail—A Special Report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran’s Arms Program,” The New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

[Etc.]

9 March 1993
Factory officials at a beryllium plant in Ustkamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, say that an Iranian delegation had visited the plant in August 1992 but deny that any sale took place. The British Broadcasting Corporation reports, however, that the Iranians purchased beryllium, a key component in nuclear weapons production, as well as 100 tons of uranium on that occasion.
—Agence France Presse, 9 March 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

[ . . . ]

September 1993
A US House of Representatives subcommittee investigation documents that over 230 companies from the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, including over 50 US businesses, have sold materials and equipment to Iran useful in the production of weapons of mass destruction. These transactions were made with the approval of their government export-control officials, according to Kenneth R. Timmerman. Timmerman claims that since the US Congress passed additional restrictions on sensitive technology sales to Iran in October 1992, US companies have been permitted by the US Commerce Department to export centrifuges, gas separation devices, gas chromatographs, machine tools, mass spectrometers, and million-dollar supercomputers to Iran that can assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Between January 1993 and June 1993, one of these sensitive US high-technology exports was shipped straight to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration of the Department of Commerce Iain Baird calls Timmerman’s claims misleading, citing the Commerce Department’s full compliance with the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act. Baird adds that a $1 million computer exported to Iran was actually an outdated computer “attached to a well-logging system used in the oil and gas industry” which was not considered a national security concern.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Caveat Venditor,” The New York Times, 25 October 1993, p. A19; Iain Baird, “Letter: On Trade Surveillance; U.S. Monitors High-Tech Exports to Iran,” The New York Times, 3 November 1993, p. A26.

[ . . . ]

2 September 1993
The Intelligence Newsletter reports that the French firm CKD is delivering nuclear materials to Iran. The report also says that a secret clause in a French-Iranian agreement, signed on 29 December 1991, provides for the resumption in 1994 on construction on three reactors in Iran.
—Intelligence Newsletter, 2 September 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.

[ etc.]

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_1870.html

***

Iran already has nuclear weapons since 1993 – why do people in the UN and in the news act like they don’t? Why is Iran trying to buy time? – nuclear assets, nuclear weapons, nuclear missiles and parts, nuclear power plants, enriched uranium – they’ve had all that for over sixteen years now –

Posted by cricketdiane on September 26, 2009

I keep hearing how Iran might get nuclear weapons – It looks like they’ve had them since 1993.

Putting a search in Google for Iran 1993 nuclear – and it yielded this -

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_1870.html

February 1993
The International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that Argentina will export a shipment of 20% enriched uranium to Iran in 1993.
—Claude van England, “Iran Defends Its Pursuit Of Nuclear Technology,” The Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1993, p. 7; The Arms Control Reporter, March 1993. (see below)

March 1993
The Arms Control Reporter reports that by December 1991, Iran had imported four nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, including a nuclear artillery shell, two nuclear warheads that could be launched on Scud missiles, and one nuclear weapon that could be delivered by a MiG-27 aircraft. [Note: See 24 May 2002 entry.] The report says that fissile material was exported from Kazakhstan to Iran and the rest of the components were exported from other republics of the former Soviet Union through Turkmenistan. Although the codes to arm the warheads were not provided with the missiles, the report says two experts from Russia arrived to bypass arming codes.

[etc.]

Nuclear Chronology

1993

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1993
China agrees to sell two 300MW Qinshan reactors under a project named Esteqlal for the facility of Darkhovin located south of the city of Ahvaz. [Note: Esteqlal usually refers to a plant under construction at the Bushehr site. See 19 September 1994, 29 September 1994, 17 April 1994 entries. But according to the Federation of American Scientists, Esteqlal is a project at the Darkhovin site. FAS reports that many sources incorrectly refer to Esteqlal as being at Bushehr, not Darkhovin.]
—Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Burgeoning WMD Program,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, <http//www.meib.org>; Federation of American Scientists, “Darkhovin,” <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/darkhovin.htm>.

1993
China provides Iran with an HT-6B Tokamak fusion reactor that is installed at the Plasma Physics Research Center of Azad University. The center is believed to be run by M. Qorannevis.
—”Transfer of Nuclear Device to Iran Cited,” FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-078, 21 April 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, “Foreign Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment,” CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

1993
Iran asks Russia for heavy water reactors, and Russia refuses because of proliferation concerns.
—”Press Conference With PIR Center Officials Regarding Russian-Iranian Defense and Nuclear Cooperation,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 16 March 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1993
President Clinton and former President Bush convince Russian President Boris Yeltsin to kill negotiations with Iran on the sale of a natural-uranium-burning [heavy water] reactor. Such reactors can be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. [Note: See previous 1993 entry on Russia and heavy water reactors.]
—Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran,” New York Times, 24 January 1995, p. A4.

1993
The Czech engineering firm, Skoda, considers selling nuclear technology to Iran; Skoda first attempts to do so in cooperation with Germany’s Siemens. When Siemens refuses, Skoda pursues the matter on its own with the support of Czech industry minister, Vladimir Dlouhy. However, sharp Western protests causes Skoda to abandon the effort. Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda’s nuclear division, says later that Skoda would not sell nuclear technology directly to Iran until adequate nuclear safeguards were in place. Svitak, however, indicates that Czech nuclear technology sold to Russia could end up in Iran.
—”Something Clunky Out East,” Economist (London), 18 February 1995, pp. 68-69.

1993
Iranian arms dealers Mehdi Kashani and Musa Khair Habibollahi purchase the small Hartenholm airport located north of Hamburg in Germany. The Iranians have reportedly been using the airport as a transit point for smuggling weapons-related materials and technology since sometime after 1985, and according to Western intelligence officials, continue to use the airport for smuggling nuclear weapons-related items and other goods under the new management of another Iranian, Nick Ahmed Semnar. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]
—Chris Hedges, “Nuclear Trail—A Special Report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran’s Arms Program,” The New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

1993
Germany’s Leybold AG sharply tightens its export controls on nuclear-related items, virtually prohibiting the transfer of dual-use items to Iran. Leybold checks with German and US authorities and investigates its potential buyers before making a sale, and through use of databases it seeks to identify possible third-party front companies that might be attempting to buy items for threshold states.
—Linda Rothstein, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1993, pp. 4-5.

1993
A feasibility study shows that it would be possible to convert Iran’s 5MW nuclear research reactor from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Future studies will be conducted to compare the possible loadings for the LEU core. These studies will need to consider the economics of such conversion and the increased handling of uranium that it will entail.
—S.M. Nejat, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1993, pp. 45-46.

1993
US companies export dual-use technologies to Iran, including “toxins, turbojet engines, air or vacuum pumps, machinery for liquefying gas, centrifuges and centrifuge parts, machine-tool holders, gas separation equipment, hydraulic presses, and laboratory furnaces,” without proper Department of Commerce (DOC) licensing or inspection, according to US Senate testimony in 1995 by Kenneth R. Timmerman, director of the Middle East Data Project. An official from the Department of Commerce in 1995 describes Timmerman’s testimony as “inaccurate and without foundation.”
—Bill Gertz, “Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia,” Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

1993
A Russian foreign intelligence report says Iran has devised a way to dodge export regulations. Other reports refer to extensive Iranian efforts to procure fissile material.
—David Albright, “An Iranian Bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1995-8/95, pp. 21-26.

7 January 1993
Kim Yong Sop, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt, says that reports that North Korea is exporting nuclear technology to Iran are erroneous. Kim further states his country does not have nuclear capabilities, therefore, it is not able to transfer nuclear technology to another country.
—”North Korean Ambassador Denies Nuclear Exports to Iran, Iraq,” Middle East News Agency (Egypt), 7 January 1993, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 January 1993
Gad Yaacobi, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, says Iran devotes $800 million per year to the development of nuclear weapons. He warns that Iran has become “the main threat now” to peace in the Middle East.
—Charles A. Radin, “Israeli Envoy Says Iran is Now Main Threat in Mideast,” The Boston Globe, 23 January 1993, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 January 1993
Sakartvelos Respublika (Tbilisi) reports that in a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by Iran and Georgia, both nations agree that they share a similar view in support of disarmament, controls on weapons of mass destruction, and their reduction and eventual elimination. The treaty also states that both nations wish to declare the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea both a zone of peace and a nuclear and chemical weapon-free zone.
—”Friendship, Cooperation Treaty With Iran Published” Central Eurasia, 27 January 1993, pp. 60-63.

28 January 1993
Russia expresses concern over the spread of weapons to other countries, and it identified certain areas of concerns. In varying degrees, Russia is concerned about Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Taiwan, Syria, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt and South Korea.
—Jeff Berliner, “Russia Worried About Spread Of Weapons,” Executive News Service, 28 January 1993.

31 January 1993
At a Teheran news conference, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani denies reports that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon. President Rafsanjani declares that Iran “cannot afford to purchase [and] will never try to purchase” nuclear bombs.
—Caryle Murphy, “Iranian Sees No Breakthrough On U.S. Ties,” The Washington Post, 1 February 1993, pp. A12, A15.

February 1993
Akbar Torkan, former Iranian defense minister, says, “Can our Air Force…take on the Americans, or our Navy take on the American Navy? If we put all our country’s budget into such a war, we would have just burned our money. The way to go about dealing with such a threat requires a different solution entirely.”
—Financial Times, 8 February 1993, p.4; in Michael Eisenstadt, “Living With a Nuclear Iran?,” Survival, 3 August 1999, pp. 124-48.

February 1993
The International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that Argentina will export a shipment of 20% enriched uranium to Iran in 1993.
—Claude van England, “Iran Defends Its Pursuit Of Nuclear Technology,” The Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1993, p. 7; The Arms Control Reporter, March 1993.

2 February 1993
An Anti-Defamation League (ADF) report says the United States is inadvertently aiding Iran’s nuclear weapon program by supplying it with more than $650 million a year in computers and “other federally listed nuclear relevant technologies.” The report also states Iran’s ability to purchase dual-use technologies has been bolstered by increasing US purchases of Iranian oil. The US Department of Commerce says any dual-use technology sent to Iran is carefully scrutinized by the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, which calls the checks “adequate and rigorous.”
—Steve Rodan, “ADL: U.S. Companies Helping Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Jerusalem Post, 10 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 February 1993
President Rafsanjani and Jiang Xinxiong, the president of the China National Nuclear Industrial General Corporation, meet to discuss the construction of a 300MW nuclear power station in Iran. China promises to provide the technology and equipment for the construction of the nuclear power station.
—”Rafsanjani Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes; Cooperation with PRC,” New China, 17 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 February 1993
Sueddeutsche Zeitung reports that Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbajev, while in Egypt, says that Kazakhstan never sold any materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. The atomic weapons of the former Soviet Union are under control of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
—”Kazkhstan mediates in the Iranian-Egyptian dispute,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 17 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS Translation]

17 February 1993
Iranian President Rafsanjani says nuclear cooperation between China and Iran is for peaceful purposes only, “All the world should believe that Iran and China are cooperating in the field of nuclear technology for the purpose of the peaceful use of nuclear energy-not for military purposes.” [Note: See 21 February 1993 entry for the signing of a nuclear agreement between China and Iran.]
—”Rafsanjani Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes; Cooperation with PRC,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 February 1993
In response to allegations made by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Iran is working towards developing a nuclear weapon by the year 2000, Reza Amrollahi, head Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says, “Our nuclear program is peaceful…my country has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has expressed its willingness to honor it. Also, we are an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Amrollahi asserts Iran seeks only to improve its ability to generate electricity for its populace and complete the work already started under the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, but he says Iran is involved with research to produce radioisotopes at a laboratory in Karaj. In response to claims by the CIA that it has halted sales of nuclear supplies to Iran by China and Argentina, Amrollahi says his organization is still purchasing low-grade uranium from Argentina and has signed a contract with China for the purchase of a nuclear reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that a shipment of 20% enriched uranium from Argentina will arrive in Iran within the year.
—Claude van England, “Iran Defends Its Pursuit of Nuclear Technology,” The Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1993, p.7; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 1993
Iran and China sign a deal in Tehran to construct two 300MW nuclear power plants in Ahvaz, following an agreement signed in Tehran in February of 1992. [Note: See 22 November 1992 entry.]
—”Update To Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” The Arms Control Reporter, March 1993; Reuters, 22 February 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

24 February 1993
CIA Director James Woolsey says that the United States is concerned about Iran’s nuclear potential, even though Iran is still eight to ten years away from being able to produce its own nuclear weapon. Woolsey said that Iran could become a nuclear power sooner if it acquired assistance from abroad.
—”U.S. Outlines Concern Over North Korean A-Arms,” New York Times, 25 February 1993, p. A5; “German Magazine: DPRK Produced 1 Nuclear Weapon”; Central Eurasia, 3 March 1993, p. 8; Original Source: KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 2 March 1993; Jim Mann, “N. Korea Nuclear Arms Potential Cited by CIA”. Los Angeles Times, 25 February 1993, p. A4.

March 1993
The Arms Control Reporter reports that by December 1991, Iran had imported four nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, including a nuclear artillery shell, two nuclear warheads that could be launched on Scud missiles, and one nuclear weapon that could be delivered by a MiG-27 aircraft. [Note: See 24 May 2002 entry.] The report says that fissile material was exported from Kazakhstan to Iran and the rest of the components were exported from other republics of the former Soviet Union through Turkmenistan. Although the codes to arm the warheads were not provided with the missiles, the report says two experts from Russia arrived to bypass arming codes. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, denies that Iran has received or will receive nuclear assistance from the former Soviet Union. While a report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) states that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, the FIS report agrees with the conclusion expressed by US CIA Director James Woolsey on 24 February 1993 that Iran could indigenously produce a nuclear bomb within 10 years. Iran denies these claims and has stated that its nuclear research is directed towards building two 1200MWe nuclear reactors at Bushehr, as well as producing cyclotrons and radioisotopes. [Note: The 1200MWe reactors are sometimes referred to as 1293MW. See 3 December 1996 and 6 March 1990.]
—”Update To Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” The Arms Control Reporter, March 1993.

1 March 1993
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd says the United Kingdom is tightening its export controls on dual-use technology and military-related equipment to Iran. Under the new British export controls, the Department of Trade and Industry will refuse approval of licenses for banned nuclear or military items listed on international rosters to Iran. The new British export restrictions exempt items considered necessary for keeping civil aircraft safe and also exempt radioactive materials used in medicine.
—Jimmy Burns and Gillian Tett, “UK Tightens Rules On ‘Dual-Use’ Iran Exports,” Financial Times, 2 March 1993, p. 8.

5 March 1993
Proliferation Issues reports that the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) has issued a report that says Iran does not possess nuclear weapons and even with outside help, it will take Iran more than 10 years to develop nuclear weapons. Russian FIS experts said three factors that inhibit Iran’s nuclear weapons program include the weakened state of Iran from the Iran-Iraq War, the great dependency of Iran on foreign assistance in technology and science, and the low level of development of Iran’s industry. The report states that Iran has attempted to overcome its lack of technology and science through buying “dual-use” technology from other countries as Pakistan and Iraq have done. Russian FIS experts said that Iran carries out research on nuclear energy at Karaj, Tehran, and Isfahan, with increased attention being given to the Tehran facility. Since 1968, a 5MW research reactor that uses nuclear fuel enriched to 93% has operated at the Tehran plant. The Russian report concludes that despite concerns over statements made by both Iranian leaders and foreign intelligence services that Iran will soon develop a nuclear bomb, there is no evidence to substantiate such claims.
—”A New Challenge After The Cold War: Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction,” Proliferation Issues, 5 March 1993, pp. 28-29.

9 March 1993
Factory officials at a beryllium plant in Ustkamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, say that an Iranian delegation had visited the plant in August 1992 but deny that any sale took place. The British Broadcasting Corporation reports, however, that the Iranians purchased beryllium, a key component in nuclear weapons production, as well as 100 tons of uranium on that occasion.
—Agence France Presse, 9 March 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

10 March 1993,
An editorial in the Tehran Times says that the Iranian Foreign Ministry should file official protests with countries in the Third World that accuse Iran of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Specific reference was made to a British television report of 8 March 1993, which declared that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, technical assistance, and nuclear weapons materials from Kazakhstan.
—”Foreign Ministry Urged to Protest Accusations on N-Arms,” Proliferation Issues, 22 March 1993, p. 26. IRNA (Tehran) in English 10 March 1993.

13 March 1993
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, denies allegations by Western intelligence sources that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons and declared that Iran has completely complied with the requirements of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. He also refutes a recent report by the British Broadcasting Corporation that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons technology from Kazakhstan. Amrollahi says, “We don’t have a bomb, nor are we seeking one. We oppose nuclear weapons because of our convictions.” Amrollahi also declares that Iran had completed work on five of twelve projects for finding uranium and says, “We hope to produce and sell uranium to the world some day.”
—”Iran’s Nuclear Chief Denies Seeking Weapons,” Reuters, 13 March 1993 Executive News Service, 13 March 1993.

15 March 1993
The Times of London reports that an Iranian opposition official has said that Russia is assisting Iran with the construction of two 440MW nuclear reactors at Gorgan. The Iranian opposition leader also declared that China is prepared to assist Iran in constructing two 300MW nuclear reactors at the Darkhovin facility.
—David Watts, “Tehran Denies Nuclear Charges,” Times, 15 March 1993.

21 March 1993
US News and World Report reports that North Korea and Iran have an agreement to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea reportedly is to sell Iran unspecified numbers of nuclear weapons as well as designs for nuclear weapons plants, in return for Iran giving North Korea $500 million for the development of ballistic missiles that could reach Japan.
—Reuters, 21 March 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

26 March 1993
Jyotindra Nath Dixit, director general of India’s Foreign Ministry, says the Indian government refused a request from Iran for an experimental nuclear reactor three years ago. In light of the relationship between Iran and Pakistan, India said it found it unwise to provide Iran with a reactor at the time. Dixit further states that international pressure to stop nuclear proliferation was a factor.
—Asher Wallfish, “Indian official: Delhi Ignored Iranian Request for Nuclear Reactor,” The Jerusalem Post, 26 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1993
Qol Yisral reports that Israel’s ambassador to Kazakstan received a “commitment” that Kazakstan had not sold nuclear warheads to Iran and does not intend to do so in the future because it wishes to strengthen its ties with Israel and western countries.
—”President Reportedly Denies Nuclear Deals With Iran,” Central Eurasia, 31 March 1993, p. 71.

31 March 1993
Reuters reports that Russia will build a nuclear power plant in Iran. Eduard Akopyan, head of the Russian state company that builds atomic power plants abroad, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, says that the Iranian plant will have two modernized pressurized water reactors. Construction is expected to take seven to eight years. Western governments are expressing concern about the safety of the Russian plants. However, Sergey Shoigu, head of the State Committee for Emergency Situations, rules out the possibility of a major accident.
—”Russia To Build Nuclear Power Plants Abroad,” Executive News Service, 31 March 1993.

April 1993
The Iranian parliament ratifies nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia and China. Iran will buy two VVER-440s [440MW reactors] from Russia and two 300MWe pressurized water reactors similar to those at Qinshan from China. [Note: See 21 February 1993 entry for the signing of the agreement. See 24 February 1993 for the Iranian president's comments on the agreement. See 13 April 1993 for more on the ratification.]
—”Agreements Ratified,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 1993, p. 10.

April 1993
Iran expresses interest in India’s new monazite-based fuel cycle technology for fast breeder reactors. The technology uses a blanket of thorium produced from the beach sands of Kerala, in southwest India.
—Cecil Victor, Patriot (New Delhi), 10 April 1993, p. 5; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-019, 22 June 1993, p. 9.

3 April 1993
Eduard Akopyan, head of the Russian Zarubezhatomenergostroy company that builds atomic plants abroad, says Russia and Iran are discussing where a nuclear reactor should be built. According to Akopyan, the reactor will consist of two units with water-cooled reactors capable of producing 440MW each.
—”Russia Building Nuclear Power Stations for Iran and Other Countries,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 April 1993
The Islamic Majlis of Iran ratifies bills on cooperation pacts with Russia and China. In July 1989, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani signed the 10-point Iran-Russia cooperation pact on peaceful utilization of “nuclear materials and related equipment.”
The agreement between Russia and Iran includes fundamental research and its application in the use of nuclear energy, research on safety in nuclear power stations, radiological and nuclear safety, and the production and use of isotopes. The agreement also provides for the “planning, construction, and utilization of nuclear research reactors and nuclear power stations, the production of components and the material needed for nuclear reactors, and research in laser production technology and applications.”
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry will sign the accords, and all cooperative projects will be subject to IAEA safeguards. The 12-part agreement between Iran and China, which President Hashemi-Rafsanjani signed in September 1992, provides for joint work on nuclear power plants, uranium extraction and exploration, and radiation safeguards.
—”Majles Ratifies Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation,” IRNA (Tehran), 13 April 1993, in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-011, 23 April 1993; “Nuclear Accords with the PRC, Russia Approved.” Hamshahri (Tehran), 14 April 1993, p. 2; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-012, 4 May 1993, pp. 17-18; “Iran Ratified Nuclear Agreements with Russia and China,” Nuclear News, May 1993.

14 April 1993
Paris Match, a French weekly, reports Tehran is investing $2 billion per year to develop its nuclear capability.
—”Paris Match: Iran Spending Billions on Arms,” The Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 1993
Foreign Report reports that North Korea is supplying Iran with nuclear know-how, technology, equipment, and materials such as enriched uranium.
—”An Israeli Lesson For North Korea?,” Foreign Report, 22 April 1993.

May 1993
Russian Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Sidorenko says Russia will build several modernized VVER reactors in both Iran and China. Negotiations with Iran are in their final stage, he says. Although weapons-grade material could be produced from the spent fuel, he says Iran will promise to adhere to the internal safeguards agreement and will allow for international supervision.
—”Russia Set To Supply Iran, China With Nuclear Plants,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 May 1993, p. A9.

11 May 1993
US intelligence analysts allege that Iran has sought weapons-related nuclear equipment and experts from Ukraine. Both nations have denied the allegations.
—John J. Fialka, “Iran Nuclear Power Effort Hides Drive For Weapons, Some U.S. Analysts Say,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 1993, p. A10.

11 May 1993
Experts from Russia and China arrive in Tehran to work on Iran’s civilian nuclear program, which the United States believes constitutes an effort to build weapons of mass destruction.
—John J. Fialka, “Iran Nuclear Power Effort Hides Drive for Weapons, Some U.S. Analysts Say,” Information Bank Abstracts, 11 May 1993, p. 14; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1993
Mohammed Mohammedi, an official of Iran’s Foreign Ministry’s Information Department, says, “At present, none of Iran’s industrial or military installations nor [sic] any of its research centers is capable of producing such weapons [weapons of mass destruction].” Iran further states that due to this belief it has no hesitation in promulgating its desire to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.
—”Iran ‘incapable’ of producing weapons of mass destruction,” Agence France Presse, 12 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1993
Time publishes an interview with Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who declares that nuclear weapons are not in the interest of anyone. He says it would be irrational for Iran to use its limited resources to develop nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons can never be used in the region. Asked about a potential nuclear war between India and Pakistan, he says Iran is more concerned with Israel’s nuclear potential. President Rafsanjani says that even if countries of the Third World tried to acquire nuclear weapons, they could never compete with the major nuclear powers.
—James R. Grimes and Karsten Prager, “Iran: Yes To Revolution And To Moderation,” Time, 24 May 1993, pp. 46-49.

9 June 1993
The Los Angeles Times reports that the United States is worried that a $360 million loan provided to Iran by Japan will allow Iran to fund its nuclear weapons program. Japan labels the money as means to “moderating” Iranian activity.
—Douglas Frantz, “U.S. Worried Over Japanese Loan to Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 9 June 1993, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1993
The United States and European Community (EC) agree to study information regarding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, “Iran must understand that it cannot have normal commercial relations on the one hand while trying to develop weapons of mass destruction on the other.” Christopher, who leads the effort to install sanctions against Iran, says Iran will yield to economic coercion since “Iran’s economy is in trouble.”
—Norman Kempster, “EC will study economic sanctions against Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 10 June 1993, p. 18, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 June 1993
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports that the partnership of Amir Kabir Technological University and the Atomic Energy Organization has produced its first X-ray tube using cobalt-57. The X-ray tube is designed to detect uranium.
—”X-ray Tube for Detecting Uranium Made in Iran for the First Time,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 18 June 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 June 1993
An Agence France Presse report says that the Swiss are major suppliers for Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The report adds that at least 10 companies have exported materials and equipment that could be used to produce nuclear chemical and biological weapons, as well as long-range missiles. The Hebrew language newspaper The Daily Maariv says that Switzerland possesses high technology, loose and legal export controls, and the inclination to sell. Maariv adds that because there is no ‘end-user’ provision in Switzerland, firms can sell parts through intermediaries. The paper also says that Swiss exports to Iran almost doubled in a span of three years. [Note: See 28, 30 June 1993.]
—Agence France Presse, 25 June 1993; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

27 June 1993
The Daily Yomiuri reports Israeli officials met with their North Korean counterparts in an effort to convince North Korea not to provide Iran with nuclear technology and Nodong-1 missiles. Israel believes the missiles would be able to hit Israel and other nations of the Persian Gulf and has asked North Korea in the past to forego any sales to Iran.
—Yomiuri Shimbun, The Daily Yomiuri, 27 June 1993, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1993
Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s prime minister, says allegations made by the newspaper Maariv that Swiss companies are providing information and supplies to Iran for its nuclear program are false, stating, “The newspaper doesn’t know what it is talking about.” [Note: See 25, 30 June 1993.]
—”Rabin Scoffs at Report of Swiss Nuclear Sales to Iran,” Agence France Presse, 28 June 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 June 1993
Shimon Peres, Israel’s foreign minister, asks the Swiss authorities to regulate its exports of materials and equipment that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. The Swiss deny that its regulations pertaining to the export of such equipment are lax. [Note: See 25, 28 June 1993.]
—”Israel asks Swiss to step up curbs on nuclear sales to Iran, Iraq,” Agence France Press, 30 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

July 1993
A new export law decreed by the Italian Foreign Trade Ministry comes into effect, requiring special authorization from the Trade Ministry for all dual-use equipment exports. However, even prior to this law, special authorization would have been needed for export of steam condensers. In the past, uncertainties about the possible utility of dual-use equipment allowed strategic items to be exported from Italy to “high-risk” countries such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq. [Note: See 11 and 13 November 1993 for Italian seizure of steam generators bound for Iran.]
—”Background To Seizure Of Nuclear Shipment Bound For Iran Outlined,” in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55; “Italian Police Seize Iran-Bound Consignment,” Reuters, 11 November 1993; “Iran: Nuclear Equipment Seized in Italy,” Intelligence Newsletter, 25 November 1993, p. 7; “Police Seize Nuclear Material Destined for Iran,” RAI Televideo Teletext (Rome), 11 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 54.

3 July 1993
Iran says no link exists between it and Switzerland for the trade of nuclear materials. Mohammad Reza Alborzi, Iran’s ambassador to Switzerland, denies any link, stating, “Such accusations are baseless and are aimed at discouraging Switzerland from doing business with Iran.” At the same time the Swiss assure its export procedures fully comply with the rules of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). [Note: See 25, 28, 30 June 1993.]
—”Iran denies nuclear cooperation with Switzerland,” Agence France Press, 3 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 July 1993
The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports that Li Lanqing, China’s vice-premier, and Hamid Mirzadeh, Iran’s vice-president, concluded a four-day meeting in which they created a memorandum calling for the construction of two 300MW nuclear power plants in Iran. The Chinese agency Xinhua says the project is “only for peaceful use of nuclear energy and will be put under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” [Note: See 31 October 1992, November 1992.]
—”Iran-China cooperation ‘for peaceful use’ of nuclear energy,” The Monitoring Report, 8 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 1993
According to US Energy Department officials, the Russian government is proceeding with plans to sell a VVER-440/V318 nuclear power plant to Iran.
—Ed Lane, “Russia Pursues Reactor Sales Despite Stiff U.S. Opposition,” Energy Daily, 15 July 1993, p. 10.

Second Quarter 1993
Various Iranian leaders visit the Czech Republic to try to finalize a number of deals arranged by Al Haj Azimi, vice-president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Akbar Itamad, technical advisor to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The leaders involved include Ayatollah Mohajirani, an advisor on nuclear matters to President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and nuclear physicist Mahdi Chamran, head of the Iranian VAVAK intelligence services.
—Intelligence Newsletter, 2 September 1993, pp. 1, 5.

10 August 1993
Sergei Tertiakov, the Russian Ambassador to Iran, says Russia will complete the construction of the nuclear power plant in southern Iran started by the German company Siemens. In response to allegations made by the United States that Russian assistance amounts to arming Iran with nuclear weapons, Tertiakov says, “We have independent relations with Iran and have told the Americans that there is no obstacle on the way of our peaceful nuclear cooperation.”
—”Russia is ready to complete Iranian power plant: Russian ambassador,” Agence France Press, 10 August 1993, <www.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 August 1993
Russia’s Ambassador to Iran states that Washington has not produced any concrete proof supporting the accusations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
—Moscow News, 27 August 1993, p. 5.

September 1993
A US House of Representatives subcommittee investigation documents that over 230 companies form the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, including over 50 US businesses, have sold materials and equipment to Iran useful in the production of weapons of mass destruction. These transactions were made with the approval of their government export-control officials, according to Kenneth R. Timmerman. Timmerman claims that since the US Congress passed additional restrictions on sensitive technology sales to Iran in October 1992, US companies have been permitted by the US Commerce Department to export centrifuges, gas separation devices, gas chromatographs, machine tools, mass spectrometers, and million-dollar supercomputers to Iran that can assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Between January 1993 and June 1993, one of these sensitive US high-technology exports was shipped straight to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration of the Department of Commerce Iain Baird calls Timmerman’s claims misleading, citing the Commerce Department’s full compliance with the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act. Baird adds that a $1 million computer exported to Iran was actually an outdated computer “attached to a well-logging system used in the oil and gas industry” which was not considered a national security concern.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Caveat Venditor,” The New York Times, 25 October 1993, p. A19; Iain Baird, “Letter: On Trade Surveillance; U.S. Monitors High-Tech Exports to Iran,” The New York Times, 3 November 1993, p. A26.

September 1993
The United States proposes to the G-7 nations that COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] export restrictions be eased and a new system created to monitor the export of conventional weapons, raw materials, and dual-use technologies to developing countries. However, the United States will only weaken the restrictions in return for a pledge that the former socialist states will not export military technologies to developing countries engaged in regional conflicts, including Iran.
—Vladimir Mikheyev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 14 September 1993, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-93-178, 16 September 1993, p. 14.

September 1993
Mohsen Nurbakhsh, Iran’s vice-president for economic affairs, declares to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that Iran will not seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction under any circumstances. Although the United States has claimed that Iran is attempting to develop chemical and nuclear weapons, Nurbakhsh states that Iran has adhered to all international agreements concerning the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons.
—Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-031, 8 October 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.

2 September 1993
The Intelligence Newsletter reports that the French firm CKD is delivering nuclear materials to Iran. The report also says that a secret clause in a French-Iranian agreement, signed on 29 December 1991, provides for the resumption in 1994 on construction on three reactors in Iran.
—Intelligence Newsletter, 2 September 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.

27 September 1993
In a speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, claims that Iran’s nuclear program is completely peaceful, that Iran is the first country to promote a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East, and that creating such a zone will be put on hold until Israel cooperates on nuclear issues. Amrollahi also says that Iran’s adherence to IAEA safeguards is clear and that Iran took the initiative of inviting the IAEA to visit Iran’s nuclear facilities.
—IRNA (Tehran) 29 February 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-031, 8 October 1993, p. 16; IRNA (Tehran), 28 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-034, 27 October 1993, pp. 27-28.

October 1993
Siemens challenges allegations that it is considering a plan to have a subsidiary of the Czech firm Skoda complete a reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Intelligence sources say that Siemens has a share in the subsidiary. Siemens spokesman Wolfgang Breyer denies that his company is “involved in any activities whatsoever which would enable third parties to complete the Bushehr plant.”
—Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Administration Accuses Bonn of Blocking its Efforts to Isolate Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 October 1993, p. A18; Terence Roth, “Bonn Denies Blocking Effort to Pressure Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1993, p. A10.

October-November 1993
A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency visits Iran, but like the previous visit in February 1992, it is not a full or special inspection mission. The team visits three nuclear research centers, at Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj, but is not given full access to all activities nor to soil and particle samples at the sites.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

October 1993
Iranian officials state that “little progress has been made” on Iran’s purchase of Russian VVERs to be constructed at Bushehr.
—Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 14 October 1993, p. 9.

5 October 1993
Pinar Bakir, a Turkish businessman and economics professor, is arrested in Turkey for possession of 2.5kg of uranium, which he was allegedly smuggling from Russia to Iran. Four Iranians and four Turkish citizens are arrested in the raid while trying to purchase the uranium from Bakir. Police suspect the four Iranians of working for SAVAMA, the Iranian secret service. Police identify Turker Gelendost, who is among those arrested, as the central figure in the smuggling of the uranium from Russia to Turkey. According to chief of the police anti-smuggling department, Salih Gungor, visitors from Russia brought the uranium into Turkey, where they sold it to Turks. Deputy Head of the Turkish Cekmeci Nuclear Research Center Erol Balikcigil announces that the smuggled material “only has about 2.5 to 3.5% uranium-235 and cannot be used in nuclear weapons manufacture.” Meanwhile, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Alaeddin Borujerdi denies that Russian uranium is destined for Iran, calling the case a plot to undermine Turkish-Iranian relations and stating that Iran is willing to cooperate with Turkish security forces in the matter. Iran continues to deny that it is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Another Iranian is being sought in connection with the case. The uranium was to be sold for $40,000 per gram. However, a specialist at the Cekmeci Nuclear Research Center estimates that “the whole amount was worth only a few thousand dollars.”
—Meral Tamer, Milliyet (Istanbul), 9 October 1993, p. 6; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 42; Istiklal Sevinc, Milliyet (Istanbul), 9 October 1993, p. 16; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 42; Deutsche Press Agentur, 7 October 1993; Reuters, 7 October 1993; Reuters, 6 October 1993; in Executive News Service, 7 October 1993.

15 October 1993
The Wall Street Journal reports that Siemens, the company that held the contract to build the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, would be willing to aid Iran indirectly with the continuation of the reactor. Iran has been asking for export licenses from Germany for the continuation of the project. The Wall Street Journal further notes that Iranian Secret Service Minister Ali Fallahian met with representatives of Siemens in Munich. Siemens had signed a contract with the Czech company Skoda-Energo, and stated that they themselves would not be willing to end the construction of the reactor in Bushehr. The Czechs have just recently sold fuel rods from the closed Greifswald reactor. American intelligence services believe that Siemens may have been trying to give the Iranian Secret Service Minister access to these fuel rods through the Czechs.[Note: See 16 October for Siemens denial.]
—”Anger in the West about German-Iranian cooperation,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 October 1993, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS Translation]

16 October 1993
A spokesperson for the German company Siemens refutes allegations made by the Wall Street Journal that there was a meeting between company officials and the Iranian Secret Service Minister Ali Fallahian. [Note: See 15 October 1993.] The spokesperson also says that the German government’s decision from 1991 not to extend export licenses for the continued construction of the reactor in Bushehr is considered binding. The paper also alleges that the venture between the Czech firm Skoda and Siemens is meant for turbine construction; this, however, is not true, as well as the allegations that the two companies would be involved in building nuclear reactors and their components together. The spokesperson considers the allegations that Siemens is trying to get fuel rods to Iran via the Czech company Skoda “grotesque.” He further states that Siemens does not have access to the fuel rods from the Czech Greifswald reactor, and that they would not even be useful in Bushehr because of the differences between the two reactors.
—”Siemens does not want to finish the Iranian nuclear reactor,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 October 1993, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS Translation]

20 October 1993
At a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers to discuss strategies for countering a “growing nuclear threat from maverick nations and guerilla groups,” US Defense Secretary Les Aspin submits proposals to NATO that include plans to improve intelligence networks in order to identify technologies or nuclear arms that may have been obtained or were being sought by nations such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others.
—Charles Aldinger, Reuters, 20 October 1993; in Executive News Service, 21 October 1993.

21 October 1993
Yossi Beilin, deputy foreign minister of Israel, says Israel is concerned with German firms’ attitude toward continuing nuclear trade with Iran. Israel cites Germany’s recent objections to placing economic sanctions on Iran at a G-7 meeting, as well as a rescheduling of $5 billion worth of debts owed by the Iranian government. Israel believes Germany is so inclined to do business with Iran that it may risk chastisement from the rest of European Community and the United States to make money.
—Evelyn Gordon, “Foreign Ministry Monitoring German Nuclear Sales to Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, 21 October 1993, p. 14; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 October 1993
US News and World Report reports that unidentified intelligence sources have claimed that scientists working in the Soviet Union’s nuclear program in Kazakhstan sold weapons-grade uranium to Iran. Sources also say that Iran has set up five separate, competing units to work on the nuclear weapons program, and that it has divided the program into smaller projects so that the necessary technology can be acquired without detection by the West. Iranian President Rafsanjani requested the assistance of Kazakh nuclear scientists to help Iran “develop its nuclear capability” during a visit to Kazakhstan. A meeting was reportedly held between Kazakhstani experts and Reza Amrollahi, the Iranian deputy president for atomic affairs and the chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, on the topic of giving aid.
—”Copycatting,” US News and World Report, 25 October 1993; “Kazakhstan Seeks Iran’s Help to Develop Nuclear Capability,” in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 44, Al-Shura (Beirut), 1 November 1993, p. 12.

28 October 1993
The French weekly Le Point reports that the Czech firm Skoda Plzen has signed a contract to provide Iran with technology for nuclear reactors in exchange for petroleum products.
—CTK (Prague), 9 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-001, 6 January 1994, pp. 8-9.

11 November 1993
Italian customs authorities seize eight steam condensers for nuclear reactors, manufactured by the Italian firm Ansaldo, and prevent them from being exported to Iran. Italian authorities suspect that the condensers, valued at about $15 million, could be used for nuclear weapons production, and they are attempting to determine if the shipment of sensitive equipment was intended to be concealed by shipping it first to Germany. The order for the eight condensers was originally placed with Breda Termomeccanica (subsequently acquired by Ansaldo) by the German firm Kraftwerk Union for use in an Iranian nuclear power plant, but delivery was prevented by an embargo instituted during the Iran-Iraq War. Special authorization was needed to export the steam condensers, and would have been necessary even prior to the September 1993 Italian export law which requires special authorization from the Trade Ministry for all dual-use equipment exports. [Note: See 13 November 1993.]
—Giorgio Cecchetti, La Republic (Rome), 12 November 1993, p. 23; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55. “Background To Seizure Of Nuclear Shipment Bound For Iran Outlined” JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55; “Italian Police Seize Iran-Bound Consignment.” Reuters, 11 November 1993; “Iran: Nuclear Equipment Seized in Italy.” Intelligence Newsletter, 25 November 1993, p. 7; “Police Seize Nuclear Material Destined for Iran” RAI Televideo Teletext (Rome), 11 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 54.

13 November 1993
An Italian judge confiscates parts deemed to be for nuclear reactors. The judge states that these parts can be used militarily and that they were meant to reach Iran. The parts are from the German company Siemens, whose spokesperson says that the steam generators that were confiscated are 16 years old and were supposed to be put into storage. Italy, along with most Western states, usually does not ship or transfer materials of such nature that can be used for military purposes. The steam generators were brought to the port of Marghera from Milan a couple of months ago. The Siemens spokesperson states that the generators were built in Italy in 1977 for the use in the reactor project in Iran. [Note: See 11 November 1993.]
—”For Iran intended reactor parts confiscated,” Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 13 November 1993, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS Translation]

14 November 1993
In response to allegations that Iran has links to eight generators seized in Italy, Iran says it “has no direct links to these generators and by publicizing the issue, the West pursues other aims.” The generators belong to the German company Siemens, which refuses to complete work on the Bushehr reactor in southern Iran despite pleas by the Iranian government to do so. [Note: See 11 and 13 November 1993.]
—”Iran Denies Link to Nuclear Generators seized in Italy,” Agence France Presse, 14 November 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 – 21 November 1993
A group of International Atomic Energy Agency officials, led by IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Bruno Pellaud, visits Iranian nuclear facilities in Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj. In December 1993, IAEA spokesman David Kyd reports that the officials “found no evidence which was inconsistent with Iran’s declaration that all its nuclear activities are peaceful.” Both the IAEA visit to Iran in November 1993 and an earlier IAEA visit to Iran in 1992 were carried out under “a standing invitation from Iran to discuss its nuclear program.” According to Kyd, the IAEA visit to Iranian nuclear facilities “was not an inspection per se but a familiarization visit” to see if anything had changed since the February 1992 IAEA visit to Iran. The visits were made partly in response to allegations in the West, including claims by members of Iranian opposition groups in exile and “pro-Israel researchers,” that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. Like the previous IAEA visit in February 1992, it is not a full or special inspection mission. The team is not given full access to all activities nor to soil and particle samples at the sites.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000; Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran), 4 December 1993, p. 14; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-002, 18 January 1994, pp. 14-15; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 16 December 1993, pp. 10-11.

27 November – 3 December 1993
The director of the Czech firm Skoda Plzen, Lubomir Soudek, visits Tehran to discuss “energy cooperation” and “possible component deliveries for the construction of a nuclear power plant.” US intelligence sources believe that Iran has a clandestine program to develop nuclear arms and the United States fears that Czech supplies could help Iran produce nuclear waste from which it could extract plutonium for a nuclear bomb.
—Stephen Engelberg, New York Times; in San Francisco Chronicle, 16 December 1993, p. A15; CTK (Prague), 22 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 43-44.

December 1993
In response to pressure from the United States against Czech sales of nuclear components to Iran, the Czech government states that it “has not decided, nor does it intend to decide in the foreseeable future, on any shipments of nuclear technology to Iran.” Earlier in the month, the Czech minister of industry and trade had defended a possible deal between Skoda and Iran.
—Stephen Engelberg, New York Times; in San Francisco Chronicle, 16 December 1993, p. A15.

December 1993
A report in the Israeli daily Haaretz by analyst Danny Keshem alleges that the Czech firm Skoda Plzen is providing Westinghouse of the United States and Siemens of Germany with access to the Iranian nuclear market, thus violating “the restrictions imposed by their home countries on trade with Iran.” Skoda spokesman Jaroslav Hudec calls the report “misleading” and says that except for limited cooperation on a very specific set of products for nuclear power plants, Skoda has virtually no other connection with Westinghouse. Hudec adds that Skoda is involved in talks with Siemens, but only pertaining to joint production of turbines.
—Lidove Noviny (Prague), 17 December 1993, p. 8; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-002, 18 January 1994, p. 38.

December 1993
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asks Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec to prevent export from the Czech Republic to Iran of equipment that can be used in Iran’s nuclear program, even for peaceful purposes, according to Israeli Ambassador to the Czech Republic Moshe Yegar. During his visit to Israel, Zieleniec claims that Czech exports could not be used by Iran for purposes that were not peaceful.
—CTK (Prague), 22 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 43-44.

December 1993
Germany refuses to resume construction of the 80-percent-complete Siemens-built nuclear power plant at Bushehr for fear that it could be accused of helping advance Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
—Agence France Presse (Paris) 13 December 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993, p. 25.

5 December 1993
Kamal Kharazi, Iran’s representative to the United Nations, says Iran is committed to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
—”Iran backs establishment of nuclear-free Middle East,” Moneyclips, 5 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 December 1993
North Korea and Iran conclude a fifth joint committee meeting centered around increasing economic, scientific, and technological ties. Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh led the Iranian delegation.
—Reuters, 10 December 1993; in Executive News Service, 10 December 1993; Reuters, 12 December 1993, in Executive News Service, 13 December 1993.

9 December 1993
The manager for technical service of nuclear power plants for the Czech firm Skoda Plzen, Frantisek Svitak, says that Iran wishes to build a nuclear power plant and that Skoda could provide it with reactor equipment through a Russian general supplier.
—CTK (Prague), 9 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-001, 6 January 1994.

9 December 1993
Reuters reports that the US State Department warned Ukraine against selling nuclear or conventional weapons to Iran or other outlaw states. A State Department official says the Ukraine had assured the United States that it would “exercise restraint in arms transfers to areas of concern.”
—”U.S. Warns Ukraine Against Arms Sale To Iran,” Executive News Service, 9 December 1993; “Kiev Denies Nuclear Technology Sold to Libya, Pakistan.” UNIAN (Kiev), 6 October 1993; in FBIS-SOV-93-193, 7 October 1993, p. 54.

10 December 1993
US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis reports that US intelligence indicates that scientists from the former Soviet Union have gone to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, where they may be assisting in the development of nuclear weapons. Davis says that the migration of former Soviet scientists is hard to document and that she does not have details on the number of scientists or the actual work they are performing. According to Davis, the United States cannot prevent scientists from migrating where they want and selling their expertise, but it does “have better control on items and trade.”
—Carol Giacomo, “Ex-Soviet Scientists Said Going To Iran, Iraq,” Executive News Service, 10 December 1993 Reuters, 10 December 1993.

13 December 1993
Defense News reports that the CIA “believes that Iran could have nuclear weapons within eight to 10 years, even without critical assistance form abroad.”
—Theresa Hitchens and Brendan McNally, Defense News, 13-19 December 1993, p. 3.

19 December 1993
Russian Ambassador to Iran Sergei Tretyakov confirms that Russia will help Iran build a nuclear power plant, indicating that a preliminary agreement has been reached but that financing is still being negotiated. Financial problems stall Russia’s assistance to Iran in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr and in the completion of a second plant started by Germany but abandoned for political reasons. Iran has requested that Russia fund the projects, but Russia has refused due to its own financial crisis.
—Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 19 December 1993; in FBIS Document FBIS0SOV-93-242, 20 December 1993, p. 53; Agence France Presse (Paris) 19 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-002, 18 January 1994, p. 39.

21 December 1993
Iran’s ambassador to the Czech Republic, Rasul Movahedian, asserts that Iran’s involvement with Skoda is directed only toward peaceful projects.
—John Mastrini, Reuters, 21 December 1993; in Executive News Service, 21 December 1993.

22 December 1993
Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s prime minister, “emphatically” asks Josef Zieleniec, Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, not to provide nuclear power components to Iran. Zieleniec denies that any exports to Iran could be used to aid in the development of nuclear weapons. Skoda Plzen, a Czech company with experience building nuclear power plants, recently admitted having discussions with Iran regarding “supplies of parts from a nuclear power plant.”
—”Israel Requests No Nuclear Supplies to Iran,” CTK National News Wire, 22 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.


	Updated August 2005

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	U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
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	Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
	The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
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	Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2006)
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	Iran’s Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold (2005)
	FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide (2005)
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	Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option (2004)
	Iran: Countdown to Showdown (2004)
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	A Preemptive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (2004)
	The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
	Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
	Iran, Player or Rogue? (2003)
	Iranian Missiles: The Nature of the Threat (2003)
	Iran and Nuclear Weapons (2000)
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About This Section	CNS Experts

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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Nuclear Sites

Lashkar Ab’ad – Laser enrichment

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/lashkar-abad-laser-enrichment/

***

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/esfahan/

[etc.]

***

Pars Trash (Tarash)

The current status of operations at Pars is unknown as IAEA inspectors had access to the site only while Iran was adhering voluntarily to the Additional Protocol.

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/pars-trash-tarash/

***

Uranium Enrichment

Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment

Iran had previously claimed its gas-centrifuge program was completely indigenous and had not been used to test nuclear material, but both of these claims were proven false by the IAEA.

In the Nov. 24 issue of Time magazine, ElBaradei said that five European and Asian countries supplied Iran with the components and that the agency will discuss the matter with those governments.

Laser Enrichment

Other Concerns

Reprocessing

Uranium Conversion

The report also states that Iran failed to provide design information about the facilities where the concealed nuclear activities took place, as is required by its safeguards agreement.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/IAEAreport

***

China earthquakes and nuclear weapons sitting side by side in a salt marsh – atomic testing, high energy physics research, international non-proliferation and atomic testing ban treaties – United Nations agreements –

Posted by cricketdiane on September 19, 2009

First, there were a whole bunch of earthquakes in a very short period of time in the same location in China. On the maps, they looked like they had occurred right on top of each other. It got me curious. Then, I was listing them on a Google My Maps and started thinking about what else was in the area. Nearly all of the earthquakes were between 4.2 M and 5.1 M, as well as being very consistently 10.0 km in depth (which is calculated, rather than measured at the site.)

***

My note – (added 09-20-09) -

My conclusions from this information are that -

1. There are nuclear weapons stored in a seismically active area.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_Ch03Chinamap.pdf

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/da_qaidam.htm

http://www.nti.org/db/china/sac.htm
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qaidam

2. There are very likely nuclear testing facilities in the same area.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_Ch03Chinamap.pdf

(see below)

3. The proximity of the salt marsh lakes suggest that sodium is being harvested in the area.

4. Some of the 10km depth, 4.2 – 5.4 earthquakes being recorded in the area could be from underground nuclear testing.

5. That China, among others did not sign the bans on testing and other nuclear non-proliferation treaties even while demanding that they be created and signed by all nuclear states.

6. That in 1963, when a thrust for participation in creating a nuclear arsenal and to enfold itself in nuclear research and surpass the levels of knowledge in that field occurring in other countries, China did so because of an internal realization of what their “known enemies” in the area were doing – particularly the Soviet Union and America, India and Japan, (although Japan is not considered the same kind of enemy).

1963 Jan 16, Nikita Khrushchev claimed the USSR had a 100-megaton nuclear bomb.
(MC, 1/16/02)

1963 Apr 6, The United States and Britain signed an agreement under which the Americans would sell Polaris A-3 missiles to the British.
(AP, 4/6/97)

http://timelines.ws/20thcent/1963.HTML

7. My other conclusions note that there are a number of questionable facilities in that same area. Sandstorms carry any contaminants from the area across population centers to the East, and that there is evidence of atomic testing that has occurred there over a period of time (from 1963 to the present day.)

8. I also noted that the testing equipment which defines where and when the atomic testing occurs around the world is not entirely in place (some 60% of it cut by arguments and only around 60% of that final agreement placed.)

Unfinished Business
The Negotiation of the CTBT
and the End of Nuclear Testing

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-194-5-en.pdf

UNDIR – February 2009

“In 2006, with only 60% of the system complete, a low-yield nuclear test conducted by North Korea was detected by 20 stations (both seismic and radionuclide) around the globe. Since then more than 60 monitoring stations have been added to the system, and the capacity to detect noble gases—the smoking gun of a nuclear explosion—has been doubled from 10 systems to 20.”

“criteria established by the CTBTO, filter it according to nationally requested criteria, and provide some additional technical assistance to states parties. Characterized as “enhanced option 2”, this was finally accepted by the United States and others in May 1996.

With conclusion of the provisions for the IDC, the IMS was able to be
agreed. It was to comprise 50 primary seismic stations and 120 auxiliary
seismic stations; 80 radionuclide stations, of which 40 would be equipped
to monitor noble gases; 11 hydroacoustic stations; and 60 infrasound
monitors.32″

9. The other thing I noticed is that placing nuclear facilities, atomic testing and nuclear research facilities and nuclear warhead tipped missiles on top of seismically active areas, both underground and above ground, is way too common around the world, including in the United States.

10. My analysis is that international cooperation is happening at the same time that some things are being held even more closely to the vest. Despite China and Italy working together on the YBJ International Cosmic Ray Observatory and its high energy physics research, and with other teams from the international community on high energy physics, they are almost totally closed off from international scrutiny in their consummate uses of that research.

11. In conclusion, where I had started to look specifically for those earthquakes from Northern Qinghai, China and then sought to locate what other resources, facilities and nuclear assets were in the area, it was not readily obvious that those nuclear weapons had been originally installed in that same area where the earthquakes were occurring.

“Da Qaidam, which literally means “a big salt lake” in Mongolian, is rich in mineral resources, with one of the largest lead-zinc mines in western China and several coal mines.”

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/28/content_11957440.htm

And, after noting railroads, inactive massive volcanic areas, the brickworks and access to an extensive highway through the area, there were still only more identically ranged earthquakes of note. But then, who puts a brickworks in the middle of nowhere, hundreds of miles from where any of those bricks will be used?

12. So, what it could mean is that a.) underground nuclear testing; b.) nuclear storage on top of earthquakes; c.) old nuclear weapons sitting on top of earthquakes and in underground facilities where earthquakes are occurring regularly; d.) atomic and high energy physics field research facilities may be located in the same area with the earthquakes; and e.) cities to the East of these facilities are downwind of them and there are densely populated areas within a radius of impact.
Coordinates: 37E51’21 N 95E21’24 E
http://wikimapia.org/12397009/Da-Qaidam

town in western Qinghai
Category: township Qinghai-Tibet Plateau Qinghai

- cricketdiane, 09 -20-09

***

Intensity.jpg
USGS ShakeMap – Monday, August 31, 2009

USGS ShakeMap - Monday, August 31, 2009 - Qinghai, China

Nuclear missile sites / nuclear testing sites? - Da Qaidam in Qinghai, China

place where nuclear missiles are known to be kept in the same area – Da Qaidam Zhen
found in article about the 2nd Artillery Group, China – mentioned nuclear program started 1957 and the unit begun in 1963

08-28-09 earthquake near Da Qaidam in Qinghai, China

earthquake near Da Qaidam in Qinghai, China
08-28-09

08-28-09 Earthquakes over 7.0 Magnitude since 1900 - in that same area

neic_kwaf_7.jpg
08-28-09 Earthquakes over 7.0 since 1900 – in that same area

Seismicity from 1990 to 08-28-09 Northern Qinghai, China (near Da Qaidam)

09-18-09 Earthquake on the same spot - 5.1 M, depth 10km

neic_lsat.jpg
09-18-09 Earthquake on the same spot – 5.1 M, depth 10km – Today

Earthquakes in that area Qinghai, China - 1990 to present - as of 09-18-09

Earthquakes in that area – 1990 to present – as of 09-18-09

Timing of P-wave from 09-18-09 earthquake 5.1 M in Northern Qinghai, China

P-wave from 09-18-09 earthquake 5.1 M in Northern Qinghai, China

Friday, August 28, 2009 - (5 earthquakes on this map from the same day) - Northern Qinghai, China near Da Qaidam

Friday, August 28, 2009
(5 earthquakes on this map from the same day) – this was the one that started my curiosity because the map from the same week had looked about that way, too.

electromagnetic wave pulse photographed in space / from the sun

from USGS site today, 09-18-09 about the earthquake in Qinghai, China

Overall, the population in this region resides in structures that are highly vulnerable to earthquake shaking, though some resistant structures exist. A magnitude 5.5 earthquake occurred in the China region 291 km northeast of the location of this earthquake on December 14, 2002 (UTC), with estimated population exposures of 102,000 at intensity VI and 272,000 at intensity V, resulting in an estimated 2 fatalities.

Magnitude 5.5
Max MMI VI
Date-Time Friday, August 28, 2009 at 02:16:06 UTC
Location 37.691̊N, 95.757̊E
Depth 9.2 km (5.7 miles)
Event ID US2009KWAN
Version 2

M 5.5 – NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
Friday, August 28, 2009 at 02:16:06 UTC
Location: 37.7̊N 95.8̊E Depth: 9km
Alert version 2

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/pager/master.php?event_id=2009kwan&network_id=us

***

MAP 5.1 2009/09/18 07:02:12 37.633 95.589 10.0 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
MAP 5.0 2009/09/18 06:53:50 37.715 95.593 10.0 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
MAP 4.8 2009/09/18 00:43:26 37.616 95.562 12.5 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
MAP 4.8 2009/09/17 23:14:53 41.602 96.787 15.1 GANSU, CHINA
MAP 5.0 2009/09/17 09:24:20 37.661 95.902 10.0 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Maps/region/Asia_eqs.php

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Maps/10/50_65.php

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Maps/region/Asia.php

Magnitude 5.1 – NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
2009 September 18 07:02:12 UTC

Versión en Español

* Details
* Summary
* Maps
* Scientific & Technical

Earthquake Details
Magnitude 5.1
Date-Time

* Friday, September 18, 2009 at 07:02:12 UTC
* Friday, September 18, 2009 at 03:02:12 PM at epicenter
* Time of Earthquake in other Time Zones

Location 37.633̊N, 95.589̊E
Depth 10 km (6.2 miles) set by location program
Region NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
Distances 35 km (20 miles) SE of Da Qaidam, Qinghai, China
155 km (95 miles) NNE of Golmud, Qinghai, China
1815 km (1130 miles) W of BEIJING, Beijing, China
Location Uncertainty horizontal +/- 10.4 km (6.5 miles); depth fixed by location program
Parameters NST= 48, Nph= 48, Dmin=>999 km, Rmss=0.34 sec, Gp=101̊,
M-type=body wave magnitude (Mb), Version=6
Source

* USGS NEIC (WDCS-D)

Event ID us2009lsat

* This event has been reviewed by a seismologist.

* Historic Moment Tensor Solutions
* Phase Data
* Theoretical P-Wave Travel Times

* Preliminary Earthquake Report
* U.S. Geological Survey, National Earthquake Information Center:
World Data Center for Seismology, Denver

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2009lsat.php

***

Da Qaidam – 412 Brigade
Ta-ch’ai-tan / Tsaidam
37°50′N 95°18′E

China established a nuclear missile deployment and launch site for DF-4 missiles (China’s first ICBM) in the early 1970s to the west of Dhashu (Haiyan) in the Da Qaidam [Tsaidam] basin. The Larger Tsaidam (Da Qaidam) site has two missiles stored horizontally in tunnels near the launch pad. Fuel and oxidiser is stored in separate tunnels with lines to the launch pad. According to the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) in Washington DC, nuclear missiles are stationed in Small Tsaidam and are only moved to Large Tsaidam in times of emergency. Da Qaidam is one of five location at which a total of between 10 and 20 DF-4s were deployed as of early 1998. The facility is probably headquarters for one of the three launch brigades, each with up to three launch battalions, subordinated to the Second Artillery Corps 80306 Unit, a Division headquartered in Xining, Qinghai province. The 80306 Unit is able to target sites in the former Soviet Union and India, and indications exist that the 80306 Unit may upgrade to the DF-21. Da Qaidam [Large Tsaidam] has been identified as the location of this Brigade headquarters. The reported relationship between Da Qaidam and Xiao Qaidam, notably the disposition of nuclear warheads, might suggest that the Xiao Qaidam facility is the primary location for this unit. However, the apparent Chinese practice of locating headquarters units separately from operational weapons locations, as seen with Second Artillery Corps Division headquarters locations, would appear to confirm Da Qaidam as the probable location for the Brigade headquarters.

Sources and Resources

Nuclear Weapons on the Tibetan Plateau By Tsultrim Palden Dekhang The Office of Tibet 9-Oct-1998
CHINA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Mark A. Stokes [U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute] — September 1999
Taking Stock – Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998 NRDC March 1998

[from -]

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/da_qaidam.htm

***

A quickie search on Google using the search term – Qinghai, China on the USGS window in the listing window under the Google entry for USGS, yields these (and others) -

#
Magnitude 5.1 – NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
Sep 11, 2009 … USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, responsible for monitoring, reporting, and researching earthquakes and earthquake hazards.
earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/…/us2009ljac.php – Cached – Similar
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Shakemap us2009kzaw
Mar 30, 2009 … USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, responsible for monitoring, reporting, and researching earthquakes and earthquake hazards.
earthquake.usgs.gov/shakemap/global/shake/2009kzaw/ – Cached – Similar
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Shakemap us2009kwan
Mar 30, 2009 … USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, responsible for monitoring, reporting, and researching earthquakes and earthquake hazards.
earthquake.usgs.gov/shakemap/global/shake/2009kwan/ – Cached – Similar
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M 5.5 – NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA
Aug 28, 2009 … USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, responsible for monitoring, reporting, and researching earthquakes and earthquake hazards.
earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/pager/master.php?event… – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Distances, 55 km (35 miles) ESE of Da Qaidam, Qinghai, China 170 km (105 miles) NNE of Golmud, Qinghai, China 1800 km (1110 miles) W of BEIJING, Beijing, …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_ljac.html – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Magnitude 4.3 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA. Friday, September 04, 2009 at 08:12:57 UTC. Preliminary Earthquake Report. Versión en Español …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_lda1.html – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Magnitude 4.2 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA. Saturday, September 05, 2009 at 08:59:22 UTC. Preliminary Earthquake Report. Versión en Español …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_lea1.html – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Distances, 45 km (30 miles) ESE of Da Qaidam, Qinghai, China 165 km (100 miles) NNE of Golmud, Qinghai, China 1800 km (1120 miles) W of BEIJING, Beijing, …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_kwa6.html – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Distances, 40 km (25 miles) ESE of Da Qaidam, Qinghai, China 160 km (100 miles) NNE of Golmud, Qinghai, China 1815 km (1130 miles) W of BEIJING, Beijing, …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_kwfy.html – Cached – Similar
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USGS Earthquake Hazards Program: Preliminary Earthquake Report …
Magnitude 4.4 NORTHERN QINGHAI, CHINA. Friday, August 28, 2009 at 02:42:29 UTC. Preliminary Earthquake Report. Versión en Español …
neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_kwaq.html – Cached – Similar

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Qaidam
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Jump to: navigation, search
Status of the Qaidam Basin

The Qaidam Basin, or Tsaidam is a desert region of northern plateau Tibet is situated in the Prefecture of Haixi province China’s Qinghai, and belonging to the ancient traditional Tibetan province of the Amdo. Its name probably derives from Tsa’ir dam, which means in Mongolian and Tibetan, salt marsh .

Geography

Landscape typical steppe desert on the northern edge of Qaidam Basin. The Qaidam Basin is located at altitudes between 2 600 and 3 300 m on the Qinghai-Tibet, and is surrounded by mountain ranges, some reaching 6 000 m altitude. It is bounded on the south by the Kunlun Mountains to the north by the Altun Shan (or Altyn-Tagh) and Nan Shan, and extends eastward to the neighborhoods of Lake Kokonor. From east to west it measures about 850 km and from north to south about 300 km.

The largest lake in the Qaidam Basin is Dabsan Hu, north of the city of Golmud. The salt lakes of Qaidam Basin is such that it forms a thick crust to the surface, ensuring that the lakes are often not perceived as such. The salt in these lakes, especially north of the city of Golmud is the subject of an industrial scale. The main cities are Golmud, Delingha and Da Qaidam.

Climate

A rainbow in the sky after a rare rain in the Qaidam Basin on the Tibetan Plateau

Because of its high altitude and its distance to the sea, the Qaidam Basin has a continental climate. The winters are long and very cold and sandstorms are frequent in the spring. The mountain ranges that impede the arrival of rains, parts of the basin are among the driest regions of China.The average temperature in Golmud is 4.9 E C and annual precipitation of 40 mm.

History

An alternative section of the southern branch of the Silk Road through the Qaidam Basin [1], [2].Recent archaeological excavations suggest that this route would, it is 1 500 years, been more prosperous than through the Gansu corridor [3].

Population

The development activity, primarily related to mineral resources in the region, has resulted in a significant increase in the population: it increased from 10 000 to 270 000 inhabitants between 1946 and 1986.

The nomads living in the basin consist of both Tibetan and Mongolian. In the most desolate regions, particularly in the arid climate, only the Mongolian nomads are present, for their animals (camels, horses, sheep tail fat) bear out the harsh conditions, unlike the yaks and sheep Tibetan nomads [4] .

In 1999, the World Bank had proposed a project to relocate about 60 000 Chinese farmers around the oasis of Xiangride (District Dulan) project that was abandoned because it had the potential to destroy the Buddhist culture specific to western part of China [5], [6], [7]. Tibetans believe that China wants to solve its energy problems at the expense of oil and gas resources of Tibet, while accelerating the transfer of Chinese settlers to the detriment of the fragile ecosystem and cultural heritage of Tibet [8].

Economy
Great Salt Lake in Qaidam Basin

Because of its rich mineral resources, the Qaidam Basin is described as a treasure basin. Among its many mineral resources, most notably the oil, the natural gas, the coal, the sodium chloride, the potassium, the magnesium, the lead, the zinc and the gold [9] and large reserves of asbestos, of borax and gypsum.

The Qaidam possess the largest reserves of lithium, of magnesium, the potassium and sodium across China. Lake Qarhan contains sixty billion tons of salt. 22 oil fields have been discovered, with estimated reserves of 225 million tons, and 6 gas fields, containing 150 billion cubic meters of gas.

Military installations

Bases of strategic nuclear missiles DF-4 would be installed since the 1980s near Delingha and Da Qaidam [10], [11], [12], [13].

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qaidam

***

“We are of the same blood.” – Medvedev about Putin on Zakaria CNN interview – yes, aren’t we all . . .

Unfinished Business
The Negotiation of the CTBT
and the End of Nuclear Testing

http://www.nti.org/db/china/sac.htm

http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qaidam&ei=NlizStGaM5SNtgflpfCuDQ&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum=1&ct=result&prev=/search%3Fq%3DDa%2BQaidam%2BHu%2Bwikipedia%26hl%3Den

NTI – working for a safer world
Center for Non-proliferation Studies – China

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Established on 1 July 1966, the Second Artillery Corps maintains control over China’s nuclear and conventional strategic missile forces, consisting of short-, medium-, long-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. It dates back to the formation of a ground-to-ground missile training group on 9 December 1957 which was later reorganized into strategic guided missile combat battalions on 18 March 1960. 1 One of these battalions launched the Second Artillery Corps’ first missile in October 1963. 2 The Second Artillery Corps made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984. 3

OTHER NAMES: Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF); Strategic Missile Forces (SMF); Strategic Missile Corps (SMC); Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF)

The Second Artillery Corps is comprised of approximately 90,000 personnel and six ballistic missile bases 4 and maintains control of over 100 nuclear warheads. 5 Proportionally, the Second Artillery Corps is given priority funding. Although it only makes up about 4 percent of the PLA, it receives 12 to 15 percent of the defense budget and about 20 percent of the total procurement budget. When the PLA cut 1 million personnel in the 1980s, Second Artillery Corps ranks actually increased. 6

Current Force Structure

China’s current nuclear weapon’s arsenal totals about 400 devices, with over 100 warheads deployed for use on China’s ballistic missiles. China maintains a number of different ballistic missiles in its inventory, including the medium-range DF-3A, DF-15 and DF-21, the intercontinental-range DF-4 and DF-5 and the submarine-launched JL-1. China’s newest missile, the road mobile DF-31, was tested on 2 August 1999 but probably has not entered into operation. Bates Gill and James Mulvenon write that Chinese nuclear force structure seems to defy simple categorization as either limited or minimal deterrence. 7 While China’s newer short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles use solid rocket motors, China’s estimated 20 some ICBMs capable of hitting the US use liquid fuel and require launch preparation times of up to two hours.

http://www.nti.org/db/china/sac.htm

***

CHINA Chart 2: Nuclear Weapons–Related Sites of
Proliferation Concerna
NAME/LOCATION
OF FACILITY TYPE/STATUS
N U C L E A R W E A P O N S C O M P L E X b
Northwest Nuclear Technology Institute, in the Archive on nuclear explosions, warfare, and weapons research and design;
Scientific Research District outside Malan, associated with testing at Lop Nur.
Xinjiang
Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex Fabrication of fissile materials into bomb cores, and final weapons assembly.
(Plant 404), Subei, Gansu
Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, Diagnostic support for nuclear test program.
Xi’an, Shaanxi
Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Test Base, Xinjiang Nuclear weapons test site and possible nuclear weapons stockpile.
Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Nuclear weapons research, design, and technology complex; called the ‘‘Los
(CAEP), Mianyang, Sichuan Alamos of China,’’ 11 institutes, 8 located in Mianyang.c
Institute 905 of CAEP, outside Mianyang Ordnance engineering lab for non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons;
‘‘the Chinese Sandia.’’d
Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Conducts research on nuclear warhead design computations for CAEP.
Mathematics, Beijing
Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research, Engaged in tomography, tests solid missile propellants, explosives, and
Shanghai, Zhejiang detonation packages for nuclear weapons.
Fudan University, Shanghai, Zhejiang Engaged in tomography, tests solid missile propellants, explosives, and
detonation packages for nuclear weapons.
Harbin, Heilongjiang Possible warhead assembly and production site.
Plant 821, Guangyuan, Sichuan Nuclear weapon assembly facility.
P L U T O N I U M P R O D U C T I O N R E A C T O R S
Plant 821 LWGR, nat. U, 1,000 MW; operational.
Guangyuan, Sichuan Largest plutonium producing reactor in China.
Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex LWGR, nat. U, 400-500 MW; operational.
(Plant 404), Subei, Gansu
R E S E A R C H R E A C T O R S
HFETR Tank, LW; HEU (90%), 125 MWt; operational.
Nuclear Power Institute of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan
HFETR critical Critical assembly, LW; HEU (90%), 0 MWt; operational.
Nuclear Power Institute of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan
MJTR Pool, LW; HEU (90%), 5 MWt; operational.
Nuclear Power Institute of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan
MNSR IAE Tank in pool, LW; HEU (90%), .027 MWt; operational.
China Institute for Atomic Energy,
Tuoli, near Beijing
MNSR-SD Tank in pool, LW; HEU (90%), .027 MWt; operational.
Shandong Geology Bureau, Jinan, Shandong
MNSR-SZ Tank in pool, LW; HEU (90%), .027 MWt; operational.
Shenzhen University, Guangdong
Zero Power Fast Critical Reactor Critical fast; HEU (90%), 0 MWt; operational.
Southwest Research Institute,
Chengdu, Sichuan
NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES 65

CHINA Chart 2 (cont’d.)
NAME/LOCATION
OF FACILITY TYPE/STATUS
HWRR-II Heavy water; LEU (3%), 15 MWt; operational.
China Institute for Atomic Energy, Under IAEA safeguards.
Tuoli, near Beijing
SPR IAE Pool, LW; LEU (10%), 3.5 MWt; operational.
China Institute for Atomic Energy,
Tuoli, near Beijing
SPRR-300 Pool, LW; LEU (10%), 3.7 MWt; operational.
Southwest Research Institute,
Chengdu, Sichuan
Tsinghua Pool Pool, two cores, LW; LEU (10%), 2.8 MWt; operational.
Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology,
Tsinghua University, Beijing
PPR Pulsing Reactor Pool, HEU (20%), 1 MWt; operational.
Nuclear Power Institute of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan
U R A N I U M E N R I C H M E N T
Heping Uranium Enrichment Plant, Gaseous diffusion plant: estimated to produce 750-2950 kg HEU/yeare;
Heping, Sichuan operational.
Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex, Gaseous diffusion plant: estimated to produce at least 150-330 kg HEU/yearf;
Lanzhou, Gansu operational.g
Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex, Gaseous diffusion plant: new cascade under construction, for LEU export.h
Lanzhou, Gansu
China Institute of Atomic Energy, Laboratory-scale gaseous diffusion: developed enrichment process later
Tuoli, near Beijing installed at Lanzhou.
Russian-supplied centrifuge enrichment plant, Large-scale centrifuge enrichment facility; under construction;j capacity:
Chengdu, Sichuani 200,000 SWU/yr.
P L U T O N I U M R E P R O C E S S I N G k
Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex Large-scale reprocessing plant, capacity: 300-400kg Pu/yr, and pilot
(Plant 404), reprocessing plant (both use PUREX method); and Nuclear Fuel Processing
Subei, Gansu Plant for refining plutonium into weapons-usable metals.
Plant 821, China’s largest plutonium separation facility, capacity: 300-400 kg Pu/yr.
Guangyuan, Sichuan
Nuclear Fuel Component Plant (Plant 812), Plutonium fuel rod fabrication, and plutonium production and processing for
Yibin, Sichuan nuclear weapons; operating.
Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex, Pilot spent fuel reprocessing plant, nominal capacity of 100 kg/heavy metal
Lanzhou, Gansu per day; under construction, completion in 2000.l
U R A N I U M P R O C E S S I N G
Nuclear Fuel Component Plant (202), Fuel rod fabrication; operating.
Baotou, Nei Mongolia province
Nuclear Fuel Component Plant (Plant 812), Fuel rod fabrication; operating.
Yibin, Sichuan
Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, Nuclear Fuel Processing Plant: Converts enriched UF6 to UF4 for shaping into
(Plant 404), Subei, Gansu metal; operational.
66 TRACKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

NAME/LOCATION
OF FACILITY TYPE/STATUS
T R I T I U M , L I T H I U M D E U T E R I D E ,
A N D B E R Y L L I U M
Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metal Research Institute China’s main research and production site for beryllium.
(Plant 905),
Helan Shan, Ningxia
Nuclear Fuel Component Plant (Plant 202), Tritium, Li-6 deuterium production; operational.
Baotou, Nei Mongolia
Nuclear Fuel Element Plant (Plant 812), Probable production of tritium and Li-6 deuterium.
Yibin, Sichuan
Abbreviations:
HEU 4 highly enriched uranium
LEU 4 low-enriched uranium
nat. U 4 natural uranium
MWe 4 millions of watts of electrical output
MWt 4 millions of watts of thermal output
KWt 4 thousands of watts of thermal output
NOTES (China Chart)

Principle sources for this chart: Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse. Nuclear Weapons Databook V ( Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Nuclear Engineering International: World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1997; “Datafile: China,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 1993, pp. 16-22; John Wilson and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press for Stockholm Peach Research Institute International, 1997); International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, December 1995; Wisconsin Project, “Nuclear profile: China,” Risk Report, November 1995, pp. 3-9.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_Ch03Chinamap.pdf

***

State Key Laboratory of Nuclear Physics & Technology
Peking University

History & Today of the Laboratory

The research of nuclear physics and technology has long history at Peking University. In 1955 the first education unit for nuclear science in China was founded at Peking University, which is well known as the Department of Technical Physics, Peking University later. There are total 13 academicians in more than 5000 graduates of that department. In 1990 the Key Laboratory of Heavy Ion Physics, Ministry of Education (MOE) was established at Peking University, which is the predecessor of our State Key Laboratory of Nuclear Physics and Technology. Great progress has been made on the scientific research and graduate student training since then.

The laboratory has made great efforts to introduce and foster the qualified scientists, so the research team has been optimized continuously. The laboratory also readjusted the research directions dynamically, strived for undertaking the major and key national projects actively, and did our best to form ourselves distinguishing feature and to promote the research level. In recent years the research activities of the laboratory have been organized into four directions, i.e. the radioactive nuclear beam physics, the hardon physics, the advanced particle accelerator techniques and the applications of nuclear technology. During the past ten years the permanent staff of the laboratory won the National S&T Advancement Award, the MOE S&T Advancement Award, and the Beijing City S&T Award many times. They published quite a lot of papers with high quality, including 5 papers on Physical Review Letters. Professor Chen Jiaer was elected as the President of Executive Council, Chinese Physical Society in 1999-2003 and the Vice-President of Executive Council, International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP) since 2005. Professor Ye Yanlin was elected as the Vice-President of Executive Council, Chinese Nuclear Physics Society since 2004. Professor Guo Zhiyu was elected as the Vice-President of Executive Council, Chinese Particle Accelerator Society since 2004. Professor Ye Yanlin and Professor Zhao Kui are principle investigators of two projects of National Basic Research Program (973).

The laboratory passed four national evaluations in 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2005, and obtained the grade “good” for all the evaluations, which is the best result among the laboratories belonging to the field of nuclear science. The laboratory was also evaluated by the Ministry of Education in 2004 and obtained the grade “excellent”. The main subjects of our laboratory, both Particle Physics and Nuclear Physics and Nuclear Technology and applications, were appraised as the State Key Disciplines in 2001 and again in 2006.

In the past two years the laboratory has experienced some important changes and is now on the way to become a State Key Laboratory based on the previous Key laboratory of the Ministry of Education. In addition the laboratory is closely related (overlapped) to the unique national education bases for basic science research with major in nuclear science. This is achieved due to the overall improvement of the situation for the nuclear science and technology in China, to the substantial progress of our research and education work and to the great effort and help from our colleagues around country.

Nuclear science in China seems experiencing a new “spring” in our society, due to the new public view and national need for nuclear power, nuclear security and nuclear technology applications. This overall situation has of course big impact to the upstream basic science research and especially the training of high level experts in the field. Establishment of the State Key Laboratory in this field will certainly help to satisfy the national and society need.

In Peking University the nuclear science research and education has more than 50 years history and has made substantial contribution to the nation’s nuclear cause. At the end of last century when the institutions related to nuclear science in the Chinese universities encountered difficulties to survive, Peking University had managed to keep the working teams and facilities at a moderate level. This turned out to be a wise choice and when the new phase of development comes in the new century we have been able to catch up in a rapid way. The laboratory has now developed into four divisions (directions) with good facilities. The research work of these divisions and their teams has largely been developed over past few years and are briefly demonstrated in this report.

Since 1990 this laboratory, as a MOE key laboratory, had been led by former director Prof. Chen Jiaer and then Prof. Guo Zhiyu, and has experienced several times the rigorous review by the Ministry of Science and Technology. The success in these reviews is essential to the step up to the state key laboratory. Over the years we have got so much helps from our colleagues in the related fields, especially those functioned in the previous and current scientific committee of the laboratory. We are so grateful to all of them and will in turn do our best to contribute to the long range development of nuclear science and technology in China.

Management

Honorary Director: CHEN, Jia’er, Academicain of CAS
Director: YE, Yanlin
Deputy Director: WAMG, Yugang; XU, Furong; LIU, Kexin

Scientific Committee

Honorary Chairman: FANG, Shouxian, Academician of CAS
Chairman: SHEN, Wenqing, Academician of CAS
Vice Chairman: CHAO, K.T, Academician of CAS CHAI, Zhifang; GUO, Zhiyu
Members:
DU, Xiangwan, Academician of CAE, CAEP
GUAN, Xialing, Professor, China Inst. of Atomic Energy
GU, Hongya, Professor, Peking Univ
LIU, Jiaqi, Academician of CAS, Inst. of Geology & Geophys
LIU, Weiping, Professor, China Inst. of Atomic Energy
MA, Boqiang, Professor, Peking Univ
MENG, Jie, Professor, Peking Univ
WANG, Keming, Professor, Shandong Univ
WANG, Yifang, Professor, Inst.of High Energy Phys
ZHANG, Chuang, Professor, Inst.of High Energy Phys
ZHAN, Wenlong, Academician of CAS, Inst. of Modern Phys

Scientific Consultants

CHEN, Jia’er, Academician of CAS, Peking Univ
FANG, Shouxian, Academician of CAS, Inst.of High Energy Phys
HU, Renyu, Academician of CAS, CAEP
QIAN, Shaojun, Academician of CAE, General Armament Department
WANG, Naiyan, Academician of CAS, China Inst. of Atomic Energy
ZHANG, Huanqiao, Academician of CAS, China Inst. of Atomic Energy
ZHUANG, Jiejia, Professor, Inst.of High Energy Phys

http://sklnpt.pku.edu.cn/english%20version/englishlast.htm

***

A
Yangbajing? – more info »
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From Panoramio Photos – By Baiyunhong????? – panoramio.com
C
yangbajing hot spring? – more info »
China?
YangBaJing hot spring 02. Photograph by N.Ming Wong. Misplaced? | Inappropriate | Comment it. Upload your photos » …
From Panoramio Photos – By N.Ming Wong? – panoramio.com
D
Tibet yangbajing? – more info »
China?
Tibet yangbajingthis is Yangbajing of tibet.
1 of 1 placemarks in Untitled Map? – bbs.keyhole.com
E
Yangbajing? – more info »
China?
2007-04-09 …
1 of 54 placemarks in Shigerus journeys? – By Nishimagi? – maps.google.com
F
Mountain behind Yangbajing? – more info »
China?
Mountain behind Yangbajing. Photograph by greenyoung. Misplaced? | Inappropriate | Comment it. Upload your photos »
From Panoramio Photos – By greenyoung? – panoramio.com
G
Yangbajing tunnel? – more info »
China?
The Yangbajing tunnel is the longest tunnel of some 3345-meters long of the Qingzang railway (Qinghai–Xizang railway) which links Xining with Lhasa …
en.wikipedia.org
H
???????(4300m):?????Highest hot spring on earth:Yangbajin Hot Spring? – more info »
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From Panoramio Photos – By ????? – panoramio.com
I
Lockheed Martin Corporation? – more info »
3251 Hanover St, Palo Alto, CA? – (650) 424-2000?
Write a review
“The purpose of this work is to search the data from Yangbajing neutron monitor obtained between 1998 October and 2000 June for the solar neutrons …”Error translating wanfangdata.com.cnwanfangdata.com.cn
J
University of Utah: Energy & Geoscience Institute (EGI)? – more info »
Ste 300, 423 Wakara Way, Salt Lake City, UT? – (801) 581-5126?
Write a review
“The Yangbajing geothermal field with the highest reservoir temperature in China is located about 90 km northwest to Lhasa City, capital of Tibet, …”Error translating wanfangdata.com.cn

http://maps.google.com/maps?oe=UTF-8&sourceid=navclient&gfns=1&q=yangbajing&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&hl=en&tab=wl

***

(the above info was a result of looking up the place on the map where the facilities below are located, which is listed on the high energy physics labs for China, which I noted isn’t comprehensive understandably -)

Yangbajing International Cosmic Ray Observatory in Tibet

TEXT SIZE: A A A

Introduction

YBJ International Cosmic Ray Observatory is located at 90°26′E and 30°13′N in Yangbajing (YBJ) valley of Tibetan highland, near the cross point of Qinghai – Tibet and China – Nepal highways, and the Qinghai – Tibet railway (to be completed in 5 years), about 90 km away from the city of Lhasa. YBJ’s wide and flat topography, convenient traffic, scarce heavy snow, rich geothermal power source, about 4,000 residents and many neighboring institutions & services, make it the best site of high altitude observatory in the world.

YBJ Observatory was founded in 1990. It has hosted the Tibet ASγ Experiment (Sino-Japanese Cooperation) ever since. After 6 years’ preparation, the ARGO -YBJ Project (Sino-Italian Cooperation) started its detector installation in 2000. Both of them aim at the research of the origin of high energy cosmic rays, the GRB physics in high energy, the correlation between the movement of the Cosmic ray sun shadow and the solar/interplanetary magnetic field and solar activity, etc. Through the observation of air showers (AS) by AS array – a semi-full sky and continuous observation technique. Taking advantage of the YBJ high altitude, by increasing the density of scintillation detector, the ASγ Array has successfully observed γ rays from Crab Nebula and Mrk 501 (during its flaring period in 1997); by developing the traditional sampling AS array as a “carpet”, the ARGO-YBJ full coverage array is intended for exploring the approximately 100 GeV uncultivated land and measuring the antiproton/proton ratio by cosmic ray moon shadow.
Beside the AS array, neutron monitor and neutron telescope have been available for solar and hiliosphere study. Along with the further development of the observatory, the existing detectors will be upgraded and more new type detectors adopted.

Sino – Japanese Cooperation on AS and Solar Neutron Experiment

The purpose of this cooperative experiment is as follows:

1) to search and monitor the Gamma ray sources with the energy threshold of 3TeV.

2) to study the configuration and variation of the solar and interplanetary magnetic fields under the influence of the solar activity by monitoring on time variation of the Sun shadows of cosmic rays.

3) energy spectrum around the composition study and the “knee” of primary cosmic rays.

4) to monitor the time variation of cosmic rays with the energy larger than 14 GeV detect the solar proton and neutron events and study the solar modulation of galactic cosmic rays and the production process of high energy particles in solar flares or CMEs.

Taking part in this international cooperation on the Chinese side are the Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP), CAS Center for Space Science and Applied Research, CAS; Shandong University; Southwest Jiaotong University; Tibet University and Yunnan University with Professor Youheng Tan being the spokesman, on the Japanese side are Hirosaki University; Utsunomiya University; Saitama University; Shibaura Institute of Technology; University of Tokyo; Tokyo Metropolitan College of Aeronautical Engineering; National Institute of Information; Waseda University; Kanagawa University; Yokohama National University; Shonan Institute of Technology; Nagoya University and Konan University with Professor Toshinori Yuda being the spokesman.

Sino–Italian International Cooperation on ARGO-YBJ Experiment

ARGO-YBJ (Astroparticle – physics Research at Ground-based Observatory Yangbajing) Experiment is to be carried out at high altitude YBJ Observatory which boasts a 5000 m² full coverage carpet-like RPC array to realize the low threshold energy high sensitivity detection of the primary γ-ray and cosmic ray particles. The RPC array covers a vast range of sky (-10°<δ<70°) and energy region (10GeV-100TeV) with the ground based full time duty AS array technique. Such characters can be vividly depicted with the mythological monster of ARGO, who has many eyes and never sleeps.
The ARGO -YBJ project was launched by Chinese and Italian scientists in 1994. Their common efforts led to the successful testing of 50m² RPC carpet at YBJ in the winter season of 1997/1998 and the conclusion of the official agreement between the two governments of China and Italy on this cooperation in 1998. A 10,000 m² ARGO hall was accomplished in YBJ Observatory in 2000, thus making possible for the installation of RPC and electric network to start. According to schedule, the whole carpet will be completed and put into operation in 2003.

Research Goals

Based on the low energy threshold (~100GeV), high sensitivity (~0.1 of Crab flux) and a fine granularity space-time picture of shower front provided by the YBJ high altitude and the full coverage detector array, the following scientific goals will be achieved:

1) Gamma-ray astronomy: Continuous monitoring of the γ-ray sources in the northern sky at a 100 GeV threshold energy to bridge the “satellite regime” to the multi-TeV region by a full time and wide FOV detector, with a sensitivity ~1/10 Crab flux. More attention will be paid to about 100 GeV and several 10 TeV region, where either it is the region which has never been explored before or the region where a γ-ray source corresponding to a UHE hardron acceleration site can be found out;

2) Diffuse –γ rays: From the Galactic plane, molecular clouds and Supernova Remnants at 3100 GeV have never been observed so far;

3) Gamma ray burst physics: Extending the satellite measurements over the full GeV/TeV range;

4) Antiproton/proton ratio measurement: At about 1 TeV (inaccessible to satellites), with a sensitivity adequate to distinguish between models of local (galactic) proton production and model accounting for an extragalactic origin;

5) Sun and heliosphere physics, including cosmic ray modulation at about 14 GeV threshold energy, continuous monitoring of the interplanetary magnetic field on monthly scale, detection of high energy Gamma and neutron flares;

6) Detailed study of air shower in the energy range of 1012-1015 eV, including the fine structures of air shower and some peculiar features in the extreme forward region of UHE interaction, based on the unprecedented details of individual air showers recorded by ARGO-YBJ carpet;

7) Measurement of the primary proton spectrum: In the 10 – 200 TeV region, the traditional balloon experiment regime, with much smaller error bars and a sensitivity sufficient to detect a possible change of the proton energy spectrum.

Taking part in this collaboration on the Chinese side are the Institute of High Energy Physics, CAS; Center for Space Science and Applied Research, CAS; Shandong University; Southwest Jiaotong University; Tibet University and Yunnan University, with Professor Tan Youheng being the spokesman of the Chinese side. Taking part in this collaboration on the Italian side are INFN and Lecce University; INFN and Napoli University; INFN Section of Napoli and University of Salerno; INFN Section of Napoli and University of Sonnio, Benevento; INFN and University Roma “Tor Vergata”; INFN and University “Roma Tre” Roma; INFN and Institute of Cosmogeo Physics of CNR, Torino; INFN Section of Catania and Institute of Physics of Cosmic and IFCA/CNR,Palerno and INFN Section of Pavia, with Professor Benedetto D’Ettorre Piazzoli being the spokesman of the Italian side

http://english.ihep.cas.cn/rs/fs/200907/t20090708_22258.html

***

Introduction

YBJ International Cosmic Ray Observatory is located at 90̊26′E and 30̊13′N in Yangbajing (YBJ) valley of Tibetan highland, near the cross point of Qinghai – Tibet and China – Nepal highways, and the Qinghai – Tibet railway (to be completed in 5 years), about 90 km away from the city of Lhasa. YBJ’s wide and flat topography, convenient traffic, scarce heavy snow, rich geothermal power source, about 4,000 residents and many neighboring institutions & services, make it the best site of high altitude observatory in the world.

YBJ Observatory was founded in 1990. It has hosted the Tibet AS? Experiment (Sino-Japanese Cooperation) ever since. After 6 years’ preparation, the ARGO -YBJ Project (Sino-Italian Cooperation) started its detector installation in 2000. Both of them aim at the research of the origin of high energy cosmic rays, the GRB physics in high energy, the correlation between the movement of the Cosmic ray sun shadow and the solar/interplanetary magnetic field and solar activity, etc. through the observation of air showers (AS) by AS array – a semi-full sky and continuous observation technique. Taking advantage of the YBJ high altitude, by increasing the density of scintillation detector, the AS? Array has successfully observed ? rays from Crab Nebula and Mrk 501 (during its flaring period in 1997); by developing the traditional sampling AS array as a “carpet”, the ARGO-YBJ full coverage array is intended for exploring the approximately 100 GeV uncultivated land and measuring the antiproton/proton ratio by cosmic ray moon shadow.
Beside the AS array, neutron monitor and neutron telescope have been available for solar and hiliosphere study. Along with the further development of the observatory, the existing detectors will be upgraded and more new type detectors adopted.

Institute of High Energy Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences 30/08/02

http://www.ihep.ac.cn/english/YBJ-E/index.htm

***

http://www.ihep.ac.cn/english/YBJ-E/as%20experiment.htm

Sino – Japanese Cooperation on AS and Solar Neutron Experiment
The purpose of this cooperative experiment is as follows:

1) to search and monitor the Gamma ray sources with the energy threshold of 3TeV.

3) energy spectrum around the composition study and the “knee” of primary cosmic rays.

Taking part in this international cooperation on the Chinese side are the Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP), CAS; Center for Space Science and Applied Research, CAS; Shandong University; Southwest Jiaotong University; Tibet University and Yunnan University with Professor Youheng Tan being the spokesman, on the Japanese side are Hirosaki University; Utsunomiya University; Saitama University; Shibaura Institute of Technology; University of Tokyo; Tokyo Metropolitan College of Aeronautical Engineering; National Institute of Information; Waseda University; Kanagawa University; Yokohama National University; Shonan Institute of Technology; Nagoya University and Konan University with Professor Toshinori Yuda being the spokesman.

Institute of High Energy Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences 30/08/02

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